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Cehaleti Anlamak
Cehalet, basit bir bilgi eksikliğinden daha fazlasıdır. Neden mi?
Günümüzde cehalet oldukça revaçta. Politikacılar, “Sonuçta ben bir bilim adamı değilim ya,” diyerek argüman sunuyor. Öfkeli vatandaşlar, Latince bir deyim duyduklarında hemen karşı çıkıyorlar: Burası Amerika, Meksika’da ya da Latin Amerika’da yaşamıyoruz! Uzmanlık değil de deneyim eksikliği bir yeterlilik hâline geliyor. Kabul gören sahte haberler ve yinelenen yanlışlıklar sarsılmaz inançlara dönüşüyor. Amerikan hükümeti ve tarihine ilişkin cehalet öylesine endişe edici durumlara varmakta ki ideal bir kültürlü vatandaş fikri artık garip karşılanıyor. Komplo teorileri ve yanlış bilgi serpilip budaklanıyor. Yaşadığımız çağın ismi Bilgi Çağı olabilir ancak hiç de öyle yeterli bilgilendiriliyor gibi görünmüyoruz.
Filozof Daniel DeNicola bu kitapta cehaletin keşfine çıkıyor. Cehaletin bolluğu, dirayeti ve neden olduğu sonuçlar üzerine derin bir gözlem sunuyor. Cehaleti anlamayı hedefliyor ki bu hedef en başta paradoksal görünüyor. Bilinmeyen nasıl olup da bilinir kılınır ve hâlâ bilinmeyen olma özelliğini sürdürür?
DeNicola cehaletin bir eksiklik ve boşluktan fazlası olduğunu, bilgi ile dinamik ve karmaşık etkileşimlerde bulunduğunu öne sürüyor.
Daniel R. DeNicola, felsefe profesörüdür. Gettysburg Koleji’nde “Renklerin Felsefesi”, “Yerlerin Felsefesi” gibi üst düzey felsefe dersleri vermiştir. DeNicola, “Cehaleti Anlamak” adlı kitabıyla 2018 yılında Amerikan Yayıncılar Birliği’nden PROSE ödülünü almıştır.
Günümüzde cehalet oldukça revaçta. Politikacılar, “Sonuçta ben bir bilim adamı değilim ya,” diyerek argüman sunuyor. Öfkeli vatandaşlar, Latince bir deyim duyduklarında hemen karşı çıkıyorlar: Burası Amerika, Meksika’da ya da Latin Amerika’da yaşamıyoruz! Uzmanlık değil de deneyim eksikliği bir yeterlilik hâline geliyor. Kabul gören sahte haberler ve yinelenen yanlışlıklar sarsılmaz inançlara dönüşüyor. Amerikan hükümeti ve tarihine ilişkin cehalet öylesine endişe edici durumlara varmakta ki ideal bir kültürlü vatandaş fikri artık garip karşılanıyor. Komplo teorileri ve yanlış bilgi serpilip budaklanıyor. Yaşadığımız çağın ismi Bilgi Çağı olabilir ancak hiç de öyle yeterli bilgilendiriliyor gibi görünmüyoruz.
Filozof Daniel DeNicola bu kitapta cehaletin keşfine çıkıyor. Cehaletin bolluğu, dirayeti ve neden olduğu sonuçlar üzerine derin bir gözlem sunuyor. Cehaleti anlamayı hedefliyor ki bu hedef en başta paradoksal görünüyor. Bilinmeyen nasıl olup da bilinir kılınır ve hâlâ bilinmeyen olma özelliğini sürdürür?
DeNicola cehaletin bir eksiklik ve boşluktan fazlası olduğunu, bilgi ile dinamik ve karmaşık etkileşimlerde bulunduğunu öne sürüyor.
Daniel R. DeNicola, felsefe profesörüdür. Gettysburg Koleji’nde “Renklerin Felsefesi”, “Yerlerin Felsefesi” gibi üst düzey felsefe dersleri vermiştir. DeNicola, “Cehaleti Anlamak” adlı kitabıyla 2018 yılında Amerikan Yayıncılar Birliği’nden PROSE ödülünü almıştır.
