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A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy
A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy is a deliberately compact introductory work aimed at junior seafarers, those who make decisions affecting the sea services, and those who educate seafarers and decision-makers. It introduces readers to the main theoretical ideas that shape how statesmen and commanders make and execute maritime strategy in times of peace and war. Following in the spirit of Bernard Brodie's Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy , a World War II-era book whose title makes its purpose plain, it will be a companion volume to such works as Geoffrey Till's Seapower and Wayne Hughes's Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat , the classic treatise that explains how to handle navies in fleet actions. It takes the mystery out of maritime strategy, which should not be an arcane art for practitioners or policy-makers, and will help the next generation think about strategy.
200 pages, Paperback
Published February 15, 2020
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Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
July 1, 2026
Very good, surprisingly condensed, Naval War College level summation of Maritime Strategy. Maritime, as opposed to strictly Naval, as James Holmes discusses that navies exist to ensure the safe conduct of passage, commerce, travel, and exploration on, and beneath, the world's oceans.
While he does get into more kinetic concerns, he goes to some length to hammer home the point that there is far more to Maritime, and thus Naval, strategy than finding an enemy ship, and blowing it up.
Though, if course, it does include that.
James discusses the how, and why, some nations are, have been, or were, great maritime and naval powers. This entails the existence of a confluence of several factors: coastal geography (does your geography provide natural harbors that can be expanded upon?, etc...), demographics, economics, and culture, just to name a few.
One very worthwhile side discussion is why the English ultimately prevailed against the French in each other's bids for global maritime, and hence economic and colonial, mastery in the 17th and 18th centuries. The English won largely because their lack of resources, and their geographical blessings of being an island with plentiful natural harbors, ensured that the English people would be driven to seek a maritime ultima form of strategic thought.
The French, on the other hand, being a people inhabiting an incredibly bountiful land that produces more than they need (creating natural economic surpluses that can be traded for riches, influence, and strategic positioning on the continent), also meant that they had a booming demographic, with the highest birth rates in Christendom.
All of this ensured that Frennch strategic thought naturally relegated maritime and naval concerns a secondary role to military and geopolitical concerns.
France, in other words, was a natural land power. England, a naval one. One can make the same analysis vis a vis Japan and China, and it will hold just as true.
Rather than spending time on naval history, he instead spends most of the final quarter of the book discussing the differences between naval doctrinal thought as proposed by the American Alfred Thayer Mahan (a Union Navy veteran during the War Between the States, and son of a beloved West Point professor), who favored a direct, confrontational approach seeking naval supremacy rapidly, and that propounded by the Brit Sir Julian Corbett.
Corbett favored a more indirect approach, avoiding direct confrontation if at all possible, and offering much in the way of thoughtful critiques of then standard naval doctrine (which, even in the early 20th century Royal Navy, was highly influenced by the American Mahan's line of thought).
Holmes admits that there is no correct answer to the question: who do you prefer, Corbett or Mahan? Both offer valid lines of thinking.
And that last is the big take away of the little book, clearly written with a mind to influencing policy makers in the Pentagon, and Washington: ossiffied thinking, doctrinal rigidity, and an unwillingness to introduce free thinkers into decision and planning groups, and thereby reducing adaptability and flexibility first intellectually, and most vitally, then operationally, is the death of naval supremacy. (Wow, that was a long sentence...yes, kids, the Oxford comma is your friend).
While the writing is a bit stiff, and dry, speaking more to it's intended audience than it's writer, this is a very worthwhile, short, read to earn a basic understanding of the topic. Hopefully, it also sparks some sense of further thought about maritime, and naval affairs, and maybe even gets one involved in advocacy for renewed American attention to rebuilding our naval supremacy.
Highly recommended.
While he does get into more kinetic concerns, he goes to some length to hammer home the point that there is far more to Maritime, and thus Naval, strategy than finding an enemy ship, and blowing it up.
Though, if course, it does include that.
James discusses the how, and why, some nations are, have been, or were, great maritime and naval powers. This entails the existence of a confluence of several factors: coastal geography (does your geography provide natural harbors that can be expanded upon?, etc...), demographics, economics, and culture, just to name a few.
One very worthwhile side discussion is why the English ultimately prevailed against the French in each other's bids for global maritime, and hence economic and colonial, mastery in the 17th and 18th centuries. The English won largely because their lack of resources, and their geographical blessings of being an island with plentiful natural harbors, ensured that the English people would be driven to seek a maritime ultima form of strategic thought.
The French, on the other hand, being a people inhabiting an incredibly bountiful land that produces more than they need (creating natural economic surpluses that can be traded for riches, influence, and strategic positioning on the continent), also meant that they had a booming demographic, with the highest birth rates in Christendom.
All of this ensured that Frennch strategic thought naturally relegated maritime and naval concerns a secondary role to military and geopolitical concerns.
France, in other words, was a natural land power. England, a naval one. One can make the same analysis vis a vis Japan and China, and it will hold just as true.
Rather than spending time on naval history, he instead spends most of the final quarter of the book discussing the differences between naval doctrinal thought as proposed by the American Alfred Thayer Mahan (a Union Navy veteran during the War Between the States, and son of a beloved West Point professor), who favored a direct, confrontational approach seeking naval supremacy rapidly, and that propounded by the Brit Sir Julian Corbett.
Corbett favored a more indirect approach, avoiding direct confrontation if at all possible, and offering much in the way of thoughtful critiques of then standard naval doctrine (which, even in the early 20th century Royal Navy, was highly influenced by the American Mahan's line of thought).
Holmes admits that there is no correct answer to the question: who do you prefer, Corbett or Mahan? Both offer valid lines of thinking.
And that last is the big take away of the little book, clearly written with a mind to influencing policy makers in the Pentagon, and Washington: ossiffied thinking, doctrinal rigidity, and an unwillingness to introduce free thinkers into decision and planning groups, and thereby reducing adaptability and flexibility first intellectually, and most vitally, then operationally, is the death of naval supremacy. (Wow, that was a long sentence...yes, kids, the Oxford comma is your friend).
While the writing is a bit stiff, and dry, speaking more to it's intended audience than it's writer, this is a very worthwhile, short, read to earn a basic understanding of the topic. Hopefully, it also sparks some sense of further thought about maritime, and naval affairs, and maybe even gets one involved in advocacy for renewed American attention to rebuilding our naval supremacy.
Highly recommended.
April 22, 2021
Not sure how I've been in the Navy this long and not been exposed to this book (although it came out in 2019, the predecessor was Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy by Bernard Brodie). It is short, logically presented, and easy to digest. It puts into perspective the "Why" and "What" for the Navy, leaving the "How" for Fleet Tactics and Operations by Wayne Hughes. Should be required reading for anyone with a stake in Naval procurement, appropriations, fleet design/deployment schedules, and their advisors.
Today, the US is falling into many errors, such as not having our own flagged merchant fleet, and letting companies seek economy of scale with ever larger bulk ships. We are also failing as a maritime power by not feeding the virtuous cycle of a large merchant marine supporting commerce overseas and the resulting taxes funding the Navy to protect the merchant marine. Our sequence of focus for the military should be people, ideas, then hardware, and we are almost always the exact opposite. The last 5 pages are also excellent at addressing maintaining a maritime culture, both in the Navy and the nation. Overall excellent read.
Today, the US is falling into many errors, such as not having our own flagged merchant fleet, and letting companies seek economy of scale with ever larger bulk ships. We are also failing as a maritime power by not feeding the virtuous cycle of a large merchant marine supporting commerce overseas and the resulting taxes funding the Navy to protect the merchant marine. Our sequence of focus for the military should be people, ideas, then hardware, and we are almost always the exact opposite. The last 5 pages are also excellent at addressing maintaining a maritime culture, both in the Navy and the nation. Overall excellent read.
July 7, 2023
Decent summary of some important concepts, but pretty dry. It wasn’t a great audio book to listen to during commute/ chores- it was too easy to zone out. Author used “behoove” at least 15 times, which was tight
June 16, 2026
Das Buch enthält genau das was es verspricht: Eine sehr kurze Einführung in die Prinzipien der Maritimen Strategie.
Es werden kurz due wesentlichen Aspekte von Seemacht genannt und auf viel weiterführende Literatur verwiesen. Also genau das, was eine kurze Einführung auch tun sollte.
Es werden kurz due wesentlichen Aspekte von Seemacht genannt und auf viel weiterführende Literatur verwiesen. Also genau das, was eine kurze Einführung auch tun sollte.
April 14, 2021
B: A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy—I wish this book had been available when I was in college or when I seriously started reading about strategy. I started tick marking each reference that I had on my shelves (most) or on my Kindle (one or two) and came up with 35, starting with Machiavelli’s Discourses, Bemis’ Diplomatic History of the United States in college, as well as the Naval Institute’s Classics of Sea Power series that I started reading during and after attending the Armed Forces Staff College in the ‘80s. The book only has 3 chapters, the first is a summary of Mahan’s theories on generating maritime power, the second maintaining it, and the third melding Mahan, Corbett, and others on various means of employing a naval force.
February 19, 2023
The title says exactly what this book is. Dr. Holmes curates the big ideas from the strategic heavy hitters (Mahan, Corbett, Machiavelli, and even Kissinger). He then presents them in a concise and logical format backed up with key quotes. While reading it will not make you an expert, it does show you the basis for modern maritime strategy. It is also an easy read that should take only a week or two to finish, something that cannot be said for some of the source material (**cough** Mahan).
August 1, 2023
Holmes walks the reading through centuries of maritime strategy, the costs, benifits and interpretations that the field has gone through in its history.
Why I started this book: My hold finally arrived, with a few others and I knew that I needed to jump on this Professional Reading title so that others could listen to it after me.
Why I finished it: Short, concise and clear this is an excellent introduction to maritime strategy and the great theorists in the field. Solid introduction.
Why I started this book: My hold finally arrived, with a few others and I knew that I needed to jump on this Professional Reading title so that others could listen to it after me.
Why I finished it: Short, concise and clear this is an excellent introduction to maritime strategy and the great theorists in the field. Solid introduction.
October 10, 2021
A thought provoking read.
Understanding strategy as a professional mariner is important it is not always easier. Mr. Holmes provides a short introduction to strategy that is needed at sea to maintain the upper hand against any for An easy read well worth the time investment to digest.
Understanding strategy as a professional mariner is important it is not always easier. Mr. Holmes provides a short introduction to strategy that is needed at sea to maintain the upper hand against any for An easy read well worth the time investment to digest.
Read
January 10, 2023Exactly what was promised: a very brief and introductory overview to the theory of naval grand strategy. Useful for someone like me, with absolutely no background in military history or strategy, but interested in a book-format summary of how the canonical thinkers construct naval strategy frameworks.
August 31, 2023
Surprisingly approachable
I saw that title and just had to give this book a try, fully expecting to drop it unfinished. Nope, this was fun even if a bit dry. The author tries to spice it up and humanize the technical material.
To sum it up, this mostly reads like aquatic von Clausewitz, but with humorous anecdotes.
I saw that title and just had to give this book a try, fully expecting to drop it unfinished. Nope, this was fun even if a bit dry. The author tries to spice it up and humanize the technical material.
To sum it up, this mostly reads like aquatic von Clausewitz, but with humorous anecdotes.
October 9, 2023
I have relatively little exposure to maritime strategy and the literature associated with it. Given this, the book could have been shortened and would have benefited from better usage of section and sub-section headers to ensure key ideas/takeaways didn't get buried in the text. Regardless, I did come away with a better understanding of the maritime domain.
March 20, 2024
While it can be a tough read at times, Holmes expertly uses history (mostly its biggest figures and events, it is a brief history after all) to convey both the reason for maintaining a navy, their possible missions, and the ways they can achieve these missions. Must read for anyone interested in maritime strategy, his notes provide a springboard for further study of the topic as well.
March 21, 2021
Quick
This really quick read is chocked full of theories and definitive information on the application of maritime strategy. I blasted through this read and recommend it to my strategists and planner friends. Maybe some policy makers need to read it too.
This really quick read is chocked full of theories and definitive information on the application of maritime strategy. I blasted through this read and recommend it to my strategists and planner friends. Maybe some policy makers need to read it too.
July 15, 2023
Solid, short survey of maritime strategy (Mahan, Corbett, etc…) with some real world, contemporary applications. Overly academic at some points when a simple explanation would do. Overall quick and efficient.
October 7, 2024
A good, brief introductory text on the subject.
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews