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Cabal! The Plot Against General Washington
The First Comprehensive Historical Investigation into the Conway Cabal, the Attempt to Remove George Washington from Command
In the spring of 1778, General George Washington wrote to his friend Landon Carter about a rumored “disposition in the Northern Officers to see me superceded in my Command.” This was as candid a statement as the general ever made about the so-called “Conway Cabal” of patriot officers and politicians critical of his leadership. Most early historians of the Revolution took the threat to Washington seriously, but by the mid-twentieth century interpretations had reversed, with the plot—if one existed—posing no real danger to the commander-in-chief. Yet, as historian Mark Edward Lender reveals in his compelling Cabal! The Plot Against General Washington , clues found in original new research provide a more comprehensive understanding of the personalities and political maneuverings of those involved in the Cabal, and the real nature of the challenge to Washington.
Rather than the “classic Cabal” of Generals Horatio Gates, Thomas Mifflin, and Thomas Conway in a plot to remove Washington quickly, the threat to Washington’s command was a gradual administrative attempt by the Board of War and political allies to take over the war effort. Reorganized in late 1777 under the leadership of Mifflin, with Gates assuming the board presidency in January 1778, the Board of War sought authority to determine military policy and strategic goals, all training, organizational, personnel, and logistical functions, and even the assignment of theater commanders. Had they succeeded, Washington’s title of commander-in-chief would have been utterly hollow. The Cabal tested Washington as few other things did during the war and perhaps tempered him into the man we remember today. Washington adroitly navigated the challenges to his leadership, meeting and defeating every attempt to curtail his authority. His response revealed a leadership style that saw him safely through the war, and gave him overwhelming support from his countrymen to become their first president.
In the spring of 1778, General George Washington wrote to his friend Landon Carter about a rumored “disposition in the Northern Officers to see me superceded in my Command.” This was as candid a statement as the general ever made about the so-called “Conway Cabal” of patriot officers and politicians critical of his leadership. Most early historians of the Revolution took the threat to Washington seriously, but by the mid-twentieth century interpretations had reversed, with the plot—if one existed—posing no real danger to the commander-in-chief. Yet, as historian Mark Edward Lender reveals in his compelling Cabal! The Plot Against General Washington , clues found in original new research provide a more comprehensive understanding of the personalities and political maneuverings of those involved in the Cabal, and the real nature of the challenge to Washington.
Rather than the “classic Cabal” of Generals Horatio Gates, Thomas Mifflin, and Thomas Conway in a plot to remove Washington quickly, the threat to Washington’s command was a gradual administrative attempt by the Board of War and political allies to take over the war effort. Reorganized in late 1777 under the leadership of Mifflin, with Gates assuming the board presidency in January 1778, the Board of War sought authority to determine military policy and strategic goals, all training, organizational, personnel, and logistical functions, and even the assignment of theater commanders. Had they succeeded, Washington’s title of commander-in-chief would have been utterly hollow. The Cabal tested Washington as few other things did during the war and perhaps tempered him into the man we remember today. Washington adroitly navigated the challenges to his leadership, meeting and defeating every attempt to curtail his authority. His response revealed a leadership style that saw him safely through the war, and gave him overwhelming support from his countrymen to become their first president.
- GenresAmerican Revolution
384 pages, Hardcover
Published June 24, 2019
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May 28, 2024
This is about the so-called Conway Cabal, said to be a conspiracy to replace General Washington during the dark days of the war. But did it happen? Washington wrote only one letter about such a possibility, to a friend, in which he only hinted. cryptically, at such a thing. In a later biography by John Marshall, however, it was described in full (outraged) detail. Other writers picked up thread and it continued as gospel until 1941 when a new history pointed out that there was no smoking gun. Maybe the whole thing was made up? Intereresting, by the way, that a history written during a time of Great Depression and world war, when the country needed to pull together, should assert that in a previous time of great crisis, there had been no signficant dissension. The book was influential and there has been considerable doubt about the existence of the cabal since then. The present work seeks to shed new light by looking deeply at where the supposed conspirators were at different times and doing deep dives on each of their motives.
The author is evidently a big fan of asides. There are perhaps rather more than interest would justify. There are also a few drops into informality, including at one point a "Seriously?".
He also appears to be a big fan of Washington's generalship, though his own evidence seems to contradict such.
There's a great deal of boilerplate here. Even past page 100 the book is still engaged in setting the stage.
