Blood, Metal and Dust: The Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 2001–14

by Ben Barry

Written by the author of the official British military analysis of the Iraq campaigns, Blood, Metal, and Dust is the first authoritative military history of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to tell the detailed story of what happened on the ground.

From the high-ranking officer who wrote the still-classified British military analysis of the war in Iraq comes the authoritative history of two conflicts which have overshadowed the beginning of the 21st century. Inextricably linked to the ongoing “War on Terror,” the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dominated more than a decade of international politics, and their influence is felt to this day.

Blood, Metal and Dust is the first military history to offer a comprehensive overview of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, providing in-depth accounts of the operations undertaken by both US and UK forces. Brigadier Ben Barry explores the wars which shaped the modern Middle East, providing a detailed narrative of operations as they unfolded. With unparalleled access to official military accounts and extensive contacts in both the UK and the US militaries, Brigadier Barry is uniquely placed to tell the story of these controversial conflicts, and offers a rounded account of the international campaigns which irrevocably changed the global geopolitical landscape.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Military History, Middle East, Military Fiction, American History, Politics

528 pages, Hardcover

First published November 24, 2020

Reviews

[Kevin Tole · Rating 5 out of 5]

Where to start with this? My views, book review, overview of conclusions, sheer outrage?

First and foremost this is the best appraisal of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq I have read. Ben Barry tries desperately to keep himself on the outside in that he doesn’t want to just express his opinions, his experiences of these campaigns. He wants to-out Chilcot the Chilcot Enquiry.

This is such a comprehensive work over such a span of time in two theatres of conflict that it is sometimes difficult to hold on to the time frame as to when exactly the events happen and what is happening around them. In fact this is to such a degree that it becomes one of my three gripes about this book and other books like it. Dates are given but commonly the year in which this date pertains to is left out. This can be confusing because of the long time span and geographical discontinuities. The important dates to hold onto are as such… (though it should be added that really for a comprehensive picture we need to go back and look at the timelines for the foundations, movement and growth of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the history of the mujahadeen as well as the dates for the first Iraq campaign with Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm).

• 2001 - 9/11 –G W Bush’s ‘War on Terror’; ultimatum in Afghanistan over Osama Bin Laden. Special Forces and CIA attack AQ bases with Northern Alliance; US air strikes against AQ and Taliban. Mass arrival of US/UK troops.
• 2002 – US and ISAF defeat of Taliban and AQ militarily (they retrench to Pakistan, mountains and countryside); rebuilding the Afghan state and military; planning for Iraq invasion.
• 2003 – invasion of Iraq by US and National forces to effect regime change. After successful invasion Blair immediately calls for British troop exit from Iraq; Bush announces ‘mission accomplished’. Iraqi army disbanded; Baath Party debarred; Rumsfeld announces combat in Afghanistan over; NATO assumes control; surge in NATO forces in Afghanistan but Taliban resurgent
• 2004 – major suicide bombings in Iraqi cities; Abu Ghraib; major flare up of violence and sectarianism; IEDs and terror tactics in Afghanistan
• 2005 - US and Coalition control of North and West Afghanistan; start of US force reduction there.
• 2006 : Iraq civil war between Shia, Sunni and AQ; Civilian deaths peak; Saddam executed; Gates takes over from Rumsfeld; In Afghanistan coalition of forces starts to fall apart with troop withdrawals. Taliban and AQ resurgent in Afghanistan; Brits move in to Helmand
• 2007 : Brown takes over from Blair; US Surge in Iraq . Petraeus takes over in Iraq; Civil War quelled. Brits leave failed mission in Basra for Afghanistan. Failure to control of south and east Afghanistan; increase in Taliban activity
• 2008 : US began to withdraw troops from Iraq. Crackdown on Shi’ite militias; Petraeus moves to Afghanistan; Better control in Afghanistan but variable w resurgent Taliban.
• 2009 : Obama takes over from Bush. Recommits to Afghanistan; US exit strategy from Iraq announced; US withdraws from Iraqi cities; coalition forces redeploy. Helmand and Brit control thereof troublesome. Surge in US troops and actions in Afghanistan
• 2010 : Cameron takes over from Brown; Combat operations ended in Iraq, and the UN lifted restrictions on Iraq. Petraeus takes over fully in Afghanistan
• 2011 : The US withdrew its last troops from Iraq. Osama bin Laden killed.
• 2012 : US starts to withdraw from Afghanistan
• 2012 : Afghan forces take over major combat roles with ‘advisers’
• 2014 : ISIS and Al Qaeda remerge in Iraq. Iraq Civil War. Obama Recommits to Iraq and announces troop withdrawals from Afghanistan; Brit troops leave Afghanistan but redeploy in 2015
• 2017 : inauguration of Trump and commitment to Afghanistan; emergence of ISIS in Afghanistan; suicide bombings in Kabul
• 2018 : ISIS driven out of Iraq by Iraqi military and ‘advisers’; increase in US forces in Afghanistan; pressure on Taliban to negotiate
• 2019 : weakening of Afghan govmt control in cities
• 2020 : US and Taliban sign agreement in Qatar; further withdrawal of US forces
• 2021 : Biden succeeds Trump; announces full withdrawal; Afghan govmt collapses; Taliban take control; Kabul scramble to withdraw in chaos

