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Modern War Studies
Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare
When Germany launched its blitzkrieg invasion of France in 1940, it forever changed the way the world waged war. Although the Wehrmacht ultimately succumbed to superior Allied firepower in a two-front war, its stunning operational achievement left a lasting impression on military commanders throughout the world, even if their own operations were rarely executed as effectively.
Robert Citino analyzes military campaigns from the second half of the twentieth century to further demonstrate the difficulty of achieving decisive results at the operational level. Offering detailed operational analyses of actual campaigns, Citino describes how UN forces in Korea enjoyed technological and air superiority but found the enemy unbeatable; provides analyses of Israeli operational victories in successive wars until the Arab states finally grasped the realities of operational-level warfare in 1973; and tells how the Vietnam debacle continued to shape U.S. doctrine in surprising ways. Looking beyond major-power conflicts, he also reveals the lessons of India's blitzkrieg-like drive into Pakistan in 1971 and of the senseless bloodletting of the Iran-Iraq War.
Citino especially considers the evolution of U.S. doctrine and assesses the success of Desert Storm in dismantling an entrenched defending force with virtually no friendly casualties. He also provides one of the first scholarly analyses of Operation Iraqi Freedom, showing that its plan was curiously divorced from the realities of military history, grounded instead on nebulous theories about expected enemy behavior. Throughout Citino points to the importance of mobility--especially mobilized armor--in modern operational warfare and assesses the respective roles of firepower, training, doctrine, and command and control mechanisms.
Brimming with new insights, Citino's study shows why technical superiority is no guarantee of victory and why a thorough grounding in the history of past campaigns is essential to anyone who wishes to understand modern warfare. "Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm" provides that grounding as it addresses the future of operational-level warfare in the post-9/11 era.
Robert Citino analyzes military campaigns from the second half of the twentieth century to further demonstrate the difficulty of achieving decisive results at the operational level. Offering detailed operational analyses of actual campaigns, Citino describes how UN forces in Korea enjoyed technological and air superiority but found the enemy unbeatable; provides analyses of Israeli operational victories in successive wars until the Arab states finally grasped the realities of operational-level warfare in 1973; and tells how the Vietnam debacle continued to shape U.S. doctrine in surprising ways. Looking beyond major-power conflicts, he also reveals the lessons of India's blitzkrieg-like drive into Pakistan in 1971 and of the senseless bloodletting of the Iran-Iraq War.
Citino especially considers the evolution of U.S. doctrine and assesses the success of Desert Storm in dismantling an entrenched defending force with virtually no friendly casualties. He also provides one of the first scholarly analyses of Operation Iraqi Freedom, showing that its plan was curiously divorced from the realities of military history, grounded instead on nebulous theories about expected enemy behavior. Throughout Citino points to the importance of mobility--especially mobilized armor--in modern operational warfare and assesses the respective roles of firepower, training, doctrine, and command and control mechanisms.
Brimming with new insights, Citino's study shows why technical superiority is no guarantee of victory and why a thorough grounding in the history of past campaigns is essential to anyone who wishes to understand modern warfare. "Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm" provides that grounding as it addresses the future of operational-level warfare in the post-9/11 era.
430 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 2004
16 people are currently reading
384 people want to read
About the author
Robert M. Citino
21 books114 followersRobert M. Citino is an American history professor, scholar and writer currently teaching at the University of North Texas. He specializes in German military history and has earned acclaim by writing several historical books on the subject. He has appeared as a consultant on the History Channel several times on the subject of World War II and German military tactics.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
March 25, 2020
Citino discusses battles from the German's 1940 Blitzkrieg to the 1991 Desert Storm, with stops for Korea, Vietnam, Arab-Israel and Iran-Iraq. He compares fighting styles, theories and weapons demonstrating that there is no one recipe for victory.
Why I started this book: Professional Reading title, that I picked up on a whim at the library.
Why I finished it: I've renewed it to the maximum and needed to return the title. To be fair, somewhere along the way, I lost the thread and put it down... and it was so easy not to pick up again. Each chapter is detailed and provides a perfect stopping point as the next chapter is a different war in another country.
Why I started this book: Professional Reading title, that I picked up on a whim at the library.
Why I finished it: I've renewed it to the maximum and needed to return the title. To be fair, somewhere along the way, I lost the thread and put it down... and it was so easy not to pick up again. Each chapter is detailed and provides a perfect stopping point as the next chapter is a different war in another country.
June 27, 2022
在知名的瑞典公司Paradox 的作品裡面，有一款以二戰為背景為主的遊戲〈Heart of Iron〉，一般譯為〈鋼鐵雄心〉。在裡面對於各國軍事理論學說有著詳細的設定，並將之分成四種，在最新的一代分別是：機動作戰學說(德國)、優勢火力學說(美國)、決戰計畫學說(英、法、日)、大規模作戰學說(蘇)，都有其特色屬性跟對應的玩法；不過遊戲中並不會解釋說明這些學說的內容，玩久了也是會想了解一下這些設定從何而來，是什麼樣的意義。前陣子簡體市場最大的軍事出版社指文出了本書：《從閃電戰到沙漠風暴：戰爭戰役層級發展史》，翻閱了一下，發現是講述自二戰以來世界各主要國對於戰役層級的作戰學說，正好符合需求，於是深感興趣，唯一妨礙我立刻買它的原因就是價錢了。
本書作者羅伯特•M.奇蒂諾（Robert M. Citino）是美國著名的軍事歷史作家，專長是二戰跟德軍的作戰理論及其影響。《從閃電戰到沙漠風暴》是他關於戰爭學說理論研究的第二部作品(第一部是《尋求決定性的勝利》，目前沒有翻譯)，講述從二戰到波斯灣戰爭這段二十世紀後半的各大國的研究與實踐。
任何一位頂尖指揮官，對於其戰爭藝術的追求，無非是以最少的損失，獲取最大的戰果。而要達成這種成就，作者指出，自古以來的名將都是把握一個原則，隨時保持機動，切忌強攻，尋求在戰場上的突破口，從弱點給予敵人重大打擊，形成決定性的勝利。從古代的《孫子兵法》到近代的《戰略論：間接路線》，無不是強調這種概念。
‧一戰的遺產
自從機關槍的發明，加上壕溝跟鐵絲網及各種大砲，戰場上的優勢越來越向防守方傾斜，日俄戰爭在中國東北的幾場陸上會戰即已有這種現象萌芽，亦即，運動戰越來越難施展，最終消耗戰化。不過施里芬依然計劃著透過運動戰來打出一場“坎尼式的勝利”。作者指出，概念是對的，但他忽略了漢尼拔是在一個小區域打出的會戰，而一戰德軍卻要在將近半個西歐運動，兩者需要的運輸力量跟通訊難度差之何止千里。當小毛奇在後方指揮部面對上百份混亂且各自矛盾的電報索性放棄乾脆憑直覺下令，我們也不難體諒了。
‧德國先制
基於容易四面受敵的地理位置，從普魯士時代開始，德國就注定了必須在有限的人力、資源跟縱深的情況下，打一場速戰速決的戰爭。坦克的出現成為各國利用來恢復運動戰的一種工具，但具體該怎麼做，列強們都在摸索。德國本來受制於和約在進度上是落後的，他們最終在二戰以裝甲機動為核心打出的“閃電戰”震驚世人卻是歷史的某種偶然。事實上蘇聯人在以圖哈切夫斯基為主的一派在裝甲作戰上走得更遠，“大縱深戰略”講求以多兵種協同正面打擊出缺口，裝甲機械做為第二波、第三波深入追擊擴大戰果，輔以空中力量不斷投射確認勝利。這種學說雖然最後因為史達林的大清洗而沒有成真，但一度吸引了許多敏銳的外國觀察家的注意。
德國是最大的受益者，他們在二零年代跟蘇聯秘密的軍事合作學到很多經驗，以古德林為首等新銳派全都認識到了多兵種混合作戰的重要性，還有堅持對戰役層面的運動戰的追求，賦予底層軍士官極大的臨戰自主權限的“任務式戰術”(Auftragstaktik)的成功，構成了其在二戰初期的優勢。而無線電的發明跟機械化則緩解了過去在一戰中出現的通訊與運輸的兩大噩夢。
戰爭最終輸掉了，作者認為除了主要是政治方面的問題外，德軍有個大弱點就是，他們並沒有思考如果“閃電戰”失敗了的備案，特別是在二戰中期，對手們都已經孰悉其戰法並各自發展對應之道之後。
‧紅軍的不可模仿性
大清洗導致蘇聯原本領先的優勢地位的喪失，他們得用血跟時間去換回。紅軍大致上恢復了“大縱深戰略”作戰方式，利用出色的情報欺瞞敵軍，短期內在某段戰線集中力量然遂行其作戰，隨著其越來越熟練跟物資與人力上的優勢，讓敵人難以招架。
當然，紅軍也是有弱點，他們的靈活性的不足，在面對德軍的彈性防禦始終拿不出好的應對方法，而在傷亡數字上的輕忽也都令許多外國觀察家目瞪口呆。作者於此時強調，每個國家都應該針對自己的條件，去找出最適合的戰爭學說。他指出，美國軍事學者雖然於戰爭結束後研究紅軍時感到敬佩，但他們也非常清楚自己國家不可能學習，光是這種傷亡數字就簡直難以想像。
‧美國的成長史
美國在兩次大戰中都扮演了重要的角色，但他們的戰役層面的學說卻是發展的異常遲緩。一戰中主要是來自法國的指導，結束之後，美國人在坦克的研究上走了另外一條道路。他們沒有像英國陷入步坦誰主誰副的爭執，而是直接把這種新式武器定位成協助步兵突破跟擴大戰果的工具，而把敵方裝甲交給坦克殲擊車去處理。這種思路導致在戰爭初期美軍戰車在虎式、豹式面前毫無優勢，而事實上坦克殲擊車也無法真正有效對付對手，美國的戰爭學說在實際應用上失敗的一蹋糊塗。以至於戰爭初期表現奇差，甚至被英軍嘲笑為：「我們的義大利人。」(兩個一起嘲諷也是絕了)
美軍真正的開竅要等到布拉德利、巴頓這些指揮官的發揮，他們在盟軍於諾曼底陷入僵局後尋找突破的機會，「眼鏡蛇行動」是一場仿製德、蘇學說要點的作戰，簡單來說，就是於敵方防線薄弱處，用大批的坦克跟戰機支援於狹窄正面達成突破，再投入大軍擴展戰果。一種結合了大規模物資優勢，從正面推進轉向運動戰的“美國戰爭方式”。
不過，二戰結束後，美軍大部分的時間都在準備一場實際上未曾發生的戰爭：與蘇聯紅軍的對抗。這是一場對雙方都尷尬的狀況。美國不可能在歐洲大陸駐紮足以跟紅軍對抗的兵力，他們只能期待友軍盡可能拖延到援軍到來，而這又取決於第三方的狀況而非自己。反觀蘇聯，實際上只要一集結大軍就會被察覺而喪失突襲性，且這也跟他們的學說相違背，但如果正面對抗實際上在北約的空襲跟核武威脅情況下，紅軍能佔多少優勢是可以打上一個大問號的。
值得慶幸的是戰爭始終沒有發生。考驗美軍的反而是另外兩場區域戰爭。朝鮮戰爭是在一個狹長半島展開的，它的運動戰只在初期人民軍突襲跟麥帥仁川登陸後的反擊上。而越戰的對手則從頭到尾都是想跟美國打一場不一樣型態的作戰。
美軍在這兩場戰爭中的表現都差強人意，但好處是，至少在七、八零年代，陸軍展開了革新運動，他們允許了對於新作戰學說的激辯，各種意見浮上檯面，但最後定型的是一種集過去半個世紀學說之大成的「空陸一體戰」。簡單來說，四個原則：主動、靈敏、縱深跟協調。首先，指揮官應該搶奪戰場主動權，設法讓對方措手不及，以全面的行動讓敵人所有力量都遭到攻擊，不知何處才是主攻分散其力量，裝甲部隊趁機尋找薄弱處突破點，用導彈打擊敵後，戰機遮斷敵援，並使用空中機動力量破壞對方的指揮與通信系統，瓦解其反抗可能。這種作戰需要全兵種的協同，如何保持一致將是作戰成功的關鍵。
很快的，波斯灣戰爭對付伊拉克成為了試金石。盟軍先對伊拉克進行全面的空襲，破壞了所有防空系統，指揮部乃至總統府，徹底的奪取了制空權。之後再轟炸地面上的各大橋梁、要道，斷絕伊軍跟本土的聯絡及援軍的可能。陸軍則是先進行佯攻，用偏師跟海上登陸部隊吸引在科威特重兵防禦的伊拉克軍的注意，然後主力裝甲部隊從西面較不設防的沙漠乾谷大膽迂迴繞後，配合空降部隊徹底的完成了一場單翼包圍的作戰。伊拉克陸軍就這麼成為美國「空陸一體戰」的第一個犧牲者。不過，作者認為這並不是什麼全新的學說，只是把過往的原則重新整，並通過現代更先進的科技再發揮。而且，目前看來似乎只有美國人玩得起，再次印證了他一再強調每個國家都應該針對自己的條件，去找出最適合的戰爭學說的見解。
除了這上述案例外，作者還讚揚了兩個小國：以色列跟印度。說來有點諷刺，這個新生的國家處境是最像德國的。四面楚歌，人力跟資源奇缺，導致他們除了速戰速決別無其他生存方法。以色列軍隊非常重視戰役層面的運動戰，而且他們也跟德軍一樣，放手讓底層軍官臨場判斷，隨時把握機會。雖然他們一度因為裝甲部隊的連戰連勝而過度迷信，忽略了兵種協同慘遭痛擊，但很快就又修正回來，繼續成為一支保持活力並在實戰中得到檢證的軍隊。另外一個印度比較不那麼典型，但同樣是運動戰的極致發揮，它在孟加拉獨立戰時，先耐心確認等中國無法介入，美國鞭長莫及後，不動聲色的調集部隊，利用機械化部隊跟空降師以迅雷不及掩耳的速度攻陷各大戰略要地，在不到的兩週內逼巴基斯坦軍投降，完成支解宿敵的任務。
總的來說，作者以流暢的文筆，搭配輕鬆易懂的戰史，向讀者展現了德國、蘇聯、美國、英國、以色列等各國的學說發展經過。本書理論跟史實並重，可讀性高，是部雅俗共賞的作品。要說缺點的話，一是地圖匱乏，讀者可能還是要自行去搜尋一下；二是中譯本雖然流暢，但把註解引用的文獻也都翻譯，可這些本身幾乎都沒有引進，只是加深讀者研究的困難，多此一舉。(聽說是政策的關係)
作者更知名的作品是他描述二戰德國國防軍的三部曲，目前已經有一本翻譯面市，有興趣的朋友也可以試試。
本書作者羅伯特•M.奇蒂諾（Robert M. Citino）是美國著名的軍事歷史作家，專長是二戰跟德軍的作戰理論及其影響。《從閃電戰到沙漠風暴》是他關於戰爭學說理論研究的第二部作品(第一部是《尋求決定性的勝利》，目前沒有翻譯)，講述從二戰到波斯灣戰爭這段二十世紀後半的各大國的研究與實踐。
任何一位頂尖指揮官，對於其戰爭藝術的追求，無非是以最少的損失，獲取最大的戰果。而要達成這種成就，作者指出，自古以來的名將都是把握一個原則，隨時保持機動，切忌強攻，尋求在戰場上的突破口，從弱點給予敵人重大打擊，形成決定性的勝利。從古代的《孫子兵法》到近代的《戰略論：間接路線》，無不是強調這種概念。
‧一戰的遺產
自從機關槍的發明，加上壕溝跟鐵絲網及各種大砲，戰場上的優勢越來越向防守方傾斜，日俄戰爭在中國東北的幾場陸上會戰即已有這種現象萌芽，亦即，運動戰越來越難施展，最終消耗戰化。不過施里芬依然計劃著透過運動戰來打出一場“坎尼式的勝利”。作者指出，概念是對的，但他忽略了漢尼拔是在一個小區域打出的會戰，而一戰德軍卻要在將近半個西歐運動，兩者需要的運輸力量跟通訊難度差之何止千里。當小毛奇在後方指揮部面對上百份混亂且各自矛盾的電報索性放棄乾脆憑直覺下令，我們也不難體諒了。
‧德國先制
基於容易四面受敵的地理位置，從普魯士時代開始，德國就注定了必須在有限的人力、資源跟縱深的情況下，打一場速戰速決的戰爭。坦克的出現成為各國利用來恢復運動戰的一種工具，但具體該怎麼做，列強們都在摸索。德國本來受制於和約在進度上是落後的，他們最終在二戰以裝甲機動為核心打出的“閃電戰”震驚世人卻是歷史的某種偶然。事實上蘇聯人在以圖哈切夫斯基為主的一派在裝甲作戰上走得更遠，“大縱深戰略”講求以多兵種協同正面打擊出缺口，裝甲機械做為第二波、第三波深入追擊擴大戰果，輔以空中力量不斷投射確認勝利。這種學說雖然最後因為史達林的大清洗而沒有成真，但一度吸引了許多敏銳的外國觀察家的注意。
德國是最大的受益者，他們在二零年代跟蘇聯秘密的軍事合作學到很多經驗，以古德林為首等新銳派全都認識到了多兵種混合作戰的重要性，還有堅持對戰役層面的運動戰的追求，賦予底層軍士官極大的臨戰自主權限的“任務式戰術”(Auftragstaktik)的成功，構成了其在二戰初期的優勢。而無線電的發明跟機械化則緩解了過去在一戰中出現的通訊與運輸的兩大噩夢。
戰爭最終輸掉了，作者認為除了主要是政治方面的問題外，德軍有個大弱點就是，他們並沒有思考如果“閃電戰”失敗了的備案，特別是在二戰中期，對手們都已經孰悉其戰法並各自發展對應之道之後。
‧紅軍的不可模仿性
大清洗導致蘇聯原本領先的優勢地位的喪失，他們得用血跟時間去換回。紅軍大致上恢復了“大縱深戰略”作戰方式，利用出色的情報欺瞞敵軍，短期內在某段戰線集中力量然遂行其作戰，隨著其越來越熟練跟物資與人力上的優勢，讓敵人難以招架。
當然，紅軍也是有弱點，他們的靈活性的不足，在面對德軍的彈性防禦始終拿不出好的應對方法，而在傷亡數字上的輕忽也都令許多外國觀察家目瞪口呆。作者於此時強調，每個國家都應該針對自己的條件，去找出最適合的戰爭學說。他指出，美國軍事學者雖然於戰爭結束後研究紅軍時感到敬佩，但他們也非常清楚自己國家不可能學習，光是這種傷亡數字就簡直難以想像。
‧美國的成長史
美國在兩次大戰中都扮演了重要的角色，但他們的戰役層面的學說卻是發展的異常遲緩。一戰中主要是來自法國的指導，結束之後，美國人在坦克的研究上走了另外一條道路。他們沒有像英國陷入步坦誰主誰副的爭執，而是直接把這種新式武器定位成協助步兵突破跟擴大戰果的工具，而把敵方裝甲交給坦克殲擊車去處理。這種思路導致在戰爭初期美軍戰車在虎式、豹式面前毫無優勢，而事實上坦克殲擊車也無法真正有效對付對手，美國的戰爭學說在實際應用上失敗的一蹋糊塗。以至於戰爭初期表現奇差，甚至被英軍嘲笑為：「我們的義大利人。」(兩個一起嘲諷也是絕了)
美軍真正的開竅要等到布拉德利、巴頓這些指揮官的發揮，他們在盟軍於諾曼底陷入僵局後尋找突破的機會，「眼鏡蛇行動」是一場仿製德、蘇學說要點的作戰，簡單來說，就是於敵方防線薄弱處，用大批的坦克跟戰機支援於狹窄正面達成突破，再投入大軍擴展戰果。一種結合了大規模物資優勢，從正面推進轉向運動戰的“美國戰爭方式”。
不過，二戰結束後，美軍大部分的時間都在準備一場實際上未曾發生的戰爭：與蘇聯紅軍的對抗。這是一場對雙方都尷尬的狀況。美國不可能在歐洲大陸駐紮足以跟紅軍對抗的兵力，他們只能期待友軍盡可能拖延到援軍到來，而這又取決於第三方的狀況而非自己。反觀蘇聯，實際上只要一集結大軍就會被察覺而喪失突襲性，且這也跟他們的學說相違背，但如果正面對抗實際上在北約的空襲跟核武威脅情況下，紅軍能佔多少優勢是可以打上一個大問號的。
值得慶幸的是戰爭始終沒有發生。考驗美軍的反而是另外兩場區域戰爭。朝鮮戰爭是在一個狹長半島展開的，它的運動戰只在初期人民軍突襲跟麥帥仁川登陸後的反擊上。而越戰的對手則從頭到尾都是想跟美國打一場不一樣型態的作戰。
美軍在這兩場戰爭中的表現都差強人意，但好處是，至少在七、八零年代，陸軍展開了革新運動，他們允許了對於新作戰學說的激辯，各種意見浮上檯面，但最後定型的是一種集過去半個世紀學說之大成的「空陸一體戰」。簡單來說，四個原則：主動、靈敏、縱深跟協調。首先，指揮官應該搶奪戰場主動權，設法讓對方措手不及，以全面的行動讓敵人所有力量都遭到攻擊，不知何處才是主攻分散其力量，裝甲部隊趁機尋找薄弱處突破點，用導彈打擊敵後，戰機遮斷敵援，並使用空中機動力量破壞對方的指揮與通信系統，瓦解其反抗可能。這種作戰需要全兵種的協同，如何保持一致將是作戰成功的關鍵。
很快的，波斯灣戰爭對付伊拉克成為了試金石。盟軍先對伊拉克進行全面的空襲，破壞了所有防空系統，指揮部乃至總統府，徹底的奪取了制空權。之後再轟炸地面上的各大橋梁、要道，斷絕伊軍跟本土的聯絡及援軍的可能。陸軍則是先進行佯攻，用偏師跟海上登陸部隊吸引在科威特重兵防禦的伊拉克軍的注意，然後主力裝甲部隊從西面較不設防的沙漠乾谷大膽迂迴繞後，配合空降部隊徹底的完成了一場單翼包圍的作戰。伊拉克陸軍就這麼成為美國「空陸一體戰」的第一個犧牲者。不過，作者認為這並不是什麼全新的學說，只是把過往的原則重新整，並通過現代更先進的科技再發揮。而且，目前看來似乎只有美國人玩得起，再次印證了他一再強調每個國家都應該針對自己的條件，去找出最適合的戰爭學說的見解。
除了這上述案例外，作者還讚揚了兩個小國：以色列跟印度。說來有點諷刺，這個新生的國家處境是最像德國的。四面楚歌，人力跟資源奇缺，導致他們除了速戰速決別無其他生存方法。以色列軍隊非常重視戰役層面的運動戰，而且他們也跟德軍一樣，放手讓底層軍官臨場判斷，隨時把握機會。雖然他們一度因為裝甲部隊的連戰連勝而過度迷信，忽略了兵種協同慘遭痛擊，但很快就又修正回來，繼續成為一支保持活力並在實戰中得到檢證的軍隊。另外一個印度比較不那麼典型，但同樣是運動戰的極致發揮，它在孟加拉獨立戰時，先耐心確認等中國無法介入，美國鞭長莫及後，不動聲色的調集部隊，利用機械化部隊跟空降師以迅雷不及掩耳的速度攻陷各大戰略要地，在不到的兩週內逼巴基斯坦軍投降，完成支解宿敵的任務。
總的來說，作者以流暢的文筆，搭配輕鬆易懂的戰史，向讀者展現了德國、蘇聯、美國、英國、以色列等各國的學說發展經過。本書理論跟史實並重，可讀性高，是部雅俗共賞的作品。要說缺點的話，一是地圖匱乏，讀者可能還是要自行去搜尋一下；二是中譯本雖然流暢，但把註解引用的文獻也都翻譯，可這些本身幾乎都沒有引進，只是加深讀者研究的困難，多此一舉。(聽說是政策的關係)
作者更知名的作品是他描述二戰德國國防軍的三部曲，目前已經有一本翻譯面市，有興趣的朋友也可以試試。
January 11, 2025
Táto kniha je výborná, ako vždy od pána citino výborná analýza operácii
March 22, 2019
A good overview of operational warfare since 1940. Citino uses case examples rather than trying to cover everything, so the coverage of World War II abruptly ends after Operation Cobra. The main complaint I have is a stupefying lack of maps which make the battles hard to follow. Therefore, discussions of doctrine are the best parts of the book, although at times incomplete. It is weird to discuss Soviet doctrine in World War II and discuss it only in general terms after 1945. In general, Citino is not a fan of theory, but a believer that war has general eternal laws that can be gleamed from experience and a deep reading of history. In terms of debates within the military, he does not believe in light troops, so I wonder how he thinks about this after we have lost one war (Iraq) and are losing another (Afghanistan).
March 23, 2019
All of Citino’s books are excellent. Although it’s a bit old (2004) it provides an excellent and unsparing analysis of the operational doctrine used by several militaries from WW2 to Desert Storm.
Would love to see an updated addition with analysis of the Russians in Chechnya, OIF and OEF, and the Russian conquest of Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
Would love to see an updated addition with analysis of the Russians in Chechnya, OIF and OEF, and the Russian conquest of Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
November 28, 2011
As usual Dr. Citino wrote a thought provoking and highly readable yet still academic (and yes, such books are rare) work on military history. The main theme (at least to me) of Citino's work is a sound one: that every single major military operation since 1940 has been an attempt to recreate the astounding German success against a larger, more powerful Allied/French force in May-June 1940. In a single campaign (Operation as Citino points out) the Germans inflicted over 1.5 million Allied casualties, wrecked the military's of four nations (France/Britain/Belgium and Holland) and suffered not quite 10% of their opponents losses all while being, numerically, weaker and outgunned than their opponents. As Citino and many other Military historians have pointed out since, the Wehrmacht's victory in 1940 was the greatest in military history. Few can nor should refute that claim. Give the Germans their due, they're still the worlds model for an efficient, hard hitting, flexible, deadly and professional military force.
As Citino points out in this great book, however, most of the worlds armies have tried to repeat this amazing performance, and most have failed.Citino points out that the Germans never again won such a decisive victory as they did in France and the Low Countries in 1940. True, they sliced through Yugoslavia and swept into Greece and drove the British from the continent...again. However, both of these victories while still stunning in their completeness and speed, were not of the scale that was 1940. And of course in the invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) the Germans smashed countless Soviet divisions, corps' and armies in massive battles of encirclement and death. However, despite the scale of victories like Minsk-Bialystok, Smolensk, Kiev and Vyazma, Bryansk the Germans were unable to topple the Soviet Union. (Although my own opinion is that this had much to do with US and British financial and material aid that by late November 1941 was beginning to flow into the Soviet Union keeping them afloat) In North Africa Erwin Rommel made himself a legend in military history by consistently thrashing a much larger and better equipped British force in Libya and Egypt until he was finally cornered and smashed at El Alamein. And the Wehrmacht/Waffen-SS never did let go of their offensive mindset, even though this did buy them more grief than victory in the face of overwhelming Allied material superiority as the war progressed.
Despite this, Citino points out that the German Military was still the best in the world pound for pound even in defeat. He looks at the Western Allied and Soviet methods of war and notes that except for Operation Bagration by the Red Army which crushed Army Group Center in the Summer of 1944, the Allies consistently dropped the ball in fighting German style battles of annihilation. Despite that though the Germans did lose the war. And Citino points out the flaws in the German system which aided the Allies. But this book covers much more than just World War Two. The chapter on the Korean War was my personal favorite as I've always found that conflict of supreme interest. (My Grandfather was a Marine Pilot during that war) Dr. Citino points out that the North Korean Army fought a brilliantly executed campaign, running over the South Korean and American forces thrown in its way and marching down near the entire length of the Korean peninsula before the US and ROK forces dug in along the Naktong River creating the Pusan Perimeter and then the North Koreans smashed themselves in headlong assaults to try and break it. MacArthur launched his one brilliant move in his career and landed far behind enemy lines at Inchon and then took Seoul forcing a headlong pursuit of the North Koreans back up the peninsula and to the very border with China.
Then the Chinese intervened and thrashed the Allied forces and the war, again, rages down the peninsula until the new American commander Matthew Ridgway finally stops them and in a series of limited yet highly efficient counteroffensives crushed the Communist Chinese Army and then forcing a stalemate to the war after nearly two years of positional warfare. (I found it amusing that Citino points out that this war is far from 'forgotten' and that this label needs to be dropped considering the vast amount of work done on the war in military historiography in the US alone let alone China and South Korea)
Citino's work would be remiss if he did not talk about Israel and the superb IDF. He devotes a whole chapter to them, and it is easy to see that one of the supreme ironies of the twentieth century is that the IDF is the heir of the military method created and used by a state run by a political party that tried to exterminate them. The IDF is pound for pound the best military in the world as it's geo-political and geographical position forces it to be. In three conflicts (1948, 1956 and 1967) the IDF crushed their Arab opponents almost easily (1948 wasn't exactly easy, but it was a clear victory nonetheless) until the Arab states of Egypt and Syria launched a well coordinated and thought out assault in 1973 on Yom Kippur (Also the Ramadan season as well) that caught the Israeli's by surprise and in turn came close to smashing the IDF. However, Israel won that war too, though it was a damned near run thing.
The book covers events such as the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 that saw the creation of Bangledesh showing that India had created a modern and highly effective Military force, the senseless slaughter of the Iran-Iraq War where neither side fought with much skill proving that vast mountains of modern weaponry doth not a modern military maketh. And of course he covers the fall and rebirth of the US Army even detailing what the US did right in the Vietnam War (we did far better than we think we did) and the intellectual revival that rescued the US Army and created an environment of intellectual superiority concerning the Art of War that the US Army still harbors. Citino points out that despite the many mis-steps taken in this arena following the First Gulf War (Desert Storm), the US Army is the worlds best because of this very intellectual renaissance.
Despite the fact that this is a great book and anyone who is considering being a true military historian should read this book (as I am) or simply has an intense, analytical interest in military history for that matter; I would be remiss without explaining why only four stars. I thought that the book would have been well served to showcase the Soviet Unions agony in Afghanistan as this would have balanced the narrative by showing the other superpower and their struggles with their art of war. Possible even highlighting the undeclared border wars between the Soviet Union and China that occurred in the 1960's and 1970's might have elucidated the Soviet art of war and why NATO was so seriously worried about the Red Army. Also I think it would have been nice to show the evolution of the North Vietnamese Army following the Tet Offensive and how it too turned into a modern and effective military force that thrashed the South once the US withdrew and even fended off a Chinese invasion a year after winning their civil war and even for the heck of it beat up on their neighbors for a while as well. Such a look, in my opinion, would have greatly balanced the story. Then again, I'm sure such research would have meant a huge investment of time and wealth.
All in all though a very good book and one I highly recommend.
As Citino points out in this great book, however, most of the worlds armies have tried to repeat this amazing performance, and most have failed.Citino points out that the Germans never again won such a decisive victory as they did in France and the Low Countries in 1940. True, they sliced through Yugoslavia and swept into Greece and drove the British from the continent...again. However, both of these victories while still stunning in their completeness and speed, were not of the scale that was 1940. And of course in the invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) the Germans smashed countless Soviet divisions, corps' and armies in massive battles of encirclement and death. However, despite the scale of victories like Minsk-Bialystok, Smolensk, Kiev and Vyazma, Bryansk the Germans were unable to topple the Soviet Union. (Although my own opinion is that this had much to do with US and British financial and material aid that by late November 1941 was beginning to flow into the Soviet Union keeping them afloat) In North Africa Erwin Rommel made himself a legend in military history by consistently thrashing a much larger and better equipped British force in Libya and Egypt until he was finally cornered and smashed at El Alamein. And the Wehrmacht/Waffen-SS never did let go of their offensive mindset, even though this did buy them more grief than victory in the face of overwhelming Allied material superiority as the war progressed.
Despite this, Citino points out that the German Military was still the best in the world pound for pound even in defeat. He looks at the Western Allied and Soviet methods of war and notes that except for Operation Bagration by the Red Army which crushed Army Group Center in the Summer of 1944, the Allies consistently dropped the ball in fighting German style battles of annihilation. Despite that though the Germans did lose the war. And Citino points out the flaws in the German system which aided the Allies. But this book covers much more than just World War Two. The chapter on the Korean War was my personal favorite as I've always found that conflict of supreme interest. (My Grandfather was a Marine Pilot during that war) Dr. Citino points out that the North Korean Army fought a brilliantly executed campaign, running over the South Korean and American forces thrown in its way and marching down near the entire length of the Korean peninsula before the US and ROK forces dug in along the Naktong River creating the Pusan Perimeter and then the North Koreans smashed themselves in headlong assaults to try and break it. MacArthur launched his one brilliant move in his career and landed far behind enemy lines at Inchon and then took Seoul forcing a headlong pursuit of the North Koreans back up the peninsula and to the very border with China.
Then the Chinese intervened and thrashed the Allied forces and the war, again, rages down the peninsula until the new American commander Matthew Ridgway finally stops them and in a series of limited yet highly efficient counteroffensives crushed the Communist Chinese Army and then forcing a stalemate to the war after nearly two years of positional warfare. (I found it amusing that Citino points out that this war is far from 'forgotten' and that this label needs to be dropped considering the vast amount of work done on the war in military historiography in the US alone let alone China and South Korea)
Citino's work would be remiss if he did not talk about Israel and the superb IDF. He devotes a whole chapter to them, and it is easy to see that one of the supreme ironies of the twentieth century is that the IDF is the heir of the military method created and used by a state run by a political party that tried to exterminate them. The IDF is pound for pound the best military in the world as it's geo-political and geographical position forces it to be. In three conflicts (1948, 1956 and 1967) the IDF crushed their Arab opponents almost easily (1948 wasn't exactly easy, but it was a clear victory nonetheless) until the Arab states of Egypt and Syria launched a well coordinated and thought out assault in 1973 on Yom Kippur (Also the Ramadan season as well) that caught the Israeli's by surprise and in turn came close to smashing the IDF. However, Israel won that war too, though it was a damned near run thing.
The book covers events such as the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 that saw the creation of Bangledesh showing that India had created a modern and highly effective Military force, the senseless slaughter of the Iran-Iraq War where neither side fought with much skill proving that vast mountains of modern weaponry doth not a modern military maketh. And of course he covers the fall and rebirth of the US Army even detailing what the US did right in the Vietnam War (we did far better than we think we did) and the intellectual revival that rescued the US Army and created an environment of intellectual superiority concerning the Art of War that the US Army still harbors. Citino points out that despite the many mis-steps taken in this arena following the First Gulf War (Desert Storm), the US Army is the worlds best because of this very intellectual renaissance.
Despite the fact that this is a great book and anyone who is considering being a true military historian should read this book (as I am) or simply has an intense, analytical interest in military history for that matter; I would be remiss without explaining why only four stars. I thought that the book would have been well served to showcase the Soviet Unions agony in Afghanistan as this would have balanced the narrative by showing the other superpower and their struggles with their art of war. Possible even highlighting the undeclared border wars between the Soviet Union and China that occurred in the 1960's and 1970's might have elucidated the Soviet art of war and why NATO was so seriously worried about the Red Army. Also I think it would have been nice to show the evolution of the North Vietnamese Army following the Tet Offensive and how it too turned into a modern and effective military force that thrashed the South once the US withdrew and even fended off a Chinese invasion a year after winning their civil war and even for the heck of it beat up on their neighbors for a while as well. Such a look, in my opinion, would have greatly balanced the story. Then again, I'm sure such research would have meant a huge investment of time and wealth.
All in all though a very good book and one I highly recommend.
April 10, 2020
An excellent book to complement your knowledge of the great wars in modern history. Citino answers the question, "How does military might establish itself and what are the catalysts that lead to the inevitable upgrades of the wartime machine?" Citino's style is both narrative and instructive so that, ultimately, it's an easy read for anyone who has even a passing interest in the subject. I commend the research done to write this book and recommend it highly.
January 29, 2018
An excellent survey of the evolution of operational warfare throughout the 20th century.
June 30, 2021
Masterpiece!
November 5, 2022
The better book in the collection.
May 14, 2024
Concise, yet detailed account of the changes in the US military born out of the intervening wars since the use of Blitzkrieg.
May 16, 2013
A fine book by an accomplished historian with a gift for incorporating keen insights on the operational level of war into the narrative of military campaigns. Citino considers several case studies on the evolution of operational warfare, from World War II to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Notably, he includes one chapter on conflicts that involve exclusively non-Western armies: the 1971 war between India and Pakistan and the Iran-Iraq War. He is strongest in his treatment of the Wehrmacht but also does well in telling the story of the U.S. Army between the Vietnam and 1991 Gulf Wars. Citino finds that decisive victory in war requires excellence at the operational level. His book is about the military attributes underpinning that excellence. Chief among these seems to be an ability to combine bold and rapid maneuver with devastating firepower.
August 17, 2020
Análisis desde un punto de vista más general de ciertas campañas relevantes desde la IIGM.
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