The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West

by David Kilcullen

A counterintuitive examination into how, and what, opponents of the West have learned during the last quarter-century of conflict.

Just two decades ago, observers spoke of the US as a "hyperpower"--a nation with more relative power than any empire in history. Yet as early as 1993, CIA director James Woolsey pointed out that although Western powers had "slain a large dragon" by defeating the Soviet Union, they now faced a "bewildering variety of poisonous snakes." In The Dragons and the Snakes , the eminent soldier-scholar David Kilcullen asks how, and what, opponents of the West have learned during the last quarter-century of conflict. Applying a combination of evolutionary theory and detailed field observation, he explains what happened to the "snakes"--non-state threats including terrorists and guerrillas--and the "dragons"--state-based competitors such as Russia and China. He explores how enemies learn under conditions of conflict, and examines how Western dominance over a very particular, narrowly-defined form of warfare since the Cold War has created a fitness landscape that forces adversaries to adapt in ways that present serious new challenges to America and its allies. Within the world's contemporary conflict zones, state and non-state threats have increasingly come to resemble each other, with states adopting non-state techniques and non-state actors now able to access lethal weapon systems once only available to governments. A counterintuitive look at a vastly more complex conflict environment, this book both reshapes our understanding of the West's adversaries and shows how we can respond given the increasing limits on US power.

Genres: Nonfiction, History, Military Fiction, Politics, China, War, Military History

336 pages, Hardcover

Published March 3, 2020

Reviews

[Murtaza · Rating 5 out of 5]

The primary national security challenge for the United States in the coming decades will be to manage its relative decline following the brief moment of superpower primacy it enjoyed at the end of the Cold War. To manage a new reality first of all requires a realistic accounting of threats and capabilities. This is something that is surprisingly hard to find as there are great political benefits to exaggerating both. This book is a refreshingly sober and informed overview of the national security environment that has emerged since the end of the unipolar moment. What makes it especially unique however is that this analysis is done from the perspective of someone who is both a military expert and an anthropologist, applying tools from the latter field to understand the former.

It used to be that non-state actors and states fought in ways that were clearly different. Over the past three decades however there has been a convergence. Today states often fight asymmetrically, utilizing stealth, deniability, pinpoint operations and various ambiguously-violent means of shaping the environment as opposed to marching large columns onto a battlefield. Meanwhile militant groups have been adapting many of the tactics and practices of states, learning from fighting the United States and other countries and copying some of their tactics and even aesthetics. In some cases these groups have even overreached by declaring themselves states themselves, as seen in the disastrous example of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Where effective, these changes on both sides have largely come as an adaptive response to a security environment defined by the United States. During the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, local militant groups were forced into a Darwinian battle for survival in which only the fittest and brutal actors survived. Militants who behaved in a way that got themselves killed ended up teaching their surviving comrades a lesson that they'd never forget. The U.S. quickly and effectively wiped out weaker and sometimes more conciliatory actors. But this often meant that the more ruthless, intelligent and capable counterparts could rise in their wake.

The violent Darwinian competition imposed by the U.S. military in the theaters that it operates has often been terrible for the local people living there. But it has also forged powerful and adaptive militant groups who have been shaped by their battles with the United States. The most notable extant example at the moment is probably the Afghan Taliban, which has been significantly transformed over 19 years of intense conflict and is now negotiating a peace deal likely to grant it an unprecedented degree of legitimacy.

One that I've often admired about analyses of sociological phenomena emanating from military sources is that they often exhibit a degree of precision lacking in other fields. This is because each death that takes place on a battlefield effectively serves as a painful lesson learned. Both armies and militant groups have learned many painful lessons over the past three decades. They’ve been honing their behavior accordingly. Following the Gulf War the United States solidified itself as the master of one particular style of war: direct confrontation with air power and armor. In response its rivals changed their own behavior to ensure that they never faced the U.S. military on turf that was so favorable to it. They have worked to fight on an asymmetric basis instead, moving the battle to terrain where the United States has been weaker like guerrilla insurgency, fighting using proxies, cyber warfare and legal and political measures. In this they have achieved considerable success, as evidenced by a string of strategic defeats suffered by the United States and a visible reduction in its power and influence.

This book condenses a lot of analysis of the military fitness and adaptation of Russia, Iran, North Korea and China, as well as non-state groups like al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Islamic State and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Like all of Kilcullen’s work it is refreshingly free of the politics and ideology that too often clouds the analysis that goes out to the general public. As an anthropological work this book leans heavily on biological metaphor to explain human behavior, but does so self-consciously and still nods towards ethical and moral considerations. I think it is useful to think at times about politics and military competition in Darwinian terms. The harsh truth is that humans learn and adapt in response to predatory environments and the experience of pain. So long as the stress that individuals and organizations experience does not take them past a point of collapse, it very often turns out to be constructive and ultimately makes them stronger and more adaptive.

As a powerful country the United States has inflicted a lot of harm on its enemies. In doing so it has often wound up making them tougher and more ruthless as a result. But the same evolutionary logic also works in reverse: fighting weaker enemies has also made the United States weaker. If it is to hold onto its relative civilizational primacy in the coming century it will have to rise to the challenge of combating enemies that have been watching, learning and developing means of fighting that are precisely calculated to avoid its strengths and hit it where it is weakest. Doing so will require a flexible method of warfare that keeps others distracted and off-balance, while giving the United States the greatest possible space to develop its own strengths at home. This book is an excellent starting point to think about how one might accomplish that.

[Scribe Publications]

Disturbingly brilliant. David Kilcullen, ever the thoughtful observer of wars and the people who wage them, captures the changes in warfare that already confound — and threaten to overwhelm us. He correctly shows that we are mentally and physically unprepared for the new nature of conflict, and will likely pay dearly for it.
Stan McChrystal, partner at McChrystal Group

David Kilcullen has produced another thoughtful, important book. At a time when some believe that the return of competition with great powers (i.e. dragons) might serve as an emotional cathartic to help forget the long war against jihadist terrorist organisations (i.e. snakes), the author exposes and transcends that false choice. His ideas about how to fight for peace in a dangerous world should be read and discussed not only by diplomats, defense officials, and military officers, but also by citizens concerned about securing a better future for their children.
H.R. McMaster, author of Dereliction of Duty and the forthcoming Battlegrounds

To absorb Kilcullen’s insights is to be forced to rethink national and international security in this new century and to adjust military and nonmilitary institutions to a host of new realities. Senior policymakers have no choice but to do so.
Gary Hart, member of United States Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees

An eye-opening look at the state of strategic balance between the United States and its rivals, large and small … The author delivers a detailed and unsettling analysis of how America’s rivals have adapted to the modern strategic landscape — and how they hope to defeat us. Essential reading for anyone concerned with America’s future on the world stage. STARRED REVIEW
Kirkus Reviews

This book should be read by everyone in uniform.
The Times

An impressive exposé on how terrorists and non-state actors outmanoeuvre conventional militaries … At the heart of The Dragons and the Snakes is a Darwinian dialectic between the mighty dragons and the snakes that seek to subvert and outflank them … The Dragons and the Snakes is based on a formidable array of military and political sources.
Malise Ruthven, The Financial Times

Interesting and provocative.
The Sunday Times

Kilcullen is a welcome guide, offering a neat summation of how both nation-states and terrorist groups alike learned to cope with America's conventional military primacy … Kilcullen's approach offers readers accessible insights into what are complex and dynamic trends.
Diplomatic Courier

David Kilcullen offers a wide ranging analysis of the strategic environment since 1993 ... compelling.
Will Leben, Australian Outlook

A dazzling performance ... This is a book that will keep you on your toes. It paints a breathtaking danger-laden picture of a world perennially at war, and of the strange and mesmerising process by which a snake eventually rears up, as fire-filled as a dragon.
Peter Craven, The Saturday Paper

Kilcullen argues persuasively that while the United States has been mired down in forever wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, our current and potential adversaries have gotten the jump on us. His book offers readers a skilfully annotated road map of contemporary conflict, describing in clear, measured prose how and why the days of American strategic and military preeminence are now behind us.
Daily Beast

Kilcullen’s The Dragons and the Snakes is a timely invitation for the West to get its strategic house in order with some new thinking.
The Bridge

An incisive work that has deservedly garnered a great deal of attention and is likely to be of enduring importance in debates about the decline of Western power.
RealClearDefense

Timely … This book should be essential reading for anyone concerned about America’s future and Australia’s place in the global order it created.
Peter Masters, Military Books Australia

[Sebastian Gebski · Rating 4 out of 5]

Pretty good synthesis of information related to the fall of Pax Americana. But 95%-focused on external factors and limited to highly visible military threats. So, what you can find here is the brief history and evolution of snakes (mostly terrorists who specialize in asymmetric warfare and guerilla warfare) and dragons (states, in particular - Russia, China, a bit of Iran, and N. Korea) - how they've raised to become a serious threat and (at least local) opponents who are not afraid of direct confrontation.

