Since publication of A THEORY OF JUSTICE in 1971, political philosopher John Rawls's conception of "justice as fairness" has been beset by critiques from both left and right. His final work, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (edited and published posthumously) was Rawls's closely-reasoned effort both to meet and overcome these objections and to further flesh out his original theory. On balance, I believe he succeeded on both counts. As with the THEORY, this is reading both illuminating and exhausting.
In the original THEORY, as modified by this RESTATEMENT, Rawls articulates a political theory of justice that is based on a very specific treatment of the notion of "fairness." His unspoken intent here is to develop a rationale for modern liberalism, built on social contract theory, that is entirely distinct from -- and sometimes opposed to -- the arguments for liberalism used in the past (everything from classical utilitarianism to standard social contract theory to socialism). In so doing, he puts liberalism on much firmer intellectual footing. A strong case can be made that John Rawls is the preeminent philosopher of modern liberalism, and by extension, the foundational thinker for some of the more thoughtful elements of the Democratic Party.
What is "justice-as-fairness"? To start with, Rawls develops his philosophy using a device -- almost a thought experiment -- the "Original Position." From an Original Position, everyone who is (or will be) in born into a given society will work to achieve a consensus in the design of the foundational political principles, structures, and institutions of that society. In short, if we all went back to the drawing board, together, how would we design our government and major economic and social policies?
There's a catch: Everyone in the Original Position must decide on the structure of society from behind a "veil of ignorance." That is, nobody in the Original Position can have any knowledge of what their life prospects will be. Specifically, nobody can know their: (1) social class of origin (income level, religion, family stability, etc.), (2) traits or native endowments (intellect, predisposition to work hard, sex, race, innate talents, etc.), or (3) good or ill fortune over the course of a lifetime (disease, natural disaster, layoffs, etc.).
The intent is force people to think about what kind of society they would construct if they cannot know ahead of time what circumstances they'll be born into, what kind of genetic predispositions they'll have, or what effect good or bad random chance events will have during their life.
In other words, if you know ahead of time that you will be born Paris Hilton, then you're probably less inclined to care about ensuring that the basic structure of society allows for appropriate levels of opportunity for advancement for those at the bottom of the income distribution. If you know you're an heiress ahead of time, you might design society according to the ideals of, say, Ayn Rand libertarianism -- not because you think it's the right and just course for society, but simply because it's convenient for you and your pocketbook.
On the flip side, if you know you're going to be born poor, dimwitted, lazy, and that you'll be wiped out by a hurricane when you're 33 years old, then you're probably not going to care too much about ensuring that functioning markets calibrate the appropriate economic incentives to ensure a productive workforce. If you know all this ahead of time, you might design a society along socialist models -- not because you think it's a just course for society, but because you simply want to collect a sizable weekly check for doing nothing.
After setting up the Original Position, Rawls spends a great deal of time in his writings deriving how individuals in that Position would, in actuality, design the fundamental principles of society. His conclusion is that people would derive two Principles of Justice:
FIRST: Each person has the same claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, such that this scheme is compatible with the same liberties for everyone.
SECOND: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (1) inequities must be mitigated by the availability of positions open to all people under conditions of "fair equality of opportunity"; and (2) they must accord with the "difference principle" such that inequalities are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
To simplify: The First Principle ensures a system of basic liberties for everyone -- much like those enshrined in several amendments of the Bill of Rights, certain elements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and similar documents. (Note, providing a inviolable set of minimum rights sets Rawlsian theory apart from classic utilitarianism.) This concept is fairly straightforward.
The Second Principle is more complicated and, in part, more controversial. The basic idea is that people in the Original Position would conclude that economic and social inequalities are permissible, or even desirable, so long as those inequalities meet two conditions. (Note: permitting inequalities is one of the main factors that set Rawlsian thinking apart from socialism.)
The first condition is that there must be equality of opportunity in employment, education, political office, and other important (but not all) areas. None of these areas can be off limits to individuals for non-meritorious reasons (such as racial discrimination, for example). So, inequality is allowable so long as, in part, there is an equal chance for everyone to get ahead. Note that Rawls is not seeking some communist ideal of "equal outcomes." No, instead he is calling only for "equal opportunity."
The second condition society must meet to be in accord with the Second Principle of Justice is that inequalities are permitted to exist, but only to the extent that they are to everyone's benefit. That is, inequality is allowed, but regulated so that those inequalities ultimately work to the advantage not only of the well-off, but also to the advantage of those who are worst-off. (Note: ensuring that inequalities nevertheless serve an overall public good is one of the main factors that set Rawlsian thinking apart from libertarianism.)
Rawls is effectively inverting trickle-down economics -- and doing so a decade before that term became vogue. For example, one could say that the difference principle might be met by imposing higher tax rates on wealthier individuals, to the extent that those tax receipts are redirected toward, say, universal pre-Kindergarten for low-income schools or medical care for the disadvantaged. In this hypothetical, the higher inequality prevalent in society (which allowed the wealthy to become wealthier in the first place) nonetheless also provides a net advantage to those who are worst-off. Obviously this type of example isn't set forth in Rawls's writings; I'm trying to illustrate the basic idea. In his books, Rawls articulates a more precise mathematical conception based on Pareto optimality.
One of Rawls's most crucial insights is his articulation that the difference principle is justifiable because it rests on the intuition that inequality shouldn't allowed to exist simply because certain people are luckier or smarter or better looking than others. A person does not "morally deserve" their inborn talents or their social class of birth or the vagaries of random chance in life. Therefore, no one is entitled to ALL the benefits these factors could provide. As a consequence, everyone in society is permitted to benefit from, at least at a minimum level, the random good luck of anyone blessed with these "excess benefits" from birth class or genes or whatever. Fairness.
(Note that Rawls takes pains to explain that the First Principle (equal basic liberties) is prior to the Second Principle, such that if there is a conflict regarding a given public policy, the First Principle wins. Basic liberties trump the difference principle.)
Obviously there is much more to justice-as-fairness, but that's the gist. The essential point to ensure the appropriate blend of -- or trade-off between -- equality and liberty. The goal is to ensure that there is an absolute minimum, a "floor" below which nobody in our society is allowed to fall resulting from bad luck, bad circumstances of birth, etc. -- but after ensuring that minimum requirement, everyone in society has the maximum freedom to work to advance oneself (based on merit, luck, etc.).
In response to the original THEORY, those on the political right objected to the difference principle, and other elements of justice-as-fairness, mostly on libertarian grounds. Some on the left, such as Amartya Sen, who otherwise agreed with Rawls that reliance on a purely utilitarian outlook is bankrupt, nonetheless believed that justice-is-fairness is too inflexible and that Rawls overlooked the need to better account for an individual's basic capabilities. Moving further left, Marxists faulted Rawls's theory for being compatible (indeed, even requiring) the protection of property rights and preservation of a market economy. Finally, some observers questioned the use of the Original Position as entirely unrealistic from a practical standpoint.
In this RESTATEMENT, Rawls meets and overcomes most of these objections. Many of the arguments are subtle, and to do justice to them, I recommend that you up this short (but dense) book.
I mentioned above that this book is a bit exhausting. It's only 200 pages but feels like twice that. The prose is dense and at times subtle -- you have to be careful you didn't just gloss over a critically important concept. But, in the end, this book is exhausting in a positive way, like a good workout. You will be smarter for having read it.
In fact, it's unfortunate that Rawls is not required reading for most, if not all, social science curricula. I believe even after setting aside my own political bias and conviction that our world would be an immeasurably better place if more people delved into a copy of John Rawls's works, and tossed their copy of ATLAS SHRUGGED into the ash bin of history to which it belongs.
A final note: I recall that, while lugging around my copy of A THEORY OF JUSTICE while reading it ten years ago, people's responses were hilarious. At least a half-dozen times, some complete stranger noticed the title under my arm and said something like, "Hey, are you in law school?" or "Dude, I read that in law school!" or "I'm in a criminal justice program too." It was troubling that so many people were so insufficiently competent in their own professions to be unaware that A THEORY OF JUSTICE has nothing to do with law, courts, or police work. The only time I received more commentary from complete strangers about a book was when reading Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (which, if you've seen it, has a rather unsettling front cover). So, be forewarned: if you pick up the THEORY, be prepared for random people to notice the term "justice" on the cover of a thick book and assume you're a part-time student at some C.S.I. training program at ITT Tech.