What do you think?
Rate this book
Very Short Introductions #619
Philosophy of Biology: A Very Short Introduction
Over the last forty years the philosophy of biology has emerged as an important sub-discipline of the philosophy of science. Covering some of science's most divisive topics, such as philosophical issues in genetics, it also encompasses areas where modern biology has increasingly impinged on
traditional philosophical questions, such as free will, essentialism, and nature vs nurture.
In this Very Short Introduction Samir Okasha outlines the core issues with which contemporary philosophy of biology is engaged. Offering a whistle-stop tour of the history of biology, he explores key ideas and paradigm shifts throughout the centuries, including areas such as the theory of evolution
by natural selection; the concepts of function and design; biological individuality; and the debate over adaptationism. Throughout Okasha makes clear the relevance of biology for understanding human beings, human society, and our place in the natural world, and the importance of engaging with these
issues.
ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and
enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.
traditional philosophical questions, such as free will, essentialism, and nature vs nurture.
In this Very Short Introduction Samir Okasha outlines the core issues with which contemporary philosophy of biology is engaged. Offering a whistle-stop tour of the history of biology, he explores key ideas and paradigm shifts throughout the centuries, including areas such as the theory of evolution
by natural selection; the concepts of function and design; biological individuality; and the debate over adaptationism. Throughout Okasha makes clear the relevance of biology for understanding human beings, human society, and our place in the natural world, and the importance of engaging with these
issues.
ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and
enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.
130 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2019
35 people are currently reading
536 people want to read
About the author
Samir Okasha
9 books86 followersBiography
I received my doctorate in 1998 from the University of Oxford, where I worked with Bill Newton-Smith. I then held a post-doctoral position at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM), before moving to the London School of Economics as a Jacobsen Fellow. I was a Lecturer at the University of York from 2000-2002, and in 2003 moved to the University of Bristol. I was promoted to a personal chair in 2006.
I have held a visiting position at the Australian National University.
I received my doctorate in 1998 from the University of Oxford, where I worked with Bill Newton-Smith. I then held a post-doctoral position at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM), before moving to the London School of Economics as a Jacobsen Fellow. I was a Lecturer at the University of York from 2000-2002, and in 2003 moved to the University of Bristol. I was promoted to a personal chair in 2006.
I have held a visiting position at the Australian National University.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
Read
January 9, 2023کتاب حول تکامل میچرخه عموماً و دوستتر میداشتمش اگر دوز فلسفهش نسبت به زیستشناسیش بیشتر میبود.
مقدمه مفیدی داره بهنظرم و ترجمه خیلی روونه.
آمم، درکل لذتبخش بود برام. فکر کنم یه مدت نیاز دارم چیزای تکاملی نخونم. :))
مقدمه مفیدی داره بهنظرم و ترجمه خیلی روونه.
آمم، درکل لذتبخش بود برام. فکر کنم یه مدت نیاز دارم چیزای تکاملی نخونم. :))
May 31, 2024
در طول چهل سال گذشته، فلسفه ی زیست شناسی به عنوان زیرشاخه ی مهمی از فلسفه علم ظهور کرده است. برخی از مناقشه برانگیزترین مباحث علم ، مانند مباحث فلسفی در ژنتیک را پوشش می دهد ، همچنین محدوده هایی را در بر می گیرد که در آن زیست شناسی مدرن به طور فزاینده ای با پرسش های سنتی فلسفی مانند اراده آزاد ، ذات گرایی و طبیعت در برابر پرورش درگیر می شود و به آن حمله می برد.
در کتاب فلسفه ی زیست شناسی این مقدمه ی بسیار کوتاه ، که توسط سمیر عکاشه نوشته شده است موارد اساسی ای که فلسفه ی معاصر زیست شناسی با آنها درگیر است، بیان شده است. عکاشه در این کتاب با ارائه یک تور جامع از تاریخ زیست شناسی ، ایده های اصلی و تغییر الگوها در طول قرن ها ، از جمله مناطقی مانند نظریه تکامل توسط انتخاب طبیعی ، مفاهیم عملکرد و طراحی، فرد زیستی و بحث در مورد سازگاری را بررسی می کند.
عکاشه در کتاب فلسفه ی زیست شناسی اهمیت زیست شناسی برای درک انسانها ، جامعه بشری و جایگاه ما در دنیای طبیعی و اهمیت تعامل با این مسائل را روشن می کند.
در کتاب فلسفه ی زیست شناسی این مقدمه ی بسیار کوتاه ، که توسط سمیر عکاشه نوشته شده است موارد اساسی ای که فلسفه ی معاصر زیست شناسی با آنها درگیر است، بیان شده است. عکاشه در این کتاب با ارائه یک تور جامع از تاریخ زیست شناسی ، ایده های اصلی و تغییر الگوها در طول قرن ها ، از جمله مناطقی مانند نظریه تکامل توسط انتخاب طبیعی ، مفاهیم عملکرد و طراحی، فرد زیستی و بحث در مورد سازگاری را بررسی می کند.
عکاشه در کتاب فلسفه ی زیست شناسی اهمیت زیست شناسی برای درک انسانها ، جامعه بشری و جایگاه ما در دنیای طبیعی و اهمیت تعامل با این مسائل را روشن می کند.
May 11, 2021
با معلومات زیستشناسی دبیرستان این کتاب رو خوندم و میتونم بگم هیچ ابهامی در هیچ قسمتی از کتاب وجود نداشت. نویسنده تمام مسائل رو به سادگی شرح داده بود، و هر جا نیاز بود توضیحات پایهای رو هم ارائه داده بود. ترجمهی کاوه فیضاللهی هم بسیار روان و دقیق بود.
کتاب روند بسیار خوبی داره و اصلاً خستهکننده نیست. دائماً نویسنده پرسشی رو ایجاد میکنه و ذهن رو درگیر میکنه و سپس به شرح پاسخ میپردازه و از این بابت خیلی خوب عمل کرده.
مباحث کتاب هم در هفت فصل دستهبندی شده که فقط فصل ششم نیاز به یک سری پیشزمینههایی از زیستشناسی داره به نظرم. فصل آخر هم که در مورد تکامل فرهنگی هست یک مقدار ضعیفتر بود. اما فصول ابتدایی واقعاً جذاب و آموزنده بودن و خوندن کتاب عمیقاً لذتبخش بود برای من.
کتاب روند بسیار خوبی داره و اصلاً خستهکننده نیست. دائماً نویسنده پرسشی رو ایجاد میکنه و ذهن رو درگیر میکنه و سپس به شرح پاسخ میپردازه و از این بابت خیلی خوب عمل کرده.
مباحث کتاب هم در هفت فصل دستهبندی شده که فقط فصل ششم نیاز به یک سری پیشزمینههایی از زیستشناسی داره به نظرم. فصل آخر هم که در مورد تکامل فرهنگی هست یک مقدار ضعیفتر بود. اما فصول ابتدایی واقعاً جذاب و آموزنده بودن و خوندن کتاب عمیقاً لذتبخش بود برای من.
May 8, 2022
Samir Okasha delivers a "whistle-stop tour" of the philosophy of biology, as the publisher's blurb promises. Much of the book's content will be at least somewhat familiar to anyone who has read a few books about biology and evolution. Before reading this book, I wasn't aware of just how much of what I thought was "biology" is territory claimed by the philosopher. In other words, most if not all of the most prominent popularizers of evolutionary biology seem to be at least part-time philosophers. At least according to philosophers who are muscling in.
A few parts of the book seemed a bit odd to me. For example, when Okasha described the species problem (the problem of clearly defining what counts as a species in biology), he said nothing about the related philosphical issue of Vagueness and the ancient Sorites paradox (the paradox of the heap). This seemed to me like an obvious place for philsophers to apply a big chunk of their existing thinking that biologists may not be aware of.
The Sorites paradox follows from the question: if you have a heap of sand, and start removing single grains of sand from the heap, at what point does the heap stop being a heap? Similar problems arise whenever people impose discrete categories on continua. For example, how many hairs must a person lose to become bald? At what precise age does a child become an adult? Even though there is no clear demarcation between "child" and "adult," clearly the conceptual division is useful, as every society recognizes it. It's useful to divide people sharply when allocating rights and responsibilities, even though this is unfair to a few individuals close to the dividing line who might more properly belong on the other side of it.
Which nations are democracies, and which are something else? One option is to replace categories with scores or indices - for example, various political organizations rank nations on scales such as the Democracy Index and the rankings by Freedom House.
People construct such rankings by listing all the properties a democracy would have, measuring the degree to which a particular country has each such property, and then adding them together perhaps with weightings. Some arbitrariness is inescapable with such a measurement or weighting scheme, but it at least makes the classification tractable. The alternative is to identify an exceptionless scheme to neatly demarcate "democracies" from "non-democracies." Continuous rankings also have the advantage of tracking changes in a nation's democratic status over time. For example, under Trump, the USA became less democratic; and under Putin, Russia became markedly less so.
I haven't read enough about the species problem in biology to know whether Okasha's non-mention of vagueness reflects an actual absence of the concept in the philosophy of biology literature. If so, there might be a need for some original work. Given that every species contains variation, and given that variation can be at least partially quantified on the genome level by identifying all the nucleotides that vary between individuals (SNPs), then perhaps species-ness itself could be a trait that varies. Just as some people are tall, some are short, but most are close to average in height, so too might species-ness perhaps be defined in terms of how close an individual is to the average genome for the species. On the genotypic level, averageness would be a function of SNPs (how many of the most common SNPs for the species an indiviual carries); and on the phenotypic level, it would be how close the individual ranks to the average for each phenotypic trait that varies. Of course this would require massive amounts of data-gathering and computation, including sequencing the genome of each individual in a population, so I imagine this will have to wait. But if this is what species-ness actually involves, then no wonder the concept remains problematic.
Incidentally the same can be said for further subdividing members of a species into subspecies or races. Biologists do this routinely for non-human species, without creating much hysteria, but when it comes to humans, the concept of race becomes a political minefield. Many people deny that human races have any basis in biology, often by invoking the continuous variation of particular gene frequencies as you compare people along a transect. But this is similar to the ring species concept that Okasha describes for some non-human animals. The fact that some species grade smoothly into other species along a transect does not negate the practical usefulness of recognizing distinct species when you compare two widely-separated populations.
When Okasha mentions ring species he doesn't mention an analogy with human language dialects. A language may have multiple dialects A, B, C, and D, such that pairs of adjacent dialects can be mutually intelligible (A with B, B with C, C with D) but not A with D. Modern English speakers experience something similar by reading progressively older documents in English. Go back far enough in time and English becomes a foreign language, but there is no particular year, or even a century, when this occurs. The older the English document, the harder it becomes to read. Deciding when "harder" becomes "foreign" is a judgement call.
Anyway, the point of this long digression is to show that the species problem in biology is hardly sui generis . Similar classifiction-along-continua problems arise in other fields, and philosophers have (or could have) weighed in on some of them.
Chapter 6 covers genes, and chapter 7 covers human behaviour, mind, and culture. While reading these chapters, I found myself re-checking the publication date to verify that it really was 2020 rather than, say, 1990. Okasha writes as though the last decades of progress in genomics did not occur. Terms that would seem essential to this chapter are absent, such as SNP, polygenic(ity), and GWAS. For example Okasha mentions the "junk DNA" controversy without mentioning that GWAS has identified numerous SNPs from non-coding (i.e. "junk") DNA that associate with particular phenotypic traits (presumably by influencing the expression of DNA that actually codes for proteins). That is, we can tell that our "junk DNA" is doing something by noting that we don't all have identical junk DNA, and the differences correlate with measurable differences in how we turn out.
Okasha didn't seem to get the memo that the sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists of the pre-gemonics era (1970s-2000ish) focused mainly on culturally invariant, majority traits because these were easiest to explain as having a genetic origin, before it became possible to identify the genetic variants involved. Today the game has expanded, thanks to GWAS. It's no longer necessary to restrict the scope of evolutionary psychology to traits common to the majority. The processes of evolution also create minority traits (such as schizophrenia), to the extent that these traits associate with particular combinations of SNPs. Okasha should also get clear on the difference between monogenetic and polygenetic traits. He does mention the Mendelian genetics of the former, and gives several examples, like Huntington's, phenylketonuria, and lactase persistence. He mentions that selection was able to work quickly (within a historical time scale) on a monogenetic trait like lactase persistence, but he doesn't explain that polygenetic traits are much harder for selection to optimize. And that is why we aren't all stunningly beautiful super-intelligent elite athletes with exceptional disease resistance, despite what a reproductive advantage having all these traits would seem to confer - because to get all these traits in a single individual requires simultaneous selection on many thousands of gene variants (SNPs). It's harder for evolution to optimize an entire vector of things that vary, when each one makes only a tiny contribution to fitness that evolution might "see", than to select for just one thing which has a huge impact (like a single gene mutation for lactase persistence).
And speaking of, Okasha could have explained the evolutionary mechanism for lactase persistence a little better. It wasn't just that people became pastoralists and then presto, they got the gene mutation that let them consume dairy products into adulthood. Rather, someone got this mutation around the time that it could confer an advantage after pastoralism became established. Raising cattle for meat was an improvement over chasing down wild game. But it is less efficient than dairying. Raising cattle for meat plus dairy increases the food calories for humans from a unit of pasture by roughly a factor of five. (A cow can produce a lot more food calories as milk during its life than it leaves as meat when it dies.) This gave the carriers of the lactase persistence mutation a huge competitive advantage over humans without it, in regions suitable for cattle husbandry, permitting the dairy-eaters to outbreed (and perhaps to out-fight and murder) the exclusively meat-eaters.
I have other quibbles about the book but it's easier to recommend other books that further illuminate concepts, correct errors, provide different points of view, or reveal new work (for example in places Okasha exhibits a whiff of anti-hereditarian bias although elsewhere he walks it back a bit). He also doesn't convey just how politically fraught the issue of biological differences between humans continues to be. Human evolution, particularly recent human evolution, is where the rubber really hits the road in terms of testing our commitment to the scientific method. Are we serious about following the evidence wherever it leads, or do we prefer the more popular and palatable alternative of wishful thinking?
Born That Way: Genes, Behavior, Personality
The New Know-Nothings: The Political Foes of the Scientific Study of Human Nature
The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature
Intelligence: A Very Short Introduction (newer 2020 edition)
Intelligence: All That Matters
In the Know: Debunking 35 Myths about Human Intelligence
The Neuroscience of Intelligence
Blueprint: How DNA makes us who we are
The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution
A few parts of the book seemed a bit odd to me. For example, when Okasha described the species problem (the problem of clearly defining what counts as a species in biology), he said nothing about the related philosphical issue of Vagueness and the ancient Sorites paradox (the paradox of the heap). This seemed to me like an obvious place for philsophers to apply a big chunk of their existing thinking that biologists may not be aware of.
The Sorites paradox follows from the question: if you have a heap of sand, and start removing single grains of sand from the heap, at what point does the heap stop being a heap? Similar problems arise whenever people impose discrete categories on continua. For example, how many hairs must a person lose to become bald? At what precise age does a child become an adult? Even though there is no clear demarcation between "child" and "adult," clearly the conceptual division is useful, as every society recognizes it. It's useful to divide people sharply when allocating rights and responsibilities, even though this is unfair to a few individuals close to the dividing line who might more properly belong on the other side of it.
Which nations are democracies, and which are something else? One option is to replace categories with scores or indices - for example, various political organizations rank nations on scales such as the Democracy Index and the rankings by Freedom House.
People construct such rankings by listing all the properties a democracy would have, measuring the degree to which a particular country has each such property, and then adding them together perhaps with weightings. Some arbitrariness is inescapable with such a measurement or weighting scheme, but it at least makes the classification tractable. The alternative is to identify an exceptionless scheme to neatly demarcate "democracies" from "non-democracies." Continuous rankings also have the advantage of tracking changes in a nation's democratic status over time. For example, under Trump, the USA became less democratic; and under Putin, Russia became markedly less so.
I haven't read enough about the species problem in biology to know whether Okasha's non-mention of vagueness reflects an actual absence of the concept in the philosophy of biology literature. If so, there might be a need for some original work. Given that every species contains variation, and given that variation can be at least partially quantified on the genome level by identifying all the nucleotides that vary between individuals (SNPs), then perhaps species-ness itself could be a trait that varies. Just as some people are tall, some are short, but most are close to average in height, so too might species-ness perhaps be defined in terms of how close an individual is to the average genome for the species. On the genotypic level, averageness would be a function of SNPs (how many of the most common SNPs for the species an indiviual carries); and on the phenotypic level, it would be how close the individual ranks to the average for each phenotypic trait that varies. Of course this would require massive amounts of data-gathering and computation, including sequencing the genome of each individual in a population, so I imagine this will have to wait. But if this is what species-ness actually involves, then no wonder the concept remains problematic.
Incidentally the same can be said for further subdividing members of a species into subspecies or races. Biologists do this routinely for non-human species, without creating much hysteria, but when it comes to humans, the concept of race becomes a political minefield. Many people deny that human races have any basis in biology, often by invoking the continuous variation of particular gene frequencies as you compare people along a transect. But this is similar to the ring species concept that Okasha describes for some non-human animals. The fact that some species grade smoothly into other species along a transect does not negate the practical usefulness of recognizing distinct species when you compare two widely-separated populations.
When Okasha mentions ring species he doesn't mention an analogy with human language dialects. A language may have multiple dialects A, B, C, and D, such that pairs of adjacent dialects can be mutually intelligible (A with B, B with C, C with D) but not A with D. Modern English speakers experience something similar by reading progressively older documents in English. Go back far enough in time and English becomes a foreign language, but there is no particular year, or even a century, when this occurs. The older the English document, the harder it becomes to read. Deciding when "harder" becomes "foreign" is a judgement call.
Anyway, the point of this long digression is to show that the species problem in biology is hardly sui generis . Similar classifiction-along-continua problems arise in other fields, and philosophers have (or could have) weighed in on some of them.
Chapter 6 covers genes, and chapter 7 covers human behaviour, mind, and culture. While reading these chapters, I found myself re-checking the publication date to verify that it really was 2020 rather than, say, 1990. Okasha writes as though the last decades of progress in genomics did not occur. Terms that would seem essential to this chapter are absent, such as SNP, polygenic(ity), and GWAS. For example Okasha mentions the "junk DNA" controversy without mentioning that GWAS has identified numerous SNPs from non-coding (i.e. "junk") DNA that associate with particular phenotypic traits (presumably by influencing the expression of DNA that actually codes for proteins). That is, we can tell that our "junk DNA" is doing something by noting that we don't all have identical junk DNA, and the differences correlate with measurable differences in how we turn out.
Okasha didn't seem to get the memo that the sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists of the pre-gemonics era (1970s-2000ish) focused mainly on culturally invariant, majority traits because these were easiest to explain as having a genetic origin, before it became possible to identify the genetic variants involved. Today the game has expanded, thanks to GWAS. It's no longer necessary to restrict the scope of evolutionary psychology to traits common to the majority. The processes of evolution also create minority traits (such as schizophrenia), to the extent that these traits associate with particular combinations of SNPs. Okasha should also get clear on the difference between monogenetic and polygenetic traits. He does mention the Mendelian genetics of the former, and gives several examples, like Huntington's, phenylketonuria, and lactase persistence. He mentions that selection was able to work quickly (within a historical time scale) on a monogenetic trait like lactase persistence, but he doesn't explain that polygenetic traits are much harder for selection to optimize. And that is why we aren't all stunningly beautiful super-intelligent elite athletes with exceptional disease resistance, despite what a reproductive advantage having all these traits would seem to confer - because to get all these traits in a single individual requires simultaneous selection on many thousands of gene variants (SNPs). It's harder for evolution to optimize an entire vector of things that vary, when each one makes only a tiny contribution to fitness that evolution might "see", than to select for just one thing which has a huge impact (like a single gene mutation for lactase persistence).
And speaking of, Okasha could have explained the evolutionary mechanism for lactase persistence a little better. It wasn't just that people became pastoralists and then presto, they got the gene mutation that let them consume dairy products into adulthood. Rather, someone got this mutation around the time that it could confer an advantage after pastoralism became established. Raising cattle for meat was an improvement over chasing down wild game. But it is less efficient than dairying. Raising cattle for meat plus dairy increases the food calories for humans from a unit of pasture by roughly a factor of five. (A cow can produce a lot more food calories as milk during its life than it leaves as meat when it dies.) This gave the carriers of the lactase persistence mutation a huge competitive advantage over humans without it, in regions suitable for cattle husbandry, permitting the dairy-eaters to outbreed (and perhaps to out-fight and murder) the exclusively meat-eaters.
I have other quibbles about the book but it's easier to recommend other books that further illuminate concepts, correct errors, provide different points of view, or reveal new work (for example in places Okasha exhibits a whiff of anti-hereditarian bias although elsewhere he walks it back a bit). He also doesn't convey just how politically fraught the issue of biological differences between humans continues to be. Human evolution, particularly recent human evolution, is where the rubber really hits the road in terms of testing our commitment to the scientific method. Are we serious about following the evidence wherever it leads, or do we prefer the more popular and palatable alternative of wishful thinking?
Born That Way: Genes, Behavior, Personality
The New Know-Nothings: The Political Foes of the Scientific Study of Human Nature
The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature
Intelligence: A Very Short Introduction (newer 2020 edition)
Intelligence: All That Matters
In the Know: Debunking 35 Myths about Human Intelligence
The Neuroscience of Intelligence
Blueprint: How DNA makes us who we are
The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution
December 9, 2023
لطالما كانت الفلسفة المجال المهيمن على مجالات المعرفة في السابق وكانت مفتاح تفسير معظم الظواهر الطبيعية والبشرية وما وراء الطبيعة ، حتى فقدت هذه السيطرة لما ظهرت العلوم الحديثة بكل تفرعاتها المعروفة ومنها علم الاحياء الذي وضع نظريات تفسيرية للتنوع الطبيعي في الحياة مما ساعد على فهم أعمق لطبيعتها البشرية أزاحت تلك الاجابات التي قدمتها الفلسفة في السابق ، لكن الفلسفة لم تستسلم لتلك الازاحة وعادت من جديد تقتحم الفروع المعرفية لتثير التساؤلات حول الحقائق التي تقدمها ، يبدو أنه الصراع بين من يريد أن يثبت سمو البشر من دون كل الكائنات لغائية معينة يفترضها وبين من يرجع البشرية لوضعها الطبيعي داخل بنية الكائنات ولكلا الجانبين تفسيرات مختلفة عن كل الانتاج الانساني القديم وما سوف يحدث في المستقبل والمسؤولية الأخلاقية المستتبعة لتلك الانقسامات الفكرية والنظرية ، تبقى الفلسفة أداة تدقيق في مفاهيم العلوم بشكل عام وعلم الأحياء بشكل خاص .
May 30, 2025
It was indeed a short introduction. Great entry point into philosophy of biology with resources for further reading. Not sure if i would’ve appreciated it as much if it wasn’t part of a uni class curriculum but it was so it doesn’t matter anyway.
July 6, 2023
كتاب جميل جدا بقلم البروفيسور سمير عكاشة، يطرح من خلاله مجال فلسفيا جديدا يسمى "فلسفة علم الأحياء"، حيث يقدم له و يشرح بتبسيط غاية في الروعة أهم النظريات.
في الفصل الأول، يجيب المؤلف عن سؤالي ما هي فلسفة علم الأحياء و ما فائدتها؟؛ حيث يرى أن الفلسفة المتخصصة نشأت بعد تطور العلوم و تمكنها من الاجابة عن الأسئلة التي لطالما حيرت الفلاسفة. و يعتبر هذا المجال الفلسفي جد حديث، و هو يحاول الاجابة عن الأسئلة التي برزت للوجود بعد تطور علم الأحياء، بشكل مستقل عن الفيزياء و باستعمال المنطق و التحليل الفلسفي لفهم الظواهر البيولوجية.
في الفصل الثاني، يشرح الكاتب نظريتين مهمتين من تطوير داروين، تعتبران الآن من أبرز التفسيرات الموجودة لعالم الأحياء؛ و هما التطور و الإنتخاب الطبيعي. و عرج كذلك على الداروينية الجديدة، و هي تلك القديمة نفسها مدعومة بأدلة و تفسيرات من علم الأحياء التطوري و اخر الجزيئي. أبرز كذلك البروفيسور أهمية هذه النظرية و حججها التي تدعمها.
في الفصل الثالث، يبين الكاتب الفرق بين الوظيفة بمعنى وصف الدور أو الأدوار التي يقوم بها عضو ما مثلا، و تساهم في ضمان بقاء و استمرار الكائن الحي. في حين ان التكيف من منظور التكيفيين يرى أن لكل شيء وظيفة محددة وجد من أجلها. في حين أن التطور يدعم الرأي الأول، ببساطة لأن هناك أشياء لا فائدة منها حاليا للكائن الحي.
في الفصل الرابع، طرح المؤلف فكرة مستويات الانتخاب، بمعنى أن هذا الأخير ليس محصورا على مستوى أفراد نوع معين، و إنما هناك إنتخاب جزيئي على مستوى الجينات، و آخر جماعي أي على مستوى الجماعة ككل. فالانتخاب على مستواه الكبير يساعدنا على تفسير بعض الظواهر كالإيثار أو التضحية في سبيل الجماعة، و على المستوى المجهري يساعدنا على تفسير ما يمكن أن نسميه التنافس الجيني.
في الفصل الخامس، يتحدث الكتاب عن فكرة الأنواع التي تساعد العلماء على تصنيف جل الكائنات الحية و تحديد الصفات المشتركة و المختلفة بينها، و كذلك تعطينا فكرة عن تطورها، و أشهر نظام معمول به هو لينيوس، الذي يقسم الكائنات الحية حسب النوع ثم الجنس ثم الفصيلة ثم الرتبة فالطائفة ثم الشعبة و أخيرا المملكة؛ هذا التصنيف على شكل هرم قمته ضيقة تضم، الحيوانات، النباتات، الفطريات، الطلائعيات، العتائق و البكتيريا؛ أما قاعدته فتضم الملايين. من بين المشكلات التي تواجه التصنيف صعوبة التفريق الواضح بين بعض الأنواع، ناهيك عن التطور المستمر لجل الكائنات الحية، و التي لها سلف مشترك. هناك ما يسمى بالنوع البيولوجي، و هو تصنيف يعتمد على امكانية التزاوج بين الانواع، لكن لهذا الأخير أيضا انتقادات و اشكالات.
الفصل السادس يحاول تقديم تفسيرات للجينات، فهناك الجين من نظور مانديل عالم النباتات الذي يقوم على أساس فلسفي احصائي، و هناك الجين من منظور علم الأحياء الجزئي، أي ذاك اللولب المكون من الحمض الريبوزي ناقص أكسجين و الفسفاط و القواعد الآزوتية.
في الفصل السابع يناقش الكاتب الانسان ككائن عاقل له سلوك متطور و مثقف، هل هو نتاج للطبيعة أو الجينات حصرا؟، و يخلص في النهاية أن الإنسان جد معقد و هو محصلة عدة عوامل تتبادل التفاعل و التأثير بينها.
كتاب ممتع و شيق، أسلوبه سهل جدا و طريقة العرض متازة و مناقشة الأفكار رائعة، أنصح بشدة بقراءته للمتعة و الفائدة.
في الفصل الأول، يجيب المؤلف عن سؤالي ما هي فلسفة علم الأحياء و ما فائدتها؟؛ حيث يرى أن الفلسفة المتخصصة نشأت بعد تطور العلوم و تمكنها من الاجابة عن الأسئلة التي لطالما حيرت الفلاسفة. و يعتبر هذا المجال الفلسفي جد حديث، و هو يحاول الاجابة عن الأسئلة التي برزت للوجود بعد تطور علم الأحياء، بشكل مستقل عن الفيزياء و باستعمال المنطق و التحليل الفلسفي لفهم الظواهر البيولوجية.
