Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty

by Norman M. Naimark

It can seem as though the Cold War division of Europe was inevitable. But Stalin was more open to a settlement on the continent than is assumed. In this powerful reassessment of the postwar order, Norman Naimark returns to the four years after WWII to illuminate European leaders’ efforts to secure national sovereignty amid dominating powers.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Russia, Soviet History, European History, Soviet Union

368 pages, Hardcover

Published October 8, 2019

About the author

Norman M. Naimark is Robert and Florence McDonnel Professor of Eastern European Studies at Stanford University, and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

Reviews

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good complement to the better known and more accessible histories like the wonderful Postwar by Tony Judt, fills in a lot of specific details.

[Dani · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was fine, certainly not the best book Wayne gave me to read.

[Christopher Benfer · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book took a look at seven different European countries in the immediate aftermath of WWII and how Soviet policy combined with local conditions and the Soviet-American dynamic to shape their future. The seven countries were Denmark, Albania, Finland, Italy, Germany, Poland and Austria.
Each chapter covered a specific country and covered the history roughly from the end of WWII to 1950, with some going a little longer or shorter depending on the circumstances. Each chapter itself was mostly chronological, but they obviously overlapped almost completely with each other. The local politicians and balance of power were discussed for each situation, as well as their relationship with Moscow. In most cases the local communists' relationship was the main focus, but not always depending on the circumstances.
Overall, I was a bit disappointed in the book, partly because there was no cohesive narrative or structure that emphasized common themes or contrasts between the situations. While some of it was covered, and the author did a summary at the end, I didn't feel like there was enough connection between the different countries - it was more like reading a series of separate essays. The author's summary touched on some main themes at the end, but I didn't feel like they were well enough developed in the book.
What I WOULD take away was that Stalin was overall very practical, and during this period was definitely more defensive - at least where these countries are concerned. He clearly wanted to establish a zone of influence in eastern Europe, with a belt of neutral countries on the perimeter. The author doesn't get into deep into motivations, but it seems to me that Stalin was very concerned about Germany repeating the attack on the Soviets in the future. On the practical side, Stalin seemed eager to take wins where he could, but also didn't want to pick fights where it wasn't worth it. In addition, as opposed to the standard Marxist view of history, Stalin was very wary of pushing revolution in eastern Europe - he seemed to view it as a destabilizing force that would be hard to control and raise concerns in the west instead of the inevitable march of history that Marx would have expected.
The other point that the author makes (and I think does show) is that the Cold War dynamic often oversimplifies conditions immediately after WWII. Individual situations were certainly affected by East-West relations but individual actors within the nations and circumstances particular to each had a large effect and shouldn't be ignored.
For overall writing, I felt like the author was a bit dry. In addition, I felt like he didn't do a great job of keeping track of key actors. In some cases he would introduce a name but not develop them fully, but then come back to them in important roles later in the chapter that made it hard to remember who was who. He also introduced a number of people that I didn't feel were necessary, which made it hard to pick up on who was important. The book didn't flow super well and while it felt like everything was researched and factual, the author didn't really make the information come alive.
Overall, not a book I would particularly recommend. Some good info, and I certainly learned things in each chapter that I didn't know before, but there are a lot of great books out there that I would read before this one.

[Barry Smirnoff · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a very well researched and analyzed study of European alignment after World War II. He demonstrates that Stalin went to extreme lengths to reach an agreement with his allies based n their discussions at Yalta and Potsdam. He had no plan for creating a bloc of countries with a common Soviet style of government. This arouse out of the forces that emerged from the post-war politics in each country. Naimark shows that the presence of the Red Army of occupation was a hindrance in winning over the people of the occupied countries. The position of the Communist Parties in the West was not helped by Stalin, who did not want any revolutions in post-war Europe. He did not want conflict until the West started to create NATO, West Germany, and the Marshall Plan. The Berlin crisis was a constant aggravation to him, as Berlin was a center for espionage and propaganda inside of East Germany. This book is very well written and I would recommend it to people interested in the history of contemporary European International relations.

[Walter Loewenstern · Rating 5 out of 5]

Interesting history

Although Stalin wanted to gain as much territory as possible after the end of the second world war, he sometimes backed off. It is interesting to read how and why he didn’t capture some of the countries that he could have.

[Anthony Buck · Rating 3 out of 5]

I've read a few books on Stalin over the years and this was an interesting addition as it covered some situations that I had not previously been aware of. Lost a mark due to a fairly lame attempt to tie it all up with a bow and link it to recent events in a way I found unconvincing.

[randommoodreads · Rating 3 out of 5]

The only reason I didn't rate this lower is because I know that I'm not the intended audience and I was forced to read it rather than doing it of my own free will. But man was this dry, the quotations felt excessive, and I feel so mentally exhausted. If what you want is a look into Stalin and the Cold War, I recommend John Gaddis's novel instead.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good exploration of 7 different countries postwar and their trajectories caught between the USA and USSR juggernauts. I liked the explanation of the various parties' thinking regarding each unique situation, showing that, despite propaganda from all sides, most foreign policy is far more flexible and pragmatic than we think. The fates of Eastern European nations were not inevitable, but a byproduct of the times and their locations

[Alex Stern · Rating 5 out of 5]

I usually stick to books about interwar European politics but this book was phenomenal. Any skepticism I had immediately went away as I started reading the first few pages. A beautiful set of case studies from a variety of different countries and how they played into the balance of power between East and West.

[Davidveidlitz · Rating 3 out of 5]

Disappointed.

[Samantha wickedshizuku Tolleson · Rating 3 out of 5]

Did a paper for this book HY404. I'll post it once I am finished with the semester. Peace pretties!
Lots of Love,
Shizuku

[Connor Douglass · Rating 3 out of 5]

My search for a clear and comprehensive history of the sovietization of Eastern Europe continues :(

[Gemesi Balazs · Rating 3 out of 5]

Great insights of post-war Europe and the surprisingly pragmatic parts of Stalin’s policy. Yet one wonders if as in many cases doubling down on a totalitarian ideology is the way to extend sovereignty, is it a universally desirable goal after all?

[Alex Broughton · Rating 3 out of 5]

A series of case studies that purport to show that Stalin was not really interested in dominating Europe in the post-WW2 era. An alternative interpretation of the facts presented could be that he had the will, but not the means.