What you definitely WON'T find here are:
- internal issues that have undermined American military global superiority
- sociopolitical changes that have ended "The end of times"
- interviews/information that was not publicly available before (this book is just the synthesis)
- potential (possible) scenarios of confrontation

The book was published in 2020, so it's relatively fresh, but the world is spinning so fast these days that some chapters are more outdated than others (mostly Hezbollah and Russia).

What is interesting is that the author tries to remain as objective and cold-blood-analytic as possible, even on such topics as Russia's stance towards NATO expansion. Sadly, in some cases (like in the one mentioned), the analysis is too shallow and oversimplified. But some comments are spot on (e.g., the description of Russian activity in Georgia just after it regained independence - very direct and to the point).

In the end, it's quite a solid book, but I've expected to learn more by reading it.

[Nick Frazier · Rating 5 out of 5]

Military Adaptation

Great read on how societies/militaries take steps to defend themselves but frequently adapt from stress or observations. Without stress, they become complacent and risk being outclassed. Too much stress, and they risk organizational collapse.

Take the model and observe how the United States, Russia, and China perceive each other and attempt to adapt.

[WIlliam Gerrard · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of the very best books I have ever read. It is up to date material and full of cutting edge military theory and ideas and I believe is critical essential reading for any politician or military personnel, especially those who conduct their employment in the NATO led West. I am no stranger to Australian soldier-scholar David Kilcullen's work. This is the fourth book of his that I have read. This work surpasses the previous books and it is genuinely a masterpiece. What are the dragons and snakes? The dragons are the main, most powerful nation-state enemies. Russia and China are the main dragons and additionally we have Iran and North Korea who pose significant military threat and who are ideologically opposed to the West. The snakes are state and non-state actors. Less powerful nation states such as Iraq or Afghanistan and terrorist organisations and quasi nation jihadist states and their peripherals such as ISIS. Al Qaeda is a big snake, as is the Taliban as is Hezbollah and it is these snakes that have predominated active warfare measures from the USA and her allies in the post Cold War world. On the whole Kilcullen criticises Western military action in the recent past citing little evidence of genuine success. Traditional warfare and indeed highly technological modern military fighting that reached its zenith in the first Iraqi conflict of 1991 has been made redundant by adaptive enemies who have learnt how to successfully withstand dominance by coalition forces and have adapted techniques and tactics that have in effect neutralised our methods. While the world witnesses this stalemate between snakes and our armies the dragons have been sat watching, taking notes and suitably adapting their own military philosophies to take advantage of the new global environment. The way in which these dragons have re-emerged into active roles demonstrates new confidence and their upward projection into the future looks very daunting a positive to a fading Western democratic dominant imperialism. The main message of this book is that if we do not adjust ourselves and realign our military strategy we will ultimately face defeat and the political and economic collapse of our societies. When analysing the snakes we look in detail at various different organisations. 'Combat Darwinism' is an interesting scientific look at the decapitation of the snake that is Al Qaeda. Our strategic focus was to target leadership of this jihadist monster and every time a key leader was successfully culled a new hydra head on the snake was born and the enemy's success in adaptation, even though its movement may have come close to complete annihilation, meant that natural selection allowed the foe to fight again with even more strength and resurge. Often our own militaries pulled back from the precipice due to economic and political factors, allowing the necessary reformation space for the enemy. This has been a key part of analysis for the War on Terror. After 9/11 We succeeded in killing the likes of Osama Bin Laden and most of the rest of the leadership but 'The Base' movement just became a self-perpetuating force unto itself without traditional vanguard leadership and it morphed into other jihadist factions such as AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq) and ISIS, producing further problems. The very fact that today, The Taliban are back in government in Afghanistan demonstrates Combat Darwinism in effect and the future of global jihad seems to be a lasting phenomenon that will continue to plague the Western World for the foreseeable future. I found the case study of Hezbollah as it fights against Israel and later in Syria to have been very illuminating. Their adaptation and growth have demonstrated how a tactically weaker military force can survive, grow more powerful and be effective in the face of complicated battle odds. Looking at the snakes we see a new Russia under the autocratic reins of Vladimir Putin who is becoming ever more military active as his increasing hostility and delusion grows especially with the latest invasion of Ukraine. Liminal warfare tactics used by Russia introduce new elements to modern warfare against the West. Operating just below the detectable surface a combination of economic warfare, information warfare and cyberwarfare does just enough damage to Russian enemies without provoking military response. From cyberwarfare attacks in Estonia through to democratic election social media disinformation warfare during Trump election in USA or Brexit in the UK, Russia is undermining the West. Often it is different sides' different perceptions of what constitutes hostile actions or warfare that our polarised views can fail to distinguish. In the last days of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev received promises that NATO would not expand any further to the East yet Western leaders lied in these reassurances. Putin and the Russian military rightfully are concerned by any move that threatens their territorial integrity. Post communist oligarch capitalism and an easing of traditional espionage has allowed a traditionally focussed long term enemy to rebuild and rekindle its old hostilities to the West. The study of China illustrates again how economic and computer technologies can be used liminally to fight out societies. The Chinese military has slowly been rebuilding and modernising. Its Navy has emerged from nowhere and it has been encroaching on island chains in the South China Sea, building barriers that can be used as both defensive and offensive bases against any future major conflict. I was particularly pleased to see Kilcullen reveal the importance of the military theory work of PLA strategists, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. I have only recently read the 'Unrestricted Warfare' book that since its publication at the turn of the millennium, has been a core component of the People's Liberation Army's development. Although he sees some of the authors' ideas as pure paranoia and delusion this also demonstrates how perception on different sides can be very different. China has undoubtedly focussed very heavily on economic warfare and the fact the renminbi now underwrites the whole US economy and the globalisation of Chinese capital investment in key infrastructure such as ports or via tech firms such as Huawei is forecast by Qiao and Wang. The question is asked in that with China being so overexposed economically could mean that direct traditional military conflict could be less likely. The analyses of our enemies is concise and precise and unsettling. What are Kilcullen's answers to the posed dilemma? He admits that there are no obvious solutions and although it is clear that change has to occur and is likely to come on both sides, The West and the Dragons and Snakes, it is felt that a Byzantine approach to preservation of Empire is the best path forward. Acceptance of our fading power and influence yet also a pragmatic and sustaining approach to preserving and development our military, political and economic futures.

[Jessica Mae Stover]

So far in the intro chapters there are too many lists in the prose, i.e. listing examples in a sentence without grounding details and background, that it’s hard to retain in audio. In audiobook those paragraphs sound like powerpoint brain without the backing lecture/storytelling. Hopefully that doesn’t continue but so far it’s a main style the author is using. What’s up with the editor? Will update upon completion if I’m up for it.

Will note that Kilcullen to date is on the modern side of the reading list for any reader of war. You can see his influence via professorial syllabi in the US and via investigative reporters who cover armed conflict in situ and refer to his work on urban warfare (and perhaps use it to prepare before heading into war zones). His particular influential title to date is Out of the Mountains and in Dragons and the Snakes he is updating his analysis.

