Sally Marks provides a compelling analysis of European diplomacy between the First World War and Hitler's advent. She explores in clear and lively prose the reasons why successive efforts failed to create a lasting peace in the interwar era. Building on the theories of the first edition - many of which have become widely accepted since its publication in 1976 - Marks reassesses Europe's leaders of the period, and the policies of the powers between 1918 and 1933, and beyond.
Strongly interpretative and archivally based, The Illusion of Peace examines the emotional, ethnic, and economic factors responsible for international instability, as well as the distortion of the balance of power, the abnormal position of the Soviet Union, the weakness of France and the uncertainty of her relationship with Britain, and the inadequacy of the League of Nations. In so doing, the study clarifies the complex topics of reparations and war debts and challenges traditional assumptions, concluding that widespread western devotion to disarmament and dedication to peace were two of several reasons why democratic statesmen could not respond decisively to Hitler's threat. In this new edition Marks also argues that the Allied failure to bring defeat home to the German people in 1918-19 generated a resentment which contributed to interwar instability and Hitler's rise.
This highly successful study has been thoroughly revised and updated to reflect the latest scholarship. Now in its second edition, it remains the essential introduction to the tense political and diplomatic situation in Europe during the interwar years.
Marks describes in detail the drawn-out negotiations surrounding the unevenly applied and much revised Versailles Treaty. She identifies the issue of reparations as a major contributor to the complexity and difficulty of the post-war settlement.
Contrary to what I was taught in high school about the effects of reparations on the German economy as a cause of the rise of fascism, Marks says that the reparations were quite light, and mostly not paid. It was a subject of loud complaint, however.
A nuanced look at the complacency and idealism which led the leaders of Western Europe to fool themselves into thinking the resolution of World War I would bring humanity into an enduring era of unprecedented peace and good feeling among all the nations of Europe, and the slow, gradual process by which that illusion would be inadvertently and deliberately torn down in the years leading up to the Second World War. Though Marks is obviously trying to prove a point with her book and therefore is not entirely fair in her appraisal of the facts, she nonetheless does a good job explaining the various trends which led to the propping up of this idealistic belief that this truly had been the "war to end all wars" and its enshrinement in the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations. The interwar era was one of almost unprecedented stupidity and weakness in the diplomatic offices of the victorious Western powers, and Marks carefully traces the mistakes and misconceptions which led to the erosion of the strong position carved out by the victor powers after the German surrender in 1918. Recommended to anyone interested in the interwar diplomatic history of Europe, but would advise further background reading to get a better sense of the whole story.
Sally Marks combines astute analysis with the even rarer qualities of remarkable clarity and conciseness. Examining the period from starting from the end of the First World War to the End of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazi Germany, Marks examines International Relations during that era and hypothesizes why no lasting peace could be created.
Interesting, in-depth analysis that is easy to comprehend even by someone with little background knowledge of the international relations field at the time