The book has a lengthy and somewhat tedious section on the problems of supply that makes it seem like those in charge where generally incompetent. What it fails to mention is that Congress had been printing a huge amount of paper money, unbacked by any hard currency and, after 1776, greatly in excess of what the economy could bear. This is the main reasons they saw rapid inflation of prices and producers not bringing their products to market unless paid in something other than the paper currency that was rapidly becoming worthless.
The author has no compunctions about jumping back and forth in time. Of course it's always difficult to handle things when multiple stories are happening at once, but sometimes that means it's difficult for the reader to fully comprehend the big picture.
There's a tendency to avoid names at times and instead write "the Virginian" or "the Pennsylvanian", for example, which can be confusing because in a discussion about Washington and Gates, both were Virginians.
It would have been good if more had been said about Congress, which is always treated at arms length. Who was in Congress at the time? How many were pro-Washington and how many anti-Washington? Which ones changed their views. There's some information on this early in the book, but objective observers such as John Adams disappear from the narrative without explanation.
In Part III the author recapitulates a great deal of what has already been written. While this might be a good exercise while writing a book, especially if there was a significant break in the writing, it's not really helpful for the reader who has been steadily reading right along. Overall I think a strong editor would have been helpful here. In fact there seem to be many sub-chapters in the early going, one for each of Washington's detractors in fact. It would have been nice if an editor had added a subtitle to each of these sections for the easy reference of the reader. There are a lot of similar things a strong editor could have done to make this book more readable.
The promise to study locations and motivations was not so strongly evident as would have been expected. Still, it was an excellent deep dive into the subject, thoroughly examining everything that was done and written, followed by welcome analysis.
My own take from the evidence? Winners write the narrative. That's what we see here. The narrative Washington and therefore the country adopted was and mostly still is one of the triumphant general eventually triumphing despite many setbacks. Among the setbacks he had to face, according to this narrative, because Washington had to be an unvarnished hero, was a cabal against his leadership by nefarious, no-good evildoers who made secret plans to oust him or at least reduce his role. But even beset by this, Washington managed to triumph and prove that in the end he was right, because did he not, in fact, win the war?
I have two problems with this. First of all, when things are going badly, especially in perilous times like war, isn't it natural, indeed wise, to question the leadership, methods and policies before it is too late? Isn't it natural too for those who think this way to compare notes and discuss with a view to making things better? There's really no reason to conclude that Conway, Mifflin, Gates, the Lees and others were doing anything else. It's just politics, already alive in the young republic, and belying the notion that during the revolution everyone was in lockstep all the time.
Second, Washington being right should be a qualified statement. The men who were critiquing his performance were probably more talented than he was. Maybe not at the court of public opinion where Washington was a master, but in the arts of war. They had more experience and better results. Washington essentially failed at Monmouth. The British had to march from Philadelphia to Sandy Point. Somewhere in that endeavor they were surely vulnerable to having their long baggage train being struck decisively, yet Washington muffed it. (That he still claimed the stalemate at Monmouth just because the British left the field was a nice propaganda move.) Even Yorktown, for which Washington gets credit, was not his idea. He foolishly wanted to recapture New York, which due to the nature of the islands and British fleet was never going to happen. It was the French general, Rochambeau, who made this wise plan. So yes, Washington won the war, but it's pretty clear that his doubters would done so also, and maybe even more quickly and effectively.
Currently the GoodReads data for the hardcover edition of this book is incorrect. Listed publication date should be 2019 and highest numbered page is 297.
The author is evidently a big fan of asides. There are perhaps rather more than interest would justify. There are also a few drops into informality, including at one point a "Seriously?".
He also appears to be a big fan of Washington's generalship, though his own evidence seems to contradict such.
There's a great deal of boilerplate here. Even past page 100 the book is still engaged in setting the stage.
The book has a lengthy and somewhat tedious section on the problems of supply that makes it seem like those in charge where generally incompetent. What it fails to mention is that Congress had been printing a huge amount of paper money, unbacked by any hard currency and, after 1776, greatly in excess of what the economy could bear. This is the main reasons they saw rapid inflation of prices and producers not bringing their products to market unless paid in something other than the paper currency that was rapidly becoming worthless.
The author has no compunctions about jumping back and forth in time. Of course it's always difficult to handle things when multiple stories are happening at once, but sometimes that means it's difficult for the reader to fully comprehend the big picture.
There's a tendency to avoid names at times and instead write "the Virginian" or "the Pennsylvanian", for example, which can be confusing because in a discussion about Washington and Gates, both were Virginians.
It would have been good if more had been said about Congress, which is always treated at arms length. Who was in Congress at the time? How many were pro-Washington and how many anti-Washington? Which ones changed their views. There's some information on this early in the book, but objective observers such as John Adams disappear from the narrative without explanation.
