Ялта. Ціна миру

by Serhii Plokhy, Сергій Плохій

Третє лютого 1945 року. До вілл поблизу чорноморського курорту Ялта прибули два найпотужніші лідери демократичного світу — Рузвельт і Черчилль. Вони називали себе аргонавтами, які дісталися чорноморського узбережжя, щоб відібрати золоте руно у дракона, що ніколи не спав. Золотим руном мало стати завершення війни, а драконом був господар маєтку, Йосип Сталін. Ця доленосна зустріч визначила стратегію перемоги над Німеччиною та Японією. Проте роками довкола наслідків ялтинської конференції точаться запеклі суперечки: чи не поклало це початок холодній війні? Чи відповідало американським інтересам наполягання приєднати СРСР до війни з Японією? Хто продав Східну Європу? Чи дійсно західні лідери могли змінити в Ялті хід історії? Спираючись на нещодавно розсекречені радянські документи, неопубліковані щоденники, листи й протоколи зустрічей, Сергій Плохій не просто дає відповіді на ці запитання, а й ставить нові, не менш гострі та провокативні.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, Politics, Russia, War, European History

416 pages, Hardcover

First published December 22, 2009

About the author

Serhii Plokhy is a Ukrainian and American historian. Plokhy is currently the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History and Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, where he was also named Walter Channing Cabot Fellow in 2013. A leading authority on Eastern Europe, he has lived and taught in Ukraine, Canada, and the United States. He has published extensively in English, Ukrainian, and Russian. For three successive years (2002-2005) his books won first prize of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies.

For his Ukrainian-language profile, please see: Сергій Плохій

Reviews

[Rick · Rating 4 out of 5]

For all one has read of World War II, the book "Yalta: The Price of Peace" will reveal much. The story of this historical event is really one of the three main participants - Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. It is a story of the three dividing up Europe into what they said they did not want -i.e. Spheres of Influence, and shaping the peace that was to come. While the meeting of the Big Three in Tehran 15 months earlier touched on many of the same subjects, Yalta in February 1945 was more immediate.

At the time of the Yalta Conference the American and British allies were newly extricated from the Ardennes and the Battle of the Bulge, and were on the western border of Germany. But the Russian army stood just 40 miles or so from Berlin, having already overrun and freed most of the Eastern and Central European countries. So having the three world leaders discuss the future of Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, and especially Poland was somewhat problematic since Russia had already been through those areas. As the Big Three discuss the various regions, the reader can see the future mess setting up before their eyes.

Written by a Harvard professor of Ukrainian History, the tale is detailed and exact. The author offers the specifics and then explains them in perspective. While this book could easily have slid into an academic tome, it doesn't. Author Plokhy keeps the story engaging from the start, with just enough backstory to make sure the reader has that ever important context. Recommended.

[Mikey B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an eminently readable account of what occurred at Yalta in February, 1945. It continues to have repercussions and to be debated in our current era. One of the strengths of this book is it gives an overall view, focusing in particular on the background and the personalities concerned. It is not merely a regurgitation of what was set down (agreed and not agreed upon) at Yalta. Mr. Plokhy gives us the historical grounding. For instance, he brings up the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the first summit at Teheran. The chapters are all well organized and the flow for the most part is chronological. We are not only presented with the obvious main characters of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, but of several others like Molotov, Anthony Eden and Harry Hopkins.

The Yalta accomplishments or decisions are given in context of the era and their myriad historical problems. The war was not over. The post-historical mythology of Yalta is largely negative – some hold the view that Eastern Europe was abandoned and given away needlessly by the Western powers. This is incorrect.

There were several significant achievements at Yalta. Roosevelt obtained a commitment and agreement from Stalin on the structure of the United Nations (the U.N. was still very much in doubt before Yalta). Churchill ratified having France occupy a portion of Germany; this was the beginning of the resurgence of France as a European power. Also, importantly, Roosevelt got Stalin to agree to join the war against Japan once Germany was defeated. It is sometimes forgotten today the degree of trepidation the Western Allies felt for the invasion of Japan. They were expecting fierce resistance and a long war with casualties for U.S. troops alone numbering in the hundreds of thousands. The atom bomb at the time of Yalta was still theoretical. The first explosion was in July, 1945. As the author points out, it could have been both the atomic explosions and the Russian invasion that finally prompted the Japanese surrender

It is obvious from reading this book that both Stalin and Molotov obfuscated before, during, and after Yalta, any attempt to have a democratic government in Poland (and Eastern Europe). They had a million troops occupying Poland and they were determined to make Poland a puppet Soviet state and they did just that. Aside from going to war against the Soviet Union there was not much Roosevelt and Churchill could do. It was Stalin (not Roosevelt and Churchill) who broke the agreement to have “free and unfettered elections” in Poland. Real elections only took place in the 1990’s after the demise of the Soviet empire.

Mr. Plokhy does well to compare Stalin to the Czars’, for his territorial acquisitions in Eastern Europe and through the secret Yalta agreements taking the land that Japan acquired during the war with Imperial Russia in 1905. Stalin succeeded well in establishing Soviet Russia as a world power.

Roosevelt often described himself as the best actor in the U.S. He was always difficult to pin down and displayed different facades to various groups of people. But at Yalta it was Stalin who gave the best performance. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill penetrated exactly who they were dealing with – a ruthless, murderous, all-powerful dictator. They actually believed they could trust Stalin (unlike many in the Soviet Union). It is curious to know why they assumed this. Was it the naïveté of their being in power for so long? The author does point out that Roosevelt and Churchill needed Stalin more than the other way around. Stalin’s Red Army killed many more Germans than the Western Allies. Also at the time of Yalta the Western Allies were just beginning to recover from the Ardennes German offensive. They needed Stalin’s army for the continuing war with Japan. As Mr. Plokhy states the enemy (Stalin) of your enemy (Hitler) should not necessarily be your trusted friend. Stalin and Hitler spoke the same brutal language which is one reason the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed so expeditiously.

Also from reading this book I was never under the impression that Roosevelt was feeble or duped as some suggest. He was quite astute throughout and did well on issues important to him, such as the U.N. He did this by compromising and varying his approach.

The author also points out the hypocrisy of some of the positions of the Western Allies. The occupation of Iran was hardly in keeping with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the upcoming U.N. The same could be said for Churchill’s intervention in Greece.

All and all this is a remarkable book on the Yalta Summit. It is excellent in its broad scope, and gives us clearly the necessary details.

[Віта · Rating 5 out of 5]

'Хоч два демократичні лідери зробили все можливе у Ялті, ціна за післявоєнний мир була високою не тільки в геополітичному, а й у моральному і людському плані. Частина їхньої жертви в Ялті лежала в царині риторики, але інша частина відображала саму суть їхніх демократичних переконань. Обидва чоловіки - зокрема Рузвельт - порушили власні принципи: вони погодилися довільно провести міжнародні кордони і силоміць перемістити мільйони людей без консультацій із залученими урядами і країнами. Вони погодилися відправити радянських військовополонених додому, навіть якщо це означало їхнє тюремне ув'язнення або навіть смерть, що добре усвідомлював Черчілль. Рузвельт вважав за краще вдавати, наче він нічого не знає про розмежування Балкан на сфери впливу і був більш ніж готовий надати Радянському Союзу сферу впливу в Азії. І останнє, але не менш важливе: він ніколи відкрито не кидав виклик сталінському правлінню над Східною Європою'.

[Jovi Ene · Rating 5 out of 5]

Stalin a fost viclean și inteligent, a cedat numai unde avea de câștigat, așa că și-a văzut ca întotdeauna interesul; Churchill a fost recalcitrant, temperamentul său fiind vizibil în permanenta pendulare între SUA și Rusia; Roosevelt a fost creierul întâlnirii, moderând conflictele și accentuând discuțiile doar pentru a-și urmări țintele - viitoarea ONU și războiul din Pacific. Consecințele conferinței, indiferent din ce parte le-am privi, au fost imense.
O excelentă carte de istorie, ”Ialta. Prețul păcii” ne oferă în cele peste 600 de pagini o analiză atentă, foarte amănunțită, a celor opt zile ale Conferinței celor trei mari (care aa decis viitorul Europei și a lumii), a deciziilor luate și a personalităților celor mai puternici oameni ai lumii din acea perioadă, precum și a contextului epocii.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well-written and informative.I will give S.M. Plokhy kudos, for he tells the story of Yalta from the basis of what happened and what the actual dynamics were behind it. Gone are the ideas of certain groups being sold out by some evil conspiracy, this work focuses on the fact that a lot of what went on at Yalta was a combination of realpolitik, and the first fractures in the World War II grand alliance. The book does a great job of demonstrating what was accomplished during the conference and what took place.

Stalin was never going to let Poland truly be independent, regardless of the opinion of Great Britain or the United States, and since the Red Army had overrun that country on its way to Berlin, protests by other countries were essentially irrelevant. Might in this case made right, and no one had the power or the will to make Stalin change his mind. There are a number of other revelations: for instance, yes, Alger Hiss was a Soviet spy at the time, but his Soviet Army spymasters apparently had little interest in the political intelligence Hiss could provide, so he apparently did little of import for the Soviets.

From the perspective of the early Cold War years, Yalta failed to prevent the Soviet takeover of eastern Europe. But if diplomacy is the art of the possible, and if one judged the conference's results according to the sitaution at the time, then the US and Britain, achieved more than they are generally credited with.

Admittedly, Roosevelt and Churchill were in a lousy bargaining position due to Red Army advances in eastern Europe. They needed a lot from Stalin but had little to offer him for it. Still, the US got what it wanted: a Soviet entry in the war against Japan and coopeation in the new UN. Churchill managed to restore French power and forestall an economic collapse of central Europe without serously undermining British interests. The Soviets were satisfied: they recieved superpower status, German reparations, control over eastern't Europe and a sphere of influence in the Far East. Eastern Europe got screwed over, but that couldn't be helped since the Red Army already occupied it. The US and British could have condemned Soviet action in eastern Europe, but only at the cost of global stability and peace. Despite what many uninformed hardline conservatives then and now said, a US war with the Soviets was unrealistic. Heck, Stalin never even betrayed anybody. He simply disregarded the "Declaration on Liberated Europe", just like Churchill did.

In all, a fantastic book.

[Joe · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Big Three – Roosevelt (U.S.), Churchill (Great Britain), Stalin, (USSR) – wartime conference held in Yalta in February 1945 has become an historical focal point for myth, legend and endless speculation. The proceedings, decisions and participants examined and re-examined over and over again in the ensuing years.

Post-Yalta, Roosevelt was dead two months later; Churchill voted out of office in the upcoming summer; and Stalin would soon become the tyrant of Eastern Europe with his Iron Curtain. The Nazis would surrender by May and after two atomic bombs, the Japanese would do the same in August. All of this was in the future in February, 1945, but in hindsight the Yalta conference has taken on an historical life of its own.

Plokhy’s book does an extraordinary job in separating fact from fiction while placing the decisions made during the conference in their proper context, i.e. none of the participants actually knew what was to come and specifically how soon after, starting with the Allied victory. Although there is no “official” record of Yalta’s proceedings, the author, using private notes and diaries, brings the meetings and the participants to life - The latter including not only FDR, Churchill and Stalin but also Molotov, Eden, Harriman and many others.

The author also does an excellent job in painting the history – when necessary – up to February 1945 – and the future, specifically the ramifications of the decisions made at Yalta – all without becoming cumbersome, tiresome or over detailed and without losing the main thread of the narrative. Not an easy task by any measure. Plokhy’s Yalta is a much needed “setting the record straight” and an engaging read.

Highly recommended.

[Rebecca · Rating 4 out of 5]

My senior thesis was on Yalta as the starting point of the Cold War. I used what was available to me at the time, and in reading this book (written several years after my thesis), I realize that I was wrong on a lot of things but that it was largely due to not having the right information available to me. So, as Neil Gaiman might say, that’s all right.

This is a meticulously researched, incredibly dense book, filled with the kind of minute detail that makes a history nerd’s heart flutter. But even for me, it was a long read—400 pages of very, very small print packed in closely together, like a student who has gone over the page count and is trying to make it all fit by reducing the font size and line spacing.

All of that to say, this is definitely not a book for everyone or for common consumption. But as someone who spent an entire year of her life studying Yalta (and getting most of it wrong, as it turns out), it is a must-have.

[Андрій Гулкевич · Rating 4 out of 5]

Передвісник поділу світу

Конференція в Ялті тала своєрідною репетицією до Постдамської конференції. У Криму зустрілися лідери трьох могутніх держав, аби вирішити важливі питання повоєнної Європи та світу загалом. Провідники трьох держав ухвалили попередні рішення щодо Польщі та Львова, Ірану, значної частини східної Європи та на далекому сході, зачепили релігійні питання та репарацій. Проте, один лише з лідерів був готовим найбільше до перемови – Й.Сталін. Таємні служби Радянського союзу зібрали вдосталь матеріалів, завдяки шпигунству, до початку зустрічі й прогнозували розвиток розмов і дискусій. Ба навіть кімнати гостей з Британії та Америки нашпигували жучками.

Найбільш важливим аспектом цієї книги є те, що конференція в Ялті вже стала відображенням тенденції 20 століття подальшого руху історії: занепад Британської імперії та появу двох нових гегемонів, що вирішуватимуть долю всіх країн – СРСР та США.

[Jozsef Varga · Rating 5 out of 5]

Plokhy does an excellent job of demystifying the outcomes of the Yalta Conference in light of additional information from Soviet archives. His writing is easy to follow: his transition from mainly academic writing to writing for a broader audience was clearly successful.
This book clarified the geopolitical tensions that were in place at the end of the Second World War, which lead to the beginning of the Cold War. I would highly recommend for anybody looking to understand the beginning of the Cold War, Western-Soviet tensions, and the liberal international order that began at the end of WWII.

[Maria Zayats · Rating 5 out of 5]

Це було дуже потужно. В найдрібніший деталях, але так цікаво! Ну і звісно моторошно від сили прийнятих рішень, і наслідків їх прийняття.

[Piker7977 · Rating 4 out of 5]

With Plokhy's detailed narrative, the reader encounters a rich education about the Yalta Conference. The topics and participants' reactions, agendas, and arguments are expertly described. These pages alone can be used a textbook for an international relations readings course. The reader also learns the details of the personalities and location of the meeting. With all the titans of foreign policy in attendance there is much to know about what motivated them and what held them back. There were leaders, military commanders, secret police chiefs, spies, interpreters, photographers, pilots, guards, and daughters. The dynamics between these people are fascinating.

A fine addition to any World War II library.

[Brad Eastman · Rating 4 out of 5]

In the last year of World War II, the big three allies (US, Brittain, and USSR) held a conference in the Crimea at Yalta to discuss how to conclude the war against Germany, the continuing war against Japan and the post-war order. The conventional wisdom is that the US and UK sold out Eastern Europe to Stalin and Soviet domination for the next 50 years. In this telling, Churchill and Roosevelt (who was at the end of his life) were completely played and abused by Stalin.

Mr. Plokhy accessed UK, US and newly available USSR top secret records to reconstruct the conference. He has constructed a detailed, blow-by-blow account of the conference. In this we are able to understand the main concerns of all three participants, the strategic alternatives available and the evaluation each participant made of the other participants' positions. We are reminded of how difficult the US thought defeating Japan would be, the UK's desperate desire to remain a great power despite its declining importance, and the USSR's deep insecurity after being repeatedly attacked by Western powers. We are therefore able to review the conference with less benefit of hindsight.

Only after reviewing the conference in detail does Mr. Plokhy ask were other outcomes possible and did the West sell out Eastern Europe. Mr. Plokhy believes, with the geostrategic circumstances, that the conference was not a sell-out of Eastern Europe. However, Mr. Plokhy does not make this case very strongly, and this is a strength of his book. He makes the arguments on both sides and let's the reader decide.

My read, the alternatives were not good. The Soviet army was firmly entrenched in Eastern Europe. Getting the army to leave would require war when the world was exhausted with war and the US was fearful of the hundreds of thousands of casualties that it anticipated in an invasion of Japan. Could the Soviet army be defeated? Perhaps. Were the US and UK in any position to take on another war? Absolutely not. However, that is my conclusion. Other conclusions are available.

Mr. Plokhy discusses in the acknowledgments of this book how he struggled to adapt his writing for a general audience, not an academic audience. He may have struggled, but he succeeded. The book reads well without jargon and without editorial interjections. The only reason I did not give the book five stars is that it is tedious at times. After all, it is a blow-by-blow account of negotiations over a week. I would love Mr. Plokhy to revisit this work and write a new post-script now that Russia has launched a full scale invasion of Ukraine. Has his opinion changed?

[Constantin Beda · Rating 3 out of 5]

S-a făcut mult zgomot pe marginea Conferinței de la Ialta, însă conform spuselor lui Serhii Plokhy (care se bazează pe documente din arhive și pe mărturii ale participanților) acordurile și înțelegerile de la vestita întâlnire din Crimeea abia dacă au fost îndeplinite pe jumătate. Churchill avea nevoie de Stalin și marea Armată Roșie pentru zdrobirea naziștilor, iar Roosevelt i-ar fi făcut aproape orice concesie dictatorului georgian atâta timp cât era de acord să îl sprijine în războiul cu japonezii. Multe decizii importante care au afectat Europa în deceniile următoare au fost luate și la Conferința de la Potsdam (1945), dar și la întâlnirea pe care a avut-o prim ministrul britanic cu Stalin în 1944. Singurul lucru bun care s-a întâmplat la Ialta a fost demararea negocierilor pentru înființarea ONU; practic, acolo a fost concepută organizația de "Cei trei mari".
Cât despre România, ei bine, nu prea conta pentru Marea Britanie și America, aveau și aceste state agendele și interesele proprii, care nu ne includeau și pe noi. Mulți spun că Churchill ne-a cedat foarte ușor URSS-ului, dar adevărul e că privirea lui era îndreptată către Mediterana și Grecia, unde Imperiul trebuia să-și susțină dominația. Așa că mister Winston nu prea putea să îl tragă de urechi pe Stalin în privința României, atâta vreme cât și el făcea același lucru în Grecia, pe principiul "nu mă bag ca să nu te bagi". Sigur, ceilalți "doi mari" au protestat un pic când dictatorul sovietic l-a instalat pe comunistul Petru Groza în fruntea guvernului, după o lovitură de stat. Dar nu prea mult, pentru că aveau nevoie de Stalin mai mult decât aveau nevoie de România și deschiderea la Marea Neagră.
Ialta a fost un exercițiu de echilibristică între ideologii și împărțirea de teritorii, din care statele mici europene au avut cel mai mult de suferit. Și care a deschis drumul către Războiul Rece.

[Mykhailo Shumylo · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Як і жодна війна, жоден мир ніколи не є одноактною п'єсою. Він має свій початок і кінець, підйоми і падіння, героїв та негідників. І також має власну ціну. Як показує Ялта, незалежно від того, наскільки сильно стараються демократичні лідери, творення альянсів із диктатурами та тоталітарними режимами завжди має свою ціну". Цими словами закрінчується книга українського історика професора, директора Українського інституту Гарвардського університету Сергія Плохія "ЯЛТА. Ціна миру".

Ялтинська конференція почала обростати легендами вже на другий день, коли її головні учасники Рузвельт, Черчель, сталін залишили Крим. До її мітологізації сильно доклалась радянська історіографія, але в суспільній свідомості вона асоціюється із наближеням закінчення ІІ світової війни та фото "великої трійки" в дворику Лівадійського палацу.

Книга прояснює багато цікавих фактів: чому перед Ялтою обрали Тенеран; чому Ялта; як Франція стала членом РБ ООН та отримала зону окупації на території Німеччини; як Україна та Білорусь опинилися в засновниках ООН; як членували територію Німеччини та Польщі; як Кенігсберг став Калінінградом; чому "вивезли" всі промислові об'єкти в срср, які служило ще до кінця 80-х; про звірства радянської армії в Східній Європі; про те, як Південний Сахалін та Північні Курили перестали бути японськими і були передані срср і чому Рузвельт погодився на це; як і хто придума ленд-ліз; як Босфор та Дарданелли недавли спокою радянцям, які хотіли переглянути Конвенцію Монтре; про трагедію обміну військовополоненими, коли радянські солдати чинили масові акти самогубство, тільки би не повертатись в радянський "соціалістичний рай".

І найголовніше, про те, ЩО НІКОЛИ НЕ МОЖНА ВІРИТИ ТОМУ ЩО ПІДПИСУЮТЬ росіяни!!! Вже після фінального засідання Ялтинської конференції, радянці почали по-своє тлумачити кожне слово, кожну букву, кожну кому у підписаних документах. Як, власне, і сьогодні!

Книга написана 2010 року, пер��кладена 2019, проте надзвичайно сильно перегукується із нашою сучасністю. Окрім історичних фактів бачиш, як старі злочини та звірства виринають із глибин історії та вриваються в сучасність, а все тому, що зло було непокаране, проте воно, на жаль, і не могло бути тоді покаране. Тепер час настам.

P.S. Окремо хотів згадати постать Лео Пасвольського (1893-1953), уродженяця Павлограда, автора статуту ООН. Переконаний, що цей факт має бути предметом гордості українців.

[Ivan · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Коли я вперше приїхав до Польщі, - Плохій цитує Тімоті Ґартона Еша, - я постійно чув дуже дивне слово. "Йовта", зітхали мої нові знайомі, "йовта!" - і розмова згасала у меланхолійній мовчанці". Йовта - це не журливий вислів на кшталт "життя складне", а польський спосіб вимовляти слово Ялта (принаймні, так це почув Еш). Справді, для багатьох поколінь поляків саме конференція у Ялті стала символом зради та полишення західними союзниками держави, що першою наважилася чинити опір Гітлеру у 1939 році. Ця образа відчутна до сьогодні. Під час мого візиту до дерматолога у польській поліклініці у 2019 році, я почув від балакучого старенького лікаря серед іншого таке: "Stalin wyruchał Roosevelt'a z Churchill'em w sprawie wschodniej granicy Polski" ("Сталін в**бав Рузвельта з Черчілем у справі східного кордону Польщі"). Книга Плохія не лише детально висвітлює перебіг цього (гм...) процесу, але й пояснює, чому альтернативні варіанти були малоймовірними.

Монографія також цікава тим, що пояснює моральну дилему союзу лідерів демократичних країн з радянським диктатором. Черчіль та Рузвельт намагались досягти повоєнного миру та стабільності у Європі, але ціна, яку довелося заплатити, не вимірювалась лише новими кордонами Польщі. Порушуючи власні принципи та ідеали, вони погодилися на примусове переселення мільйонів людей (що було результатом створення нових кордонів), відправлення радянських військовополонених додому (попри те, що для останніх це часто означало ув'язнення або смерть), а також беззаперечне панування Сталіна у Східній Європі.

З перспективи Польщі чи балтійських країн може видаватись, що конференція у Ялті закінчилася цілковитим тріумфом СРСР. Але це не зовсім так. Рузвельт та Черчіль домоглися від Сталіна поступок у найбільш важливих для себе питаннях. Черчіль запевнив собі невтручання радянців у стратегічно важливих для Британської імперії країнах Середземномор'я (насамперед Греції), а Рузвельт - допомогу СРСР у війні з Японією та створення ООН на прийнятних для США умовах.

Книга починається з поетичної метафори про аргонавтів (Черчіль та Рузвельт), що вирушають на схід зустрітись з страхітливим драконом (Сталін) та здобути Золоте руно (мир). Це в багато чому визначає стиль, у якому з притаманною для автора елегантністю поєднуються політична історія та історія дипломатії, що написані на основі широкого масиву джерельних документів (від приватних листів та спогадів до матеріалів з нещодавно відкритих радянських архівів).

[Jonas Short · Rating 4 out of 5]

*DNF 20%

I greatly admire Plokhy as a researcher, and for his ability to construct a compelling narrative about these pivotal meetings that shaped the last century. With that said, it was simply too thorough for me as a casual reader. If Cold War geopolitics were a passion of mine, I would love to dive into the details wrestled from long sealed archives by the author. But as it stands, it is simply too detailed for me to enjoy right now.

[Kateryna Shunevych · Rating 5 out of 5]

«Як і жодна війна, жоден мир ніколи не є одноактною п’єсою. Він має свій по- чаток і кінець, підйоми і падіння, героїв та негідників. І також має власну ціну. Як показує Ялта, незалежно від того, наскільки сильно стараються демократичні лі- дери, творення альянсів із диктатурами та тоталітарними режимами завжди має свою ціну. Якщо ви підтримуєте союзника з розрахунку й нарощуєте його силу, вам буде важко утримати його під контролем. Ворог вашого ворога може стати вашим власним ворогом після того, як закінчиться початковий конфлікт, якщо альянс не базується на спільних цінностях та принципах.»

[Connor Harty · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting content and thoroughly researched, but just because the author had the information, doesn't mean it needed to go in the book. It wound up being very tedious.

[Mathieu Totev · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting read, puts better into perspective what really happened at Yalta and why there is nothing to regret, the West simply did not have the cards.

Lots of interesting information about the talks, and the content. The book provides historical context, which I liked, mentioning the Crimean War or the Gallipoli battle and its impact. A few dialogues quoted are also quite entertaining, but I wished there were more, to really immerse myself and feel like I was at the table. But it does a good job at describing Yalta the place, and the palaces and the life there.

It is a long book, but was not a long read as it was pretty easy to read.

[Socrate · Rating 5 out of 5]

Momentul și locul întâlnirii au fost printre cele mai bine păzite secrete ale războiului. În seara zilei de 3 februarie 1945, la adăpostul întunericului, o coloană de automobile Packard i-a adus pe cei mai puternici doi lideri ai lumii democratice, Franklin Delano Roosevelt și Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, la destinație – câteva vile situate lângă stațiunea Ialta, pe malul Mării Negre, cândva aflate în posesia țarilor Rusiei și a unor aristocrați de rang înalt. Ei se autointitulau „argonauții“, o referință la războinicii antici care călătoriseră pe coasta Mării Negre pentru a recupera Lâna de Aur de la un dragon care nu dormea niciodată. Recompensa era soluționarea unui război care pusese stăpânire pe întreaga lume; dragonul era chiar gazda lor, Iosif Stalin, un fost poet promițător transformat în dictator atroce. Împreună, cei trei au condus cea mai discretă conferință de pace din istoria lumii moderne. Ei au ghidat armate formate din milioane din oameni și au împărțit
dreptatea învingătorilor așa cum au crezut de cuviință, hotărând destinele unor națiuni și trimițând milioane de refugiați spre est sau spre vest, crezând că astfel vor inaugura o perioadă de pace de lungă durată. Împreună au creat o instituție menită să apere pacea și interesele învingătorilor. Confruntarea aspirațiilor geopolitice, ciocnirea personalităților și a sistemelor de valori și luptele pentru putere dintre cei mai abili negociatori ai țărilor lor s-au desfășurat pe parcursul a opt zile în Ialta, în februarie 1945. Au plecat din Ialta mulțumiți, dar plini de temeri. În urma lor rămâ-
neau 30 de ani de distrugeri provocate de două războaie mondiale care răpiseră zeci de milioane de vieți. La orizont se aflau incertitudinile lumii postbelice. Cei trei lideri s-au întrebat mereu dacă partenerii lor erau de încredere și dispuși să ajungă la un compromis. Puteau absolvenții celor mai bune școli private din Marea Britanie să ajungă la o înțelegere cu fiul unui cizmar georgian care fusese exmatriculat dintr-un seminar ortodox? Știau cei doi lideri aleși în mod democratic cum să discute cu inițiatorul Gulagului? Conferința le-a provocat participanților nenumărate dileme morale. A fost un carusel al emoțiilor în care nu au fost impli- cați doar liderii Marii Alianțe, ci și diverșii lor aliați care luptau pentru interesele propriilor țări și pentru a intra în grațiile propriilor conducători. După doar câțiva ani de la încheierea conferinței, marile speranțe ale inițiatorilor
au fost spulberate, deciziile lor fiind condamnate atât de prieteni, cât și de dușmani. Participanții care au supraviețuit au adoptat o poziție defensivă sau au preferat să uite de implicarea în acel eveniment. Ambele tabere ale Războiului Rece au ajuns să fie dezamăgite și să regrete evenimentul. Ialta a devenit simbolul unei șanse pierdute, indiferent de semnificații. În Occident, ea a devenit piatra de hotar a drumului spre „pierderea păcii“, pentru a cita titlul de pe prima pagină a unui
număr al revistei Time din anii 1950. În discursul public al epocii McCarthy, cuvântul „Ialta“ a devenit sinonim cu trădarea libertății și conciliatorismul în relația cu comunismul mondial.

[Mike Carey · Rating 3 out of 5]

This really is a scholarly treatment of the Yalta conference - with much background material and interpretation of how the nations got to the table. I was hoping for more information about the conference itself and rich details about the time spent at Yalta. The author didn't intend to draw a profile of the players from this work, which I would have liked.
I did think that the author did a good job of demonstrating how balanced the outcome of the conference was from the perspective of the US and Great Britain. Both countries were successful in getting some of their major goals meet. In the final analysis, I learned that Stalin and Russia had the lead role in defeating Nazi Germany. It dawns on me how bias our own historical reporting is because I know little about the Eastern Front War against Germany and that is because the US was not involved in that front. As a result our history of WW 2 concentrates on the Western Front in Europe and the Pacific.
The fact that the Russians had already fought and re-captured almost all of Eastern Europe on their march to Berlin really made the Western bargaining position on that part of the world extremely weak. Russia felt it had earned generous concessions after the war due to their huge commitment and sacrifice during the war. The book also bears home the point that Stalin was a tough, shrewd negotiator who knew what he wanted for his countries sacrifice in WW2 - a large, safe buffer between Russia and the West for decades to come; which he was able to create with satellite countries controlled by the Soviets.

[Roger · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting update on the important Yalta Conference and how it impacted post WWII world history. Gives a different viewpoint if Stalin got too much from FDR being ill and Churchill being almost powerless to stop the Russians. Gives you a lot of insights on the deals that were made and the reasons behind the deals that were made. An interesting sidelight was the role Alger Hiss played on the American side and was he really a spy for the Soviets. Did his secret life have a role on FDR and some of the decisions made. Many people in the late 1940s and 1950s felt he comprimised FDR while the author argues differently. Would recommend this book to anyone interested in the history of the Cold Was and the end of WWII.

[Lefki Sarantinou · Rating 5 out of 5]

Το νέο πόνημα του Ουκρανο-αμερικανού ιστορικού του πανεπιστημίου του Χάρβαρντ S.M Plokhy προσφέρει έναν σπάνιο συνδυασμό ιστορίας όταν αυτή συναντά τη λογοτεχνία. Ελάχιστες είναι οι φορές που ιστορικοί καταφέρνουν να καθηλώσουν τόσο πολύ τους αναγνώστες μέσω της γραφής τους, προσφέροντας ταυτόχρονα έγκυρες ιστορικές πληροφορίες.
Το "Γιάλτα, το τίμημα της ειρήνης" είναι ένα βιβλίο που απευθύνεται σε όλους, στους ιστορικούς, σε όσους διαβάζουν ερασιτεχνικά για τον Δεύτερο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο, αλλά και στο ευρύ κοινό.
Η νέα προσέγγιση του Plokhy για την περίφημη Διάσκεψη της Γιάλτας, προσέγγιση που αντλεί την έμπνευσή της σε μεγάλο βαθμό από το πρόσφατο άνοιγμα των σοβιετικών αρχείων, έρχεται να καταρρίψει παγιωμένους μύθους σχετικά με το ιστορικό αυτό γεγονός, αλλά αποσκοπεί και στο να φωτίσει την ιστορία της καθημερινότητας της Διάσκεψης.
Η Διάσκεψη της Γιάλτας έλαβε χώρα στη Γιάλτα της Κριμαίας από τις 4 έως τις 11 Φεβρουαρίου του 1945, λίγο πριν τη λήξη του Δευτέρου Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου στην Ευρώπη, στις αρχές του Μάη του ίδιου χρόνου. Η συνάντηση ήταν αποτέλεσμα της επιτακτικής ανάγκης των Τριών Μεγάλων Ηγετών του πολέμου, του Στάλιν, του Ρούσβελτ και του Τσόρτσιλ, να συναντηθούν και να αποφασίσουν για μία σειρά ζητημάτων. Ελάσσων εταίρος θεωρούταν ο Τσόρτσιλ, ενώ ο Στάλιν είχε το απαραίτητο προβάδισμα όσον αφορά τις σοβιετικές απαιτήσεις, λόγω των επιτυχιών του Κόκκινου Στρατού στο Ανατολικό Μέτωπο εκείνη την περίοδο. Ο Ρούσβελτ ήταν εκείνος που με την άριστη διπλωματία του κράτησε τις ισορροπίες ανάμεσα στους Συμμάχους με τις τόσο διαφορετικές επιδιώξεις για την Ευρώπη, του κομμουνιστή Στάλιν και του εμφορούμενου από την "αυτοκρατορική ιδεολογία παλαιού τύπου" Τσόρτσιλ. Ο Ρούσβελτ, από την άλλη, ήταν περισσότερο πρόθυμος από τους άλλους δύο εταίρους, οι οποίοι είχαν ήδη μοιράσει τα Βαλκάνια σε ζώνες επιρροής, να υπερασπιστεί τα δημοκρατικά ιδεώδη του πολέμου και την αυτοδιάθεση των λαών, καθώς και την μεταπολεμική ειρήνη, προσπάθεια που δεν στέφθηκε βέβαια πάντοτε από επιτυχία.
Οι δημοκράτες Ρούσβελτ και Τσόρτσιλ ήταν δέσμιοι του πολιτικού συστήματος, με αποτέλεσμα να υπολογίζουν πάντοτε το πολιτικό κόστος, έννοια που ο Στάλιν, ως δικτάτορας δεν είχε σε καμία περίπτωση. Τους ηγέτες των τριών χωρών πλαισίωνε πληθώρα αξιωματούχων, καθώς και οι υπουργοί των εξωτερικών τους και οι κόρες του Τσόρτσιλ και του Ρούσβελτ.
Ο συγγραφέας δεν διακατέχεται από καμία βιασύνη όταν θέλει να περιγράψει κάτι και αυτό ακριβώς είναι και το δυνατό σημείο του βιβλίου. Αντιθέτως, παίρνει τον χρόνο του για να περιγράψει διεξοδικά τα πάντα, ανθρώπους, κτίρια, ταξίδια, σχέδια, συζητήσεις και κρυφές προθέσεις, όλα με σκοπό να μας κάνει να πιστέψουμε ότι ήμασταν κι εμείς παρόντες στην Διάσκεψη και παρακολουθήσαμε από κοντά τα τεκταινόμενα.
Αφού ο Plokhy μας διηγηθεί αναλυτικά το χρονικό του ταξιδιού των Ηγετών στην Κριμαία, παραθέτει με χρονολογική σειρά όλα τα επίμαχα ζητήματα που συζητήθηκαν στη Γιάλτα. Συνάμα, στέκεται στις μικρές λεπτομέρειες της συνάντησης, λεπτομέρειες φαινομενικά ανούσιες και αχρείαστες, οι οποίες όμως προκαλούν συχνά το γέλιο και είναι αυτές ακριβώς που προσδίδουν στο ιστορικό αυτό έργο τη λογοτεχνική του διάσταση, μεταφέροντάς μας νοερά εκεί. Έτσι γελάμε κι εμείς με τα χοντροκομμένα αστεία του Στάλιν όταν αυτός πειράζει τον Τσόρτσιλ, πλήττουμε θανάσιμα κι εμείς καμιά φορά μαζί με τους συνδαιτυμόνες με τη φλυαρία του τελευταίου και θαυμάζουμε αλλά και συμπονούμε τον Ρούσβλετ για τις θαυμαστές διπλωματικές ικανότητές που τον διακρίνουν παρά την προχωρημένη του ασθένεια. Παράλληλα γνωρίζουμε τι ακριβώς ειπώθηκε, επισήμως και κάτω από το τραπέζι, πως ήταν ακριβώς τα ανάκτορα που φιλοξενούσαν τους Τρεις Μεγάλους, τι έφαγαν και τι τους δυσαρέστησε κατά τη διάρκεια της παραμονής τους.
Αποτυπώνεται επίσης ολοκάθαρα η νοοτροπία των φιλελεύθερων δυτικών από τη μία και των κρυψίνοων και μυστικοπαθών Σοβιετικών από την άλλη, που παρακολουθούν τα πάντα και τρέμουν την οργή του Γεωργιανού δικτάτορα. Αυτή ακριβώς η διαφορά των νοοτροπιών, μαζί βέβαια με τα αντικρουόμενα συμφέροντα, ήταν που προκάλεσε τελικά και το ξέσπασμα του Ψυχρού Πολέμου.
Στη Γιάλτα συζητήθηκαν θέματα όπως η δημιουργία του Οργανισμού ηνωμένων Εθνών και η είσοδος της ΕΣΣΔ στον πόλεμο κατά της Ιαπωνίας, θέματα που αποτέλεσαν την προτεραιότητα του Ρούσβελτ, η τύχη της Ανατολικής Ευρώπης, της ηττημένης Γερμανίας και το ύψος των πολεμικών αποζημιώσεων που θα πλήρωνε αυτή, καθώς και το ζήτημα αν θα έπρεπε να συμπεριληφθεί η Γαλλία στις Μεγάλες Δυνάμεις, θέματα που απασχολούσαν περισσότερο τον Τσόρτσιλ.
Το μεγάλο αγκάθι της Γιάλτας δεν ήταν άλλο από το πολωνικό ζήτημα, το οποίο προείχε στην ατζέντα του Στάλιν, καθώς και η επιθυμία του να κυριαρχήσει στην Ανατολική Ευρώπη. Τη επιδίωξη αυτή του Στάλιν δεν έγινε εφικτό να το εμποδίσουν οι δυτικοί, εφόσον ο δικτάτορας είχε την προβάδισμα στον πόλεμο κατά των Γερμανών.
Τελικά η Γιάλτα ήταν μία ήττα των Δυτικών Ηγετών; Ήταν μια αποτυχημένη Διάσκεψη που παρέδωσε την Ανατολική Ευρώπη στις αδηφάγες ορέξεις του Στάλιν; Μπορούσε τελικά να επιτευχθεί κάτι καλύτερο για την Ανατολική Ευρώπη ή όχι; Γιατί ακόμη και η συμμαχία του Ρούσβλετ με τον Τσόρτσιλ παρουσίαζε ρωγμές; Ποια ήταν η συμβολή της Διάσκεψης στον επακόλουθο Ψυχρό Πόλεμο;
Σε τέτοια ερωτήματα επιχειρεί να δώσει απάντηση ο Plokhy με το βιβλίο του. Ένα βιβλίο που συγκεράσει την Ιστορία σε πολλές παράλληλες ιστορίες. Είναι η Ιστορία του Β' Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου, η Ιστορία της πολιτικής της εποχής αλλά και της γεωπολιτικής, η Ιστορία της καθημερινότητας της Διάσκεψης και, τέλος, η Ιστορία των απαρχών και των αιτιών του Ψυχρού Πολέμου.

[Валерій Калниш · Rating 3 out of 5]

Відеоогляд книги на моєму каналі "Черная лампа". https://youtu.be/idqV5oZ1hjo

[Mariusz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Serhii Plokhy’s work is admirable. Originating from Central and Eastern Europe, he could have been expected to deliver an account which would be possessed of bias, given the amount of ideology and misinformation which have accreted around this historical event. Not so. Having apparently researched all available material covering the Yalta conference – from official minutes of all three delegations, through memoires written by the various participants of the conference, right to the diaries and letters of some of the official and unofficial (inter alia, Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s daughters’) participants – Plokhy managed to deliver a very measured day-by-day account of the conference, whose proceedings shaped so much of post-WWII history.

The book largely dispels the picture of Churchill and Roosevelt acting in unison. While much of the policy agenda was common, much more - divergent. While Churchill and Stalin represented 19th Century-origin “spheres of influence” ideology (Stalin towing the traditional Russian imperial expansionist line, Churchill protecting the continued existence of the British Empire), Roosevelt was the proponent, at least nominally, of the new multilateral order, to be anchored on the about-to-be-born United Nations Organisation. While this lack of synchronicity was not in itself all detrimental, as it facilitated many concessions from Stalin, due to Roosevelt’s positioning as an independent arbiter, it did not help in towing the line in the same direction on a number of issues, unfortunately including Poland. The lack of alignment was apparent during the bilateral pre-conference meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill, and their respective delegations, in Malta, during which Roosevelt all but refused to meet in a one-on-one meeting.

Another aspect which strongly influenced the events, but which has not traditionally been brought to the fore, is the failing health of FDR, who died within two months of the conference. While his intellectual capacity was unimpaired, and he displayed top pedigree diplomatic skills, so important in negotiations with Stalin, his stamina was clearly failing. He could not work long days, which both Churchill and Stalin were prepared to do, and he cut the conference short, much against Churchill’s wishes, who wished to translate into details many of the topics discussed, and agreed in principle, including Poland.

On Poland, the book largely dispels the narrative in circulation in Poland ever since the Yalta conference – that of Yalta representing the betrayal of Poland by its Western allies. Yes, it confirms that the outcome of the conference landed large swathes of Central Europe, including Poland, in the Soviet sphere of influence, but not without sustained effort from Churchill, and to some extent Roosevelt, to redress the situation and strive for as democratic solution for Poland as possible under the circumstances. Sadly, whereas Churchill’s determination went beyond what was achieved, Roosevelt was content with any solution, as long as it was capable of being sold as a success to US Poles. A temporary government, which would include Poles from London, which would administer Poland until free elections, supervised by the Allies’ ambassadors, was deemed sufficient. Due to the lack of time, the details were left to be worked out between Molotov and the two Allies’ Moscow ambassadors. It was these details – of the basis on which a combined government would be composed, of the meaning of the word “free” in elections, and the meaning of the word “supervised” in the “supervised by ambassadors” – which resulted in the Soviet domination of Poland over the ensuing half-century. This is where Roosevelt’s extra time commitment may have tilted the scales.

That said, the discussions on Poland were being led against the backdrop of the Soviet troops already occupying much of Central Europe, of the winter offensive commenced in January 1945 bringing Soviet troops to within 70 km from Berlin, and of the Western Allies, the Americans in particular, slowly licking their wounds after the near-defeat in the Ardennes. Not much leverage to be yielded by the Western Allies in the face of Stalin’s consistent determination to expand Soviet sphere of influence to much of Central Europe, which was to become a buffer against any future ill designs from remilitarised Germany. After all, as famously said by Otto von Bismarck, „Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable — the art of the next best.” Sadly, short of starting another global conflict, which neither the US, nor Britain, were prepared to entertain, given the massive strain caused upon the free world by WW II, it was very difficult to imagine a better outcome under the then prevailing circumstances.

Contrary to the narrative circulated in Central Europe, the conference was about a much broader range of topics than just CE. Each of the three Great Powers came to Yalta with their smorgasbord of objectives and, seen from this perspective, almost all of these objectives were met. The US’s two primary objectives were: securing Soviet commitment to enter the war against Japan, which was to help save a million plus American lives, needed to drive Japan to capitulation; and securing Soviet membership of the United Nations Organisation. Britain’s objectives were: securing France’s place as one of Europe’s powers, culminating in France becoming one of the four to jointly occupy Germany (strong France was deemed essential, as a buffer protecting Britain against a future remilitarised Germany); securing Greece and Italy, and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia, as Britain’s sphere of influence, which was deemed essential to protect Britain’s domination of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, in itself critical for the control over India (Stalin delivered on this objective, standing by while British paratroopers dealt conclusively with communist insurgents in Greece); and ensuring a democratic solution for Poland. Both the US and Britain additionally wished to ensure the Soviet troops’ withdrawal from Persia (which was earlier jointly occupied by the British and Soviet troops), and prevent a potential Soviet grab of Istanbul and the Black Sea Straits, the control over which had been on Russia’s, and later Soviet Union’s, strategic priority list for almost a century. All of these objectives, but Poland, were achieved. Sadly, Poland, and the rest of Central Europe, were the sole objective of Stalin’s and, as such, became collateral damage of the Western Allies’ other objectives being satisfactorily secured.

[Rhuff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Contrary to some reviews, this book does not really open too much new ground, but it is a detailed re-examination of the contentious Big Three meeting and - for all its faults - likely to stand as the definitive mainstream account for some time.

Sergei (Serhii) Plokhy is an ex-Soviet emigre and the foremost Ukrainian nationalist academic in the English language, so it's understandable he would approach the subject from a pro-Western viewpoint. This is reflected in his subtext of Western Allies in western Europe as liberators, while the Soviet (Allies) are occupiers who "overrun" eastern Europe. Such intentions are seen as nefarious when practiced by Stalin, but normative when engaged in by the US and UK. But as Stalin said to the Yugoslav, Milovan Djilas: "This war will not be as wars in the past. Now the victorious powers will impose their social systems as far as their armies can reach." This was Stalin's understanding, and the West's too; so there were no real "misunderstandings" at Yalta but rather very self-centered jockyings for advantage.

Along the way Plokhy reiterates old myths. For all his access to "new archives", it seems these were interpreted to reinforce the conventional views of Western historiography - such as the myth of Alger Hiss as Soviet agent, though Plokhy is honest enough to add that "no real damage" was done by Hiss' "revelations"; the myth of Stalinist evildoing in "allowing" the Warsaw Uprising to be crushed, though this uprising was entered into against Moscow's advice and was launched to pre-empt the Red Army advance, so Stalin's "standpat" attitude is not hard to fathom; the myth of eastern Europe as a string of Soviet puppet governments in 1944, though at that time there were only three - Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania; and the myth that the Western Allies did not engage in such behavior, though the Greeks under British occupation would have strongly disagreed, as well as anti-fascist partisans and trade unionists bearing the brunt of "democratization" in France, Italy, and western Germany. One myth that he does dispel, though, is the "percentage agreement" as recounted by Churchill: Stalin never acquiesced in all of Churchill's percentages, but only in the trade-off between Greece and Romania, so there was no violation over that point.

For Plokhy's native Ukraine there were but two alternatives: to continue as part of the Ukrainian SSR or return to Polish administration. A pro-Western outcome in Poland would have sabotaged the very Ukrainian nationalism on which he's built his academic career, as well as the modern successor state. While Soviet evildoing at Katyn is recounted as a stumbling block for the London Poles, the ethnic cleansing conducted by Ukrainian nationalists against the Poles of West Ukraine is slighted. Plokhy surely knew of this, as did Stalin, which would have made a return to the forced old borders impossible for Poles and Ukrainians alike.

The revelation that Moscow wanted to divide Germany is not altogether new, though it does counter Soviet professions to the contrary. However, one must recall that it was the US and UK that actually took the first steps to permanently divide occupied Germany, through the creation of "Bizonia" in 1947; while the Soviets did offer to reunite the Germanies in 1955 to forestall West German integration into NATO.

One incredible passage in the book, on page 283, states that it's hard to find a clearly-drawn line between Western ideals and self-interest in the Middle East: to the contrary, the line is most clearly drawn, with ideals left totally in the outer margin. Plokhy gives Gulf War I as "proof" that the spirit of Allied co-operation at Yalta was finally fulfilled. Maybe so; but it's also true that the realpolitik of Yalta was upheld by Round II in 2003, as Iraq was turned into a Polish-style puppet government by an overwhelming liberator/occupier, who imposed its own social system as far as its armies could reach.

[Charles · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Yalta conference featuring the big three of Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt tool place almost 80 years ago. Yet, there is still resounding debate regarding which of the three did the best in achieving their goals, which were quite distinct and in some cases mutually exclusive.
Being a product of the British Empire, the primary goal of Winston Churchill was to maintain and if possible expand the influence of the Empire. Having experienced multiple invasions of the area in the Soviet Union over the centuries, the goal of Joseph Stalin was to achieve the domination of Eastern Europe in order to preclude any future invasion. The primary goal of Franklin Roosevelt was to convince Stalin to enter the war against Japan as soon as possible.
The battle for Iwo Jima had just begun and it was clear that the American casualties were going to be high. In the previous battles between U. S. and Japanese forces, the Japanese generally fought to the death and the projections of U. S. casualties in an invasion of the Japanese home islands started at 250,000. The Japanese still had almost three quarters of a million troops in the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and there were fears that they would be transferred back to defend the home islands. The atomic bomb was still theoretical, so that was still a great uncertainty. Therefore, Roosevelt’s primary goal was to get Stalin to join the war against Japan. He succeeded almost too well as the Soviet forces moved quickly, taking control of half of Korea.
Those who criticize Roosevelt and Churchill ignore the fact that the Soviet Red Army was occupying Eastern Europe and there was only two ways they would depart. The first was for Stalin to order them back and the second was for Allied forces to push them back. Neither of these was even remotely possible.
The other key point to keep in mind as you read this book is that the British Empire was in rapid decline by 1945. When it came to armed forces available, it was really only the big two. Yet, Churchill tried to act as if he was the military equal of the other two. As is made clear in this book, Churchill was still trying to delineate spheres of influence in Europe for Great Britain. His stated percentages of influence in Eastern European countries is classic great power colonial thinking.
This book takes the reader inside the machinations of these three men and their primary advisors as they begin to parcel out the world in a way where the Axis would be defeated and there would be a minimum of jockeying for territory once peace was achieved. It was interesting to read how the Soviets successfully bugged the Allied quarters and when combined with their vast spy network, knew all they needed to know about the goals of Roosevelt and Churchill. It was the one way that Churchill and Roosevelt were operating at a disadvantage.
This book does not resolve the debate over who won at Yalta. It does explain why the three men acted the way they did and why the end result was about the best that could have been achieved in terms of postwar control of territory.

[Олег Проданчук · Rating 5 out of 5]

Вже не один мій відгук було написано на чудові книги Сергія Плохія. Так цікаво розповідати історію, ще донедавна приховану у стосах архівів, доносячи її до читачів практично з легкістю роману - справжня знахідка для тих, хто цікавиться минулим. "Ялта. Ціна миру" перевершила усі мої сподівання. Вражає, наскільки глобальні питання вирішувались на даній зустрічі, на які поступки були вимушені йти лідери цивілізованого світу перед кривавим диктатором Сталіним. Наслідки деяких, ухвалених на Ялтинській конференції, рішень ще й досі виринають у сьогоденні, що ще більше підвищує вагомість й цінність даної книги.


Чітко відтворені по архівних записах перемовини дозволяють значно глибше зрозуміти ті чи інші кроки на світовій арені. Поділ Німеччини державами-переможницями Другої світової війни, розділ сфер повоєнного впливу, створення ООН,  обмін полоненими та угода про вступ СРСР у війну проти Японії це далеко не всі питання, які намагалась вирішити "Велика Трійка".


Від написаного у деяких розділах перехоплює подих, та про примусову репатріацію радянських військовополонених читати просто страшно. Людей проти їхньої волі повертали в совок, де на них чекали табори або розстріл. Ніхто не проводив розслідувань, вишукуючи докази проти "зрадників", до числа яких зараховували навіть цивільних, котрих Рейх примусово вивозив на свої заводи як робочу силу.


Довго можна сперечатись про доцільність черезмірно м'якого ставлення Черчилля та Рузвельта до тварини у мундирі - генералісімуса Сталіна, та важко відповісти, яке майбутнє б настало, якби їм вистачило мужності приборкати забаганки радянців. 


Холодна війна, зародки якої чітко прослідковцються ще з Ялти, таки змогла розвіяти ілюзії США та країн Західної Європи що до люб'язності совітів. Сподіваюсь, цього імунітету вистачить й для запобігання подальшим наївним домовленостям із Росією у наш час.

[Olenka Levenets · Rating 3 out of 5]

Чи могли б Рузвельт і Черчілль досягнути кращих домовленостей?
Чи зробили вони все можливе для цього?

Основна лінія викладу матеріалу присвячена опису неймовірних результатів радянської влади у підготовці конференції в Ялті, таємним та офіційним зустрічам трьох сторін і, звісно, розподілу сфер вливу у поствоєнному світі.

Автор майстерно передає читачеві атмосферу, яка панувала на засіданнях та поза ними. Дуже детально описано облаштування тимчасових резиденцій із ліжками, ванними, різновидами страв під час банкетів, бункерами (доречі для британської штаб-кіартири його не передбачили). І, паралельно з цим, у в історію вриваються флешбеки із попередніх років війни.

Три титани тогочасного світу працювали над формулами створення ООН, і в кожній з них сильні країни мали суттєву перевагу над слабшими.

Тривалі дискусії трьох сторін мали вирішити під чиїм керівництвом буде Польща (тут і про претензії на Львів), долю Німеччини, питання вступу СРСР у війну з Японіює та демаркацію східноєвропейських кордонів.

В книжці, як і в історіі, можна відслідкувати наскільки гнучкими можуть бути лідери у своїх політиці і цінностях. До прикладу, для Черчілля, який лобіював інтереси Польщі - це замовчування Кантинської трагедії. Для Сталіна - пакт із нацистами у 1939. А для Рузвельта - маніпуляція польськими американцями в ході останньої передвиборчої кампанії.

У підсумку, книжку точно буде цікаво прочитати тим, хто почав детально досліджувати Другу світову…
Засмутило лише, що автор вирішив перекласти брудну білизну сім‘ї Рузвельтів на сторінки книжки. Це була б чудова історія для мемуарів, а не для історичної праці (ловіть спойлер зі ст. 47).

[Inna · Rating 5 out of 5]

На фоні руїни, коли все ще більшість світу стікає кров’ю, неймовірної трагедії і загибелі мільйонів життів, в Ялті зароджується нова трагедія - з метою досягнення миру і спокою, відбувається новий поділ світу, який просто зачинить горе, страждання і смерті людей за залізною завісою. Щоб втихомирити і вбити одного тирана, іншому тирану і диктатору буде віддано в руки цілі народи.
На фоні заяв про демократичні принципи , про моральні цінності, сильні світу цього, в першу чергу ставлять свої інтереси, свої політичні амбіції, хвилюються про вибори. Три людини просто пальцем по карті проводять нові міжнародні кордони, силоміць перемістивши мільйони людей, без консультацій і залучень урядів цих країн.
Які б демократичні та моральні принципи не керували світом, Ялта гарно показує, хто має силу, той і має більше прав, доля малих та слабких народів, завжди буде залежати від сильних …та зло розуміє тільки мову сили.
Чи можна зламати хід історії? Чи можна було втихомирити апетити Сталіна? Які були варіанти в Черчилля та Рузвельта, і чи не зависоку ціну ми заплати за мир, який для багатьох країн став новим пеклом?
Ці всі відповіді можна спробувати знайти для себе в книзі. Неймовірно цікава, насичена фактами та роздумами, детальна, ледь не по годинам розписана, історія ялтинської конференції.