Yep. Confusing!! But Ben Barry manages to pull sense out of it all and it is easier to follow through his impressive 500 pages of text, maps and addenda. So what conclusions does he come up with bearing in mind we are dealing with two separate theatres and a timespan of 20 years (whether in fact these conflicts have ended or not – Iraq still continues and the Taliban run Afghanistan and the conflicts are still there ready to escalate at any moment).

Barry describes Iraq 2003 as ’the biggest military disaster and stupidest plan since Napoleon marched on Russia or Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa’. The biggest failure of the biggest disaster seems to be the lack of post-combat planning. This applies almost as much to Afghanistan as to Iraq. Just what was to be done once regime change had been accomplished. And along with that appears to be the total misunderstanding of the nature of Iraq. A Shi’ite majority; a Sunni minority which had been in power through Saddam and the Baath Party; inter-sectarian civil war and counter-insurgency. US and Allied forces seem to have been totally unprepared for what they would face once they had done their ‘invasions’ and ‘regime changes’ and been 'warriors'. This too applies to Afghanistan – a total failure to understand an almost medieval country where the concept of ‘State’ came well down below tribe / kinship / local regional leader and was further confounded by warlords, corruption and illegality including the drugs trade and a barely functionning economy. In Iraq the only winner identified by Barry is Iran.

Reading this book makes it almost imperative to read further. Mike Martin's An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012 is essential reading to understand the make-up of the Afghan people and what was faced by coalition and US forces. How the Taliban could melt into the countryside and how insurgency rekindled time and time again. The role of Pakistan and it's ISI security services still needs to be fully explored. The border between Pakistan and Iraq was totally permeable to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Indeed there is the line examined by Barry which sees Pakistan's support for insurgency as a counteraction to the growing power of India. Also of relevance is the book produced by reservist and barrister who served in Iraq and Afghanistan Frank Ledwidge’s Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan . Ledwige is if anything more damning of the lack of planning and foresight than Barry and perhaps even angrier.