في الفصل الثاني، يشرح الكاتب نظريتين مهمتين من تطوير داروين، تعتبران الآن من أبرز التفسيرات الموجودة لعالم الأحياء؛ و هما التطور و الإنتخاب الطبيعي. و عرج كذلك على الداروينية الجديدة، و هي تلك القديمة نفسها مدعومة بأدلة و تفسيرات من علم الأحياء التطوري و اخر الجزيئي. أبرز كذلك البروفيسور أهمية هذه النظرية و حججها التي تدعمها.
في الفصل الثالث، يبين الكاتب الفرق بين الوظيفة بمعنى وصف الدور أو الأدوار التي يقوم بها عضو ما مثلا، و تساهم في ضمان بقاء و استمرار الكائن الحي. في حين ان التكيف من منظور التكيفيين يرى أن لكل شيء وظيفة محددة وجد من أجلها. في حين أن التطور يدعم الرأي الأول، ببساطة لأن هناك أشياء لا فائدة منها حاليا للكائن الحي.
في الفصل الرابع، طرح المؤلف فكرة مستويات الانتخاب، بمعنى أن هذا الأخير ليس محصورا على مستوى أفراد نوع معين، و إنما هناك إنتخاب جزيئي على مستوى الجينات، و آخر جماعي أي على مستوى الجماعة ككل. فالانتخاب على مستواه الكبير يساعدنا على تفسير بعض الظواهر كالإيثار أو التضحية في سبيل الجماعة، و على المستوى المجهري يساعدنا على تفسير ما يمكن أن نسميه التنافس الجيني.
في الفصل الخامس، يتحدث الكتاب عن فكرة الأنواع التي تساعد العلماء على تصنيف جل الكائنات الحية و تحديد الصفات المشتركة و المختلفة بينها، و كذلك تعطينا فكرة عن تطورها، و أشهر نظام معمول به هو لينيوس، الذي يقسم الكائنات الحية حسب النوع ثم الجنس ثم الفصيلة ثم الرتبة فالطائفة ثم الشعبة و أخيرا المملكة؛ هذا التصنيف على شكل هرم قمته ضيقة تضم، الحيوانات، النباتات، الفطريات، الطلائعيات، العتائق و البكتيريا؛ أما قاعدته فتضم الملايين. من بين المشكلات التي تواجه التصنيف صعوبة التفريق الواضح بين بعض الأنواع، ناهيك عن التطور المستمر لجل الكائنات الحية، و التي لها سلف مشترك. هناك ما يسمى بالنوع البيولوجي، و هو تصنيف يعتمد على امكانية التزاوج بين الانواع، لكن لهذا الأخير أيضا انتقادات و اشكالات.
الفصل السادس يحاول تقديم تفسيرات للجينات، فهناك الجين من نظور مانديل عالم النباتات الذي يقوم على أساس فلسفي احصائي، و هناك الجين من منظور علم الأحياء الجزئي، أي ذاك اللولب المكون من الحمض الريبوزي ناقص أكسجين و الفسفاط و القواعد الآزوتية.
في الفصل السابع يناقش الكاتب الانسان ككائن عاقل له سلوك متطور و مثقف، هل هو نتاج للطبيعة أو الجينات حصرا؟، و يخلص في النهاية أن الإنسان جد معقد و هو محصلة عدة عوامل تتبادل التفاعل و التأثير بينها.
كتاب ممتع و شيق، أسلوبه سهل جدا و طريقة العرض متازة و مناقشة الأفكار رائعة، أنصح بشدة بقراءته للمتعة و الفائدة.
July 26, 2021
Excepting the final chapter, this wasn’t the book I expected, but it did raise some compelling questions. The book did devote more space to semantic and categorical questions than I found useful or interesting. These are the kinds of questions which philosophers may find joy in catching peers in paradoxes, but which are pure navel-gazing, offering no insights on how to achieve the well-lived life or to better understand the grand questions of the universe.
The book looks at the metaphysical and epistemological ramifications of evolution, species classification, genetic and memetic transmission, and the degree to which humans are or aren’t constrained by our evolutionary history. Among the questions I found most interesting were: Is it useful to speak in terms of “function” (i.e. “what a thing is for”) when discussing biological entities, given that those words seem to imply an intended purpose inconsistent with evolution? Does selection occur at the level of the individual, the group, or both? How does one reconcile the Mendelian notion of a “gene” with that of molecular biology? Lest one think Mendel’s ideas were partially formed and are now supplanted, they do internally explain dominance and recessivity, a thing molecular biology can’t yet do. Is it reasonable to apply the logic of evolution and heritability to the cultural domain?
I got a lot out of this tiny guide. It may have spent more time on semantics and categorization than I would have liked (as well as more time reviewing basic biological science,) but it did raise some intriguing questions that I didn’t anticipate as well as illuminating new dimensions of those I did. Your patience with the insubstantial questions will be a major factor in how much you get out of this book.
The book looks at the metaphysical and epistemological ramifications of evolution, species classification, genetic and memetic transmission, and the degree to which humans are or aren’t constrained by our evolutionary history. Among the questions I found most interesting were: Is it useful to speak in terms of “function” (i.e. “what a thing is for”) when discussing biological entities, given that those words seem to imply an intended purpose inconsistent with evolution? Does selection occur at the level of the individual, the group, or both? How does one reconcile the Mendelian notion of a “gene” with that of molecular biology? Lest one think Mendel’s ideas were partially formed and are now supplanted, they do internally explain dominance and recessivity, a thing molecular biology can’t yet do. Is it reasonable to apply the logic of evolution and heritability to the cultural domain?
I got a lot out of this tiny guide. It may have spent more time on semantics and categorization than I would have liked (as well as more time reviewing basic biological science,) but it did raise some intriguing questions that I didn’t anticipate as well as illuminating new dimensions of those I did. Your patience with the insubstantial questions will be a major factor in how much you get out of this book.
November 27, 2022
This short introduction gives a clear overview of the philosophy of biological sciences. Samir Okasha discusses different philosophical perspectives regarding subjects like evolution and levels of selection, function talk in biology, aulterism, classification and the species problem, genes and what can be considered a gene, and whether human behavior and culture can be explained by biology.
The book claims it doesn't require any specialized knowledge in both subjects (philosophy and biology), and I find this true, at least for someone with minimum knowledge in both. The language is easy and whenever it comes to somewhat difficult-to-grasp philosophical concept, intentionality for example, it tends to adhere to simple language and use examples to simplify.
I think it gives a clear overview for the topic and is a very good starting point for an "outsider"- someone who haven't came across that field before and wishes to explore it on deeper levels. Yet, I don't see it adding anything new to someone who is familiar, even vaguely, with either field.
The book claims it doesn't require any specialized knowledge in both subjects (philosophy and biology), and I find this true, at least for someone with minimum knowledge in both. The language is easy and whenever it comes to somewhat difficult-to-grasp philosophical concept, intentionality for example, it tends to adhere to simple language and use examples to simplify.
I think it gives a clear overview for the topic and is a very good starting point for an "outsider"- someone who haven't came across that field before and wishes to explore it on deeper levels. Yet, I don't see it adding anything new to someone who is familiar, even vaguely, with either field.
May 6, 2021
تمرکز کتاب بر مباحث تخصصی زیست شناسی بیشتر است تا فلسفه ی زیست شناسی هرچند این مباحث زیرساخت ذهنی برای نتیجه گیری فلسفی را آماده میکند.. در فصل آخر بر تأثیرات متقابل زیست و فرهنگ پرداخته شده که در نوشته های دیگر هم به شکل کاملتری ارائه شده است.
July 11, 2023
أعتقد أن محبين الأحياء المبتدئين سيفضلون الكتاب أكثر بالنسبة لي كان فصل السلوك البشري والعقل والثقافة أهم جزء.
April 22, 2023
Samir Okasha's Philosophy of Science entry in the VSI Oxford series was very well done, so I purchased this more specialized book. Once again, the writing is clear and accessible (though at least a little philosophy background is necessary), and more important it is more than a recap of what others have already said. Rather, Okasha raises good questions, critiques various authors, and covers some topics in depth and with care.
One such example is his extended discussion on the use of teleological terms and concepts that seem hard to dispense with in biology (as opposed to say physics, where forces and objects do not act in any way that appears purposive). When we speak of "biological functions" (e.g. "the function of the heart is to pump blood"), we are doing something other than engaging in a metaphor. In biology, a good account or description often involves articulating the main function, purpose or job of a given part of a system (e.g. a vital organ within a given organism). We don't speak of the "functions" of inanimate bits of matter, be it atoms, molecules, chemicals or rocks. Though many in science hold that teleology has no place in the modern scientific understanding of the world, things get a bit trickier when we begin to describe the behavior of living beings and systems. Just how we make sense of this difference has been a rich subject of debate among philosophers of biology and biologists (such as Ernst Mayr who was both a biologist and one of the founders of the phil of biology in the 1970s).
Another difference between biology and the sciences of inanimate matter/energy, is that the latter all emphasize the centrality of "laws of nature." Physics has long been the paradigmatic case of this, and the notion of making nature intelligible is often dependent on the articulation of what are thought to be universal laws. Whether the laws are those of Newton or Einstein, subsequent research in, say, physics presupposes the laws until/if they are replaced by others (as in Kuhn's "crisis" where anomalies multiply putting pressure on the reigning paradigm, or something more like Popper's "falsificationist" view). But in biology one is hard pressed to find any "laws" at all; at least as understood in physics. Of course, biological components of living systems obey the laws of physics, but the existence and behavior of living organisms cannot be deduced from those laws alone. One is hard pressed to find a universal formula like F = Ma or E = MC2 in the science of living systems.
Other sections deal with taxonomy, and issues of just what constitutes a species; the issue of "natural kinds" and the status of such systems level concepts as "emergence." The latter is an intriguing and controversial philosophical area. The idea is that *emergent* properties-- perhaps life itself, or sentience-- cannot be deduced from the laws of fundamental physics, but "emerge" within complex systems that yield novel properties that do not exist at simpler levels of analysis, so that "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts"). If this is so, it complicates epistemological and ontological reductionism in science. All these topics, and others, are handled with balance, intelligence and, not infrequently, insight. Fine intro to a fascinating sub-field of phil of sci.
One such example is his extended discussion on the use of teleological terms and concepts that seem hard to dispense with in biology (as opposed to say physics, where forces and objects do not act in any way that appears purposive). When we speak of "biological functions" (e.g. "the function of the heart is to pump blood"), we are doing something other than engaging in a metaphor. In biology, a good account or description often involves articulating the main function, purpose or job of a given part of a system (e.g. a vital organ within a given organism). We don't speak of the "functions" of inanimate bits of matter, be it atoms, molecules, chemicals or rocks. Though many in science hold that teleology has no place in the modern scientific understanding of the world, things get a bit trickier when we begin to describe the behavior of living beings and systems. Just how we make sense of this difference has been a rich subject of debate among philosophers of biology and biologists (such as Ernst Mayr who was both a biologist and one of the founders of the phil of biology in the 1970s).
Another difference between biology and the sciences of inanimate matter/energy, is that the latter all emphasize the centrality of "laws of nature." Physics has long been the paradigmatic case of this, and the notion of making nature intelligible is often dependent on the articulation of what are thought to be universal laws. Whether the laws are those of Newton or Einstein, subsequent research in, say, physics presupposes the laws until/if they are replaced by others (as in Kuhn's "crisis" where anomalies multiply putting pressure on the reigning paradigm, or something more like Popper's "falsificationist" view). But in biology one is hard pressed to find any "laws" at all; at least as understood in physics. Of course, biological components of living systems obey the laws of physics, but the existence and behavior of living organisms cannot be deduced from those laws alone. One is hard pressed to find a universal formula like F = Ma or E = MC2 in the science of living systems.
Other sections deal with taxonomy, and issues of just what constitutes a species; the issue of "natural kinds" and the status of such systems level concepts as "emergence." The latter is an intriguing and controversial philosophical area. The idea is that *emergent* properties-- perhaps life itself, or sentience-- cannot be deduced from the laws of fundamental physics, but "emerge" within complex systems that yield novel properties that do not exist at simpler levels of analysis, so that "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts"). If this is so, it complicates epistemological and ontological reductionism in science. All these topics, and others, are handled with balance, intelligence and, not infrequently, insight. Fine intro to a fascinating sub-field of phil of sci.
February 20, 2025
القضايا التي يطرحها أي علم تحمل في طياتها تأملات فلسفية عميقة.
تلعب الفلسفة دورًا كبيرًا في تعميق فهمنا للصورة التي يرسمها العلم عن العالم، حيث تركز على تحليل المفاهيم العلمية، ودراسة تأثير التطورات العلمية، وكشف المنطق الذي يحكم النظريات العلمية.
في بداياتها، كانت فلسفة العلم تهتم بالفيزياء بشكل أساسي، إذ كانت الوضعية المنطقية هي المدرسة الفكرية المسيطرة في النصف الأول من القرن العشرين. وقد كان رواد هذه المدرسة جميعهم فيزيائيين، فبنوا تصورهم للعلم ضمن إطار فيزيائي، حيث اعتبروا أن البحث العلمي يتمثل في اكتشاف قوانين الطبيعة واستنباط الظواهر منها. كان هذا التصور متوافقًا تمامًا مع الفيزياء، لكنه لم يكن ينطبق بنفس الدقة على العلوم البيولوجية. ففي البيولوجيا، ندرس الظواهر ونحاول فهمها من خلال نماذج ونظريات، لكن الحقائق التجريبية غالبًا لا تمكننا من استخراج قوانين عامة كما هو الحال في الفيزياء، مما يجعل من الصعب إدراج علم الأحياء ضمن الرؤية العلمية التي أسستها الوضعية المنطقية.
لم يتوقف تهميش علم الأحياء عند هذا الحد، حيث إن توماس كون، في كتابه بنية الثورات العلمية، أوضح كيف تتغير الأفكار العلمية عبر الزمن. وعلى الرغم من أنه كان من منتقدي الوضعية المنطقية، إلا أنه ظل مركزًا على الفيزياء، واستمد أمثلته حصريًا من هذا المجال.
ما جعل علم الأحياء اليوم ضمن اهتمامات فلاسفة العلم هو القضايا المفاهيمية العميقة التي بدأ يطرحها بقوة، والتي رافقت التقدم العلمي الثوري في هذا المجال.
من بين القضايا التي تناقشها فلسفة علم الأحياء:
مفهوم الوظيفة والتكيف: ما المعايير التي تجعلنا نصف صفة أو سلوكًا معينًا بأنه تكيف؟
مستويات الانتخاب: هل يحدث الانتخاب الطبيعي على مستوى الجين، الفرد، المجموعة، أم على جميع هذه المستويات معًا؟
مفهوم النوع والتصنيف البيولوجي: لا يوجد تعريف دقيق ومتفق عليه بين جميع العلماء والفلاسفة للأنواع (species). من بين التعريفات الشائعة، نجد تعريف إرنست ماير الذي ينص على أن "النوع هو مجموعة من الكائنات الحية القادرة على التزاوج فيما بينها وإنتاج نسل خصب". غير أن هذا التعريف يظل ناقصًا ولا يمكن تطبيقه على جميع الكائنات الحية.
مفهوم الجين: يشبه هذا الإشكال ما يتعلق بتحديد مفهوم النوع. فعلى الرغم من التقدم الثوري الذي حدث في القرن الحادي والعشرين بعد ثورة الجينوم البشري، لا يزال مفهوم الجين من أكثر المفاهيم تعقيدًا في المجال العلمي. فرغم دقة علم الوراثة الجزيئي، إلا أن هذه الإشكاليات توضح كيف أن الدقة التجريبية قد لا تتماشى أحيانًا مع الدقة المفاهيمية.
بعض المسائل الفلسفية المتعلقة بعلم الوراثة.
انعكاسات علم الأحياء على الإنسان: مثل قضية "الطبيعة مقابل التنشئة"، والتفسير البيولوجي للسلوك البشري، وهي مسائل لا تزال محل جدل حتى اليوم.
كتاب رائع وممتع، يمكن قراءته في جلسة واحدة، مكتوب بأسلوب سلس، ويطرح العديد من المواضيع المثيرة للاهتمام، كما يقدم قراءات إضافية لكل موضوع يناقشه.
تلعب الفلسفة دورًا كبيرًا في تعميق فهمنا للصورة التي يرسمها العلم عن العالم، حيث تركز على تحليل المفاهيم العلمية، ودراسة تأثير التطورات العلمية، وكشف المنطق الذي يحكم النظريات العلمية.
في بداياتها، كانت فلسفة العلم تهتم بالفيزياء بشكل أساسي، إذ كانت الوضعية المنطقية هي المدرسة الفكرية المسيطرة في النصف الأول من القرن العشرين. وقد كان رواد هذه المدرسة جميعهم فيزيائيين، فبنوا تصورهم للعلم ضمن إطار فيزيائي، حيث اعتبروا أن البحث العلمي يتمثل في اكتشاف قوانين الطبيعة واستنباط الظواهر منها. كان هذا التصور متوافقًا تمامًا مع الفيزياء، لكنه لم يكن ينطبق بنفس الدقة على العلوم البيولوجية. ففي البيولوجيا، ندرس الظواهر ونحاول فهمها من خلال نماذج ونظريات، لكن الحقائق التجريبية غالبًا لا تمكننا من استخراج قوانين عامة كما هو الحال في الفيزياء، مما يجعل من الصعب إدراج علم الأحياء ضمن الرؤية العلمية التي أسستها الوضعية المنطقية.
لم يتوقف تهميش علم الأحياء عند هذا الحد، حيث إن توماس كون، في كتابه بنية الثورات العلمية، أوضح كيف تتغير الأفكار العلمية عبر الزمن. وعلى الرغم من أنه كان من منتقدي الوضعية المنطقية، إلا أنه ظل مركزًا على الفيزياء، واستمد أمثلته حصريًا من هذا المجال.
ما جعل علم الأحياء اليوم ضمن اهتمامات فلاسفة العلم هو القضايا المفاهيمية العميقة التي بدأ يطرحها بقوة، والتي رافقت التقدم العلمي الثوري في هذا المجال.
من بين القضايا التي تناقشها فلسفة علم الأحياء:
مفهوم الوظيفة والتكيف: ما المعايير التي تجعلنا نصف صفة أو سلوكًا معينًا بأنه تكيف؟
مستويات الانتخاب: هل يحدث الانتخاب الطبيعي على مستوى الجين، الفرد، المجموعة، أم على جميع هذه المستويات معًا؟
مفهوم النوع والتصنيف البيولوجي: لا يوجد تعريف دقيق ومتفق عليه بين جميع العلماء والفلاسفة للأنواع (species). من بين التعريفات الشائعة، نجد تعريف إرنست ماير الذي ينص على أن "النوع هو مجموعة من الكائنات الحية القادرة على التزاوج فيما بينها وإنتاج نسل خصب". غير أن هذا التعريف يظل ناقصًا ولا يمكن تطبيقه على جميع الكائنات الحية.
مفهوم الجين: يشبه هذا الإشكال ما يتعلق بتحديد مفهوم النوع. فعلى الرغم من التقدم الثوري الذي حدث في القرن الحادي والعشرين بعد ثورة الجينوم البشري، لا يزال مفهوم الجين من أكثر المفاهيم تعقيدًا في المجال العلمي. فرغم دقة علم الوراثة الجزيئي، إلا أن هذه الإشكاليات توضح كيف أن الدقة التجريبية قد لا تتماشى أحيانًا مع الدقة المفاهيمية.
بعض المسائل الفلسفية المتعلقة بعلم الوراثة.
انعكاسات علم الأحياء على الإنسان: مثل قضية "الطبيعة مقابل التنشئة"، والتفسير البيولوجي للسلوك البشري، وهي مسائل لا تزال محل جدل حتى اليوم.
كتاب رائع وممتع، يمكن قراءته في جلسة واحدة، مكتوب بأسلوب سلس، ويطرح العديد من المواضيع المثيرة للاهتمام، كما يقدم قراءات إضافية لكل موضوع يناقشه.
June 8, 2023
Не помня да съм бил толкова разочарован от книга.
Очаквах малко, но това, което получих беше абсолютното дъно.
Ако тази книга отразява цялото поле на философия на биологията - то значи това поле не представлява нищо повече от политическа коректен еволюционен спам.
Реално авторката спами доста за еволюция, което поне ме накара да се замисля, че всъщност идеята за еволюция, и в частност еволюция движена от ествествен отбор и отива да се счита не толкова за научна идея - както се казва наука е физика, математика, и колекция на марки.
а е просто философия, или по-скоро парадигма от философията на биологията в която да се разглежда живота.
Авторката получи 1 звезда за дето излъга, знайно или не знайно - вероятно е от немърливост, но и в двата случая тази авторка не става за нищо, щом не я е срам да напише нещо такова,
а именно, че "Чарлз Мъри е написал цяла книга за IQ-т0 между различните раси".
Това е лъжа. Неистина. Книгата Камбановидната крива ima 22 глави и само 1 от тях е за раса и IQ. Останалите книги не са за това и като цяло книгата не е за това, а е по-скоро много повече за разликата в класите, и за междукласовото IQ и развитието на когнитивен елит с високо IQ и пролетарят с ниско IQ.
