Winner, 2019, Gettysburg Civil War Roundtable's Distinguished Book Award, best book published on the Gettysburg CampaignThis is the first book-length, critical analysis of Lieutenant General James Longstreet's actions at the Battle of Gettysburg. The author argues that Longstreet's record has been discredited unfairly, beginning with character assassination by his contemporaries after the war and, persistently, by historians in the decades since. By closely studying the three-day battle, and conducting an incisive historiographical inquiry into Longstreet's treatment by scholars, this book presents an alternative view of Longstreet as an effective military leader, and refutes over a century of negative evaluations of his performance.
Cory M. Pfarr works for the Department of Defense. He is the author of the award-winning Longstreet at Gettysburg: A Critical Reassessment (McFarland Publishers, 2019), Righting the Longstreet Record at Gettysburg: Six Matters of Controversy and Confusion (McFarland, 2023), in addition to John Quincy Adams's Republicanism: "A Thousand Obstacles Apparently Stand Before Us" (Massachusetts Historical Society, 2014). He is an associate editor for North & South Magazine, has written articles for North & South Magazine and Gettysburg Magazine, and appeared on the Pennsylvania Cable Network and C-SPAN American History TV. He lives in Fallston, Maryland with his wife and four kids.
The focus of this book is what the author sees as unfair criticism of James Longstreet's performance at Gettysburg. A group of Confederate officers went after Longstreet when the war ended, and much of their criticism stuck over the years. This book attempts to defend Longstreet's work on July 2nd and 3rd. It does a decent job of it.
On Day 2 of Gettysburg, Longstreet's First Corps (minus Pickett's Brigade) fought very well. The leadup to the battle carries questions about Longstreet--he was slow moving his troops to get into position, he had to double back because of a mistake in the route that his troops were taking (could well have been a staff problem, and not Longstreet's error), and could not carry out Lee's orders because Union forces were not stationed where Lee's reconnaissance said that they would be. But, think of this: Longstreet had one corps out of three in the Confederate army. He took on the following: 1st Corps (some remnants), 2nd Corps, 3rd Corps, 5th Corps, 6th Corps, segments of the 11th Corps (wrecked on the first day), and the 12th Corps. The 2nd Corps was mauled as was the Third. Other corps were hit hard, too. That was good fighting. But, at the end of the day, the southern forces had to drop back to not too far from where they had started.
The 3rd Day was Pickett's Charge (although troops from A. P. Hill's Corps were heavily involved, too. Longstreet was in overall charge. The Federal troops held "high ground" (if you have been to Gettysburg, you know that it isn't a huge steep ridge, but it was good ground). Longstreet is blamed for poor placement of the attacking forces, for not using supporting troops to bolster the charge, etc. The author addresses each of these, suggesting that if Longstreet made some errors, the two other corps commanders did as well. And that the charge was a desperate venture.
At any rate. An interesting book. I think the author may have overstated the case somewhat, but I have long thought that, overall, Longstreet had a pretty good day as a general at Gettysburg.
Longstreet at Gettysburg: A Critical Reassessment by Cory M. Pharr is indeed a critical reassessment and an impassioned defense of General James Longstreet's performance during the Battle of Gettysburg. Conventional views of the battle, Pfarr holds, blame the Confederate loss on Longstreet for being intentionally slow and petulant because General Robert E. Lee wouldn't fight the battle using Longstreet's tactics and strategy. Pfarr maintains that this view was formed by the Lost Cause school of Civil War History with Longstreet a convenient scapegoat because of post-war views and an unwillingness to lay the blame at Lee's feet. He takes a critical look at after-action reports, letters, memoirs, and more to show that Longstreet didn't purposefully obstruct Lees plans and that he dutifully carried out Lee's plans, often with Lee at his side or very close by. He takes a critical look at post-Gettysburg actions and the relationship between Longstreet and Lee after Gettysburg to show that Longstreet retained Lee's confidence.
Perhaps there will be those that accuse Pfarr of a lack of objectivity, but I found that he compared and contrasted primary materials from a variety of observers along with official after-action reports and took a reasoned look at the battle itself and the actions of the participants. I have long thought that many authors have been unfair toward Longstreet and that Lee as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia bore most of the blame for the failure at Gettysburg (through errors of tactics and strategy and command errors), so I'm glad to see that someone has done such a detailed examination and analysis. I truly hope that Pfarr's work leads to a more balanced view of what happened at Gettysburg.
This in-depth, high-quality exposition achieves the objective of rebuking the unsubstantiated claims by many Civil War writers regarding James Longstreet at Gettysburg. Pfarr’s thorough research and analysis of primary sources, in conjunction with critiques of more modern historical works, holds historians accountable by exposing blatant falsehoods, biases, and mere conjectures treated as fact over the years since Gettysburg, while clearly pointing out the errors and positing alternatives that approach the topic with a refined and studied perspective. The analysis and refutations contained in this text should encourage other historians to strive for truthful representations of history, rooted in fact and reflective of honest, unbiased study.
Longstreet at Gettysburg covers the Gettysburg campaign from the Confederate perspective, noting perceptions of enemy force locations and strengths, as well as discussions of strategy and alterations of those plans as events transpired. Considerable focus is directed toward some of the major blunders that befell the Confederates (especially the absence and failure of reconnaissance) outside of Longstreet’s control that had largely been omitted by writers intending to pin the defeat on Longstreet. Taking each significant moment throughout the battle in turn, Pfarr presents the critiques leveraged against Longstreet, returns to original source material to identify the weaknesses in those arguments, and guides the reader to a more accurate conclusion of Longstreet’s actions at those moments. While ensuring the various shortcomings of the Confederates at Gettysburg were attributed appropriately, Pfarr describes the battle in great detail, supplementing the prose with helpful maps depicting the Confederate and Federal forces throughout the three days.
While Longstreet is (appropriately) portrayed much more genially in this work than others concerning the same topic, Pfarr rightfully notes Longstreet’s own erroneous assertions developed decades after Gettysburg, rather than committing the same error of presenting a flawless, unblemished character as many of the refuted authors had done for both Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson. The result is a scholarly, dutiful, and unbiased correction of historical chronicling of Longstreet’s conduct at Gettysburg. The text is also easily accessible to non-historians and even skillfully piques one’s general interest in the Civil War throughout the narrative. Lastly, Pfarr’s work constitutes the noble task of restoring Longstreet’s reputation as a loyal, expert military leader during the war, and as a humble, devoted patriot afterward.
In almost fifty years of civil war reading I have always felt it odd that two generals, one Union and one Confederate were always demeaned by historians. Granted these warriors were not perfect but there seemed to be issues beyond their war records. The Union general is William Rosecran, the Confederate is General James Longstreet. Mr. Pfarr’s book, Longstreet at Gettysburg is the perfect response to those that heap all the failures upon him for the Confederate loss. Longstreet’s attempts to heal the broken South put a bullseye on him and those writers as well as Confederate soldiers trying to cling to the “Lost Cause” mentality cast a lot of stones at Longstreet trying to seriously discredit him and his contributions. Then he did the unspeakable, he was honest about “The Marble Man”Robert E. Lee on those faithful three days. Mr. Pfarr takes the reader through all of the arguments against Longstreet beginning with the march into Pennsylvania to Pickett’s charge. He skillfully takes apart each argument with skill and really compelling writing. I enjoyed this book so much I asked our local library to order a copy for general usage. Anyone who enjoys Civil War reading, that enjoys James Longstreet as a general, anyone that wants to see wrongs corrected, or arguments skillful disassembled this is a book for you. I can not recommend this book highly enough, it is excellent and should be on every serious readers bookshelf. By the way the book for Rosecrans is “General Grant and the Rewriting of History; How the Destruction of General William S. Rosecrans Influenced Our Understanding of the Civil War” by Frank P. Varney. Also an excellent book.
Finally, an honest review of James Longstreet at Gettysburg. His strategy was correct for that battle, Lee's was not. Lee was right when he said "It's all my fault."
A fascinating examination of Longstreet’s actions at Gettysburg; Pfarr’s work should assist in moving scholarship forward to remove some of the Lost Cause baggage the general has carried for almost 150 years.
Compelling review of Longstreet's actions during the Battle of Gettysburg including comparisons of post-conflict Lee apologists and the second and third generation historians (viz. Freeman, Catton, Coddington and so forth), who apparently accepted or agreed in these biased assessments. Using contemporary after-battle reports along with letters and a close reading of post-conflict memoirs, Pfarr persuasively argues that Longstreet has been unfairly pilloried in Civil War history through misrepresentation and fabrication of Gettysburg events in order to elevate the Robert E. Lee ideal and bolster the Lost Cause myth. Additionally, Pfarr takes to task the later contemporary historians of the Civil War who either agreed, in greater or lesser degrees, with those earlier or assessments or who allowed themselves to be unduly speculative about the state of minds of men in command long since dead. Neither does Pfarr descend into a ramshackle practice of rudimentary psychology by giving credence to allegations of Longstreet's bruised ego or jealousy of T.J. Jackson. Organizationally, Pfarr addresses the weeks preceding the events of July 1-3, 1863, as well as reviewing each day in minute detail and I came away with a much-improved conception of how the battle unfolded and how the Confederate generalship undermined its own operations e.g. not only Lee and the absent Stuart but Hill, Ewell, Lee's his own chief of artillery, William Pendleton, as well as his chief of scouts must bear heavy responsibility for actions that would weigh decisively against them.
A very informative, comprehensive but also concise and well written defense of Longstreet at Gettysburg. The author's viewpoint is summarized by this early passage in the book:
"Of all Lee's corps commanders at that battle in the summer of 1863, Longsteet was by far the most reliable and subordinate despite his tactical reservations. Contrary to what many modern Longstreet critics would admit, if supported properly during the second day's battle, the First Corps cammander's assault would likely have broken the Federal line"
This is the central premise of his argument and he provides more than enough supporting evidence to make it overwhelming.
An excellent attempt at setting the record straight and rehabilitating the reputation of one of the wars greatest generals. A wonderful book about a great and talented soldier.
I was thrilled to read this worthy addition to my civil war collection. Many thanks to the author for setting the record straight. Civil war history and historians have come a long way.
Outstanding assessment of Longstreet’s actions at Gettysburg. Painstakingly goes through all the controversies and accusations. Important contribution to the Gettysburg library.
I greatly enjoyed Corey Pfarr’s Longstreet at Gettysburg: A Critical Reassessment. Farr synthesizes a wide array of historical research from both earlier and contemporary scholars on the Gettysburg Campaign. His analysis persuasively demonstrates that General Lee and General Longstreet entered the Pennsylvania campaign with an agreed-upon offensive strategy coupled with a tactical defensive option to be employed when circumstances allowed. That understanding was effectively disrupted when the Army of Northern Virginia unexpectedly encountered General John Buford’s cavalry on July 1.
Pfarr’s conclusions are also supported by contemporaneous Confederate sources. For example, Edward Porter Alexander, in his first memoir Fighting for the Confederacy (often referred to as offering “enough proof” on this question), makes clear that Longstreet performed his duties conscientiously and executed Lee’s chosen tactics on July 1, 2, and 3 to the best of his ability.
Additional corroboration arises from General Lee’s own conduct after the battle. Far from expressing dissatisfaction, Lee preserved a warm and trusting relationship with Longstreet. In fact, approximately ninety days after Gettysburg, Lee wrote to Longstreet, stating: “My whole heart and soul have been with you and your brave corps in the late battle. Finish the work before you do, my dear General, and return to me.” Lee sent other letters in the same spirit, underscoring his continued respect and confidence. Such language is entirely inconsistent with the later accusations that Longstreet had been insubordinate, slow, sulking, or derelict during the battle.
Pfarr’s work therefore rests on a firm evidentiary foundation, and it aligns with a broader historiographical shift that has taken place from the mid-2000s onward. Scholars such as Allen Guelzo, in Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, have contributed further nuance that helps correct earlier Lost Cause-era characterizations of Longstreet.
For anyone interested in this specialized area of Civil War history, Pfarr’s book is highly recommended.
James "Old Pete" Longstreet has been vilified since the Civil war, and blamed for losing the battle of Gettysburg because of obstinacy and intentional tardiness of day 2 and 3 of that battle. It was said he argued with Lee and couldn't stand the fact that his superior would not budge, and therefore took to sabotaging wherever he was able during the fight.
Pfarr robustly vindicates Longstreet, by detailing all the controversies that have since arisen and illustrating that Longstreet did not, in fact, sulk and sabotage; that much of the responsibility of any of the failures during the early July days of 1863 indeed lay elsewhere. Longstreet was not averse to doing battle, but very much preferred "offensive strategy, and defensive tactics." That is: take the army up north, then force the enemy to attack you when you're well entrenched on the ground of your own choosing. Lee opted, instead, to go for offensive tactics (attack the Federals who occupied the high ground), and the ultimate blame for losing Gettysburg lies with him.
Pfarr's opinionated reasoning may rub some readers the wrong way, but his arguments are largely historiographical and are bound to go against what has long been said about Longstreet's actions. And his arguments are solid, his use of primary material excellent and refreshing. He often relies on words written by people who were present at different stages of the campaign, in order to dismantle the Lost Cause rhetoric that has been raging against Longstreet for much since the death of Robert E. Lee in 1870, and that has since influenced many historians.
This is a slim volume, but it sure packs a punch, and is rather detailed in its analysis. I very much recommend it, for anyone who wants to better understand what happened during the fateful July days in 1863.
Prose style makes Cory Pfarr's LONGSTREET AT GETTYSBURG an unsatisfying read. His knowledge of historiography regarding Lee, "The Lost Cause," Longstreet, and Gettysburg impresses. Consistently, his argument evidences immersion into primary and secondary sources, and his analysis of these sources, particularly of the post-war writings of the officer corps of the Army of Northern Virginia is cogent. Pfarr's narrative often caused me to re-evaluate the work of Civil War historians I admire, academic and popular. Gary Gallagher, particularly, appears to be less than balanced in his writing about Longstreet at Gettysburg when Pfarr brings his analytical lens to bear on Gallagher's work.
Pfarr does a conscientious job of providing two things that often mar popular history: excellent maps and footnotes.
Writing, however, particularly narrative prose, is not Mr. Pfarr's metier. In once sentence, for example, he writes: "After the war...in his post-war article...." Now this kind of mis-step is one that also raises questions about who his editor might have been. An inexperienced historian benefits when a veteran editor or a group of peers pore through his text. Clearly, that step wasn't taken, or, if it was, it was done in such a cavalier fashion that Pfarr, who has the data to make a compelling read, wasn't pushed hard enough to do re-writes.
This is the definitive assessment of James Longstreet at Gettysburg. Pfarr systematically traces and addresses the origins and motivations behind criticisms of Longstreet’s performance in the battle. Much of that criticism centers in the myth of the Lost Cause and the compulsions of its adherents to always reverence Robert E. Lee’s battlefield prowess and to always attack those, like Longstreet, who cooperated with Reconstruction after the war. These criticisms have—either maliciously or ignorantly—been perpetuated by many different historians since the late 18th Century and into the 21st Century. Pfarr offers convincing evidence against it all, placing the Longstreet whom Lee affectionately called his “old warhorse” in his proper place as one of the brilliant military leaders of his time. In so doing, Pfarr offers a stunning rebuke of the Lost Cause tenet of Lee’s infallibility, and a volume of scholarship well worth adding to anyone’s personal library.
Definitely not a book for beginners on the battle of Gettysburg… but a great read for anyone who has already studied the battle quite a bit. The author does an excellent job examining the validity of many different complaints about Longstreet’s performance at Gettysburg, and building a well fortified argument against the many Lost Cause claims. The book is nicely organized into a many different chapters where each chapter explores one different claim against Longstreet. This makes reading easy and what could be overpowering quite a digestible read. I always appreciated the numerous callbacks to many different works on Gettysburg by authors that I’ve read. It help’s really make his approach feel very well rounded and throughly researched. In the end the author’s claims to defend Longstreet seem very believable.
Cory Pfarr gives us a really nice look at the Lost Cause thinking created by the south after the war. The lost cause raises Robert E. Lee up to a Christ like figure. In order to maintain this view of Robert E. Lee, they in turn scapegoated James Longstreet as the reason the south was defeated at Gettysburg.
Their premise is somewhat suspect, and Cory Pfarr does an excellent job of laying out details that refute it. If you have an interest in the Civil War, or particularly this Lost Cause view, then I would read this book. I think you will be enlightened by Pfarr’s detail on Longstreet’s role at Gettysburg, as well as his beliefs on how the war should be prosecuted, defensive verses offensive.
Cory Pfarr has written a tour de force in defense of James Longstreet’s performance at the Battle of Gettysburg. In the process, he dismantles much of the Lost Cause mythology that surrounds Longstreet at Gettysburg. The book was very well written and researched. The only serious problem I had with the book was that the notes were endnotes at the back of the book. With his arguments for Longstreet and against the proponents of the Lost Cause, it was critical to see from where he was drawing his material. The back of the book was too clumsy for that. The notes truly needed to be footnotes. That is why I only gave it four stars.
I’ll make this short and sweet. If you’re a serious student of Gettysburg then Pfarr’s book should be required reading. Period. By using extensive primary sources he unleashes salvo after salvo against those who believed and still believe that Lee and Jackson were “marble men” immune to bad military decisions, and how he took decades of abuse for losing the battle from Lost Cause buffoons.
Again my only complaint is the price ($39.95) for a 200 page paperback, but that’s McFarland for you.
I’m sure that “Old Pete” is up in heaven telling his friend, Dan Sickles, “See, I told you so.”
Of course, history has not been kind to Lt Gen Longstreet, due to his support of Grant and the Republicans after the Civil War. To a large extent, the entire "Lost Cause" myth chose him to bear the burden of the South's defeat.
Having spent a good amount of time tramping around Gettysburg, one can only wonder what the heck Lee was thinking. So it was quite refreshing to see a pretty much unbiased review of Longstreet's performance at Gettysburg.
A critical study of General James Longstreet and his role in the Battle of Gettysburg. Long a foil for writers convinced he was responsible flr the defeat in order to maintain the romantic mythology of Robert E Lee, this study suggests otherwise. It is quite thorough and gave my a lot of information about pivotal events in the battle.
The author provides detailed evidence to prove that the many critics of Longstreet’s performance at Gettysburg were attempting to avoid any blemish upon Lee’s record by making Longstreet the scapegoat for the Confederate defeat. Excellent writing!
After all these years, General Longstreet finally gets the defense he deserves! Exceedingly well researched and persuasively argued. Lee's Warhorse put in perspective as Lee's senior and most reliable subordinate.