История на Първата световна война

by B.H. Liddell Hart, Горан Райновски (Translator)

Сър Базил Лидъл Харт е един от най-бележитите световни преподаватели историци. Той е роден през 1895 г. в Париж, а образованието си получава в училище „Сейнт Полс” и колежа „Корпус Кристи” в Кеймбридж, Великобритания. Лидъл Харт постъпва в Кралската йоркширска лека пехота, където служи през Първата световна война. През 1924 г. е инвалидизиран и три години по-късно се пенсионира с чин капитан.
Лидъл Харт доразвива някои тактически военни принципи като например системата за строева подготовка и е един от първите поддръжници на идеите за развитието на военната авиация и използването на танковете във военното дело. През 1937 г. става личен съветник на министъра на войната, но заради твърде мудната реорганизация на армията напуска поста само година по-късно, поставяйки на преден план в публичното пространство нуждата от промени.
Лидъл Харт е военен кореспондент на в. „Дейли телеграф” (1925–1935), а след това на в. „Таймс” ( до избухването на Втората световна война). Преподава тактика и стратегия във военни училища в много страни и написва над тридесет книги. Умира през 1970 г.
Книгата представлява забележителен като яснота и обективност анализ, който остава незасегнат от предразсъдъци към миналото, били те професионални, или чисто лични.
Книгата провокира преосмисляне на историческите факти и е изключително полезна както за тези, които са наясно със събитията, описани в нея, така и за читателите, които запръв път попадат на темата и биха искали да научат повече за случилото се през ?първата световна война.

Genres: History, Military History, Nonfiction, War, World War I, Military Fiction, World History

536 pages

First published January 1, 1930

About the author

British military authority Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart early advocated tank and air warfare.

Usually known as captain before his knighthood, this English soldier and historian led theorists.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._H._L...

Reviews

[Abhinav Choudhry · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is strictly a book for folks who are able to visualize war as a complex puzzle with complex characters who are struggling for achieving definite objectives. This is not a book for those who wish to know about the costs of war or what war wreaks on a nation. Casualties and costs are rarely mentioned. We never get to know what the peasant tilling on the fields of Germany thought of the war effort as he sat eating ersatz foods during his lunch break.
The book breathes life into even the most static military struggle the world has ever witnessed. The campaigns are covered in detail and theaters other than Europe are also covered. Being British, the author perhaps focuses a wee bit more on their efforts. However, this is an unbiased military history and it is clear that the author has genuine respect for the Germans even though he personally fought against them.

The author is scathing in his criticism of generals for wasting precious lives in futile struggles but he at the same time acknowledges where the effort might have had a greater impact.The author doesn't just describe events but also brings his own analysis and knowledge into the picture. Thus, the reader can grasp both the actual turning points of the war or the points where the war could have turned. The latter are overwhelmingly more. It is incredible how many opportunities were missed through bad generalship and poor foresight and how many were rescued through ignoring of orders at local level.

This book is sure to educate interested folks in lessons in management, strategy and tactics, perhaps the only profit from the mistakes of people long dead.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

In his War Memoirs, Lloyd George recalls a conversation with the French General de Castelnau as stalemate set in on the Western Front. “Had (Napoleon) been here”, de Castelnau observed, “he would have thought of the something else”. In fact, Napoleon’s conduct at Wagram, Borodino, and Waterloo suggests otherwise, but the belief took hold. As casualties on the Western Front ran into the hundreds of thousands for a single battle while the gains were measured in yards, some observers at the time and most observers since thought that there must be an alternative, we just had to find it. Those who persisted with the attacks in France and Belgium were guilty of callous stupidity; they should have been looking for the “something else”.

This book makes that argument better than any other. Understandably sickened by the Western Front, Liddell Hart developed the strategy of Indirect Approach, namely, avoiding the bulk of the enemy's forces and taking his flank or rear (see his book Strategy). Offensives such as Loos, the Somme, or Third Ypres, where the bulk of the British army threw itself on the defences of the bulk of the German army, should have been avoided. Instead, Liddell Hart praises Gallipoli, in theory if not in practice, and Lawrence’s campaign in Arabia.

The trouble is, as Richard Holmes pointed out, that Liddell Hart “could produce no evidence that the destruction of railways in the Hejaz made the teacups rattle in Berlin”. And was the Indirect Approach not what the Schlieffen Plan was all about? It failed, and in doing so it left no room for further Indirect Approaches, only costly but irrelevant sideshows like Salonika. Where there was room for the Indirect Approach, on the Eastern Front, the front line swayed inconclusively this way and that for three years until the Tsarist regime collapsed from within. The Russian army was defeated as much by the uselessness of it's own leaders as by the good generalship of the Germans.

The tragic truth is that the “something else” did not exist militarily, only politically. This was beyond the purview of the generals to deliver, except in Germany where civil authority was more completely subordinated to military authority than elsewhere. To all intents and purposes Hindenburg and Ludendorff ran Germany by the end of the war, the same could not be said for Haig in Britain or even Foch in France. If politicians could not deliver peace the generals must deliver victory and to secure this there was no alternative to defeating the German army in the field. As horrible as the Western Front was, the “something else” on another battlefield is a chimera.

[Musab · Rating 4 out of 5]

birinci dünya savaşını benim gibi detayları ile öğrenmek isteyenler için oldukça iyi bir kaynak kitap. ağırlıklı olarak batı cephesi ve doğu cephesinde alman-rus ve avusturya macaristan-rus mücadeleleri işlenmiş. savaşın en çok kayıp veren ülkesi osmanlı'ya dair çok az detay var bu ciddi bir eksiklik bana göre kitabın başındayken de yorum olarak belirtmiştim savaş öncesi ülkeler hakkında bilgi verilirken de osmanlı es geçilmişti. bunun dışında batı cephesi ile ilgili çok doyurucu bilgiler var. yazar her yıl öncesi genel hatlarıyla bir ön bakış yapıyor daha sonra kronolojik olarak cephe cephe anlatmış o yıldaki savaşları ben bu tarzı sevdim şahsen. bazı muharebeleri okurken sıkılabiliyor insan ama her bölümde çok kıymetli bilgiler ve yazarın da güzel tespitleri var. harp tarihine ilgisi olan herkesin bu kitabı okumasını tavsiye ediyorum.

[Steven · Rating 4 out of 5]

5-star on quality and analysis, and 2-star on readability. Liddell Hart is one of the most distinguished historians of the two World Wars, having participated as a captain in World War 1 and interviewed many military leaders of the second, his analysis are sharp and reliable. I first heard of Liddell Hart's work from an Indonesian history book about the European wars compiled by the founder of one of the biggest newspapers in Indonesia, P.K Ojong (founder of Kompas), and turns out he took a lot of his material from Hart. It was entertaining stuff, I couldn't put it down. However, reading Hart is a different experience. You'll need some familiarity with the events. Hart's love of war strategy and maps mean that a lot of imagination is required to follow the movement of the troops. Lack of maps does not help.

Nevertheless, what came out was a clear portrayal of the war. It's a horrifying tale. The whole thing is like a giant squid game involving millions of people. The war started on the stupidest of reasons. Germany looking for reasons to conquer territory through short wars (just like it did to France in 1870 under Bismarck), Austria-Hungary is used for that purpose when the heir to the throne Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot; Russia, France, and Britain cannot back down from their escalating threats once they made a threat. Interestingly, there was this moment when all the European powers had started mobilizing before Germany realized that it's possible for everyone to back down. Serbia has decided to accede to Austria's impossible demand (meant to be that way so that the Central Powers have adequate reasons to go to war). However, it cannot happen because the war machinery has started operating and you cannot stop mobilizing troops when everyone else already declared war on each other. Tragic.

It makes me think, can such a thing happen today, let's say if China attacks Taiwan, and US decides to back Taiwan? Once a threshold is reached, and everyone starts mobilizing, considering all the years of verbal threats and tension between US and China, and China's national pride combined with expansionist intentions, if World War 1 is to be an example, then the answer is an unequivocal yes. However, we are fortunate that we have more connection between Americans and Chinese, more anti-war sentiments which hopefully can stop such depressing possibility. But yeah, it's a scary possibility. A big war can come out of small things. Butterfly effect.

