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“Yirminci yüzyıl tarihin en kanlı dönemiydi” iddiası, ateizm, Darwin, devlet yönetimi, bilim, kapitalizm, komünizm, ilerleme ideali ve erkek cinsiyetin de aralarında bulunduğu pek çok şeytan itham edilirken başvurulan klişelerden biri. Peki ama bu doğru mu? Pinker tam tersini savunuyor. Avcı-toplayıcı toplumların, ilkel kabilelerin ya da “devletsiz toplulukların” insan öldürmeye daha az eğilimli oldukları şeklindeki klişe, pek çok istatistiksel veriyle çürütülüyor. Peki insanın doğası iyi mi kötü mü? Şiddetin kaynağı ekonomik eşitsizlik mi? Yoksulluk arttıkça insanlar şiddete daha mı eğilimli oluyorlar? Oysa 1960’larda şiddetin zirve yaptığı dönemde Batı toplumlarında eşitsizlik katsayısı hiç olmadığı kadar minimumdaydı. İçimizdeki kötülüğü açığa çıkaran eşitsiz toplum mu yoksa doğuştan mı kötüyüz? Hobbes ile Rousseau arasındaki yüzyıllardır süren bu tartışmayı Pinker bir üst boyuta taşıyarak, modern analizlerle aydınlatıyor. Hümanist devrimin insanı ehlileştirdiğini savunan Pinker, Aydınlanmanın insanın doğasının iyi tarafını nasıl ortaya çıkardığını göstererek, kimi Aydınlanma düşmanlarının saldırılarının geçersizliğini ispatlıyor.
“Olağanüstü önemli bir kitap.”
–The New York Times Book Review
“Olağanüstü önemli bir kitap.”
–The New York Times Book Review
592 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1986
48 people are currently reading
2493 people want to read
About the author
Patricia S. Churchland
16 books212 followersPatricia Smith Churchland (born July 16, 1943 in Oliver, British Columbia, Canada) is a Canadian-American philosopher working at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) since 1984. She is currently a professor at the UCSD Philosophy Department, an adjunct professor at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies, and an associate of the Computational Neuroscience Laboratory (Sejnowski Lab) at the Salk Institute. She won a MacArthur prize in 1991. Educated at the University of British Columbia, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Oxford (B.Phil.). She taught philosophy at the University of Manitoba from 1969 to 1984 and is the wife of philosopher Paul Churchland.
Churchland has focused on the interface between neuroscience and philosophy. According to her, philosophers are increasingly realizing that to understand the mind one must understand the brain. She is associated with a school of thought called eliminativism or eliminative materialism, which argues that folk psychology concepts such as belief, free will, and consciousness will likely need to be revised as science understands more about the nature of brain function. She is also called a naturalist, because she thinks scientific research is the best basis for understanding the nature of the mind. Her recent work focuses also on neuroethics, and attempts to understand choice, responsibility and the basis of moral norms in terms of brain function, brain evolution, and brain-culture interactions.
She was interviewed along with her husband Paul Churchland for the book Conversations on Consciousness by Susan Blackmore, 2006.
She attended and was a speaker at the Beyond Belief symposium on November 2006 and November 2007.
Patricia and her husband are noted for their attempts to apply their philosophical positions in their daily life. Emotions and feelings, for instance, are eschewed in favour of more precise formulations, such as the following which describes the state of Patricia after a hectic meeting:
"Paul, don't speak to me, my serotonin levels have hit bottom, my brain is awash in glucocorticoids, my blood vessels are full of adrenaline, and if it weren't for my endogenous opiates I'd have driven the car into a tree on the way home. My dopamine levels need lifting."