I don’t hold much with the ‘Help for Heroes’ campaigns. You sign up for the Armed Forces, you should know what to expect. Your life is on the line. That’s what you’re offering in return for a wage and a trade and a sense of camaraderie and purpose. What is expected of these men and women that choose to do their ‘patriotic duty’? On the other hand, no serviceman or woman deserves to be let down so so badly by utterly poor leadership and decision making (or indeed lack of any of those necessities). It is in fact criminal that so many people died in these two conflicts and the misguided views on ‘regime change’ continue to be the mind-set of democratically elected politicians (look at Libya and the chaos unleashed there without even boots on the ground). All those civilians that died (and that count has never been totalled). All these serving servicemen and women and those that never came home have a justified right to feel not just angry but completely let down and destroyed by political decisions and sheer lack of foresight by people that were empowered to know better. Furthermore these ‘leaders’ get away without facing the wrath of the people they condemned to death or tortured future existences. Barry does make a point of specifically condemning some of the faces that deserve to face the firing squad. Blair, Rumsfeld, Bremer and Bush were poor, incompetent wartime leaders out of their depth. Generals and staff officers were responsible for poor and even complete lack of planning and yet most have managed to escape the outcome of their incompetency, some even receiving medals, honours and advancement when they should have faced juries and paid for crimes against humanity. But it went on… and it still continues

Barry does not come across through this book as an angry man or even as one throwing mud from the sidelines. He was there. He took part. He wants to get those facts out there. Perhaps if we were less blind to what happened the general public OUTRAGE would be greater. We WOULD clamour for the heads of these mindless bloated self-important fuckers. But as we absolve ourselves from these decisions, as we become more inured to political inactivity and are sucked into the mind-numbing world of cyber, as we seek to be less and less humanly involved, we become disinterested and blasé and self-centred. Try telling that to an amputee. Try telling that to an Afghan ‘illegal immigrant’ as they step off an inflatable onto a Kent beach after escaping seeing their country bombed back to the stone age and their kin murdered. And as such we are ALL complicit in these deaths and disfigurements. They happened when we weren’t watching …. Or were watching the latest episode of ‘Love Island’.

The complacency of modern life. And death.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a book that was a tad difficult to read, to be honest. Having many friends who served in both Afghanistan and Iraq, with more than one of them having come back with wounds, both physical and psychological, and with both events recent enough to still cause the reader more than a tad bit of emotional response, this wasn't exactly an enjoyable read.
This is an incredibly honest, open, astutely analytical, and critical when it needs to be, look at two recent defeats for the United States, NATO, and the collective Western elite at large. The author, a British Brigadier General who was in charge of the British occupation, and in part the operations in, Basra draws not just from his own personal experience, but also declassified source material, and Intelligence assessments, to craft a compelling narrative of these two connected wars.
The narrative reads initially like a triumph, a practical walk over, of both the Al'Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan, and the Iraqi Army in Iraq, before it rapidly dissolves into an utterly chaotic mess as, largely American, civilian officials completely wreck, interfere, bungle, and purposefully sabotage (or so it seemed), the effort of the Coalition forces to nation build in both countries. Iraq in particular becomes a proxy war with Iran, one which Iran, ultimately, emerges successful, while the effort in Afghanistan is betrayed both by incompetent leadership, both in Washington and in the field from top brass who had little idea what they were really doing, as well as backstabbing from supposed allies such as Pakistan.
Barry levels a judicious charge against Washington, and NATO, that little enough thought was given to a coherent strategic plan for the entire conflict. And with revolving Administration's in Washington playing politics with said strategy, while real people die from the results, is more than a little maddening to the reader.
The author did a good job highlighting the, many, tactical, and operational, successes of the American, British, Canadian, and larger NATO forces, as well as given credit to the Iraqi National, and Afghani National Armies where it is due. But he also does not shy away from showing the actions where AQ, the Taiban, ISIS, and the various militias, both Sunni and Shia, in Iraq performed well, as well. (He doesn't quite come out and admit that ISIS was a direct creation of the America Intelligence establishment, but he strongly hints at it).
And he has to point out that for all of their tactical, and operational successes, the lack of a coherent strategy, or even comprehension of what that might even be, doomed all of the blood, sweat, metal, and tears shed by the Coalition forces.
Seeing the current Administration's foreign policy blunders, and disasters, it's clear that Washington has learned but little, if anything at all, from the disasters in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Thousands of NATO, American, and allied native foces were killed or injured for no gain, many more Insurgents, and foreign fighters were slain or maimed, and God alone knows how many innocents trapped in the middle paid the price for poorly conducted, and quite frankly, not entirely defensible, wars.
Often, a very depressing, very personal read. But one that should be required reading for anyone hoping to understand the cost, and failures, of the 'War on Terror'.
Very highly recommended.

[Joseph · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wow, what can I say about this book??!! The author makes the argument that the wars in the Levant were both strategic defeats for the US and our allies. I tend to agree with the author's analysis. Throughout the narrative, the author draws the reader's focus towards the nitty-gritty; the war as the troops saw it firsthand. This was also the first modern war book I've read where the author didn't sugarcoat the facts as they occurred; he has a wonderful way of being blunt without demeaning the subject. If you are looking for a clear, concise modern war study, give this book a go.

[Joe · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very, very good military history of the US & British interventions into Afghanistan & Iraq, spurred by the events of 11 September. This book takes you inside those 2000s military campaigns and the flailing attempts to win the peace on the ground. A lack of good political leadership in Washington, DC & London is mostly to blame for the flailing - and the book gets 4/5 because it rarely mentions ISIS but does give a blurb to the early rise of Covid19.

[Eric J. Hartsfield · Rating 5 out of 5]

An outstanding summary of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan

This is one of the best books I have come across in providing a thoughtful analysis of the two campaigns. He provides very good summaries on the operational level of the military campaigns with great analysis of the political, social, religious and ethnic aspects and factors. Highly recommended!

[Navneet Bhushan · Rating 5 out of 5]

An absolutely riveting account of two major wars of the 21st Century. These wars are all the more interesting that these were conducted by the sole super power with all its military economic might and in a predominantly unipolar world.

Yet the verdict is a defeat.. A strategic defeat despite tactical and operational military operational victories.

Three US presidents and three UK PMs and their associated administrations displayed "strategic incompetence" And a level of hubris that is highly unexpected by the country that has highest number of strategi c thinktanks and military thinking and military dollars spent.

Author dissects phase by phase the US UK and NATO strategy and the evolution of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Author finds the greatest strategic competent leader in the whole game as

IRG head qasim solemani who was assassinated in January 2020 by US Drone Strike.

This book is must read!

[Matthew Stienberg · Rating 5 out of 5]

The wars that dominated my youth in Afghanistan and Iraq ostensibly ended a few years ago, while the 20th anniversary in the Iraq War is creeping up on us. Here, Ben Barry provides an excellent military summation of both those wars, their successes, and their failures. From good leaders to bad leaders it shows that while an overwhelming amount of military power was brought to bear on the enemies the US chose to engage, poor leadership and fracticious debates inside the countries who led the charge resulted in strategic defeat in both theaters of war.

The sad coda to this book is that, published in 2020, it was only a year shy of seeing the debacle of Afghanistan's complete collapse and fall to the Taliban. As he says, the people who fought and died, and the people of Afghanistan and Iraq deserved more than blood, metal and dust as their legacy.

[Brian Asalone · Rating 4 out of 5]

this reads more like a lecture on these wars by a military expert. the author goes into enough details to give a general picture of major engagements and to highlight important aspects. the reader can really get a full understanding of the work by simply reading the last two chapters.

[Jacqueline · Rating 4 out of 5]

A comprehensive military history of the Western wars in the Middle East. The author comes off as very well informed and mostly neutral, though the final chapter or so feel a tad polemic. Read critically, though, it is great. Frank and honest about the myriad failures of the wars.

[Grouchy Historian · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the book I have been waiting for. A real narrative military history of the GWOT campaigns of the last 20 years.

[Norbert · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really good analysis of the operations until 2012 more or less. Operation from 2012 to 2019 are less detailed.

But it is a very interesting book

[Peter Kilburn · Rating 1 out of 5]

I am sure there is some merit to this book but I found it deeply confusing and I am not sure that it is really accessible to anyone without a degree in Military History- gave up