The war is ultimately decided on US' entry, which is triggered by Germany's decision to engage in total warfare, sinking many US ships in the process, who was then a neutral country. US' big resources eventually decided the war in the long run. I used to think Germany's war leaders was stupid in letting this happen. Turns out Germany's war leader, General Ludendorff already took that into account. His way of reasoning is that his total warfare will destroy Britain due to Britain's reliance on shipping supplies to feed its population. Thus, it's a race between Britain's ability to survive and the speed in which America can commit its troops in the Western Frontier. At some point, it looked rather bleak for the Allies, especially in the early 1918 given that Italy, Rumania, and Russia were defeated, and thus Germany has excess manpower to be committed to the Western Frontier. Things got critical around May 1918, and started to reverse around June when US troops came in bulk.

Key takeaways:

1. Winning the war is more important than winning battles. Germany did brilliantly to win many battles, often with inferior numbers. They have an advantage in unified command, efficiency in supply chain, better railway system, and decisive military leadership. However, what made them lose in the end are some poor decisions during the war which might be beneficial in the short run but bad in the long run. For instance is the decision to sink commercial ships in the Atlantic which brought US to war that I mentioned above. German's leadership also refused to take seriously innovations such as mustard gas, cyanide gas, and tank. Okay, the first two are unethical to use in war, however, from a military perspective, Germany were slow to realize its potential. Even with tanks, the Allied started to use it around 1916 but Germany did not take them seriously to mass produce them, until it was too late. The final Allied offensive was done with hundreds of tanks, breaking through trench and wires that Germany has spent years defending in. Instead of these long term investments into new technologies like tanks, Germany preferred to invest in beneficial short term measures such as tactical improvements, artillery arrangements, and so on, which is excellent in the short run but was ultimately overwhelmed by the Allies' new technologies. This focus on the short term vs long term is almost like Nokia vs Apple.

Contrast that with Germany's conduct under Bismarck and Moltke in the 1870. The war was short and it was to achieve certain objectives. Moltke was a masterful commander but it was Bismarck's brilliance as a political strategist that created the backdrop for Germany's success, focusing on long term objectives, even while using immoral means. It was this kind of Bismarckian guile that Germany was missing in the first world war.

2. Surprise is paramount. The moral is more important than the physical. As Hart showed in many of the World War 1 battles, the decisive stroke was often done with surprise. Its effect even compensates the lack of lengthy bombardment that was customary. A concentrated and decisive movement at the right moment in the right spot can defeat an army multiple size of the attacker, as Germany demonstrated in its campaign against Rumania and Italy.

3. Genius military commanders can win wars, but they have a hard time rising to the top due to their tendency to be outspoken. Hart was repeatedly pointing out commanders of the diligent/unoriginal type, like Joffre, Haig, and Falkenhayn. They can be brilliant organizers, however, their campaign rarely generate any breakthrough. Not to mention their tendency for inefficiency and preference for compliant subordinates. Hart was more appreciative of Petain who was rather good at boosting his troops' morale and was cautious. Germany has some of the best commanders. Ludendorff is a genius and Germany was lucky to have him as a commander in the later stages of the war. The man is really good at crunching numbers and generating strategical plans. However, Hart portrayed him as lacking boldness. He seemed to back down often when he needed to be decisive and commit reserve troops forward. He also has a tendency for emotional collapse under pressure, which I'm not sure is a defect of his because he did remarkably well and it was only near the end when the massive scale of the war combined with Germany's declining morale and resources made him broke down. I'm not sure whether Helmuth von Moltke, Germany's 1870 war hero, could have done better under similar circumstances.

Hart was fond of this brilliant captain named Max Hoffmann who served under Ludendorff when he and Hindenburg beat the Russians in Tannenberg. I don't know how brilliant he is since he is little mentioned, but it was such a pity that his talent was not used.

All in all, a great history book. Please don't read if this is your first book about this topic, since it's hard going with all the facts and directions of troops. However, if you are slightly familiar, it's quite rewarding. Deep psychological insights into the characters too!

[Христо Блажев · Rating 4 out of 5]

История на Първата световна война: http://knigolandia.info/book-review/i...

Основният ми интерес и в университета, и до днес е Втората световна война и началните етапи на Студената, пряко следствие от нея, но не можех да пренебрегна излизането на този прекрасно изглеждащ том на Базил Лидъл Харт, посветен на Първата световна война. Доколкото разбрах, първоначално книгата излиза през 1930 г., после двукратно е преработвана и допълвана, като преводът е от последното издание от 1970 г.

Издателство Труд
http://knigolandia.info/book-review/i...

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was my first book by Liddell Hart. Initially I struggled to maintain interest as the author is very thorough in his writing and wasn’t grabbing my attention. Luckily after I got through the first 100+ days, the narrative picked up and gained my interest. Overall, I did like the book and it certainly expanded my knowledge of WWI. I was surprised by the number of tanks in some of the later battles in the war. Never thought they made that many back then. Lots of key ideas in the book, but the below are the one’s I found most important.

- Thus in the final act, as in the earlier acts, “technical military arguments” were decisive. The German army must go through Belgium, even though with the certainty that Britain would thereby be drawn in against Germany. Military technique – how competent in peace to gain war; how impotent in war to gain victory, so it was soon to prove! P35.
- For instead of regarding their reservists as troops of doubtful quality, fit only for an auxiliary role or garrison duty, the Germans during mobilization were able to duplicate almost every first line army corps with a reserve corps – and had the courage, justified by events, to use them in the opening clash…. They alone realized what is today an axiom – that, given a highly trained cadre of leaders, a military machine can be rapidly manufactured from short term levies, like molten liquid poured into a mould. P37. PJK: Interesting. While the US military relies heavily on its reserve forces, I’m not sure we have the same level of confidence as the early 1900s Germans.
- Esprit de corps is not enough; the stimulus of a great moral impulse to action is necessary, a deep-rooted belief in the policy for which citizens are called on to fight. P37.
- Britain… This regular army was primarily maintained for the protection and control of the overseas dependencies – India in particular – and had always been kept down to the minimum strength for this purpose. P41. PJK: Great insight into the role of the British army in previous centuries.
- The multiple controversy has at least served to show that the Marne was psychological rather than a physical victory. So, also, have been most of the immortal victories of history, with the actual fighting a secondary influence. For the profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battles is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men. P83.
- The old idea of keeping an even alignment still ruled, as it did until 1918, so that if one corps or division was checked it’s neighbors tended to halt. Thus frequent opportunities were missed for pushing on past the flanks of a temporary resistance and maintaining the momentum of the advance. P100. PJK: classic adjustment of tactics as lessons are learned… or not learned.
- (General Rennenkampf, Germany) He had also learned in Manchuria the incredible carelessness of Russian methods… p109. PJK: Hmmmm. Has much changed with the Russian army?
- On January 2, 1915, Kitchener received an appeal from the Grand Duke Nicholas for a diversion which would relieve the Turkish pressure on Russia's army in the Caucasus. P121. PJK: Even back then, the Russians needed help to open a second front and relieve pressure on their western edge.
- While the British were striving to unlock the back door to Russia, the Germanic powers were hammering the Russians, whose resistance was collapsing in large measure from a lack of munitions which could only be made good by foreign supplies through the locked entrance, the Dardanelles. P124.
- But if lack of reserves was the fundamental cause of the Germans’ failure, the immediate cause was the troops’ fear of their own gas. They had only been issued with the crudest form of respirator, which many of them did not even wear; no special tactics had been thought out…. P180.
- To throw good money after bad is foolish. But to throw away men's lives where there is no reasonable chance of advantage is criminal. P185.
- “Battlecraft” is a rare quality, the product of gifted and original leadership, and in its absence mere dash is often more effective than so-called experience. P196.
- It is a truism that the war of 1914 to 1918 revolutionized all ideas of time, in a military sense, and especially in the duration of its battles. For several thousand years of warfare hey what do you like pizza dude do you want anything other than cheese yes now, the battle, however great the scale, had been a matter of hours. This remained the general case down to the beginning of this century…. With the World War the standard became months - because the battles had usually become sieges, without being recognized or scientifically treated as such. P214. PJK: Great insight.
- Moreover, we should not forget that the Government had the heavy responsibility of being the trustee for the lives of the nation. P367. PJK: This section talks about how the British had slow rolled added reinforcements to the war on the European continent.
- Conscious of his responsibility to the nation, and personally distrustful of Haig's judgment, Mr. Lloyd George placed a firm check on the flow of reinforcements to France lest they should be poured down another offensive drain pipe. P388.

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well written book about the cause and effect of World War One.

[Classica Castagna · Rating 5 out of 5]

Storia militare: strategia, politica, personalità influenti. In questo libro sulla Grande Guerra si trattano questi aspetti. L'autore stesso ha partecipato al conflitto, ma nonostante la terrificante esperienza è riuscito a fornire una lettura degli eventi il più oggettiva possibile.
Apprezzo molto che abbia trattato altri fronti oltre a quello occidentale (per esempio quello italiano, romeno, bulgaro, mesopotamico, russo...). Posso immaginare come negli anni '20 e '30 le fonti relative a questi scenari fossero meno accessibili rispetto a quelle riguardanti il fronte occidentale, e quindi il suo lavoro diventa ancora più prezioso per dare un quadro omogeneo degli eventi, ma magari questo è un pregiudizio mio. Il volume termina con una corposa bibliografia, a prova della serietà del suo studio.
È una lettura che intimorisce? Non lo si può leggere senza mettere in conto un minimo di concentrazione, tuttavia è stimolante e a tratti illuminante. Adoro i momenti in cui l'autore inserisce citazioni tratte da lettere o conversazioni: come un lumicino nel buio, ciò contribuisce a rendere più tangibili e vicine le strategie di cui parla e le loro conseguenze.
A tratti si percepisce il coinvolgimento dell'autore, per esempio quando, descrivendo "un inarrestabile torrente di tedeschi" che raggiunge la Marna, definisce l'evento come carico "di deprimenti valori simbolici" (p. 525-526). È deprimente perché lui è inglese, e quindi dall'altra parte dello schieramento rispetto ai tedeschi. Ciò è del tutto naturale, e per questo non posso non sottolineare lo sforzo e l'impegno dell'autore nell'essere più oggettivo possibile. Nel complesso si capisce benissimo come la potenza tedesca fosse davvero un gigante e che solo l'alleanza di più nazioni abbia potuto condurlo alla sconfitta. La stessa Italia viene travolta a Caporetto grazie all'intervento tedesco, certo non dai soli austro-ungarici che per buona parte del conflitto hanno contenuto le offensive italiane senza mai sfondare. Non c'è odio per il nemico, che viene sempre descritto con rispetto.
Nel corso della lettura si percepisce la passione dell'autore per due elementi: la sorpresa e Napoleone. La prima viene continuamente messa in evidenza come elemento essenziale di ogni azione militare (ho perso il conto delle volte in cui si parla di "sorpresa", dopo una decina di pagine se non avevo letto quel termine cominciavo a chiedermi "ma la sorpresa dov'è?"); il secondo viene citato più sporadicamente, e tuttavia talvolta fa capolino e strizza un occhietto furbo che dice "io ne sapevo, neh?"
Non sono le vicende umane del singolo fante l'oggetto di questo testo, non vedremo le singole azioni di guerra se non sotto la lente dell'esame storico e strategico. L'aspetto umano, prezioso e valido, suscita di solito più interesse, ma sentivo che per capire a fondo le vicende militari i riassuntoni dei manuali scolastici non erano più sufficienti. Perché si parla di condotte scellerate dei generali? Cosa significa vincere una battaglia, respingere il nemico oppure guadagnare una posizione? Meglio una vittoria tattica o una strategica? Quale contributo diedero i nuovi mezzi?
Queste sono le domande a cui il libro può rispondere.
Infine, non si può non menzionare una parte apparentemente marginale: l'epilogo. Poche pagine di riflessione, equilibrate e oneste, sulla guerra e la sua conclusione, pagine che ho letto tristemente, sapendo che a pochi anni dalla loro stesura un'altra guerra mondiale avrebbe distrutto l'Europa, soffocando le speranze di Liddell Hart.
.
"I capi sono ancora necessari [...] ma il fatto che l'uomo della strada abbia finalmente aperto gli occhi, rendendosi conto che anche i capi sono uomini, costituisce una salvaguardia contro il rischio di aspettarsi troppo da loro, o di riporre in loro troppa fiducia. È stato tutto a vantaggio tanto della storia quanto delle future generazioni che il passato decennio ha visto un tale profluvio di prove e di rivelazioni, di documenti e di memorie".