Anyone who follows headlines about cyberwar or the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting drone warfare will be able to recognize the concepts herein. I think as a society we are likely in some trouble with broad public understanding about the modern shape of war in the American mind due to the state of mass-broadcast war fiction, i.e. military-themed movies and television that depict industrial warfare, superior US high-tech warfare and throwback WWII dogfighting over and over again, and a narrow visual depiction—usually politicized—of what a terrorist looks like (maybe you caught the footage from J6) and a solider (maybe you watched former kindergarten teaches have to take down incoming attacks with RPG-style weapons in Ukraine?). And we’ve always been deluded about what battle is like and the aftermath of battle—the total breakdown of moral structure and obliteration of good for everyone involved—due to the same media and related myths. But if you know me and my work then you know I have long been banging this drum from the artist side of matters. ;-)

Note: Audiobook

2025

[Fox12345 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Це дуже сильна книга, яку я прочитала ще до повномасштабного вторгнення Росії в Україну. Вона про те, що ми думали, що "мир" буде безкінечним. В той час як Китай і Росія, дивились, вчились воювати на багатьох рівнях і в чому полягає небезпека. Цю книгу я б хотіла мати у власній бібліотеці.

[Scott Simpson · Rating 5 out of 5]

An engaging and enlightening read from Australia's own warrior-scholar. Typical of his other books, it's the small but significant details which makes this so valuable. His personal connection to the people doing the fighting is on display, as is his access to those in the high seats of power. It's a rare combination.

Kilcullen puts three decades of military and political history into an interesting context - we see the USA as the dominant world power, but he argues that they are only dominant in a very narrow military space. Adversaries have, either by direct conflict or observation, sought to compete in different spaces, rendering the military advantage less important.

The climax of the book is worth waiting for, and underscores the danger of assigning your assumptions to those of your adversary. We are at war, we just don't know it.

[Tav Harling · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mega read.
Kilkullen is a Australia's own warrior-sholar, and articulates three decades of politico-military strategy into enlightening context.

Weaves predator/prey convolution theories with 'liminal warfare' concepts. Compelling dialogue for the need to upgrade the western military model for a 'better peace'. He describes the effects of liberal military adventurisms of the west since the end of the Cold War and how maladaptive that model has now become. He proposes an interesting 'Byzantine model' for adaptive strategies geared towards long term competitiveness.

Kilkullen was my professor in a couple of masters units on contemporary strategy, he is probably the highest regarded Australian strategist currently in academia.

Warning: baseline military literacy is required prior to reading, as some concepts may be complex to the uninitiated.
5⭐️
Would recommend

[Dale · Rating 4 out of 5]

Always insightful writing from David Kilcullen. An easy read with very interesting concepts that are very germane to the current security environment the west find itself operating in.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a superb examination of the disconnect between America’s conception of our own superlative military capabilities and our adversaries’ understanding of how to fight us, not in battle, but in war. The eponymous dragons, Russia and China, while more or less at peace with the West since the end of the Cold War, have themselves been on a war footing and adapting to what they perceived as their pacing threat: the United States and its like-minded allies and partners in Europe and East Asia. At the same time, the titular snakes, which encompasses failing states, rogue states, and non-state actors, have been in direct confrontation and at war with the West for a quarter-century and learning and adapting along the way. By using the language of IR theory about innovation and adaption and combining it with Darwinian and anthropological terms, Kilcullen provides a helpful study of why our way is failing and how our adversaries are exploiting those failures.

First, adaptation and innovation are not the same thing. Adaptation is in direct response to a stimuli, often in wartime, sometimes after a loss, but always because of how an adversary is engaged against you. It is driven by the need to survive in a violent, resource- and time-deprived environment. Innovation is normally a peacetime activity, and is usually grounded in observation of how an adversary is fighting someone else or how they are arrayed against you. It is conceptually driven, and uses the time and space afforded by peace to get out in front of a battlefield challenge. It is not always successful, because unlike adaptation, testing is not always possible before the first shots ring out.

Second, Kilcullen’s use of evolutionary terms flows from that differentiation—most notably in how non-state actors approach the West. He looks at social learning—our adversaries observing or suffering failure, learning from it, and spreading the word within and across organizations, thus creating a military culture of sorts; natural selection—successful units learn, unsuccessful units are punished, and weaker states fight and learn on their own battlefields while stronger sides rotates in and out, losing some of that expertise; artificial selection—wherein changing patterns of prey (terrorists, for example) and predators (counter-terrorism forces and concepts, for example), lead to fluctuations and adaptation in the capabilities of the former [killing the leadership of terror groups, for example, culls inexperienced leaders at the start of a conflict who are replaced over “generations” by more savvy, more skilled, more experienced leadership]; and finally institutional adaptation—involving after action reports, lessons learned exercises, and the creation of formal doctrine.

Where the West comes into play is how it has sought to combat the snakes with one hand tied behind its back, a physical handicap of which the snakes are aware and plan according. The Western reliance on airpower in battle, combined with tight legal, political, and moral guidelines, provides space for the snakes to operate and weaknesses to exploit. The proliferation of smart consumer electronics has allowed a level of technological connectivity and expertise that at times rivals Western conventional capabilities. These three phenomena reward stealth, dispersion, political and media warfare, and autonomy, to name a few. These patterns are observable across different political, social, and geographical domains; Kilcullen looks at Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Lebanese Hezbollah, specifically.

The Dragons, on the other hand, are engaged in something else, but they have spent decades observing how the West has fought the snakes, and have innovated and adapted at different paces throughout the past 30 years. Russia, for instance, has engaged in “liminal warfare”, living close to the threshold of conflict, only crossing it when detection or attribution are challenging, and quickly dropping back below the threshold when observed. In short, Russia—a nuclear-armed state with strong conventional and nonconventional capabilities—is engaging in warfare that border militants would recognize in a different age. A dragon is behaving like a snake. Russia has learned profound lessons from its wars in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine over the past two decades. Indeed, the conflict in Ukraine is perhaps the most striking window into future warfare present in the world today. How NATO first understands the threat—how Russia seeks to manipulate questions of time, detectability, and attribution—will be critical to confronting it. A conflict with Russia will not be something out of Tom Clancy, but will much more complicated to observe, react to, and win in a time-constrained environment. Russia, it must be said, is exploiting the vertical aspect of conflict, seeking to remain below certain thresholds while acting offensively or kinetically.

China, the West’s largest geopolitical challenge of this century, has learned the lessons of the last 30 years differently. Unlike Russia, China has not had venues in which to adapt and learn from failure and success on the battlefield, but it would be a mistake to believe that China is not interested or engaged in conflict with the West (Trotsky, anyone?). China observed the West’s destruction of Saddam Hussein’s military twice in 12 years, and decided that they would not fight the United States in that kind of war. As such, their strategy of building island bases, exploiting new technologies, building robust missile and air forces capable of engaging at long ranges, and of exploiting questions of economics, law, technology, alliance-structures, and information, to name just a few, is stretching the horizontal aspect of conflict to involve areas that the West is unwilling to conceive. Kilcullen calls this “conceptual envelopment.” Thus, to the Chinese Communist Party, winning the leadership position of the U.N.’s standard-setting body for intellectual property was as important as commissioning a new class of warship (and something which the West was fortunately able to stop). Similarly, pouring $60 billion of investment into Pakistan is not just a means to a better economic future, but is an active means of preparing for and engaging in conflict with the United States in the Middle East and with their long-time rival India in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The danger for the West here is that China may be engaging in its own definition of war long before we are aware we are fighting. By the time we do, we may already be losing.

This just touches the surface of the many challenges, and fewer opportunities, which Kilcullen lays out. He provides several alternative solutions, ranging from poor to least-bad (by his own concession). But fundamentally he makes an important point about how the West fights. Our strength is not in our way of war, but in our way of battle. Our military capabilities are, as I said at the start, still superb, even if badly in need of improvement to face present and future challenges. Where we fail, and have done so regularly since the fall of the Soviet Union, is in our conception of war as best understood as a Clausewitzian exercise in national interest and political desire. Our failure to align battlefield success with political resolve, diplomacy and development, robust alliance commitments, and informational warfare is understood by our adversaries, who will continue to exploit the gaps. Figuring that problem out, which won’t be easy, is the first step in ensuring that we are up to the present challenge. Neither the dragons nor the snakes are going anywhere, and as they learn from one another and their models of warfare converge, understanding them better will be key. Kilcullen goes a long way in trying to solve that riddle here.

[Walter Qian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book on the security challenges America faces in the 21st centuries. Kilcullen dives in detail on how both nation state level actors (dragons) and guerilla forces (snakes) have evolved to challenge USA military supremacy in the traditional battle field. Well-cited and super easy to read, the book provides great historical context on the decline of the west in the past 30 years. Loved chapters 4 and 5 where the evolution of Russia and China are closely examined and the threats are laid out.

I would've liked to see more analysis into alternate battlefields. I felt the author could have expanded more on cyber, media, education, aid, etc as the contests between countries expands in the 21st century.

[Ed · Rating 5 out of 5]

A perceptive work that is rather worrying and alarming for our current world. Indeed, the chapter on non-state actors adapting akin to species under threat was fascinating as were the chapters on Sino- Russian moves to adapt and cherry pick the most effective methods employed by non-state actors coming into contact with the 'West'. Incredibly well written and accessible even if there was a fair undercurrent of foreboding with the conclusions made

[Tim G · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thorough and excellent examination of the unclear adversaries currently, facing the west. The collection of alarming, open sourced knowledge that is thoroughly explained through each of these chapters is confronting and compelling.
Growing non state and state actors from such traditional threats as Russia and China, are explored in depth, and due to their own previous miscalculations or shortfalls, "Where threats emanated mostly from week or failing states and from non-state actors (snakes) rather than from capable state adversaries (dragons)," and these actors have learned to adapt and grow in increasing threat.
All of this is articulated well by the author applying Darwinian and anthropologic terms, indicating how these varying state and non state actors have evolved, through deceptive tactics and while the west is distracted by weary, inconsequential never ending wars.
The authors own lengthy military experience, coupled with his government work, and with connections and networks still sound in both, allows the author the unique position. Not tied directly to either, but with first hand knowledge, really allows the author to provide such in depth, unbiased tactical insights, as well accurate predictions through on the ground knowledge and insight.
Overall the understanding that is gained from these chapters is second to none, and provides sound awareness of just how, "The adversary may be acting in ways it considers warlike, while we with our (the West) narrower notion of warfare remain blithely unaware of the fact, so that by the time we realise we are at war, we have already lost."

This is a worthy read, and really helps understand the current threats, through analysis and on the ground experience
Some stand out highlights,

'While those that exhibited strongly adaptive traits prospered and grew, surviving to pass their ideological and tactical DNA onto the next generation.'
'In Iraq, Abrams tanks worth nine millions dollars apiece were disabled by IED’s, at most, thirty bucks to make.'
'State adversaries took advantage of our tunnel vision on terrorists, and blindsided us with new subversive, hybrid, and clandestine techniques of war.'
'Social learning, along with natural selection, artificial selection, and institutional adaption, is the one of the four key dynamics that we can observe when watching how adaptive enemies adapt'
'Media manipulation – the ability to goad, provoke, or trick and adversary into inflicting disproportionate civilian casualties or property damage, and then exploit such errors through a manipulated media backlash.'

[Sinta · Rating 4 out of 5]

I believe Kilcullen’s thesis is true. I’m just not sure it’s unique to this period of history? Reading the list of things states do now that are supposedly the tactics of non-state actors - sponsorship of militias and guerillas, promotion of coups, application of propaganda, assassination of political opponents, election interference etc - just sounds like a list of things the U.S. has done for many decades to maintain its hegemony. I imagine that is probably true of other hegemonic powers too (though my history is too rusty to provide more examples)


It feel it is likely that non-state actors have also used tactics of the state in the past too. Surely any movement hoping for revolution or usurption of the state does?


Kilcullen’s strength is instead in his closer read of history - how the ‘dragons’ (Russia, China) are using particular tactics of the ‘snakes’ in new ways. And likewise for the ‘snakes’. He knows his shit. The concrete grounds his universal concepts in the particularities of the relevant historical moment and makes them insightful for now. Even if they don’t necessarily signal a complete paradigm shift, you still get a comprehensive idea of the specific developments and dynamics that shape “the west and the rest” up until 2020


Quotes:

convergent evolution, the way in which unlike actors confronting a similar environment can come to resemble each other.


And to be sure, ISIS provides a striking example of one of these ideas-the increasing adoption by nonstate actors of statelike tactics, techniques, and technologies.


ISIS thought of itself as a state, levying taxes, establishing civilian governance structures, selling electricity and water, and trading oil on the international market. It fought like a state, adopting conventional tactics borrowed from nation-state adversaries or derived from the large portion of its leaders trained in Soviet tactics under Saddam Hussein. It acquired tanks, artillery, at least a couple of working aircraft, rockets, and mortars, and sought to seize and hold cities and control populations using remarkably conventional means. Its strategy-which amounted to seizing and holding territory, then expanding that territory through conventional military conquest supported by guerrillas, terrorist cells, and subversion efforts in its enemies' hinterland-was entirely statelike. The group's horrific atrocities and its mastery of social media tended to distract from its utterly statelike strategic approach. And though ISIS was eventually defeated as a territorial entity—in part because of its insistence on conventional warfare and on continuing to hold cities and control populations rather than melting away, as a traditional nonstate actor might have done—it came terrifying close to success


If ISIS represented one-half of the equation, the other major developments of 2014-15-Russia's seizure of Crimea, its use of guerrillas and proxies in combination with conventional armored battlegroups to invade Ukraine, the shooting down of MH17, and direct military intervention in Syria-illustrated the other. For, clearly, Russian efforts were not solely conventional or statelike; on the contrary, just as ISIS borrowed techniques, organizations, and equipment from nation-states, Russia proved increasingly adept at drawing from the playbook of nonstate ac-tors. Sponsorship of militias and guerrilla groups (both in the physical world and via cyber militias and botnets online), the promotion of coups and separatist movements, the application of agitation and propaganda to destabilize adversaries, the manipulation of migration, the assassination of political opponents, the weaponization of energy supplies, and election interference all showed Russia's willingness to adopt the techniques of nonstate actors while pursuing nation-state objectives. The election of Donald Trump in the United States, Britain's vote to leave the European Union, Catalonian separatism in Spain, an attempted coup in Montenegro, and ongoing attacks on Russias neighbors in the Baltic and Caucasus regions all showed signs of increasingly active Russian political and information warfare. At the same time, the unveiling of a series of advanced new weapon systems and a newfound swagger in international affairs showed that Russia was back to stay.


If there is one takeaway from the chapters that follow, it is that the military model pioneered by US forces in the 1991 Gulf War —the high-tech, high-precision, high-cost suite of networked systems that won the Gulf War so quickly and brought Western powers such unprecedented battlefield dominance in the quarter century since then—is no longer working.

Our enemies have figured out how to render it irrelevant, have caught up or overtaken us in critical technologies, or have expanded their concept of war beyond the narrow boundaries within which our traditional approach can be brought to bear. They have adapted, and unless we too adapt our decline is only a matter of time.


Throughout this book, I use the capitalized term "Western" or "the West" to describe a particular military methodology, along with the group of countries whose warfighting style is characterized by that methodology. In essence, it is an approach to war that emphasizes battlefield dominance, achieved through high-tech precision engagement, networked communications, and pervasive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). It is characterized by an obsessive drive to minimize casualties, a reluctance to think about the long-term consequences of war, a narrow focus on combat, and a lack of emphasis on war termination-the set of activities needed in order to translate battlefield success into enduring and favorable political outcomes.


On 90’s lack of great power conflict / focus on disparate non-state conflict: In the same vein, a 1992 book on Australian defense strategy was titled Threats without Enemies, while in Europe the French theorists Loup Francart and Jean-Jacques Patry characterized military operations of that era as contre-guerre, "counter-war" —where the phenomenon of war itself (not a particular armed adversary) was the enemy and the fundamental goal was to end the conflict, not to win it."


Decade after 2003 - focus narrowed to terrorism, in particular salafi jihadism


But the need to apply military decision-making processes, designed for the ragon during the Cold War, to the post-9/11 snakes, led by default to two-ided adversarial planning: as the National Security Strategy conceptualized he environment, there was something called "terrorism" and its allies on one side, with "civilization" and its allies on the other. This in turn led to the notion of terrorists being organized, structured, and motivated by long-term strategic goals that were equivalent, though diametrically opposed, to ours. This planning construct, always artificial, proved increasingly hard to sustain over time.


The 2002 National Security Strategys legislative counterpart was the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorized the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons."' Nineteen years later, this 275-word resolution, passed by Congress only seven days after 9/11, following an extraordinarily brief debate-and with only two abstentions in the Senate and a single "nay" vote in the House of Representatives —remains the sole legal basis for an ongoing, worldwide, functionally unlimited campaign, a "forever war" against an ever-expanding collection of mutating groups most of which did not even exist on 9/11 and some of which-notably Islamic State—are active enemies of the groups the 2001 AUMF was designed to combat.


The combination of sophisticated air power, advanced armor, precision targeting, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and the integration of air, land, and sea capabilities into a networked system-of-systems had given the United States unprecedented battlefield dominance within one narrowly defined conventional form of warfare. The rapid, humiliating disintegration of Saddam's forces during the long-delayed re-match, in 2003, only underscored that lesson.

But by contrast, from the 2003 invasion onward, our ineffectual struggles to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan showed our adversaries exactly how to fight us—using a dynamic swarm of self-synchronized small groups, with lightly equipped, fast-moving irregular forces that operated in the shadows, staying below the detection threshold of our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, avoiding our major combat forces whenever possible, targeting the vulnerable populations and infrastructure we needed to protect, and attacking or subverting our (often unreliable) local partners. By taking the long view, avoiding our strongest units and most capable combat assets, and targeting the weakest links in our system (usu-ally civilian agencies, indigenous police, local government officials, and

at home), our opponents in these wars of occupation managed to evolve a form of protracted resistance warfare that enabled them to survive while running out the clock, waiting until our publics lost patience, our partners lost ground, and our politicians pulled out.

To borrow a term from US defense policy, our adversaries had adopted a suite of "offset strategies" to sidestep our conventional power


But while we were struggling to deal with these nonstate offset strategies, state adversaries were busy developing offset strategies of their own.

These included weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) designed to deter us from attacking them, along with disruptive technologies (laser systems, cyberweapons, thermobaric explosives, distributed command-and-control tools) that also aimed to render conventional forces irrelevant. Entire new classes of weapons— miniaturized non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) devices that could knock out all electronic systems within a specific distance, advanced chemical weapons with fearsome lethality and novel mechanisms of action, ballistic missiles that could target ships on the move at sea, and hypersonic missiles that could evade advanced air defenses—were all in the works.

While we were preoccupied with post-Cold War chaos in the 1990s and bogged down in the war on terrorism after 2001-beating the bushes to find the snakes-the dragons were watching and learning.


Iran's strategy was asymmetric because it would attack the U.S. consistently but at levels that would not trigger the U.S. to engage in a direct military response against Iran. The method of these attacks could be diplomatic, propaganda, financial sub-version, or support for terrorist proxies." The goal was to inflict enough pain to push the United States out of the Arabian Gulf, without prompting direct retaliation."

Iranian strategists were therefore some of the first to pursue what we might call a "liminal strategy" in relation to Western conventional power, seeking to ride the edge, doing just enough to frustrate the United States and further their own interests but not enough to trigger an outright military response.


We could also consider it a variation of the "selection-destruction cycle" advanced by the military sociologist Roger Beaumont in his seminal 1974 study of military elites. As Beaumont points out, one defining feature of specialized elite forces (mountain troops, rangers, special forces, elite light infantry, aircrew, submariners, and so on) is that they tend to select from the best available personnel-choosing fitter, more intelligent recruits with better leadership skills, initiative, and endurance than ordinary units do. They may even (as in Australian, British, and American special operations forces) recruit primarily from existing members of high-readiness units who themselves are already highly trained and subject to rigorous selection. But as Beaumont shows in a comprehensive study of twentieth-century elites, such forces also tend to have higher loss rates—they operate at the upper end of the stress bell curve. They are thrown into dangerous or demanding missions, experience higher than usual rates of death and wounding, and so erode more quickly than the

This selection-destruction cycle means that a force with too high a proportion of elites — an army with too many special forces units, a navy that diverts too many of its most aggressive junior commanders into the submarine arm, or an air force (like that of imperial Japan) with aircrew standards that prove unsustainable over a long war—can actually damage its adaptive potential. Such a force experiences a brain drain, where individuals who would have been leaders in regular units (and would likely have survived to spread their knowledge to others) are instead segregated into subgroups where, even if they survive, their talents are lost to the wider force. Meanwhile, major combat formations can cease to be much more than feeders for specialized units, providing the recruiting base for elite forces that increasingly usurp normal combat roles, exacerbating both the brain drain and the selection-destruction cycle that Beaumont describes.


Dunbar points out that human groups have "a distinctive layered structure with successive cumulative layer sizes of 15, 50, 150, 500 and 1500*31 and that this structure, which reappears in hunter-gatherer societies, offline and online social networks, campsites, kibbutzim, nomad bands, and subsistence villages, also seems to recur throughout history in military groups. This suggests that human organizations tend to fragment at distinct sizes, and Dunbar points out that "the question arises as to whether there are natural 'sweet spots' at which communities are likely to be more successful (i.e. survive longer without fissioning) because they map better onto natural grouping patterns and their underpinning psychology."


A fitness landscape maps all the potential combinations of characteristics for a given organism in that environment, so that any point on the landscape represents a particular combination.

The more adaptive (i.e., the more conducive to survival and success) a given combination turns out to be, the higher its elevation as plotted on the fitness landscape, making altitude a metaphor for fitness. Selection pathways—-the journeys toward greater fitness undertaken by evolving actors in the landscape—can thus be visualized as routes that climb upward to higher (more survivable) elevations, or fitness peaks.? There may be multiple peaks in a landscape-several distinct combinations that each offer significant advantages for a specific set of selective pressures. On rare occasions there may be a single peak only, representing a fitness terrain with just one optimal configuration. In other cases there are a great number of fitness peaks, so that the landscape (when plotted on a graph) looks like a hilly mountain range and is known as a rough or "rugged" fitness landscape.

Computer scientists and designers borrowed the notion of fitness landscapes from biologists to help them think about adaptation, innovation, and optimization strategies.'


The fitness landscape for adversaries (since the Cold War):

Air supremacy, but with severe limitations
Tightening self-imposed legal and political constraints
Omnipresenr surveillance, overwhelmed analysts
Proliferation of consumer smart systems (e.g., GPS, drones)


Adaptive traits of non-state groups:

Stealth
Dispersion
Modularity
Autonomy
Hiding in electronic plain sight
“Hugging” protected populations or systems opponents can’t disable
Media manipulation
Political warfare
Technology and connectivity hacking


Perhaps counterintuitively, effective air campaigns in fact rely heavily on capable ground forces, who play a crucial role in forcing enemies to concentrate (which ground troops must do to survive attack from another ground force), flushing them out of cover, or baiting them to draw them into the open, thereby creating targets that can be seen and struck from the air.

Conversely, dispersing to avoid air attack makes ground troops vulnerable to another land force, so that the presence of air forces helps ground units attack larger, more capable enemies, who cannot concentrate against them lest they be destroyed from the air. Recognizing this, modern tacticians try to create what they call a "combined arms" effect, catching adversaries on the horns of a dilemma in which, to defend against one arm (ground forces), they must expose themselves to another (air power) and vice versa.


9/11 cost $500k to organise and caused the US $500B direct financial impact and $2.8T from follow-on conflicts


AQ's survival in late 2001 came about largely through luck and the inability of Western airpower to find and finish key leaders, scattered in the Tora Bora hills, due to the lack of a capable partner ground force. A band of Afghan militia under a local warlord failed to close the AQ remnant's escape route into Pakistan, and there were simply too few US and Australian special operators on the ground to do the job themselves—an early example of two features of the environment (thinly spread airpower and shortage of effective ground forces) that were to become more obvious as time went on.

It was also, not for the last time, an instance of naive overconfidence among US leaders, epitomized by the decision of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, head of United States Central Command, even as the battle at Tora Bora was still raging in December 2001, to pull assets away from the fight and redirect planning efforts toward war against Iraq.

[Will Atkins · Rating 5 out of 5]

In 18 years of military service and countless professional military education programs, I have had to read a lot of books on military strategy. This book is, by far, the best I’ve ever read on the topic. It’s a relatively short read, but covers Russia and China (the dragons) as well as terrorism/non-state actors (the snakes). It argues for changes in American defense policy that are both intuitive and genius. Highly recommend for the entire national security enterprise!

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

Every soldier and every person at all interested in national security and strategy should read, not only The Dragons and the Snakes, How the Rest Learned to Fight the West by David Kilcullen, but they should read everything that he writes from his regular contributions to The Australian and his earlier books Accidental Guerrilla, Out of the Mountains, and Blood Year . In his latest book, which has been many years in the writing, Kilcullen posits a thesis that adversaries, especially those that have recently been defeated, adapt their warfare to improve their chance of success in the next battle. This is not a new or revolutionary idea. Whilst reading the book I was reminded of the aphorism of ‘Don’t fight the last war’ and ‘Surfaces and gaps’ from manoeuverist warfare theory. He uses examples from the fall of the Soviet Union through to the present day to support his argument. The title, ‘Dragons and Snakes’ makes reference to a metaphor that former CIA Director James Woolsey described in Senate confirmation hearings in 1993. The ‘Dragons’ are the great power adversaries such as Russia and China and to a lesser extent Iran, Iraq and North Korea. While the snakes are typically non-state actors such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Hezbollah. According to the metaphor, both dragons and snakes are dangerous, but they will do you harm in different ways. Kilcullen describes how the dragons have looked at the US military successes in the 1991 Gulf War and the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 and have concluded that they have neither the hardware nor the expertise to defeat the US in a head-to-head battle. On the other hand, they have observed how the US and its’ allies have struggled in warfare where the overmatch in technology is less effective, such as in Afghanistan and during the post 2003 phases of the Iraq War.
The key message that I took away is the need to constantly adapt and that counter-intuitively, success doesn’t necessarily breed success, but it can in fact breed failure. Success in this war is punished in the next if the enemy adapts and you fail to adapt.
As with all Kilcullen’s work, the clarity and flow of the writing make for easy reading and a ready comprehension of the argument being put forward. He does not shy away from criticism of politicians and political decisions (war is after all an extension of politics) but he has a brilliant capacity to avoid perceptions of partisanship and this is well managed in The Dragons and the Snakes. Even in the bipolar world that we occupy, I challenge anyone to read this and label it ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’. David Kilcullen is smart (he did a PhD in anthropology whilst serving as an infantry officer in the Australian Army), he is experienced (he has seen warfare as a participant or observer in Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia amongst others), and he is educated (he applies the historical context to contemporary events). In my view David Kilcullen is emerging as one of the superior thinkers on strategy and warfare in the early 21st century. Very well written, a ‘must read’ in my humble opinion. I give it 5 stars.

[Grant · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book is a blend of war college material and contemporary history or political science that may be stronger at describing the dragons than it is the snakes–I think some of the evolutionary/biology metaphors may have been a bit of a reach. When it comes to the dragons, Kilcullen is careful to point out that the 'adversary' countries are full of real people with real agency, particularly in the case of Russia, where he highlights NATO expansion and the post-USSR shock therapy. He articulates some interesting insights I haven't quite heard articulated elsewhere, describing how the vaunted Russian hybrid warfare might not be so much their unprovoked aggression and dastardly scheme so much as them doing what they think we've been doing to them. Similarly, he presents an interesting quandary of how a (possible) very broad interpretation of 'war' in the PRC's mindset could be leading the West to either under-react now or overreact in the future. I really enjoyed the analysis and explanation of the PLA's transformation, which provides a lot more insight into their mentality and strategy than the typical "oh no China has a new missile" news story tends to do.

Based on interviews, I was expecting some of Kilcullen's views would challenge my opinions in good ways and irritate me in others. In practice, I found it more difficult to categorize Kilcullen's worldview than I expected. One shouldn't make the mistake of brushing him off as a hawk, and he acknowledges real domestic political and socioeconomic issues. He speaks about values as something the West needs to live up to rather than being a given, and he rejects the notion that the West has an inherent right to rule. He also readily acknowledges many, many mistakes the West has made in the post-Cold War era, and acknowledges global competitors as independent actors with their own motivations rather than being cartoonish villains. However, I think his political orientation does lead him to gloss over some things and to incompletely analyze others. There's barely any mention of the catastrophic threat of climate change and how real, sizeable cooperation with the PRC is necessary to avert the worst of it–generally, I feel he has resigned the PRC to being more of an enemy than it necessarily needs to be, especially when the West is their best customer. The post-1991 focus largely skips over the imperialism and truly egregious acts the West undertook to "win" the Cold War, not to mention the coups that it keeps supporting or the continued indefensible strangling of Cuba. Generally speaking, I think he underappreciates that economic sanctions are a weapon at a national/population level that the West uses fairly wantonly, something that the PRC or Russia may have a lot better understanding of. For example, there are abundant reasons to criticize Iran, but maybe they wouldn't be such a snake if, say, the West didn't tear up the JCPOA without any provocation and reimpose sanctions?

[Matias Singers · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The Dragons and the Snakes" was an easy and enjoyable read on a complex topic spanning the current geopolitical landscape, historical events, and strategy as it relates to military developments of key players (Russia, China, Hezbollah, etc.).

It provides a somber and honest look at "the decline of the West" and how to manage this decline from a warfare, strategic, and foreign policy perspective. David Kilcullen takes an evolutionary lens to look at how state players like Russia and China developed and adapted their strategies as they observed the US in various conflicts starting from the Gulf War in 1991. The key argument of the book is that the West has inflicted a lot of harm on its enemies, thereby making them more robust by weeding out weaker elements within.

Chapter 4+5 provides a fascinating in-depth look at the vast differences in military strategy and structure across two state players like Russia and China. Kilcullen does a superb job at tracing back through history key events (Kosovo, NATO's bombing of Serbia, and the Chinese embassy in Belgrade) that lead to the military strategies and policies today.

Throughout the book, I realized that my prior historical understanding of topics like Hezbollah and "post-Cold War Russia" was very flawed and filled with a significant bias.

David Kilcullen ends with a great paragraph:

[...] it's entirely possible that none of us actually know what we're doing, that far from having cunningly executed master plans we are all reacting instinctively, often incompetently in the moment—stumbling around in a fog, bumping into things without really understanding each other. This mutual incomprehension is a recipe for miscalculation, and nuclear miscalculation at that.

[Gordon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Precisely the kind of book I enjoy, from a boots-on-the-ground practitioner who now surveys the field of his expertise with a scholar's eye, and renders his narrative with a story-tellers delight. Beginning with evolutionary theories about reactive adaptation to explain the downfall of Western military adventurism in the past quarter century, the author draws in broad sweeps of history to frame his argument, and targets notable pivot points in this decline, such as the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, or the failed first targeted strike to kill Saddam Hussein and his sons. He seeks to re-define and peg-down the increasingly fuzzy concept of hybrid warfare by delineating for our times his own - that of 'liminal warfare,' whose most inventive practitioners are the Russian and Chinese states. For those of us who matured to deeply suspect the pronouncements of our military and political leaders, and who as professionals are now coping with societies considerably weakened by post-Cold War arrogance and blunderbuss overreach, this is an authoritative analysis crafted with lively prose by a man with a capacious mind. If one is interested in building resilient societies for our children in the age of nuclear and weapons proliferation, economic decline, renewed great power contestation, and pandemics, this book is indispensable salt to the broth.

[Michael Roberson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is a must-read. David does an amazing job of synthesizing the surprising effects of Western battlefield dominance in a book that straddles evolutionary biology and geopolitical strategy.

It includes deep dives on Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, as well as shorter case studies on non-state actors. I personally loved the case study on Hezbollah--completely fascinating.

The book is really a three-for-one deal: it's a short survey of conflict since the Cold War, it's a primer on the competitive landscape for the West, and it's a piece of guidance for forward-looking policy with regard to both the metaphorical "snakes" (smaller, non-state adversaries) and the "dragons" (larger, state adversaries including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea) and with regard to the United States' general military purpose.

David recently was kind enough to join my podcast, where we explore the content of the book. After you hear him talk about it, I guarantee you'll want to read the whole thing. Here's the podcast link: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast...

If you want to understand the geopolitical landscape, definitely check this book out!

[Will · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kilcullen discusses the manner in which Western governments and militaries have become focusses on fighting terrorism, at the expense of other security concerns. Kilcullen argues that the 1991 Gulf War and the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 are the highwater marks, and showed the world how NOT to fight the West. These events showed that any country that stood up to the West in a conventional sense would be obliterated. Other states, therefore, learned from the insurgents and terrorists who successfully stood up to the West. States like Russia moved into the 'liminal' space of conflict, using techniques learned from insurgents. Russia therefore began to use nonconventional means in the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Syria, while also beginning the use of cyberwarfare. Likewise, China began adopted similar measures, although less aggressively in the case of military intervention. Overall, its an interesting take on how confrontation between the West and Russia especially has evolved through the 2010s.

[Ben · Rating 4 out of 5]

Better Understand China's Spy Balloon, And The USA's Reaction To It

This book is an engaging and insightful look into the current security landscape and the challenges facing America's military supremacy in the 21st century.

David Kilcullen expertly explores the evolution of dragons and snake forces, delving deep into the details and providing comprehensive historical context.

The book is well-researched and presents its arguments in an easy-to-follow manner, making it accessible for readers of all backgrounds.

Kilcullen's proposals for change in American defense policy are both innovative and thought-provoking, making this book a must-read for anyone in the national security or military planning.

This book is highly recommended for anyone seeking to understand the current international relation landscape and the challenges facing the world today.

4.4/5

[Andrew Tollemache · Rating 4 out of 5]

David Kilcullen is a former Australian soldier who rose to fame as one of Gen David Petraeus's group of informal advisers on handling the insurgency in Iraq from 2004-2008. Since then he has written numerous books on counter insurgency and evolving trends in guerilla warfare. IN his latest, "The Dragon and the Snakes" Kilcullen is focused on more state actors like Russia and China to see how they adapted their approach to warfare to reflect their lessons from watching the US military over the last 30 years.
After the 1991 Gulf War it became obvious that country could stand toe to toe with 7 heavy US divisions and stand a chance of winning. Countries like Russia and China looked at that and saw how the US struggled with low intensity warfare and insurgency and adapted their future military plans to those lessons

[John Poole · Rating 5 out of 5]

Where Kilcullen wrote an excellent analysis on the rise of ISIS in 2014 and 15 this work provides an even more interesting framework understanding state and non-state actors and the changing geo political scene. He intertwines key historical lessons with an understanding of strategy which is amazingly insightful (borderline humourous at points) and unpacks these with ease. Worth a read for both these frameworks, which can be broadened to look at wider society, and for the examination of the idea: Just because we see something one way, does it mean it is true?

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good read, especially the part where it discusses the possibility of rivals to the West having wider definitions of warfare, meaning that they (or indeed we) could be engaging in actions we perceive as below the conflict level that they perceive as being acts of war. I don't entirely agree with the conclusions (or his judgement of the Trump presidency's competence in international affairs), but worth reading for the insights it has.

[Oleksandr Golovatyi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Швидкочитання (promo)

Кращі нотатки з книги:

“Чим більше ми дізнаємося про перші 72 години вторгнення, повітряний напад на Гостомель, битви за Бучу та Мощун і початковий наступ на Київ, стає зрозуміло, що вони не збиралися вдаватися до конвенційної боротьби, а мали за мету єдиним ударом скинути владу Зеленського.”

“На початок 2013 року я читав і писав, формував свій погляд на події крізь окуляри Джеймса Вулсі, у які той дивився на справи рівно два десятиліття тому. Ось що він тоді сказав: Захід убив «великого дракона» (Радянський Союз), тільки щоб зустрітися з неймовірною навалою «змій», породжених Холодною війною. До кінця 2013-го стало цілком очевидно: «дракон» повернувся у вигляді путінської Росії.”

“усі ці двадцять років «дракони» (серед яких і Китай) спостерігали та навчалися. Вони вчилися боротись із нами так, як це робили «змії», які теж серйозно виснажили нас після Холодної війни, а надто після 2003 року.”

“Уже наприкінці 1980-х було зрозуміло, що конвенційна загроза включає не одного дракона, а радше двох великих і двох менших: по-перше, Росію та Китай, а по-друге — Іран і Північну Корею.”

“після 2003-го, коли ми воювали в раку та Афганістані, дракони розробили способи обходити наші сильні сторони, водночас експлуатуючи наші слабкості, які ставали дедалі очевиднішими в міру розвитку кожної з військових кампаній.”

“Поки ми переймалися хаосом, який настав у 1990-х після Холодної війни, та загрузли у війні з тероризмом після 2001-го, поки вирубували хащі й шукали там змій, — дракони спостерігали та навчалися.”

“У вересні 2017-го Північна Корея випробувала водневу бомбу, придатну для розміщення на міжконтинентальній балістичній ракеті (МБР). У листопаді там випробували МБР «Хвасон-15», здатну доставити ядерний боєзаряд до будь-якої цілі в Сполучених Штатах, включно з Вашингтоном. А в новорічній промові в січні 2018-го Кім Чен Ин заявив, що його країна завершила створювати ядерну зброю. Підсумовуючи, він наголосив, що «завдяки цьому засобові стримування США не наважаться розпалити війну “проти мене і нашої країни”»73. Змія взірця 1993-го впевнено перетворювалася на дракона.”

“Дракони - загрози на державній основі — включають: Росію з її оновленою агресивністю; дедалі самовпевненіший Китай; іранський режим, який може розробляти чи не розробляти ядерну зброю, але однозначно зміцнює контроль на просторі від західного кордону Афганістану аж до Голанських висот і водночас очолює глобальну конфронтацію із сунітським ісламом; спадкову диктатуру Північної Кореї, яка в особі Кім Чен Ина уже в третьому поколінні поєднує внутрішні репресії, зовнішній авантюризм і небезпечні ігри з ядерною зброєю. Усі вони практикують порогові стратегії — тримаються на межі освітленого кола, щоб досягати своїх військових і політичних цілей, не наражаючись на пряму відплату.”

“Отже, інституційна адаптація - вирішальний механізм еволюції здатних пристосовуватися супротивників у партизанській війні.”

“Telegram (2013), улюблений месенджер «Ісламської держави».”

“За минулі девʼятнадцять років війни з тероризмом (і за попередній період 1990-х після Холодної війни) державні й недержавні субʼєкти вчились одні в одних, тож нині багато найефективніших прийомів недержавних збройних формувань базовано на ідеях, запозичених у держав, а багато успішних державних стратегій скопійовано в недержавних угруповань. Змії навчилися воювати як дракони, а дракони тепер воюють як змії.”

“існують обставини, які переконливо свідчать про спроби російської влади впливати на британський референдум про брекзит, на президентські вибори 2016 року в США, на голосування в Каталонії за вихід зі складу Іспанії 2017-го, на німецькі федеральні вибори та проміжні вибори в США 2018-го, на вступ Чорногорії до НАТО 2018-го і на підйом ультраправих (та ультра-лівих) партій у різних країнах, від Греції та Угорщини до Австрії, Швеції та Франції”

“Сувора реальність полягає в тому, що найуспішнішу військову адаптацію викликає поразка. Прикладів цього — без ліку: реформи в Пруссії після перемоги над нею Наполеона 1806 року3°9, модернізація британської армії після колоніальних катастроф 1870-х3го, британське винайдення танкового бою 1916 року внаслідок низки кровопролитних невдач на західному фронтізи, німецька розробка концепції «бліцкригу» у відповідь на поразку 1918-г0312, перехід австралійців від «війни в пустелі» до «війни в джунглях» після поразок від японців 1942-гоз3, нарешті створення Командування спеціальних операцій (SOCOM) після катастрофи «Пустелі-I» 1980 року.”

“лімінальна зона починається на порозі виявлення, де супротивник спершу переконується в самому факті операції. Під цим порогом активність замаскована (факт операції залишається непоміченим), тоді як над ним вона таємна (встановлено факт операції, але не особу творця, або ж йому легко виправдатися).”

“Те, що поріг реакції залежить більше від політичних чинників, ніж від технічних засобів, підкреслює той факт, що лімінальна війна є формою політичної війни — застосування комбінації військових і невійськових засобів задля суто політичних цілей.”

Трекер звичок (promo)

[Robert Jr. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Modern day work on the age-old challenge and response dynamic.

[Urey Patrick · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting read, applying biological principles of evolution, adaptation, selective pressure to military developments, changes, strategies, preparations and tactics. Specifically, the author focusses on enemies of the West: “snakes” – the non-state actors, terrorists, militias, failed states and asymmetric conflicts, and “dragons” – state opponents, specifically Russia and China ( the big dragons) and Iran and North Korea (little dragons)... none of whom can stand against the West in conventional military terms. Thus have the snakes evolved, adapted and developed new and different capabilities, strategies and tactics that have proven successful over the past 20-plus years in Iraq and Afghanistan. The dragons have learned, as well, and adjusted accordingly.

Kilcullen is not optimistic. First, although he credits the snakes and dragons with successful adaptations, and his descriptions of their histories, incentives, and evolutionary changes are great history superbly condensed, explained and substantiated, in conclusion he anticipates Western decline but this is short-sighted for several reasons.

First, he gives little credence to the possibility that Western evolution and adaptions in response could be effective, if not decisive. The improved, evolved and adapted capabilities of the dragons are the basis for his pessimism about Western decline. This overlooks Western adoption of similar, if not more effective, evolutionary changes. For example, to cite just one comparative fact, the United Staes represents 25% of the total global economy, with just 5% of the global population. As hostile competition evolves horizontally to encompass more than just military conflict (cyber war, economic advantage, information campaigns, social media influences, and more) that presents the dragons with a significant disadvantage to overcome.

Moreover, this book was written early in the first Trump administration, so the author was unaware of the Biden administration (which frankly would have supported his anticipation of Western decline) and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which would have diluted his conclusions of Russian military evolution, modernization and improvement. Ukraine has shown us that Russia is a hollow shell – plagued by deficient leadership, obsolete equipment, insufficient industrial and materiel support, and mass casualty tactics – hardly the image of a modern, multi-tasking, advanced concept military that he describes in the book. Russia is an excellent example of what might be called the dictator’s dilemma.

A dictator (such as Putin) has to be concerned with survival, a focus on internal politics and considerations. There is no trust. Police state surveillance breeds paranoia. A would-be opponent cannot know who to trust – if he is approached by a kindred spirit, how can he know whether that person is not a ruse, a loyalty test reporting back to the dictator. Second, the dictator cannot afford to put competent, capable, innovative people in positions of power – they would ultimately form their own centers of power and influence. So the dictator puts sycophants and mediocrities in positions of importance who then lie about the realities under their control. He cannot afford to do otherwise... and the deleterious effects on actual institutions and capabilities are inexorable. And overlaying it all is an ecosystem of corruption and personal aggrandizement. At the time of this book’s publication, little of this was evident... the glowing descriptions of Russia’s military reform, modernization of systems and weaponry, and effective leadership were essentially cover stories concealing the realities of the dictator’s dilemma. Kilcullen does not recognize any of this, but then, at the time he wrote this book he would have no reason to.

The same problems afflict China to different (presumably?) degrees. China’s premier is no less a dictator than Putin. China has severe, and growing, economic and demographic problems. All of which would indicate to me that the decline of the West may not be as inevitable as Kilcullen would have us believe. Time will tell.

[George Siehl · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is not your usual look into warfare's dark corners; it is an enlightening but worrisome book. As such, it is important reading for those interested in the nature of competition to the point of conflict among state and non-state global actors. My rating is a very solid 5 stars. Author David Kilcullen, an Australian infantry officer who has served with U. S. forces in recent conflicts, provides several new lenses through which to view the spectrum from international competition to combat. The "dragons" of his title refer to the large, technologically advanced national competitors, i.e. Russia and China. The "snakes" include smaller nations, such as Iran and North Korea, as well as the terrorist organizations that have proven venomous in this century. A central theme is how, increasingly, the two entities have co-evolved to resemble one another as a result of their conflicting interactions; terrorist groups have become more technologically proficient, while states have adopted smaller scale, more flexible modes of confronting enemies. Kilcullen draws on a surprising range of disciplines in this informative analysis of the trends he narrates: sociology for the formation and interactions of groups, anthropology for its nuance in understanding boundaries, ecology for its insights of predator-prey relationships, and evolutionary theory as it relates to natural selection and behavioral adaptation.

Two of the new lenses presented are elaborated in chapters titled "Liminal Warfare" and "Conceptual Envelopment." The first uses Russia as its focus, the second, China; both present numerous examples of their use by these nations.

Boundaries are usually considered to be sharp lines of delineation, but liminal warfare recognizes the frequent presence of ambiguity, of blurring, in a boundary, then proceeds to take advantage of that ambiguity. Kilcullen explains, "Things that are in limbo, transitioning, or on the periphery, that have ambiguous political, legal, and psychological status--or whose very existence is debated--are liminal." In application, "the approach exploits undefined or legally ambiguous spaces and categories--using these as cover for action without retaliation." The author includes as example Russian unauthorized movement across the remote border into Norway to gather information or communicate with friendly parties living there.

In military terms, envelopment refers to outflanking or surrounding an enemy. Kilcullen describes how China's us of conceptual envelopment employs the idea beyond the battlefield, but as part of the competition. He defines it as, "a situation in which an adversary's conception of war becomes so much broader than our own " with two dangerous eventualities. "First, that adversary may be acting in ways it considers warlike, while we with our narrower notion of warfare remain blithely unaware of the fact, so that by the time we realize we are at war, we have already lost." A second danger is that we may be doing something we don't consider warlike, but the adversary does, "and responds accordingly." Examples of the first danger include Chinese business efforts to acquire property near sensitive Western military sites, or to acquire interests in operating such sites, in Australia, San Diego, and Scotland. Chinese efforts to secure control of rare earth mineral deposits around the globe could easily have strategic consequences as such elements are crucial to many high technology applications from military equipment to wind towers.

This is an important book that informs, but raises concerns about the need for close attention by Western national leaders.