Авторката е под всяква критика. То бива бива, ама смятай, колко е запозната и с останалите неща, ако е толкова запозната с тази книга.
Като цяло под всяква критика. Дори цветовете на корицата са скучни.
Видях, че авторът на книгата Теория и реалност - Питър Годври Смит - въведение във философия на науката е написал книга за философия на биологията, ама книгата на тва момиче ми остави толкова лош слух в ушите, че скорочната година се съмнявам да прочета нещо друго.
Дори от книга за Социологията не бях толкова горчиво разочарован, колкото от тази книга.
Такава немърливост би трябвало да се наказва с отнемане на всякакви титли и даване на длъжност редит модератор - за назидание.
Очаквах малко, но това, което получих беше абсолютното дъно.
Ако тази книга отразява цялото поле на философия на биологията - то значи това поле не представлява нищо повече от политическа коректен еволюционен спам.
Реално авторката спами доста за еволюция, което поне ме накара да се замисля, че всъщност идеята за еволюция, и в частност еволюция движена от ествествен отбор и отива да се счита не толкова за научна идея - както се казва наука е физика, математика, и колекция на марки.
а е просто философия, или по-скоро парадигма от философията на биологията в която да се разглежда живота.
Авторката получи 1 звезда за дето излъга, знайно или не знайно - вероятно е от немърливост, но и в двата случая тази авторка не става за нищо, щом не я е срам да напише нещо такова,
а именно, че "Чарлз Мъри е написал цяла книга за IQ-т0 между различните раси".
Това е лъжа. Неистина. Книгата Камбановидната крива ima 22 глави и само 1 от тях е за раса и IQ. Останалите книги не са за това и като цяло книгата не е за това, а е по-скоро много повече за разликата в класите, и за междукласовото IQ и развитието на когнитивен елит с високо IQ и пролетарят с ниско IQ.
Авторката е под всяква критика. То бива бива, ама смятай, колко е запозната и с останалите неща, ако е толкова запозната с тази книга.
Като цяло под всяква критика. Дори цветовете на корицата са скучни.
Видях, че авторът на книгата Теория и реалност - Питър Годври Смит - въведение във философия на науката е написал книга за философия на биологията, ама книгата на тва момиче ми остави толкова лош слух в ушите, че скорочната година се съмнявам да прочета нещо друго.
Дори от книга за Социологията не бях толкова горчиво разочарован, колкото от тази книга.
Такава немърливост би трябвало да се наказва с отнемане на всякакви титли и даване на длъжност редит модератор - за назидание.
August 1, 2024
Do you like or are interested in evolution? Then read this book. Do you not like evolution or don’t give a crap but still want to read this book for some reason? Skim every single chapter but the last two
No seriously, it was almost all evolution. Which I understand for a biology book, especially one dealing with philosophy. But the author took an incredibly heavy handed approach, discounted all Abrahamic religions on the foundation they don’t support evolution, and basically said that you can’t be called a real scientist if you don’t believe in evolution (starting a section titled “Why believe in evolution?” with, “The theory of evolution is a mainstay of modern biology, and no biologist today seriously disputes its truth.”). I understand arguing for something you believe in in but it was just plain disrespectful
No seriously, it was almost all evolution. Which I understand for a biology book, especially one dealing with philosophy. But the author took an incredibly heavy handed approach, discounted all Abrahamic religions on the foundation they don’t support evolution, and basically said that you can’t be called a real scientist if you don’t believe in evolution (starting a section titled “Why believe in evolution?” with, “The theory of evolution is a mainstay of modern biology, and no biologist today seriously disputes its truth.”). I understand arguing for something you believe in in but it was just plain disrespectful
March 27, 2023
I found this book pretty challenging at points as it's been a long time since I've read or delved into the world of biology. that said, I found the book relatively easy to understand while still being incredibly interesting. it's interesting to me that there is so much still to learn in the realm of science as it was already portrayed to me as something 'objective' and 'fixed'. it's refreshing to hear biologists say that they also don't know all the answers yet. the part on genetics, how to define a gene and the interplay between genes and their environment I all found very eye-opening. this book reiterated the importance of stepping outside of one's comfort zone with books every once in a while!
Read
August 19, 2021If the philosophy of biology is picking on the use of terms like function and adaptation, I find myself a bit sceptical about the need for it. I also find it curious that most issues addressed here seem to be disagreements on different views among scientists. An example is the discussion over at which level natural selection finds place. Gene-level, indvidual level or group level.
With that being said, I did find the book to be a good read. It made me aware of how scientific discoveries sometimes are formed by ideologies. I also appreciated the last chapter on human behaviour, as seen from a biological perspective. And reading about cultural evolution is always exciting.
With that being said, I did find the book to be a good read. It made me aware of how scientific discoveries sometimes are formed by ideologies. I also appreciated the last chapter on human behaviour, as seen from a biological perspective. And reading about cultural evolution is always exciting.
March 23, 2024
It's been drought reading season for me, but this book was completely fascinating to go through. As a biologist, there were many seemingly simple questions I didn't think to ask. And I found myself thoughtfully stimulated by the ideas being presented in the book. Vocabulary used was also immaculate, words used to describe states and concepts, fav word: "spandrel" I also enjoyed the proposed structures of thinking about how to categorise research ideas, eg, "proximate" vs. "ultimate" questions. Also fascinated by things I hadn't noticed myself eg, biology is the only science that introduces a hierarchical system of organisation. Cool cool
June 11, 2023
Very good intro to the philosophy of biology including topics that I had not previously given much thought to such as: what is a gene? Does natural selection act on groups, species, individuals or genes? What is a species? Is cultural evolution like Darwinian evolution? Nature or nurture? Do genes contain information?
Fascinating stuff. Makes me want to learn more.
Fascinating stuff. Makes me want to learn more.
February 1, 2022
کتابی مختصر و مفید برای آشنایی با فلسفه ی زیست شناسی
Read
March 14, 2023Nogmaals gelezen voor mijn onderzoek.
Read
March 30, 2023“it is better to seek knowledge and be conscious of your own ignorance than to claim knowledge that you really do not have”
ergo, know nothing
this quote is not featured in the book hehehe
ergo, know nothing
this quote is not featured in the book hehehe
October 7, 2023
As always, very interesting way to learn about the key points of a topic. Clear and precise, and it does more than just exposing facts in the way that it also opens on questions and opinions.
July 12, 2024
heel erg goed geschreven en erg toegankelijk
December 24, 2024
Philosophy + biology is kind of dumb. It’s just arguing over semantics and how to categorize things. Maybe I’m not smart enough to get it. Super clean and concise writing though.
May 13, 2025
I don't know anything about this topic but it was just kind of either stuff I've already thought about a lot before of stuff I really didn't care about, probably not the author's fault.
July 31, 2022
Samir Okasha has been known for his lucid writing on some of the thorniest debates in evolutionary biology. In this book, he opens the canvas a bit more and gives an wholesome introduction to philosophy of biology. I wish it to be part of first year undergraduate curriculum irrespective of the major.
Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews