This is a well-reasoned study of Robert E. Lee’s strengths and (mostly) weaknesses when he took the strategic offensive (i.e., invaded the North and fought at Antietam and Gettysburg). While the book admits Lee’s defensive brilliance, those traits that made him a genius on the strategic defensive (trust in his commanders, the desire to improvise and take chances), were his weaknesses on offensive. He invaded the North twice without clear goals or objectives, leaving his commanders to guess at his intentions. The results speak for themselves.
Additionally, whether it’s Lee’s fault or not, the Confederacy lacked a coherent overall war strategy. However, Lee did not help. While they were losing New Orleans, Tennessee, Kentucky and Vicksburg (essentially the entire Mississippi River, cutting the nation in two), Lee adamantly argued against sending any of his troops south. In fact, his solution to every crisis in the deep South was to suggest an offensive into the North.
This book is an important antidote to the Lee Cult that grew after the war and is still present today. He was a good “game day” general, but a poor overall strategist. Lee won almost every battle but lost the war. George Washington lost almost every battle but won the war. Who was the better general?