319 pages, Paperback
Published January 1, 2018
41 people are currently reading
334 people want to read
About the author
Daniel R. DeNicola
4 books5 followersDaniel DeNicola is a Professor of Philosophy at Gettysburg College in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. For ten years (1996-2006), he was Provost of Gettysburg College; he then served a year as Vice President for Program Development, leading both the Eisenhower Institute and the Leonard Bernstein Center for Learning. In earlier years, he had been Provost at Rollins College, where he had also chaired the Department of Philosophy and Religion. He has held visiting appointments at Harvard University and at Lancaster University (UK). He has led a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar on John Stuart Mill.
Professor DeNicola focuses on aspects of epistemology, philosophy of education, theories of the emotions, and theoretical and applied ethics. He teaches upper division courses, such as 'Choice, Chance, Luck, and Fate'; 'Emotion'; 'Philosophy of Place'; 'Ethics & Economic Life'; and 'The Philosophy of Color'. He has twice taught the Senior Seminar in Philosophy on the topic of 'Ignorance'. Previously, he taught First-Year Seminars, such as 'Designer Genes' and the 'Ethics of Human Enhancement' and 'Secrets and Lies'. He served as Director of the Gettysburg London Seminar in 2013. Currently, he serves as Chair of the Department of Philosophy.
Professor DeNicola focuses on aspects of epistemology, philosophy of education, theories of the emotions, and theoretical and applied ethics. He teaches upper division courses, such as 'Choice, Chance, Luck, and Fate'; 'Emotion'; 'Philosophy of Place'; 'Ethics & Economic Life'; and 'The Philosophy of Color'. He has twice taught the Senior Seminar in Philosophy on the topic of 'Ignorance'. Previously, he taught First-Year Seminars, such as 'Designer Genes' and the 'Ethics of Human Enhancement' and 'Secrets and Lies'. He served as Director of the Gettysburg London Seminar in 2013. Currently, he serves as Chair of the Department of Philosophy.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
August 2, 2019
Knowing the Unknown
If there is a better book on the subject of ignorance - I do not know what it is. ;-)
If there is a better book on the subject of ignorance - I do not know what it is. ;-)
May 10, 2026
Ignorance.
One touchy subject.
We are tackling this from a philosophical point of view— Agnoiology.
In common parlance, the appellation of “ignorant” is typically employed as a derogatory remark. This designation implicitly asserts a stance of superiority, suggesting that “I know that which they do not, plus I know that they do not know it.”
All too frequently, ascriptions of ignorance and stupidity are employed to deprecate and further marginalize minorities. To declare, "He is ignorant," can function as a form of verbal epistemic shaming and a subtle assertion of authority. The term "ignorance" acquires its intensity from its pejorative implications, particularly within the framework of historical Western culture. Classical Western traditions valorized knowledge as a virtue and regarded ignorance as a defect in need of redress. Socrates and Plato espoused the extreme view that every vice and societal malady can be traced back to ignorance.
To discuss ignorance, we must first delineate its definition. In some cases, it is hard to differentiate ignorance from stupidity and unreason, despite their discrete meanings.
Ignorance is, in common usage, a lack of knowledge. Stupidity denotes intellectual torpor, indicative of either an inherent incapacity for learning or a chronic indifference to it. While stupidity undeniably contributes, to make rife stupidity the single, simple explanation for a culture of ignorance is overly reductive and unfairly dismissive. Unreason encompasses irrationality, including intentional but self-defeating actions or the espousal of contradictory beliefs. Ignorance is remediable; stupidity is in corrigible. One can be ignorant without being stupid or irrational, though stupidity inexorably engenders ignorance. Irrationality often stems less from ignorance and more from acting antithetically to knowledge, though willful ignorance can itself be irrational.
We are said, to exist within a knowledge society in the midst of the Information Age.
In our hands, we wield diminutive devices that afford us unparalleled access to a monumental compendium of human understanding. But our era has also been labeled the Age of Ignorance, a confounding paradox that warrants deeper contemplation.
In a culture of ignorance, appalling ignorance not only flourishes, it is flaunted, even celebrated. It becomes an ideological stance. The tenacious strain of anti-intellectualism in North American society is well chronicled. It manifests in the disparagement of "book learning," a distorted skepticism towards orthodox views, the elevation of "my common sense" above specialized knowledge, a proclivity for conspiracy theories on a wide range of subjects, and a rural antipathy toward urban existence and its mores. This populist sentiment has long pervaded public discourse. While it may occasionally be motivated by genuine intellectual inquiry, it is often marred by individuals who perversely revel in their own ignorance. In certain instances, this attitude may be rooted in class antagonism, a form of ressentiment directed at intellectual elites, but more commonly, it represents a defensive stance shaped by religious or ideological convictions. Frequently, a disdain for commonly accepted knowledge is buttressed by claims of “private”, “special” insights into "the real truth" insider knowledge of conspiracies, information available only to the initiated, or truths "revealed" to individuals. But such claims to esoteric knowledge by the supposedly savvy are merely forms of ignorance in elaborate disguise.
Today, their number is legion. They are not benignly eccentric; they shape public discourse. Nowadays we have wasted too much time, energy, and capital battling willful ignorance: "Vaccinations cause autism." "The Barth is 2,000 years old and Neanderthals roamed with dinosaurs." "The wild winter in my state disproves global warming." "The Sandy Hook massacre never happened." Such assertions epitomize a deliberate ignorance and a rejection of the possibility of error. Advocates of these views assert their "right to believe," but with no recognizing of the responsibilities for their beliefs. Many refuse to acknowledge any evidence that contradicts their cherished beliefs about policies, practices, and individuals. This phenomenon is currently captured by the internet slang term "derp." When such willful ignorance gains influence, it hampers not only the resolution of social issues but even the recognition of these issues as problems. So why did this happen?
Understanding Ignorance by Daniel R. DeNicola is philosophical take on the study of ignorance, some refers to Agnoiology, a quixotic quest sprung from a paradoxical idea. The book is structured around four spatial metaphors, each aligning with a core section of the text: (i) place, (ii) boundary, (iii) limit, and (iv) horizon. I will provide a concise overview of DeNicola’s key arguments, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, before delving more deeply into two of the text’s more philosophically significant components. Yes, you can tell that I already have an opinion about this book.
In “Ignorance as Place”, DeNicola juxtaposes Plato's Allegory of the Cave with the biblical Garden of Eden to elucidate divergent historical perspectives on the notion that, to varying extents, we all "reside in ignorance." Across two chapters, he expounds upon a range of research and presents myriad examples to substantiate the argument that ignorance is too intricate to be perceived solely in a negative or positive framework. Alongside some introductory discourse on the repercussions of ignorance for both society and individuals, this approach establishes the project's premise: ignorance transcends mere deficiency in knowledge, and comprehending it is crucial for grasping the human condition.
The core of the work is found in “Ignorance as Boundary”, where four chapters delve into subjects ranging from the architecture and origins of ignorance to its connections with epistemic virtues and vices, as well as the ethics of belief. Noteworthy in this section is an effective cartography metaphor that highlights the interplay between knowledge and ignorance: they mutually shape each other, their boundary is often indistinct and fluid, and it can emerge through natural or contrived means. The author also presents an inventory of empirical and philosophical research on various forms of intentional ignorance (e.g., strategic ignorance, willful ignorance, forbidden knowledge) and epistemic injustice. However, the analysis includes a somewhat idiosyncratic characterization and critique of "mainstream" epistemology, and a discussion of the virtues and vices of ignorance that, while promising, falls short of expectations. I will revisit both points below.
In “Ignorance as Limit”, DeNicola seeks to delineate the various constraints on knowledge and their origins, spanning from contingent biological aspects of humanity to conceptual considerations surrounding the very feasibility of omniscience. The book proceeds to catalogue several key mechanisms for addressing ignorance, including superstition, ritual, behavioral economics, and institutional design. While the arguments presented are generally persuasive and supported by a wealth of intriguing references, the discussion remains somewhat cursory. For instance, the text devotes only a single paragraph to empirical research on decision-making under uncertainty, touches briefly on the necessity of juxtaposing descriptive work with a normative framework for managing ignorance, and laments the limitations of rational choice theory due to its "simplistic and controversial" assumptions. These are indeed compelling topics and assertions. However, while an exhaustive analysis of each is not expected within the scope of this project, the treatment given leaves the reader uncertain about the takeaways. Those unfamiliar with empirical research and rational choice theory might find themselves unclear about the significance of these claims, whereas those well-versed in the subject may perceive the discussion as adding little to existing discourse.
However, in “Ignorance as Horizon”, DeNicola does clarify the project’s significant contributions to the literature, which are meta-epistemological in nature. Specifically, the discussion aims to critique "mainstream" epistemology and advocate for its expansion in various ways. Some of DeNicola’s claims are convincing, such as the notion that the study of ignorance will both benefit from and enrich developments in various epistemological sub-disciplines (e.g., social, feminist, knowledge-first). His focus on ignorance itself is commendable. Nevertheless, the critique of 'standard Anglophone epistemology' (196) is based on a somewhat limited interpretation, as many key advancements in epistemology since the 1970s—such as reliabilism, virtue epistemology, work on testimony, contextualism, and other sub-disciplines—are not considered "mainstream." Consequently, it is not always clear what DeNicola's actual targets are, and despite the revisionary stance, the proposed expansion amounts to a modest call for greater emphasis on inclusive investigations of epistemic phenomena.
I have some complaints. DeNicola critiques the binary disjunctive view of knowledge, which posits a stark divide between knowing and not knowing. He proposes a spectral view, suggesting knowledge exists on a continuum of epistemic states. However, his rationale for this shift appears insufficiently developed, often glossing over critical distinctions. DeNicola argues that the disjunctive view conflicts with the vague boundary between knowledge and ignorance. Yet, his focus on entire bodies of knowledge rather than individual instances leaves unclear how this vagueness challenges the disjunctive perspective. Furthermore, his criticism regarding the view's inability to address levels of consciousness or borderline knowledge seems addressable through established distinctions like propositional versus non-propositional knowledge. While DeNicola may be correct that the disjunctive view is flawed, his argument does not convincingly support this claim.
Overall it was still a nice read. What is going on in today's culture of ignorance is complicated. It extends beyond widespread, egregious ignorance; it involves the skepticism of mainstream sources of information and the dismissal of rational considerations in belief formation. It seems to abandon institutions and hard-won standards of knowledge that have served us since the Enlightenment, that have brought us the living conditions we enjoy today. Paradoxically and oddly, individuals often reject scientific knowledge while simultaneously utilizing the technologies it has spawned. Evidence and conclusions are accepted selectively, cherry picked, if I may, usually to align with intractable ideological commitment.
The Impact of Ignorance discounts the value and authority of expertise in favor of collective opinion. The empty "right to believe" has not emerged with the corresponding responsibilities for the consequences of our beliefs. Social critics identified many possible precipitating conditions of this culture: the thrall of fundamentalist religion and partisan political ideology; postmodern deconstructions of institutions and ideals, including truth and reason; the conflation of news and entertainment and misdirected attempts to offer "balanced" coverage by the media; the seduction of virtual reality; the corruption of pure science by "sponsored" research and profit motives; "the silence of the rational center, and many other ingenious and plausible candidates. Today, our ignorance can be perpetuated by user-preference technology. Whatever our beliefs, we may enjoy a cozy echo chamber in which we receive only the news, opinions, music, and voices we prefer. Ideas that might challenge our views never reach us. Whatever its causes, the culture of ignorance reflects an elevation of will over reason, the loss of a credible concept of objectivity, and a radical change in democratic epistemology.
I’m an ignorant motherfucker. Calling ignorance by its name can be good. Acknowledging one's ignorance and the possibility of being wrong is the first step to an open mind. Understanding ignorance is cognitively healthy, so if you’re a bit intrigued to learn about the philosophical study of ignorance, pick up this book.
One touchy subject.
We are tackling this from a philosophical point of view— Agnoiology.
In common parlance, the appellation of “ignorant” is typically employed as a derogatory remark. This designation implicitly asserts a stance of superiority, suggesting that “I know that which they do not, plus I know that they do not know it.”
All too frequently, ascriptions of ignorance and stupidity are employed to deprecate and further marginalize minorities. To declare, "He is ignorant," can function as a form of verbal epistemic shaming and a subtle assertion of authority. The term "ignorance" acquires its intensity from its pejorative implications, particularly within the framework of historical Western culture. Classical Western traditions valorized knowledge as a virtue and regarded ignorance as a defect in need of redress. Socrates and Plato espoused the extreme view that every vice and societal malady can be traced back to ignorance.
To discuss ignorance, we must first delineate its definition. In some cases, it is hard to differentiate ignorance from stupidity and unreason, despite their discrete meanings.
Ignorance is, in common usage, a lack of knowledge. Stupidity denotes intellectual torpor, indicative of either an inherent incapacity for learning or a chronic indifference to it. While stupidity undeniably contributes, to make rife stupidity the single, simple explanation for a culture of ignorance is overly reductive and unfairly dismissive. Unreason encompasses irrationality, including intentional but self-defeating actions or the espousal of contradictory beliefs. Ignorance is remediable; stupidity is in corrigible. One can be ignorant without being stupid or irrational, though stupidity inexorably engenders ignorance. Irrationality often stems less from ignorance and more from acting antithetically to knowledge, though willful ignorance can itself be irrational.
We are said, to exist within a knowledge society in the midst of the Information Age.
In our hands, we wield diminutive devices that afford us unparalleled access to a monumental compendium of human understanding. But our era has also been labeled the Age of Ignorance, a confounding paradox that warrants deeper contemplation.
In a culture of ignorance, appalling ignorance not only flourishes, it is flaunted, even celebrated. It becomes an ideological stance. The tenacious strain of anti-intellectualism in North American society is well chronicled. It manifests in the disparagement of "book learning," a distorted skepticism towards orthodox views, the elevation of "my common sense" above specialized knowledge, a proclivity for conspiracy theories on a wide range of subjects, and a rural antipathy toward urban existence and its mores. This populist sentiment has long pervaded public discourse. While it may occasionally be motivated by genuine intellectual inquiry, it is often marred by individuals who perversely revel in their own ignorance. In certain instances, this attitude may be rooted in class antagonism, a form of ressentiment directed at intellectual elites, but more commonly, it represents a defensive stance shaped by religious or ideological convictions. Frequently, a disdain for commonly accepted knowledge is buttressed by claims of “private”, “special” insights into "the real truth" insider knowledge of conspiracies, information available only to the initiated, or truths "revealed" to individuals. But such claims to esoteric knowledge by the supposedly savvy are merely forms of ignorance in elaborate disguise.
Today, their number is legion. They are not benignly eccentric; they shape public discourse. Nowadays we have wasted too much time, energy, and capital battling willful ignorance: "Vaccinations cause autism." "The Barth is 2,000 years old and Neanderthals roamed with dinosaurs." "The wild winter in my state disproves global warming." "The Sandy Hook massacre never happened." Such assertions epitomize a deliberate ignorance and a rejection of the possibility of error. Advocates of these views assert their "right to believe," but with no recognizing of the responsibilities for their beliefs. Many refuse to acknowledge any evidence that contradicts their cherished beliefs about policies, practices, and individuals. This phenomenon is currently captured by the internet slang term "derp." When such willful ignorance gains influence, it hampers not only the resolution of social issues but even the recognition of these issues as problems. So why did this happen?
Understanding Ignorance by Daniel R. DeNicola is philosophical take on the study of ignorance, some refers to Agnoiology, a quixotic quest sprung from a paradoxical idea. The book is structured around four spatial metaphors, each aligning with a core section of the text: (i) place, (ii) boundary, (iii) limit, and (iv) horizon. I will provide a concise overview of DeNicola’s key arguments, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, before delving more deeply into two of the text’s more philosophically significant components. Yes, you can tell that I already have an opinion about this book.
In “Ignorance as Place”, DeNicola juxtaposes Plato's Allegory of the Cave with the biblical Garden of Eden to elucidate divergent historical perspectives on the notion that, to varying extents, we all "reside in ignorance." Across two chapters, he expounds upon a range of research and presents myriad examples to substantiate the argument that ignorance is too intricate to be perceived solely in a negative or positive framework. Alongside some introductory discourse on the repercussions of ignorance for both society and individuals, this approach establishes the project's premise: ignorance transcends mere deficiency in knowledge, and comprehending it is crucial for grasping the human condition.
The core of the work is found in “Ignorance as Boundary”, where four chapters delve into subjects ranging from the architecture and origins of ignorance to its connections with epistemic virtues and vices, as well as the ethics of belief. Noteworthy in this section is an effective cartography metaphor that highlights the interplay between knowledge and ignorance: they mutually shape each other, their boundary is often indistinct and fluid, and it can emerge through natural or contrived means. The author also presents an inventory of empirical and philosophical research on various forms of intentional ignorance (e.g., strategic ignorance, willful ignorance, forbidden knowledge) and epistemic injustice. However, the analysis includes a somewhat idiosyncratic characterization and critique of "mainstream" epistemology, and a discussion of the virtues and vices of ignorance that, while promising, falls short of expectations. I will revisit both points below.
In “Ignorance as Limit”, DeNicola seeks to delineate the various constraints on knowledge and their origins, spanning from contingent biological aspects of humanity to conceptual considerations surrounding the very feasibility of omniscience. The book proceeds to catalogue several key mechanisms for addressing ignorance, including superstition, ritual, behavioral economics, and institutional design. While the arguments presented are generally persuasive and supported by a wealth of intriguing references, the discussion remains somewhat cursory. For instance, the text devotes only a single paragraph to empirical research on decision-making under uncertainty, touches briefly on the necessity of juxtaposing descriptive work with a normative framework for managing ignorance, and laments the limitations of rational choice theory due to its "simplistic and controversial" assumptions. These are indeed compelling topics and assertions. However, while an exhaustive analysis of each is not expected within the scope of this project, the treatment given leaves the reader uncertain about the takeaways. Those unfamiliar with empirical research and rational choice theory might find themselves unclear about the significance of these claims, whereas those well-versed in the subject may perceive the discussion as adding little to existing discourse.
However, in “Ignorance as Horizon”, DeNicola does clarify the project’s significant contributions to the literature, which are meta-epistemological in nature. Specifically, the discussion aims to critique "mainstream" epistemology and advocate for its expansion in various ways. Some of DeNicola’s claims are convincing, such as the notion that the study of ignorance will both benefit from and enrich developments in various epistemological sub-disciplines (e.g., social, feminist, knowledge-first). His focus on ignorance itself is commendable. Nevertheless, the critique of 'standard Anglophone epistemology' (196) is based on a somewhat limited interpretation, as many key advancements in epistemology since the 1970s—such as reliabilism, virtue epistemology, work on testimony, contextualism, and other sub-disciplines—are not considered "mainstream." Consequently, it is not always clear what DeNicola's actual targets are, and despite the revisionary stance, the proposed expansion amounts to a modest call for greater emphasis on inclusive investigations of epistemic phenomena.
I have some complaints. DeNicola critiques the binary disjunctive view of knowledge, which posits a stark divide between knowing and not knowing. He proposes a spectral view, suggesting knowledge exists on a continuum of epistemic states. However, his rationale for this shift appears insufficiently developed, often glossing over critical distinctions. DeNicola argues that the disjunctive view conflicts with the vague boundary between knowledge and ignorance. Yet, his focus on entire bodies of knowledge rather than individual instances leaves unclear how this vagueness challenges the disjunctive perspective. Furthermore, his criticism regarding the view's inability to address levels of consciousness or borderline knowledge seems addressable through established distinctions like propositional versus non-propositional knowledge. While DeNicola may be correct that the disjunctive view is flawed, his argument does not convincingly support this claim.
Overall it was still a nice read. What is going on in today's culture of ignorance is complicated. It extends beyond widespread, egregious ignorance; it involves the skepticism of mainstream sources of information and the dismissal of rational considerations in belief formation. It seems to abandon institutions and hard-won standards of knowledge that have served us since the Enlightenment, that have brought us the living conditions we enjoy today. Paradoxically and oddly, individuals often reject scientific knowledge while simultaneously utilizing the technologies it has spawned. Evidence and conclusions are accepted selectively, cherry picked, if I may, usually to align with intractable ideological commitment.
The Impact of Ignorance discounts the value and authority of expertise in favor of collective opinion. The empty "right to believe" has not emerged with the corresponding responsibilities for the consequences of our beliefs. Social critics identified many possible precipitating conditions of this culture: the thrall of fundamentalist religion and partisan political ideology; postmodern deconstructions of institutions and ideals, including truth and reason; the conflation of news and entertainment and misdirected attempts to offer "balanced" coverage by the media; the seduction of virtual reality; the corruption of pure science by "sponsored" research and profit motives; "the silence of the rational center, and many other ingenious and plausible candidates. Today, our ignorance can be perpetuated by user-preference technology. Whatever our beliefs, we may enjoy a cozy echo chamber in which we receive only the news, opinions, music, and voices we prefer. Ideas that might challenge our views never reach us. Whatever its causes, the culture of ignorance reflects an elevation of will over reason, the loss of a credible concept of objectivity, and a radical change in democratic epistemology.
I’m an ignorant motherfucker. Calling ignorance by its name can be good. Acknowledging one's ignorance and the possibility of being wrong is the first step to an open mind. Understanding ignorance is cognitively healthy, so if you’re a bit intrigued to learn about the philosophical study of ignorance, pick up this book.
August 31, 2024
Understanding ignorance delves into the concept of ignorance not just as lack of knowledge but as a complex phenomenon that influences our thoughts, behaviors, and social structures.
The book categorizes ignorance into different types, such as intentional ignorance, socially constructed ignorance, and systemic ignorance. DeNicola discusses how ignorance can be harmful, but also how it can be a natural and sometimes necessary part of human existence. The book also explores how ignorance can be maintained or challenged in various contexts, including education, politics, and ethics.
It was a good 3.5.
The book categorizes ignorance into different types, such as intentional ignorance, socially constructed ignorance, and systemic ignorance. DeNicola discusses how ignorance can be harmful, but also how it can be a natural and sometimes necessary part of human existence. The book also explores how ignorance can be maintained or challenged in various contexts, including education, politics, and ethics.
It was a good 3.5.
July 27, 2020
A nimble and wide-ranging philosophical exploration of ignorance that is accessibly written. See my full review at https://inquisitivebiologist.com/2018...
Read
February 28, 2020153.4 D394 2017
January 9, 2025
This was okay. I loved the concept and inquiry but I’m not sure I learned a lot that was new or non-obvious.
May 11, 2025
"Masumların masumiyetini korumak masum olmayanlara düşer." s.80
October 15, 2020
«الجهل »
الجهل منتشر. إنه موجود في كل مكان ، والشك في هذه الحقيقة يعني أن نخاطر بأن نتهم بالجهل . في الاستعارة المألوفة ، جهلنا (سواء كان فرديًا أو جماعيًا) هو بحر شاسع لا يسبر غوره. معرفتنا مثل جزيرة صغيرة غير آمنة. حتى الخط الساحلي غير مؤكد: يشير كل من تاريخ الجنس البشري والأبحاث النفسية إلى أننا نعرف أقل مما نعتقد. في الواقع ، جهلنا واسع النطاق إلى أبعد من تقديرنا.
الجهل يدوم ، ويستمر. أوه ، قد تهدأ هشاشته الواضحة ، كما في سخرية أوسكار وايلد التي كثيرًا ما يتم الاستشهاد بها: "الجهل مثل فاكهة غريبة حساسة ؛ المسها و سوف يختفي بريقها " يتلاشى ويختفي بمجرد لمسة من التعلم. ولكن ، على الرغم من زوالها ، فإن الجهل لا يتعرض للخطر. قد تكون أزهاره حساسة ، لكن بعض أنواعه شديدة الصلابة . على الرغم من انتشار التعليم الشامل والإلزامي ؛ على الرغم من الأدوات الجديدة للتعلم والتقدم الكبير في المعرفة ؛ على الرغم من الزيادات المذهلة في قدرتنا على تخزين وفرة من المعلومات والوصول إليها ومشاركتها - على الرغم من كل ذلك ، يزدهر الجهل.
قد يتساءل المرء لماذا يحدث هذا؟. هل يزدهر الجهل لأننا ، حسنًا ، جاهلون جدًا؟ هل يمكننا ببساطة أن نفتقر إلى المعرفة الكافية - أو المعرفة الصحيحة - لدحر موجة الجهل؟ ربما يكون استمراره انعكاسًا لحالتنا الساقطة ، أو ضعف إرادتنا المخزي ، أو خطيئة الكسل المعرفي. هل الجهل مثل قذارة العالم ، التي تقاوم بعناد جهودنا الدؤوبة لتطهيرها تمامًا ، والتي ستبقى معنا إلى الأبد؟ أو ما هو أسوأ من ذلك ، هل من الممكن أن يزيد التعلم في الواقع من جهلنا - مثل تنظيف وصمة عار ، تنتشر أكثر مع كل محاولة للقضاء عليها؟ أصبحت الفكرة مبتذلة: كلما عرفنا أكثر ، عرفنا أننا لا نعرف. هل يمكننا حقًا أن نكون نحن من صنعنا جهلنا؟ مثل هذا الاجترار ، مثل جميع الأسئلة ، يعبر عن الرغبة في الفهم ، والتي ، من سخرية القدر ، لا يمكن أن تنشأ إلا داخل ومن الجهل. الجهل هو مصدر وهدف مثل هذه الأسئلة.
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Daniel R DeNicola
Understanding Ignorance
Translated By #Maher_Razouk
الجهل منتشر. إنه موجود في كل مكان ، والشك في هذه الحقيقة يعني أن نخاطر بأن نتهم بالجهل . في الاستعارة المألوفة ، جهلنا (سواء كان فرديًا أو جماعيًا) هو بحر شاسع لا يسبر غوره. معرفتنا مثل جزيرة صغيرة غير آمنة. حتى الخط الساحلي غير مؤكد: يشير كل من تاريخ الجنس البشري والأبحاث النفسية إلى أننا نعرف أقل مما نعتقد. في الواقع ، جهلنا واسع النطاق إلى أبعد من تقديرنا.
الجهل يدوم ، ويستمر. أوه ، قد تهدأ هشاشته الواضحة ، كما في سخرية أوسكار وايلد التي كثيرًا ما يتم الاستشهاد بها: "الجهل مثل فاكهة غريبة حساسة ؛ المسها و سوف يختفي بريقها " يتلاشى ويختفي بمجرد لمسة من التعلم. ولكن ، على الرغم من زوالها ، فإن الجهل لا يتعرض للخطر. قد تكون أزهاره حساسة ، لكن بعض أنواعه شديدة الصلابة . على الرغم من انتشار التعليم الشامل والإلزامي ؛ على الرغم من الأدوات الجديدة للتعلم والتقدم الكبير في المعرفة ؛ على الرغم من الزيادات المذهلة في قدرتنا على تخزين وفرة من المعلومات والوصول إليها ومشاركتها - على الرغم من كل ذلك ، يزدهر الجهل.
قد يتساءل المرء لماذا يحدث هذا؟. هل يزدهر الجهل لأننا ، حسنًا ، جاهلون جدًا؟ هل يمكننا ببساطة أن نفتقر إلى المعرفة الكافية - أو المعرفة الصحيحة - لدحر موجة الجهل؟ ربما يكون استمراره انعكاسًا لحالتنا الساقطة ، أو ضعف إرادتنا المخزي ، أو خطيئة الكسل المعرفي. هل الجهل مثل قذارة العالم ، التي تقاوم بعناد جهودنا الدؤوبة لتطهيرها تمامًا ، والتي ستبقى معنا إلى الأبد؟ أو ما هو أسوأ من ذلك ، هل من الممكن أن يزيد التعلم في الواقع من جهلنا - مثل تنظيف وصمة عار ، تنتشر أكثر مع كل محاولة للقضاء عليها؟ أصبحت الفكرة مبتذلة: كلما عرفنا أكثر ، عرفنا أننا لا نعرف. هل يمكننا حقًا أن نكون نحن من صنعنا جهلنا؟ مثل هذا الاجترار ، مثل جميع الأسئلة ، يعبر عن الرغبة في الفهم ، والتي ، من سخرية القدر ، لا يمكن أن تنشأ إلا داخل ومن الجهل. الجهل هو مصدر وهدف مثل هذه الأسئلة.
.
Daniel R DeNicola
Understanding Ignorance
Translated By #Maher_Razouk
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