Churchland has focused on the interface between neuroscience and philosophy. According to her, philosophers are increasingly realizing that to understand the mind one must understand the brain. She is associated with a school of thought called eliminativism or eliminative materialism, which argues that folk psychology concepts such as belief, free will, and consciousness will likely need to be revised as science understands more about the nature of brain function. She is also called a naturalist, because she thinks scientific research is the best basis for understanding the nature of the mind. Her recent work focuses also on neuroethics, and attempts to understand choice, responsibility and the basis of moral norms in terms of brain function, brain evolution, and brain-culture interactions.
She was interviewed along with her husband Paul Churchland for the book Conversations on Consciousness by Susan Blackmore, 2006.
She attended and was a speaker at the Beyond Belief symposium on November 2006 and November 2007.
Patricia and her husband are noted for their attempts to apply their philosophical positions in their daily life. Emotions and feelings, for instance, are eschewed in favour of more precise formulations, such as the following which describes the state of Patricia after a hectic meeting:
"Paul, don't speak to me, my serotonin levels have hit bottom, my brain is awash in glucocorticoids, my blood vessels are full of adrenaline, and if it weren't for my endogenous opiates I'd have driven the car into a tree on the way home. My dopamine levels need lifting."
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
June 1, 2009
A really wonderful exploration of what we understand about how the mind works, and what a future theory of cognition might entail. The book is a little over 20 years old, so necessarily out of date when dealing with the topic of neuroscience, but still provided a very comprehensive analysis of what we know. More than that though, Churchland provides a framework and the necessary background information to even begin to address questions of the mind/brain.
Churchland begins by going over some basic neuroscience, to help the reader understand the functioning of the sensory systems and the workings of neurons. And delves a bit into the some higher order processing systems. The main purpose of this is to start off by driving home the point that to develop any realistic theory we need to understand that our mental states are the result of(or really just "are") neuronal firing in the brain, and introduces us to the what kind of information is used as input to this system. Once this base is built up she delves into psychological theories of mind, and follows this up with philosophical theories of mind. She ends the book by bringing all of these things together to propose some possible methods by which we can attack the problem of cognition, as well as even trying to explicitly state what the problem is.
One particularly interesting fact that I had never thought about, which upon reading was so blatantly obvious, had to do with the nature of consciousness in relation to time. Our consciousness is limited by the firing rate of our neurons, because if action potentials(neuronal messages) can only travel at a limited speed, then the resulting mental states have this limiting factor imposed on them. We know how many possible connections or steps can possibly be made during the time it takes a thought to occur. This on it's own I thought was fascinating, and tells us a lot of important information about how many possible steps can be involved for a certain mental processes to happen in the brain, and thus what kind of processing power must be involved, but what this goes on to say about the nature of our whole experience of time and events was some fun philosophical food for thought.
Her focus towards the end of the book on the importance of creating a theory of brain function really changed my perspective on what subjects are worth studying. I had discounted the importance of modeling and understanding how representations and computations occur in systems of neurons. It's this hugely important step that comes between biological neuroscience and psychology without which there can be no comprehensive theory.
I think we need more philosophers like Pat Churchland. People who understand the importance of the cross disciplinary nature of studying the mind, who understand that any theories must be built upon sound scientific data, but who are able to come at these problems, and present questions from a perspective many hard scientists are not always prone to do. Maybe some day neuroscience will make philosophy obsolete, but for the time being philosophers like Pat Churchland are indispensable.
I'm not sure how out of date some of the things in this book are, but without any specific knowledge of other books of this ilk, I highly recommend this to anyone curious about cognition.
Churchland begins by going over some basic neuroscience, to help the reader understand the functioning of the sensory systems and the workings of neurons. And delves a bit into the some higher order processing systems. The main purpose of this is to start off by driving home the point that to develop any realistic theory we need to understand that our mental states are the result of(or really just "are") neuronal firing in the brain, and introduces us to the what kind of information is used as input to this system. Once this base is built up she delves into psychological theories of mind, and follows this up with philosophical theories of mind. She ends the book by bringing all of these things together to propose some possible methods by which we can attack the problem of cognition, as well as even trying to explicitly state what the problem is.
One particularly interesting fact that I had never thought about, which upon reading was so blatantly obvious, had to do with the nature of consciousness in relation to time. Our consciousness is limited by the firing rate of our neurons, because if action potentials(neuronal messages) can only travel at a limited speed, then the resulting mental states have this limiting factor imposed on them. We know how many possible connections or steps can possibly be made during the time it takes a thought to occur. This on it's own I thought was fascinating, and tells us a lot of important information about how many possible steps can be involved for a certain mental processes to happen in the brain, and thus what kind of processing power must be involved, but what this goes on to say about the nature of our whole experience of time and events was some fun philosophical food for thought.
Her focus towards the end of the book on the importance of creating a theory of brain function really changed my perspective on what subjects are worth studying. I had discounted the importance of modeling and understanding how representations and computations occur in systems of neurons. It's this hugely important step that comes between biological neuroscience and psychology without which there can be no comprehensive theory.
I think we need more philosophers like Pat Churchland. People who understand the importance of the cross disciplinary nature of studying the mind, who understand that any theories must be built upon sound scientific data, but who are able to come at these problems, and present questions from a perspective many hard scientists are not always prone to do. Maybe some day neuroscience will make philosophy obsolete, but for the time being philosophers like Pat Churchland are indispensable.
I'm not sure how out of date some of the things in this book are, but without any specific knowledge of other books of this ilk, I highly recommend this to anyone curious about cognition.
March 6, 2019
I read this book back in the late 1990s. At some points I will make future commentary. I highly recommend this book for anyone interest in eliminative materialism specifically and philosophy of mind generally.
October 16, 2017
Even being released in 1986, this book is an amazing argument for 1) the co-dependence of Neuroscience, Philosophy, and Psychology (and in a modern context Cognitive Science as a multi-disciplinary enterprise) and more specifically 2) that brain states are mental states, specifically in part II. It has a great tripartite structure, which makes it suitable for just about anybody with interest. Part I goes over Neuroscience, getting the reader current to 1980 levels (quite well), Part II is Philosophy of Science, which is still 100% relevant today and IMHO still has a lot to say that has not been integrated, and Part III covers the synthesis of the two. All in all, a fantastic read. Churchland showcases her wit and brilliance in an accessible and important way.
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March 25, 2008Churchland is one of the first to attempt to integrate the hard sciences (neurology) into the perceived "mind/brain duality" problem in philosophy. Will she resolve this "problem? I'm in the process of finding out! One thing's for certain:
Descartes would have loved to have access to the brain scans found in this little gem from the late 80s!
Descartes would have loved to have access to the brain scans found in this little gem from the late 80s!
July 29, 2020
The pace of science moves quickly, so this book is already quite out of date in many ways, but still well worth reading.
May 15, 2016
This book was an interesting overview in the field and, although outdated in some areas, still holds up to the test of time. That said, it is not great as an introduction for complete neophytes in neuroscience and philosophy as her explanations are succinct but jargon-y. She's clearly writing to an informed academic audience rather than a lay audience, but if you have the requisite background, that's exactly what makes this book enjoyable. It's as readable as a pop-sci book with the informational density of a textbook, a rare combo. The style is esoteric, but if you can get on board, the book is enjoyable and informational.
January 15, 2018
A good, albeit long read. For those just interested in the philosophy side, I recommend just purchasing Paul Churchland's 'Matter and Consciousness' which delves heavily into the eliminative materialist argument made here.
I'm hesitant to trust much of the neuroscience in this book with all of the recent developments, and even further 70% of it will go over your head if you're relatively new to the subject.
One real positive of the book for me was the 'Introduction and History" portion of Part II on the Philosophy of Science. It presents a really concise history of philosophy's growing relationship with science that I found unparalleled to anything I've read elsewhere.
I'm hesitant to trust much of the neuroscience in this book with all of the recent developments, and even further 70% of it will go over your head if you're relatively new to the subject.