In Part III the author recapitulates a great deal of what has already been written. While this might be a good exercise while writing a book, especially if there was a significant break in the writing, it's not really helpful for the reader who has been steadily reading right along. Overall I think a strong editor would have been helpful here. In fact there seem to be many sub-chapters in the early going, one for each of Washington's detractors in fact. It would have been nice if an editor had added a subtitle to each of these sections for the easy reference of the reader. There are a lot of similar things a strong editor could have done to make this book more readable.
The promise to study locations and motivations was not so strongly evident as would have been expected. Still, it was an excellent deep dive into the subject, thoroughly examining everything that was done and written, followed by welcome analysis.
My own take from the evidence? Winners write the narrative. That's what we see here. The narrative Washington and therefore the country adopted was and mostly still is one of the triumphant general eventually triumphing despite many setbacks. Among the setbacks he had to face, according to this narrative, because Washington had to be an unvarnished hero, was a cabal against his leadership by nefarious, no-good evildoers who made secret plans to oust him or at least reduce his role. But even beset by this, Washington managed to triumph and prove that in the end he was right, because did he not, in fact, win the war?
I have two problems with this. First of all, when things are going badly, especially in perilous times like war, isn't it natural, indeed wise, to question the leadership, methods and policies before it is too late? Isn't it natural too for those who think this way to compare notes and discuss with a view to making things better? There's really no reason to conclude that Conway, Mifflin, Gates, the Lees and others were doing anything else. It's just politics, already alive in the young republic, and belying the notion that during the revolution everyone was in lockstep all the time.
Second, Washington being right should be a qualified statement. The men who were critiquing his performance were probably more talented than he was. Maybe not at the court of public opinion where Washington was a master, but in the arts of war. They had more experience and better results. Washington essentially failed at Monmouth. The British had to march from Philadelphia to Sandy Point. Somewhere in that endeavor they were surely vulnerable to having their long baggage train being struck decisively, yet Washington muffed it. (That he still claimed the stalemate at Monmouth just because the British left the field was a nice propaganda move.) Even Yorktown, for which Washington gets credit, was not his idea. He foolishly wanted to recapture New York, which due to the nature of the islands and British fleet was never going to happen. It was the French general, Rochambeau, who made this wise plan. So yes, Washington won the war, but it's pretty clear that his doubters would done so also, and maybe even more quickly and effectively.
Currently the GoodReads data for the hardcover edition of this book is incorrect. Listed publication date should be 2019 and highest numbered page is 297.
September 20, 2019
Chalk it up to a sort of Nietzschean perspectivism, the difficulty I had finishing Mark Edward Lender’s book Cabal!. Not that it wasn’t well written. Quite the contrary; it was thoroughly researched, well presented and raised a number of interesting questions.
Initially I was impressed with Lender’s even-handed approach; he was often deliberate in stressing that the gentlemen being fingered as “conspirators” (for lack of a better word) were patriots every bit as much as General Washington and his cadre of staunch supporters:
“But there is something to bear in mind before looking at the actual Cabal -- or what the general and his partisans were convinced was the Cabal. In their criticisms of Washington men such as the Adams cousins and major General Lee, or even a busybody like Rush, never meant to harm the American war effort. Indeed, these men had risked their lives in declaring for independence.”
Here is where my perspectivism comes in. I have read Dr. Benjamin Rush’s autobiography as well as 6 biographies of the man. I have also read letters exchanged between Dr. Rush and many of our Founding Fathers. All my reading has resulted in a deep respect and sympathy for the undeterred idealistic, unwisely outspoken doctor, so I found it difficult not to see Lender’s Cabal! as rife with 20/20 historical hindsight, even in spite of his repeated declarations to the contrary. When I took note of the words used to describe the conspirators (I really need a better word than “conspirators” to refer to this group, maybe a nonsensical one like “cabaliers”) and/or their actions and protestations -- words such as “yammerings,” “spouting off,” “carping,” “zealots,” “blabbermouth,” “arrogance,” “virulent,” and “power grab” -- it was hard to see any even-handedness as sincere. Connotation is everything.
Lender argues that any discussion of whether there was an actual organized “cabal” is irrelevant because there were undeniable measures taken by the cabaliers to restrain the decision-making abilities of the Commander In Chief. I see his point, and he supports it well. There is no doubt that actions were taken to limit General Washington’s power. However, I’m confused as to why the objections and measures taken by those cabaliers should be viewed as sinister in any way. Wouldn’t they be considered expected and necessary behaviors emanating from one of many subsets within a heterogenous body of rebels feeling their way towards a new, inclusive, and equitable governing system, the limits of which were being defined on the fly? Besides, weren’t there numerous warning signs during those early years to justify criticizing and restraining the Commander In Chief? Primarily, all those early retreats and defeats. Even the thought process for putting a Virginia gentleman farmer in charge in the first place -- the thought that Virginia, the largest and arguably the most powerful of the colonies, wouldn’t join the struggle unless they were in charge -- was fraught with the possibility of an eventual power grab; how willing would wealthy Virginia aristocrats be to stick to the plan of forming a government based on equality and inclusion? Further, the commander in chief was espousing the reliance on a continental army, under his command, over state militias! And when the general and his cronies began to express disdain for any opponents and launched counter-attacks when the general’s right to command solely as he saw fit was challenged, surely that was an indicator that some reining in was called for. And who was “challenging” that right? The Board of War, i.e., “the congressional department established to support the patriot war effort.” Seems to me a commander taking umbrage over the actions of a congressional department should be a red flag, or at least a yellow post-it. Arguably, it would be imperative to regulate the powers granted to the general. Perhaps it would have been a more dangerous threat to a nascent democracy had no one had the courage to speak up and call for checks and balances. After all, isn’t that what democracy is all about?
Obviously things worked out for the rebels in the end, and the commander in chief proved to be the right man for the job. But we need to keep in mind that at the time, given the varied backgrounds and motivations from which the rebels entered into agreement, given the risk-filled investments which they made, given the lenses through which each patriot evaluated what they were witnessing, there is no way such a belief (i.e., that Washington was the right man for the job and could be trusted with an almost supreme power) could or would or should have been unanimous. Importantly, as we look back on those times, we need to acknowledge that we owe a genuine respect as well as a debt of gratitude not just to those brave people whose opinions seem to shine in the light of history, but also to those people whose well-intentioned opinions and courageous actions do not shine quite as brightly under that same light even as they risked just as much and fought just as courageously. As I made my way through Cabal! I didn’t feel respect and gratitude was as genuine as professed, but I do recognize my opinion may be grounded in my affinity for Dr. Benjamin Rush.
All that being said, Mark Lender’s book is well worth the read full of fascinating information, character studies, and thought-provoking insights.
Initially I was impressed with Lender’s even-handed approach; he was often deliberate in stressing that the gentlemen being fingered as “conspirators” (for lack of a better word) were patriots every bit as much as General Washington and his cadre of staunch supporters:
“But there is something to bear in mind before looking at the actual Cabal -- or what the general and his partisans were convinced was the Cabal. In their criticisms of Washington men such as the Adams cousins and major General Lee, or even a busybody like Rush, never meant to harm the American war effort. Indeed, these men had risked their lives in declaring for independence.”
Here is where my perspectivism comes in. I have read Dr. Benjamin Rush’s autobiography as well as 6 biographies of the man. I have also read letters exchanged between Dr. Rush and many of our Founding Fathers. All my reading has resulted in a deep respect and sympathy for the undeterred idealistic, unwisely outspoken doctor, so I found it difficult not to see Lender’s Cabal! as rife with 20/20 historical hindsight, even in spite of his repeated declarations to the contrary. When I took note of the words used to describe the conspirators (I really need a better word than “conspirators” to refer to this group, maybe a nonsensical one like “cabaliers”) and/or their actions and protestations -- words such as “yammerings,” “spouting off,” “carping,” “zealots,” “blabbermouth,” “arrogance,” “virulent,” and “power grab” -- it was hard to see any even-handedness as sincere. Connotation is everything.
Lender argues that any discussion of whether there was an actual organized “cabal” is irrelevant because there were undeniable measures taken by the cabaliers to restrain the decision-making abilities of the Commander In Chief. I see his point, and he supports it well. There is no doubt that actions were taken to limit General Washington’s power. However, I’m confused as to why the objections and measures taken by those cabaliers should be viewed as sinister in any way. Wouldn’t they be considered expected and necessary behaviors emanating from one of many subsets within a heterogenous body of rebels feeling their way towards a new, inclusive, and equitable governing system, the limits of which were being defined on the fly? Besides, weren’t there numerous warning signs during those early years to justify criticizing and restraining the Commander In Chief? Primarily, all those early retreats and defeats. Even the thought process for putting a Virginia gentleman farmer in charge in the first place -- the thought that Virginia, the largest and arguably the most powerful of the colonies, wouldn’t join the struggle unless they were in charge -- was fraught with the possibility of an eventual power grab; how willing would wealthy Virginia aristocrats be to stick to the plan of forming a government based on equality and inclusion? Further, the commander in chief was espousing the reliance on a continental army, under his command, over state militias! And when the general and his cronies began to express disdain for any opponents and launched counter-attacks when the general’s right to command solely as he saw fit was challenged, surely that was an indicator that some reining in was called for. And who was “challenging” that right? The Board of War, i.e., “the congressional department established to support the patriot war effort.” Seems to me a commander taking umbrage over the actions of a congressional department should be a red flag, or at least a yellow post-it. Arguably, it would be imperative to regulate the powers granted to the general. Perhaps it would have been a more dangerous threat to a nascent democracy had no one had the courage to speak up and call for checks and balances. After all, isn’t that what democracy is all about?
Obviously things worked out for the rebels in the end, and the commander in chief proved to be the right man for the job. But we need to keep in mind that at the time, given the varied backgrounds and motivations from which the rebels entered into agreement, given the risk-filled investments which they made, given the lenses through which each patriot evaluated what they were witnessing, there is no way such a belief (i.e., that Washington was the right man for the job and could be trusted with an almost supreme power) could or would or should have been unanimous. Importantly, as we look back on those times, we need to acknowledge that we owe a genuine respect as well as a debt of gratitude not just to those brave people whose opinions seem to shine in the light of history, but also to those people whose well-intentioned opinions and courageous actions do not shine quite as brightly under that same light even as they risked just as much and fought just as courageously. As I made my way through Cabal! I didn’t feel respect and gratitude was as genuine as professed, but I do recognize my opinion may be grounded in my affinity for Dr. Benjamin Rush.
All that being said, Mark Lender’s book is well worth the read full of fascinating information, character studies, and thought-provoking insights.
April 21, 2021
If you think George Washington was the indispensable and unassailable Commander in Chief of the Continental Army throughout the Revolutionary War, then you must read this book. Cabal! will show you how, after the Army's defeats at Brandywine and Germantown, during the critical Valley Forge winter of 1777-1778, Washington's opponents in Congress and among his general staff (whether with fair or foul motivations) sought to undermine his authority and even replace him with the "Hero of Saratoga, " General Horatio Gates. What Washington's enemies failed to take into account was his political acumen and the unwavering loyalty of his trusted military aides. Although it took several tense months, Washington and his allies managed to scatter his opponents and go on to success at the Battle of Monmouth, thereafter enshrining Washington as the inviolable leader of the American Cause. History has its dangerous turning points and the "Cabal" against Washington was indeed a dangerous moment. But like so many other such moments in his illustrious career, Washington saw to it that the danger passed. This book is lucid and entertaining history.
August 19, 2021
Cabal Against Washington
I saw this book in an email from bookbub or a similar site and decided to get it from the library because I felt it looked interesting. The book details in three parts, and eight chapters the existence of a Cabal against the leadership of George Washington as commander in chief of the Continental Army in 1777 and 1778. The author does a masterful job of detailing the cabal, the participants and supporters of those who were part of the cabal, as well as Washington's supporters, and how the situation turned out. In the epilogue, the author details what happened to the participants on both sides. A thoroughly enjoyable and interesting book.
I saw this book in an email from bookbub or a similar site and decided to get it from the library because I felt it looked interesting. The book details in three parts, and eight chapters the existence of a Cabal against the leadership of George Washington as commander in chief of the Continental Army in 1777 and 1778. The author does a masterful job of detailing the cabal, the participants and supporters of those who were part of the cabal, as well as Washington's supporters, and how the situation turned out. In the epilogue, the author details what happened to the participants on both sides. A thoroughly enjoyable and interesting book.
August 4, 2019
The author makes a strong case that the leading figures of the famed Conway Cabal went on to attempt to administratively strip the Commander-in-Chief of much of his authority, granting it instead to the Congressional Board of War. It's an interesting narrative of the struggle over control of the Continental Army during the American Revolution.
May 22, 2023
A great read before a full day visit to Valley Forge --- Lender did a superb job of detailing the personal histories, motivations and character (as much as could be derived from sources and letters, etc) of the many military men and politicians involved. Finished in just a few days -- highly recommend for American Revolutionary history buffs like me!
September 27, 2025
I stopped reading this after a while and then couldn't get back into it. I learned more than I needed to know about the cabal and didn't really care what happened next. The lecture the author gave and the autographed book are worth keeping. Maybe one day, I will want to know more.
October 7, 2025
Well written and researched in my opinion. It helps to give an insight into an aspect of American independence not presented as often as other facets.
Read
July 18, 2020Very comprehensive and tedious at times. Next time I would go for the 'Cliff notes' version if you know what I mean.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews