Are We Bodies or Souls?

by Richard Swinburne

What are humans? What makes us who we are?

Many think that we are just complicated machines, or animals that are different from machines only by being conscious. In Are We Bodies or Souls? Richard Swinburne comes to the defence of the soul and presents new philosophical arguments that are supported by modern neuroscience. When scientific advances enable neuroscientists to transplant a part of brain into a new body, he reasons, no matter how much we can find out about their brain activity or conscious experiences we will never know whether the resulting person is the same as before or somebody entirely new. Swinburne thus argues that we are immaterial souls sustained in existence by our brains. Sensations, thoughts, and intentions are conscious events in our souls that cause events in our brains. While scientists might discover some of the laws of nature that determine conscious events and brain events, each person's soul is an individual thing and this is what ultimately makes us who we are.

Genres: Philosophy, Theology, Religion

208 pages, Hardcover

Published October 1, 2019

About the author

Richard G. Swinburne is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. Over the last 50 years Swinburne has been a very influential proponent of natural theology, that is, philosophical arguments for the existence of God. His philosophical contributions are primarily in philosophy of religion and philosophy of science. He aroused much discussion with his early work in the philosophy of religion, a trilogy of books consisting of The Coherence of Theism, The Existence of God, and Faith and Reason.

Reviews

[Amora · Rating 4 out of 5]

Swinburne refines Descartes’ original argument for souls in a way that avoids a number of common objections. I spent a good deal thinking about what objections to throw at Swinburne’s amended argument but all the objections I could think of he took down with ease. So far, this has been the best book I’ve read on Cartesian dualism!

[Nikki · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was hoping for something a little more accessible. This is a true philosophical analysis (which means it's quite tedious and dull). Nevertheless, I'm glad that I persisted simply to have a more detailed understanding of Swinburne's concept of the soul and how it's differentiated from the body/brain.

[AH · Rating 4 out of 5]

I enjoyed reading this book and even sharing it with my friends, that being said, my expectations for this book were much much more higher. I was hoping for something close to the genius of Swinburne's other works but I have to admit a bit torn apart between 3 stars and 4 stars. Consider my rating 3.5
I will write a proper review in future. For now I have to just mention that I was expecting some reasoning on the reliability of our intuitions and our introspections on these matters.

[Aran Joseph · Rating 3 out of 5]

For Philosophers and the Philosophically Inclined

Are We Souls presents a series of arguments that human beings are not purely material but also consist of an immaterial component traditionally called the soul. In Swinburne’s account, there are events in the brain that impinge upon the soul as well as a soul able to direct the brain.

From a philosophical perspective the arguments are interesting. If the material brain is the seat of identity then who is the new person formed when a futuristic brain donor gives each of their hemispheres to two different donees? Do we have a natural grasp of a personal identity theoretically distinct from a body which is inaccessible to public scrutiny?

While there are counter-arguments to Swinburne’s claims (wouldn’t any animal with two brain hemispheres be susceptible to such transplantation questions even though we wouldn’t think of them as having souls? Didn’t Wittgenstein point out the fallacy of the Cartesian cogito by pointing out that the I is a learned phenomena—something which modern neuroscience has confirmed?) I am certain that Swinburne would have counter-replies in turn.

My major objection to the work is not then that it doesn’t advance philosophical discussion but that it ignores the real reasons modern people tend not to believe in a soul. When, in evolutionary history, did this immaterial soul come to exist? If we know that injuries to various parts of the brain inhibit proper functioning what does the soul do that isn’t accounted for by different brain regions?

In short, Swinburne has written a book for philosophers and the philosophically inclined that does raise provocative questions about the existence of a soul. But it doesn’t even address the larger reasons most academics find such reasoning archaic. Recommended if you find contemporary philosophy interesting and germane. For those merely intellectually interested in this question, I would recommend another perspective.

[Gavin Brand · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although a deep philosophical dive not aimed at the average person interested in the topic, this book makes a great contribution to the debate between various forms of physicalism and substance-dualism. Swinburne argues for a Cartesian form of substance-dualism and applies a very helpful distinction between uninformative and informative designators to get out of one of the classic objections to Descartes argument. Additionally, he attempts to strengthen Descartes original argument by adding an amended second premise, amended lemma, and an amended conclusion (see page 78-79).

The book also went on to discuss some implications of his argument as well as some suggested theories for the interactions of souls and bodies (chapter 6) and some suggested directions and limitations for scientific further investigations into the soul (chapter 7).

Overall I found his arguments convincing but am unsettled by some of the implications of his argument. I look forward to hearing responses and objections to his argument.

[Jacques · Rating 2 out of 5]

I found this difficult to follow. To my untrained mind, a lot of the technical language seemed unnecessary. He is not very kind to the reader with the way he phrases things, for example:

"A law of nature is a general principle which determines that all events of some type (that is, all events of substances having a certain collection of properties) cause (of physical necessity or with a certain physical probability) an event of some other type (that is, an event of a substance having a certain different collection of properties, or a substance of a certain type coming into existence or ceasing to exist)."

Or

"Hence there are metaphysically impossible/necessary sentences (and so propositions which the sentences express) which are not logically impossible/necessary; and there are logically possible sentences (and so propositions which the sentences express) which are not metaphysically possible."

[David Diaz · Rating 3 out of 5]

This exposition on the mind-body problem is well worth the read. The early chapters lay out the key terms and definitions necessary to follow the discussion of this topic, while the latter chapters reveal the author’s own views and conclusions. Swinburne has a “dry” style of writing but is such an innovative and detailed thinker that he is always provides a substantial set of ideas.

If you are Beginning a study the mind-body literature, I recommend starting with the following books:
1. Philosophy of Mind: A Beginners Guide by Edward Feser;
2. The Mind-Body Problem by Jonathan Westphal (this is an excellent, brief primer on the subject);
3. The Soul: How we Know It’s Real and Why It Matters, by J. P. Moreland;
4. Am I Just My Brain?, written by Sharon Dirckx; and,
5. In Search of the Soul: Four Views of the Mind-Body Problem, by Joel B. Green (ed.).

[Christopher · Rating 3 out of 5]

Great analysis. Richard is a world class scholar. This puts forward the standard case for the the soul. However, one can question the reliance on thought experiments. For this problem, the reader should consult Kathleen Wilkes' book Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments for a penetrating critique. I would take a slightly different approach and argue for Hylomorphic Dualism from Biological Structure and from the problems with reductive physicalism. For that approach, I recommend William Jaworski's work.

Despite these differences, I highly recommend this work from one of the best philosophers of religion.

[David Kemp · Rating 2 out of 5]

Keeping in mind, that when you read a book you are saying "No" to reading every other book in existence, read this book only if:

(1) You understand it has nothing to do with faith and religion
(2) You are adapt at reading college-level philosophical and scientific writings
(3) You are really interested, theoretically, in the question: "Are we bodies or souls?"

If the answer to all three is yes, knock yourself out, it would be worth your time. If not, there may be better options for using up your limited reading hours.

[Lucas G. · Rating 3 out of 5]

Overall this is an interesting and challenging read. For those who are seriously interested in philosophy of mind, this book deserves a spot in their library. But it is not for the faint of heart. Many pages need to be read multiple times in order to fully grasp the train of thought being put forth. With that said, I wouldn’t ultimately call the arguments in this book convincing to the average person. This is not because they are obviously flawed, but because they are incredibly detailed, and if any component is missed the conclusions can be hard to understand. But this is to be expected since Are We Bodies or Souls? is a work of pure philosophy of the highest caliber. So whomever reads this book ought to know what he or she is in for already. 

Read my full review at:
https://apologetics315.com/2020/07/ar...

[YOYO · Rating 1 out of 5]

I was looking for some fresh grenades launched towards uberdominant dogma of materialism, but this guy looks at matter such as our bodies as something even lower than the worst of materialists...
And that edifice of logical reasoning he put together is as incontrovertible as a near death experience.
But if it is read as a joke at the expense of the dominant worldview, than it may deserve a smirk, inside your soul

[Austin Bradford · Rating 3 out of 5]

Pretty enjoyable for philosophy, I disagree with his claim that we are merely our souls but he is rather convincing

[rebecca · Rating 2 out of 5]

Tedious

[Bart Klink · Rating 2 out of 5]

What a disappointing book, especially from an eminent philosopher, published at OUP. Swinburne throughout the book simply *presupposes* the reliability of our dualist intuitions, but this is exactly what he has to show, for the (ontological) reductionist (i.e. identity theorist) rejects these intuitions. His arguments are therefore circular. Furthermore, the book contains a lot of wild speculations about how the soul is supposed to work and interact with the body. The chapter on the soul-body interaction doesn’t contain any explanation of how this magic should work. In the last chapter, he proposes that all kinds of new laws of nature are necessary for this interaction between the mental and the physical. The reductionist doesn’t need such extravagant new laws of nature, for which there is no evidence. I don’t get the impression Swinburne is aware of the modern defences of mind-brain identity, like the works of Dennett or the Churchlands. He also doesn’t seem to be aware of the relevant neuroscience (like the works of Stanislas Dehaene or Michael Graziano, although he mentions two theories in one small footnote) and ethology (like Frans de Waal). Substance dualism remains a weak position and isn’t taken seriously anymore in modern neuroscience. This unconvincing book by Swinburne, one of the best living philosophers of religion, confirms this judgement.

[Mark Livingstone · Rating 3 out of 5]

You need to be interested in philosophy to understand this book.