One real positive of the book for me was the 'Introduction and History" portion of Part II on the Philosophy of Science. It presents a really concise history of philosophy's growing relationship with science that I found unparalleled to anything I've read elsewhere.
January 31, 2019
This has been my fallback work on topics of mind/brain, cognition, and related matters. The book is old but still foundational. I no longer recall when I read it except that it was around the time it was first published or maybe one to two years later. I like how it involves analytical philosophy and neurobiology at the state is was at publication. Both Patricia and Paul Churchland write well and think clearly. This is one of the least jargon encased essays on mind/brain.
October 15, 2016
Pat Churchland's 'neurophilosophy' is a great book as it is two books in one! Some elementary neuroscience in the first half and philosophy of mind in the latter.
Only gripe is that I still think that reductive physicalism is not right and still in the camp of non-reductive physicalism (more in line with Kim and Chalmers).
Only gripe is that I still think that reductive physicalism is not right and still in the camp of non-reductive physicalism (more in line with Kim and Chalmers).
January 6, 2008
A must-read for any psychologist.
September 23, 2025
THE PHILOSOPHER EXPOUNDS THE VIEW OF "ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM”
Patricia Smith Churchland (born 1943) is a Canadian-American philosopher and Professor of Philosophy Emerita at the University of California, San Diego. She has also written books such as 'The Computational Brain,' 'Brain-Wise,' 'Touching a Nerve: The Self as Brain,' etc.
She wrote in the Preface to this 1986 book, "In the mid-seventies I discovered that my patience with most mainstream philosophy had run out... Since I was a materialist and hence believed that the mind is the brain, it seemed obvious that a wider understanding of neuroscience could not fail to be useful if I wanted to know how we see, how we think and reason and decide.... As a philosopher, I had found myself driven to the neurosciences, but having immersed myself in the neurosciences, I found I could not leave the philosophy alone either... the boundaries are ill defined. This book is thus the result of what I came to regard as neurophilosophical inquiries." (Pg. ix-xi)
She admits, "it is true that at this stage in the history of science, subjective experience has not been successfully identified with and explained by states and processes in the brain. Insofar as it has not, then subjective experiences do not now enjoy a reduction to brain states. Nevertheless, this current state of science does not entail that no neuroscientific theory will ever reduce psychology." (Pg. 326)
She explains her own view: "By 'eliminative materialism' I mean the view that holds: 1. that folk psychology is a theory; 2. that it is a theory whose inadequacies entail that it must eventually be substantially revised or replaced outright (hence 'eliminative'); and 3. that what will ultimately replace folk psychology will be the conceptual framework of a matured neuroscience (hence 'materialism')." (Pg. 396)
She adds, "The cardinal background principle for the theorist is that there are no homunculi. There is no little person in the brain who 'sees' an inner television screen, 'hears' an inner voice... and so forth. There are just neurons and their connections. When a person sees, it is because neurons ... are collectively orchestrated in the appropriate manner." (Pg. 406)
She summarizes, "A primary objective of this book has been to show that neuroscience matters to philosophy. I have advanced three general lines of argument in support of this view: (1) mental processes are brain processes, (2) the theoretical framework resulting from a co-evolution of neuroscience and psychology is bound to be superior to folk psychology, and (3) it is most unlikely that we can devise an adequate theory of the mind-brain without knowing in great detail about the structure and organization of nervous systems." (Pg. 482)
Her arguments, as well as those of husband Paul Churchland [e.g., 'The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul'] are important reading for anyone seriously studying the contemporary philosophy of mind.
Patricia Smith Churchland (born 1943) is a Canadian-American philosopher and Professor of Philosophy Emerita at the University of California, San Diego. She has also written books such as 'The Computational Brain,' 'Brain-Wise,' 'Touching a Nerve: The Self as Brain,' etc.
She wrote in the Preface to this 1986 book, "In the mid-seventies I discovered that my patience with most mainstream philosophy had run out... Since I was a materialist and hence believed that the mind is the brain, it seemed obvious that a wider understanding of neuroscience could not fail to be useful if I wanted to know how we see, how we think and reason and decide.... As a philosopher, I had found myself driven to the neurosciences, but having immersed myself in the neurosciences, I found I could not leave the philosophy alone either... the boundaries are ill defined. This book is thus the result of what I came to regard as neurophilosophical inquiries." (Pg. ix-xi)
She admits, "it is true that at this stage in the history of science, subjective experience has not been successfully identified with and explained by states and processes in the brain. Insofar as it has not, then subjective experiences do not now enjoy a reduction to brain states. Nevertheless, this current state of science does not entail that no neuroscientific theory will ever reduce psychology." (Pg. 326)
She explains her own view: "By 'eliminative materialism' I mean the view that holds: 1. that folk psychology is a theory; 2. that it is a theory whose inadequacies entail that it must eventually be substantially revised or replaced outright (hence 'eliminative'); and 3. that what will ultimately replace folk psychology will be the conceptual framework of a matured neuroscience (hence 'materialism')." (Pg. 396)
She adds, "The cardinal background principle for the theorist is that there are no homunculi. There is no little person in the brain who 'sees' an inner television screen, 'hears' an inner voice... and so forth. There are just neurons and their connections. When a person sees, it is because neurons ... are collectively orchestrated in the appropriate manner." (Pg. 406)
She summarizes, "A primary objective of this book has been to show that neuroscience matters to philosophy. I have advanced three general lines of argument in support of this view: (1) mental processes are brain processes, (2) the theoretical framework resulting from a co-evolution of neuroscience and psychology is bound to be superior to folk psychology, and (3) it is most unlikely that we can devise an adequate theory of the mind-brain without knowing in great detail about the structure and organization of nervous systems." (Pg. 482)
Her arguments, as well as those of husband Paul Churchland [e.g., 'The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul'] are important reading for anyone seriously studying the contemporary philosophy of mind.
March 1, 2020
Reread after 30 years, holds up.
August 14, 2025
Reading Neurophilosophy is a bit like attempting a high-altitude trek without acclimatization—intellectually exhilarating, but at times, oxygen-deprived. I tackled it in 2020, and even as someone who enjoys philosophy of mind, I found myself doubling back over certain sections just to catch my breath.
Churchland’s central thesis is eliminative materialism: the radical claim that our everyday ���folk psychology” (beliefs, desires, intentions) is not just incomplete, but outdated—destined to be replaced by the explanatory frameworks of a mature neuroscience.
Much as chemistry absorbed and replaced the vocabulary of alchemy, Churchland envisions neuroscience one day rendering terms like “belief” or “pain” obsolete.
She dismantles the idea that philosophy of mind should operate in an abstract vacuum, detached from the sciences. Instead, she insists on direct integration with biology, neuroanatomy, and cognitive science.
The book traverses the history of mind–body debates—from Descartes’ dualism through the rise of physicalism—and pauses for a lucid primer on neuroscience fundamentals, including neuroanatomy, synaptic transmission, and the workings of computational and connectionist models.
One of the most impressive aspects is Churchland’s bold interdisciplinary vision. In the early 1980s, most philosophers of mind were still tinkering with thought experiments and formal logic. She broke the mold by dragging philosophy into the lab and demanding that it converse with empirical data. This cross-pollination helped pave the way for neuroethics, neuroeconomics, and the field of neurophilosophy itself.
Her clear neuroscience primer is another strength. For a work so steeped in philosophical argument, the accessible explanations of brain structure and function make it unusually inviting to non-specialists.
Finally, Churchland’s philosophical courage is undeniable. Eliminative materialism is not a safe or popular stance—it challenges centuries of human self-understanding. She doesn’t hedge her bets; she commits.
Yet this same commitment risks tipping into overconfidence in reductionism. By betting so heavily that neuroscience will explain everything about the mind, she risks flattening the complexity of emergent, higher-level explanations offered by cognitive psychology, phenomenology, or systems theory.
Her dismissal of phenomenology is another sticking point. Conscious experience—the “what-it’s-like” of perception—gets sidelined as a pseudo-problem or as something science will dissolve away. This alienates readers sympathetic to the “hard problem” articulated later by David Chalmers.
The speculative nature of eliminativism is also evident. Decades after Neurophilosophy appeared, folk-psychological concepts like “belief” and “desire” remain central in cognitive science, AI, and behavioral economics. The obsolescence she predicted hasn’t yet materialized.
Lastly, the historical overview is narrow in scope—focusing almost exclusively on Western philosophy and leaving non-Western traditions on mind conspicuously absent.
So, boottom line? Neurophilosophy is part neuroscience textbook, part philosophical sledgehammer. It was revolutionary in its insistence that serious philosophy of mind cannot proceed without grounding itself in brain science. Whether or not you buy into eliminative materialism, the book is a landmark—a map for collapsing the artificial boundaries between philosophy and neuroscience.
Tough? Absolutely.
Worth the climb? Without question.
Churchland’s central thesis is eliminative materialism: the radical claim that our everyday ���folk psychology” (beliefs, desires, intentions) is not just incomplete, but outdated—destined to be replaced by the explanatory frameworks of a mature neuroscience.
Much as chemistry absorbed and replaced the vocabulary of alchemy, Churchland envisions neuroscience one day rendering terms like “belief” or “pain” obsolete.
She dismantles the idea that philosophy of mind should operate in an abstract vacuum, detached from the sciences. Instead, she insists on direct integration with biology, neuroanatomy, and cognitive science.
The book traverses the history of mind–body debates—from Descartes’ dualism through the rise of physicalism—and pauses for a lucid primer on neuroscience fundamentals, including neuroanatomy, synaptic transmission, and the workings of computational and connectionist models.
One of the most impressive aspects is Churchland’s bold interdisciplinary vision. In the early 1980s, most philosophers of mind were still tinkering with thought experiments and formal logic. She broke the mold by dragging philosophy into the lab and demanding that it converse with empirical data. This cross-pollination helped pave the way for neuroethics, neuroeconomics, and the field of neurophilosophy itself.
Her clear neuroscience primer is another strength. For a work so steeped in philosophical argument, the accessible explanations of brain structure and function make it unusually inviting to non-specialists.
Finally, Churchland’s philosophical courage is undeniable. Eliminative materialism is not a safe or popular stance—it challenges centuries of human self-understanding. She doesn’t hedge her bets; she commits.
Yet this same commitment risks tipping into overconfidence in reductionism. By betting so heavily that neuroscience will explain everything about the mind, she risks flattening the complexity of emergent, higher-level explanations offered by cognitive psychology, phenomenology, or systems theory.
Her dismissal of phenomenology is another sticking point. Conscious experience—the “what-it’s-like” of perception—gets sidelined as a pseudo-problem or as something science will dissolve away. This alienates readers sympathetic to the “hard problem” articulated later by David Chalmers.
The speculative nature of eliminativism is also evident. Decades after Neurophilosophy appeared, folk-psychological concepts like “belief” and “desire” remain central in cognitive science, AI, and behavioral economics. The obsolescence she predicted hasn’t yet materialized.
Lastly, the historical overview is narrow in scope—focusing almost exclusively on Western philosophy and leaving non-Western traditions on mind conspicuously absent.
So, boottom line? Neurophilosophy is part neuroscience textbook, part philosophical sledgehammer. It was revolutionary in its insistence that serious philosophy of mind cannot proceed without grounding itself in brain science. Whether or not you buy into eliminative materialism, the book is a landmark—a map for collapsing the artificial boundaries between philosophy and neuroscience.
Tough? Absolutely.
Worth the climb? Without question.
September 22, 2023
This book has left an indelible impact on the interdisciplinary field of neuroscience and philosophy. Churchland masterfully bridges the gap between the abstract world of thought and the empirical realm of brain science. The book serves as a comprehensive guide that challenges traditional philosophical inquiries about the mind, offering instead a neuroscientific approach. Churchland argues that understanding the architecture and functions of the brain can provide valuable insights into questions that philosophy alone has struggled to answer, such as the nature of consciousness, free will, and cognition. The book is meticulously researched, drawing upon a wealth of studies to support its claims, making it a cornerstone text for anyone interested in the intersection of philosophy and neuroscience.
What sets "Neurophilosophy" apart is its audacious endeavor to integrate two seemingly disparate disciplines into a cohesive framework. Churchland doesn't merely present neuroscience as a supplementary tool for philosophy; she posits it as a transformative lens through which philosophical questions can be re-evaluated and perhaps more effectively addressed. The book is not without its critics, many of whom argue that it leans too heavily on reductionism, potentially sidelining the complexities and nuances that philosophy brings to the table. However, even if one doesn't fully subscribe to Churchland's views, the book serves as a thought-provoking catalyst for dialogue and further research. Its influence is undeniable, shaping academic discourse and encouraging a generation of thinkers to adopt a more interdisciplinary approach.
What sets "Neurophilosophy" apart is its audacious endeavor to integrate two seemingly disparate disciplines into a cohesive framework. Churchland doesn't merely present neuroscience as a supplementary tool for philosophy; she posits it as a transformative lens through which philosophical questions can be re-evaluated and perhaps more effectively addressed. The book is not without its critics, many of whom argue that it leans too heavily on reductionism, potentially sidelining the complexities and nuances that philosophy brings to the table. However, even if one doesn't fully subscribe to Churchland's views, the book serves as a thought-provoking catalyst for dialogue and further research. Its influence is undeniable, shaping academic discourse and encouraging a generation of thinkers to adopt a more interdisciplinary approach.
June 3, 2023
Didn't realize that the title means the first half is a bunch of useless neuroscience chapters. Skip them, they are a complete waste of time. The last chapter somewhat makes up for it. It can be read independently, and will be a good use of your time.
March 12, 2024
Dar bir çemberdeki uzman grubun anlayabileceği bir yapıt. Konuyu merak edenler için büyük bölümü neredeyse tamamen anlaşılmaz; özellikle terminoloji hakkında tek bir “çeviren notu”nun yer almadığı düşünülürse.
August 17, 2021
Bazı bölümleri atlayarak okudum çünkü teknik bilgiye sahip olmayanlar veya eksik olanların zorlanacağı bir kitap, işin felsefesine bence çok yer ayrılmamış
October 10, 2025
Kötü çeviriyle işkenceye dönen bir kitap oldu maalesef.
November 23, 2025
"for all we know, it may happen that one’s brain does sometimes go into a state with the content ‘I am aware’ when it is false that one is aware, perhaps, for instance, when the brain is in certain kinds of coma. Such might even be the stock response of the brain to sudden severe trauma. I certainly do not know that this never happens or never could happen." (p. 309)
February 8, 2023
5 stars for the readable part and 1 for the hard-to-follow part! (hard for my neurons to follow the technical staff)
…and is true, when i read fast my eyes tend to go to the right of the page, i force myself to read the left part…
…and is true, when i read fast my eyes tend to go to the right of the page, i force myself to read the left part…
October 2, 2024
I wish I had read this when I first bought it, instead of letting it languish on my shelf for a few decades while I went on to other things. I heard Churchland speak a few times and there was a lot of biology and relatively little philosophy. It is now clear that was because she thinks a good understanding of the biology is a necessary propaedeutic to doing good philosophy of cognition and that few philosophers had that background. She argues this in convincing detail in this book. Open-minded, she considers what a science of knowing will look like. Ideas she presents have received more support in the subsequent years, but this sets out the issues clearly.
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February 26, 2018follow her shes figured it out
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