[Stephen Morrissey · Rating 4 out of 5]

For those looking for a (relatively) short military history of the First World War with a primary focus on the Western Front, B.H. Liddell Hart's "the Real War: 1914-1918" is a very fine overview of four gruesome years of war in mud, muck and misery. Hart hits upon theaters beyond the Western Front, including the Eastern Front, Italian campaigns and the ill-fated Dardanelles expedition by the British. However, the bulk of the book falls between the Channel ports and Alsace-Lorraine, from the first hectic days of the German invasion of Belgium to the last gasps of German morale during the March 1918 offensives.

Hart hits upon a constant theme: for much of the war, both Allies and Germans tossed aside millennia of strategy as to how to win battles and wars: surprise, mobility and receptiveness to innovation. Only in 1918 did the Allies fully embrace the newfound weapon of the tank, and only then did the Germans forsake long, ponderous pre-battle artillery bombardment for more quick, decisive actions against the trenches.

Alas, few names emerge shining from the world's first global war: Allenby's Middle East campaigns are glittering if largely peripheral; Ludendorff succumbs to nervous exhaustion and strategic stalemate; Haig, Foch and Joffre all miss how to implement offensive campaigns, sending millions into a meat grinder of a war that almost crippled and collapse French and British civilization.

Surprise, speed and élan - all three need technology and tactics to help succeed, but victory is almost impossible without it.

[Trevor Seigler · Rating 3 out of 5]

Dating from a little over a decade from the end of the First World War (back when it was just "The World War"), this does a lot to help put certain episodes of the war into perspective and give a wider view of the entire course of the conflict. Better histories of the war or of incidents dealt with in this book have been written since, but for a one-volume run through many of the war's biggest moments this is a good start (James L. Stokesbury's similarly "short history" of WWI is highly recommended by this reviewer)

[Nemezida · Rating 3 out of 5]

I’ve wanted to read a book about the First World War for a long time since a few lessons on this topic in school days were not enough for such an array of information. And here it is: A History of the First World War by the famous English military historian B.H. Liddell Hart.

The first edition of this book was published in 1930. Therefore it was not obscured by glances at the Second World War. It's both a plus and a minus because sometimes the author was categorical in his assessments, which were perfect for one war but subsequently wouldn’t be suitable for the second.

There is a lot of material in the book, and it’s well structured: plans of operations, the actions and decisions of commanders and staff members, and a detailed description of the battles, as well as the political and economic background of wartime, an analysis of the strategy and tactics of hostilities.

Since this book is the first for me on this war, it has become enlightening for my part. I’m pleased I read it.

On the other hand, it’s written in noticeably dry language, and I tormented this volume for a long time.

Therefore 3 out of 5. But the book is worth reading.

[Michael Ransley · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found this book incredibly insightful. It was written not long after the war and before the second world war and his concept behind what the future looked like in warfare was very accurate.

I also found his analyis of some of the challenges of warfare in World War 1 very relevant to my own professional life. So much of the problems were lack of communication and understanding.

Thoroughly recommend this book for anyone with any interest on the subject.

[Iain · Rating 3 out of 5]

A bit long winded, but a fascinating read when considering (a) it was written prior to WWII, and (b) it's likely that Hitler or his generals read it. Liddell Hart does well to analyze what the Germans did wrong in The World War as he knew it. They didn't repeat those mistakes the second time they invaded France.

[Andrea Bettoni · Rating 4 out of 5]

Libro molto interessante, da una panoramica generale degli avvenimenti del primo conflitto mondiale analizzando particolari battaglie significative. Non è super esaustivo per uno appassionato della prima guerra mondiale in quanto tratta tutti i fronti di guerra su tutti gli anni in modo poco approfondito, ma per un neofita è eccezionale

[Dingo87 · Rating 4 out of 5]

L'autore di questo di libro riesce a far risultare scorrevole un libro di oltre 600 pagine, con un 'infinita lista di nomi e di località, senza mai risultare noioso. Ottima sintesi e analisi delle battaglie della prima guerra mobdiale.

[David · Rating 3 out of 5]

A 1930 history of WW I. Very interesting, especially knowing what we know now about WW II.

[Hans · Rating 3 out of 5]

A decent summary of the main parts of the first world war, told mainly from the generals perspective.

[JorgVonRiminsk · Rating 3 out of 5]

3,5

[Andreas Schmidt · Rating 5 out of 5]

Scrittura fluida, come sempre, però priva di grandi dettagli tecnici (qualche dato un più su produzione militare e tonnellaggi avrebbe giovato).

[Dan LeSeure · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent analysis. Pulls no punches, so it has some great lines.

[Berkay · Rating 5 out of 5]

Usta tarihçi Basil Liddell Hart’ın kaleminden, bizzat katıldığı savaşı okumak çok etkileyiciydi. Birinci Harp için mutlaka okunması gereken bir kitap.

[Rob Markley · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a tremendously powerful analysis - of perhaps a seminal moment of darkness in the entire span of human history. Liddell Hart's format it this: broadly based on years, firstly he writes an overview chapter, then he breaks this down into a number of scenes choosing the main events (usually!) to further describe and critique. Interspersed are thematic accounts and analyses - such as the pre war situations (origins, balance of forces, war plans), the rise of the tank and of the airplane. The maps are amongst the best I've struck in any military history and the only thing lacking would have been period photos, but not to be expected from this era of publication.

There is an interesting element in all this. From an author point of view the book is understandably Anglo-centric - obviously the interest and readers are mostly in the book's own language. Therefore some areas receive less coverage like the eastern front, Africa and Italy; all to be expected, however quite unaccountably what is missing are Liddell Hart's 'scene' detail accounts of the two great triumphs; on the eastern front with the total defeat of Russia and on the western front with the British breaking through the Hindenburg line into open country at long last. Why? Normally a war history is of the build up towards the culminating result - but here no?!

Perhaps the clue is in the original form of this work - 'The Real War' of 1930 expanded four years later to become 'A History of the First World War'. Was Liddell Hart intent on exposing the 'real mess' the world found itself in rather than detracting by an 'all's well that ends well' conclusion that is so usual in the history of conflict where initial mistakes and assumptions take time to catch up with reality. All the same - now so far distant in time, it is a shame for the modern reader not to see these final annals of victory when that aspect of the conflict is now forgotten in the popular mind.

If no praise is delivered or warranted in the overall there is credit given where due - the Royal Navy, the foresight of the 'tank men', a balanced assessment of some of the generals and most exceptionally the decisive victory of Allenby over the Turks. Liddell Hart might well be the greatest military mind of all time - being credited by Guderian among others as the inspiration for blitzkrieg tactics, but he is certainly not one dimensional seeing tanks as the answer for everything. What he has to say - the many great questions he asks and then answers are invariably worth listening to.

There are two great ideas running like a thread through this history. One is what not to do and other the key to unlocking everything. What not to do is to reinforce failure by throwing in more and more resources - 'lives' that is! It is not Liddell Hart's, but my conclusion from his analysis to see something downright diabolical in the persistence in frontal attacks to thereby intensify loss where cost is greatest, instead of following that age old maxim of seeking to outflank. This is not merely military conservatism, or incompetence (although surely it is that too!), or even later Napoleonic like ruthlessness; no it is evil. What compounds this is the inexplicable inability to dismiss and replace failed generals until a bright new wave changes failure. Broadly speaking only the downright evil trio of Moltke, Joffre and French are passed over to their more capable but scarcely 'better' replacements. These replacements instead of falling in turn, seem able to crush and dismiss all critics and better men who might have fixed things. Cream is thrown in the bin instead of being allowed to rise to the top.

The second theme of what to do, in actual fact is the element of surprise. In Liddell Hart's overall conclusions to the war, surprise was the key to success every where, and yet so slow to learn! On the other hand he mitigates this with an astute yet obvious observation that everyone else seems to miss. The western front in particular is the abject example of siege warfare. Siege warfare is almost the antipathy of the element of surprise, always excepting mining when it comes off (Messines). Why then were the principles of siege war, with its economy of lives and mathematical principles never adopted given its long military tradition? Diabolical?! But in the end surprise - the sudden ascent and escalade also breaks the rules of sieges!

This is a powerful book. It is well worth the read, yet it is not a place to start off studying WW1. It is too dense, too much geography and overview knowledge is prerequisite and there are many allusions that are lost. I'm no WW1 expert and have only a sketchy understanding of the course of the war but I'm left numbed and fearful that such might ever occur again.

[Himanshu Bhatnagar · Rating 4 out of 5]

There are many, many ways in which history can be recounted. Over the last few decades, the trend in reporting history has taken a decidedly Marxist tone. From the rulers and their deeds the focus has shifted to the ruled and their lives. From the grand palaces we have moved to unearthing modest homes; and in war, from generals and their schemata of battle we have moved to the foot-soldier’s letters to his family back home.
This history of WW1 predates this red-shift of historians’ affections. There is little personal, less emotional, and nothing of the proletariat in it. It is written by a military historian, and in his scope lie the grand war-plans of the Field Marshals and the Crown Princes, the whirling, sweeping moves along fronts miles broad, entire armies described as pawns on a chessboard spanning a continent that was awash in blood by the end of the “Great War” but stubbornly refused to learn a single lesson from it.
Within the limitations described above, this book is a marvellous read indeed. It is, arguably, unmatched as a military history of WW1, written by one of the world’s most eminent military historian; close enough to the actual events to have eye-witness accounts while at the same time far enough to be less clouded by nationalistic or other flavours. For a student of the history of war this book reads like a pot-boiler, full of action and larger than life characters facing each other in situations that stymied the smartest among them. Each major chapter in the war has its own section, described like a set-piece that stands alone. The set-pieces are grouped together into chapters with a preamble which provides a bird’s eye view of the entire action.
The pages are awash with action, moves and counter-moves, feints and strategic retreats, mad dashes across ravaged terrain and dogged resistance in hellish trenches. Every major action of war is detailed in technical, tactical, and strategic detail. It elevates the war to the heroic struggle, the paean to mankind’s endurance, the lofty epic that, for centuries, has been the popular vision. The focus is on the leaders, the generals and the commanders, and the great struggle of wills between them. But in a way, by concentrating on their actions, Liddell Hart exposes them for they are – mortals; with a few more medals than the other.
You will marvel at Foch’s nonchalance and confidence while the Germans are within sniffing distance of Paris; at the British General French’s (yes, really)incessant swaying between extremes of fanciful hope and premature despair; at the refusal of both sides to look for alternate ways out of the trench deadlock, at the resistance to modern technology – be they aircraft or tanks; at the utter daftness of Brusilov and the other Russian generals in forcing ill equipped, demoralized men into battle with such an organized enemy; at Hindernberg’s lack of a long term goal for his short-term tactics. Page after page makes you realize just how much sheer, dumb luck matters in war, at times more than all the astuteness, vision, preparation and courage of an entire nation.
There are omissions, of course. Precious little is mentioned outside the main battleground of Europe (and the Middle East in the context of Turkey). And there is no talk of the colonial armies put into use by the Empires on both sides of the conflict. That the human angle is absent was mentioned at the start of the review, of course.
In the end, the sense you get of the Great War is that of the author as a bird soaring above the European battle lines, calmly observing the ebb and flow of armies and their fortunes; too far removed to smell the smoke, see the mud or taste the blood.
But with all its faults, it is a masterpiece of what it sets out to be, a complete military history of a Great War.

[Robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

I had actually been looking for a one-volume history of the first world war for a long time, and was delighted when I found that Basil Liddell-Hart had written one in 1930. His writing is as usual concise and engaging, though even I had a bit of trouble staying with it through the largest battles like Verdun, the Somme, and Passchendaele, though this is really more the nature of the conflict than Liddell-Hart's writing at fault.

However, the side campaigns and the eastern front are portrayed quite vividly, and this will be a good springboard into further reading about the war.

[WRH · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a criticof the strategy and tactics of both sides in WW I by a British military officer. Ir provided some interesting insights but mostly was short on overviews and long on criticism. You would need to have an indepth knowledge of WW I to get the most out of this book

[Štěpán · Rating 4 out of 5]

WHY did the countries fight

[Cem Dylan]

The book itself describes the progress of the history of the war not only as a historian and/or as a captain but also an English intellectual who wants to look the affairs w/a wide angle including international relations and a political scientist. We're very lucky to have such a book to enlight the contemporary politics and affairs.

[Tropik · Rating 4 out of 5]

Güzeldi.