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Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War

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In The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Jeremy Yellen exposes the history, politics, and intrigue that characterized the era when Japan's "total empire" met the total war of World War II. He illuminates the ways in which the imperial center and its individual colonies understood the concept of the Sphere, offering two sometimes competing, sometimes complementary, and always intertwined visions—one from Japan, the other from Burma and the Philippines.

Yellen argues that, from 1940 to 1945, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere epitomized two concurrent wars for Asia's future: the first was for a new type of empire in Asia, and the second was a political war, waged by nationalist elites in the colonial capitals of Rangoon and Manila. Exploring Japanese visions for international order in the face of an ever-changing geopolitical situation, The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere explores wartime Japan's desire to shape and control its imperial future while its colonies attempted to do the same. At Japan's zenith as an imperial power, the Sphere represented a plan for regional domination; by the end of the war, it had been recast as the epitome of cooperative internationalism. In the end, the Sphere could not survive wartime defeat, and Yellen's lucidly written account reveals much about the desires of Japan as an imperial and colonial power, as well as the ways in which the subdued colonies in Burma and the Philippines jockeyed for agency and a say in the future of the region.

413 pages, Kindle Edition

First published April 15, 2019

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About the author

Jeremy A. Yellen

2 books1 follower
Jeremy A. Yellen is a historian of modern Japan and an assistant professor in the Department of Japanese Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK). He received a Ph.D. in history from Harvard University in 2012, and taught at Harvard and Boston University before moving to CUHK in 2014.

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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
Profile Image for Andrew.
685 reviews261 followers
June 22, 2021
The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War, by Jeremy A. Yellen, is an interesting look at Japan's wartime empire building techniques, focusing on policy choices, political discourse and on-the-ground practicalities inherent in Japan's attempt to control its sphere in East Asia. Japan entered WWII early, by some accounts, when an officers rebellion stormed into Manchuria and created a puppet state. From that point forward, Japan's political leaders became increasingly interested in the creation of an empire of some sorts. They termed it "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The geographic or political boundaries of the sphere were never clear; even to Japan's highest wartime leaders. A few camps existed within this thought process. Some more conservative members of the government wished to create an economic sphere, engaging in diplomatic maneuvers with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Axis Powers, as well as Great Britain and colonial French Indochina and Dutch Indonesia. Japan sought to overcome its resource constraints by securing an economic foothold in Asia. It's colonies in Korea and Taiwan, as well as Manchukuo - were heavily exploited for resources, with over 80%+ of each colonies exports going to Japan, and 90% of their imports coming from Japan; this was by far the highest percentage in the world at the time. Even so, Japan required numerous resources, such as metals, chemicals, petroleum, foodstuffs and more to ensure a stable domestic supply of goods, and to boost its burgeoning economy. This meant that Japan was heavily reliant on importing materials from other nations. This was all fine and good during the post-WWI Wilsonian age of free trade, conference diplomacy, and Open Doors, and Japan sought to tack into this new world.

Things changed during the economic rescission in the 1930's. All of a sudden, the world moved from free trade, to protectionism, and Japan struggled to meet their domestic needs. Other nations began to form trading blocs, utilizing their own colonial possessions to supply cheap materials to the metropole. Japan could not meet the same targets. Further to that, a series of humiliating diplomatic agreements, such as the Washington Naval Treaty, which saw the US conspire to break up the Anglo-Japanese alliance, saw Japan increasingly alienated in the Post-WWI world. This led to a radicalization of politics in Japan, culminating in the officers rebellion which saw the annexation of Manchukuo to Japan, and large shifts in government in favour of further colonization and empire building schemes.

Japan initially sought to use diplomacy, as much as possible, to secure gains. It became increasingly close to Germany and Italy, admiring their administrative control over the economic sphere, and their underdog persona in the face of what Japan deemed to be Anglo-American machinations. Japan initiated its war with China, in the hopes of securing further territorial gains and resources in Inner Mongolia and Coastal China. It quickly became bogged down in the Chinese mainland. Even so, the world either watched indifferently, or, in the case of the French, British and Americans, sent tacit aid to the Chinese government. Japan then initiated a diplomatic offensive, under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry, to try and secure a stable position in affairs. It signed on to the Axis Powers in the Triple Alliance with Italy and Germany, securing a major diplomatic victory which ensured Japan could enter WWII on it's own terms, with no requirement to come to Germany's aid. As WWII began in Europe, Japan began to eye events with alarm. Germany's rapid advance in the Netherlands and France made the position of French Indochina and Dutch Indonesia alarming to Japanese policy makers. Japan was convinced Germany would seek to annex or control these colonies, although little evidence suggests such events would occur. Japan also extended a diplomatic hand to the Soviet Union, after Germany's surprise Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact leaked. Japan was further flustered, as Germany failed to mention this to their Japanese counterparts in Foreign Affairs. Japan signed its own non-aggression pact with the USSR in response, which saw favourable diplomatic gains, securing Soviet recognition of Japan's aims for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in writing, and ensuring this Sphere included potential gains in Inner Mongolia. Japan sought to deal with the pressing issues in South Asia, and strong armed the French Vichy government in French Indochina into resolving a border dispute with Thailand in the Thai's favour. This saw Japan able to station troops throughout Northern Indochina, closing European aid to China from this route. It also saw Japan gain an ally in Thailand. So far, everything was coming up Japan.

However, events rapidly shifted. The German advance into Russia was met with further alarm in Japan - they had just recently signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviets. this led to a policy dilemma in Japan. Should they move north, and take advantage of Russian weakness, which would also potentially placate the rest of the Allied powers, or should they move south and take advantage of Europe's weakness by further invading European colonies in Asia? History shows the latter happened, although it was a close game. The decision of Japan to move into South Asia saw the decline of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the rise of the army and navy as Japan's supreme decision making bodies. Japan moved rapidly into Asia. This was inspired by the failure of the Japanese government to make diplomatic inroads into Dutch Indonesia. The Japanese responded by first moving troops south into the rest of French Indochina. After this move, the Americans embargoed Japan, cutting them off from almost 80% of imports, and crucially 90% of their oil supply. Japan had no choice at this point; it was war.

The thought process behind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was always in flux, even throughout the war. Yellen states that "War beget Order" with Japan. The Sphere and the idea of it, as well as its boundaries, were primarily related to Japan's successes in the early war. Originally intended to be something of an economic union, Japan began to experiment with more overt political control, creating something of a pseudo-colonial empire; on the one hand engaging with nationalists throughout Asia, while on the other being reluctant to relinquish control after success. Even Japan's own political and academic elite struggled to understand what was meant by the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The general thought process emerged of a sphere that was run through the notions of filial piety, anti-liberalism, economic and political cooperation, and a general notion of anti-western colonialism and nationalism. Confusing no?

Yellen looks at two specific case studies to compare and contrast. The Philippines was, at the time of the Japanese invasion, a Commonwealth colony under the United States, who had annexed it in 1898 during the Spanish-American War. The Americans had promised (vaguely) independence in 1946, although notions of Western Chauvinism were present. For their part, Filipino political elite used the national struggle to maneuver for power, putting the kibosh on each others attempts at independence talks. When Japan invaded, much of the elite fled to Corregidor, and eventually to the United States. However, some stayed behind, under the direction that they collaborate with the Japanese in order to reduce the impact of occupation. Japan originally saw the Philippines as a largely valueless area - its main exports were tobacco, sugar and other raw materials useful in the US domestic economy. However, by 1943, Japan's need for rice outpaced this thinking, and the Philippines increasingly became an important source of food for Japan. The Philippine elite, for their part, were seemingly reluctant collaborators. They did cooperate, but frequently stated their reluctance to do so, and protested harsher Japanese measures. On the flip side, the Philippines was able to secure their long awaited "independence" as the Republics of the Philippines, imbedded in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. This independence, was of course, highly suspect, but it was a step further than the US was able to deliver on pre-WWII. Rebellions were common in the Philippines under Japanese occupation, as was collaboration - this was a mixed bag of targeted cooperation for gain and safety, as well as resistance when Japan wasn't looking.

Burma (now called Myanmar) is the second case study. A similar colonial beginning, Burma was part of the British Indian Empire. It too, was ruled relatively lightly by Britain, albeit in a much more globally integrated system than the Philippines. Burma, however, cooperated early and strongly with Japan. Burmese nationalists saw Japan as a liberating force in the early world, much do to Britain's continued recalcitrant stance on Burmese independence. This led to Japanese training of Burmese partisans, and the eventual quick capture of Burma to Japanese forces and allies on the ground. This was a windfall for Japan, who was able to further close supplies into China. It was also a windfall for Burmese nationalists, who gained immense popularity after the war that they would use to leverage their independence, even in the midst of military defeat.

This was a fascinating book, looking at the politics and policy decisions inherent in the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This topic is often confusing to historians, and one can see why. Even Japan struggled with the concept. Even so, this book looks at this topic in a more nuanced light than most WWII era books on Japan, which often look at them during only their most radical phase toward the end of the war. Instead, this book seeks to understand what led Japan to that moment, and comes up with many factors. Muddled policies within the Japanese government, a radicalized officer corps and weak upper leadership, Western pressure to put Japan in its place, a place tarred with racism, colonialism and indifference, and a lack of resources to service the domestic economy. Japan, as Yellen states, put war first, and let war make the policy decisions for it in the end, to great disaster. This book was very interesting, and worth a read for those looking for a more in-depth look at the Japanese Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere that goes beyond the Amero-centric books we often see in the West on the topic.

Profile Image for Mark.
1,371 reviews162 followers
June 17, 2019
On 1 August 1940, the newly appointed Japanese foreign minister Matsouka Yōsuke gave a radio speech in which he explained the shift in policy undertaken by the recently formed government of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro. He declared that "the essence of our country's foreign policy must focus on the establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that centers on Japan, Manchukuo, and China" (40), thus giving a label to the various war aims that underlay Japanese strategy until their surrender in September 1945. Yet as Jeremy Yellen (Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong) explains in his new book, the Co-Prosperity Sphere was not simply a synonym for Japan's wartime empire but a transnational project for restructuring the region that involved local elites in the territories Japan seized from the Western empires.

To read the rest of my review, click on this link:

http://www.miwsr.com/2020-004.aspx
Profile Image for Shrike58.
1,628 reviews26 followers
October 14, 2022
Can expediency lead to meaning? That's sort of the question here, as Yellen examines how a program to build a self-contained security state morphed into something, on paper, that promoted a higher social and political purpose. This was more apparent than real, as it's mostly a commentary on Tokyo's desperation to maintain strategic momentum, having bitten off more than they can chew. The most interesting portion of this monograph is Yellen's examination of how politicians in Burma and the Philippines sought to turn collaboration into real progress towards political independence; this didn't happen, but it is a fascinating historical cul-de-sac.
81 reviews16 followers
July 25, 2023
I picked up this book looking for a general history of Japan's wartime empire. I didn't get that, but what I found was nonetheless well worth reading. This book is split into two parts. The first half is on the motivations behind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and its ideological shifts over the war. The Sphere was envisioned as a pan-Asian international community, with Japan ruling as the dominant patriarch. Japanese leaders saw the world splitting into distinct blocs and wanted to ensure that the future Asian bloc would be firmly under Japanese control. Behind this were important economic motivations. As a country with scarce natural resources, the other countries or colonies in the Sphere would act as an economic appendage to Japan. Japan was to stand at the top of the value chain with the highest skill and most capital-intensive industries while the rest of the Sphere would offer natural resources and production from low-skill labor-intensive industries. Although Germany was Japan's ally throughout WWII, much of the Sphere's propaganda was aimed towards Germany. With Germany's initial success in the war, Japan believed that Germany would quickly take over Europe then set their eyes on the Dutch and French colonies in Asia. Joining the Axis and promoting the Sphere were both attempts to ward off Germany and secure Japan's position as the hegemon of Asia. By 1943 with the war going poorly for Japan, the Sphere was reimagined with Wilsonian internationalist ideals as an egalitarian grouping of Asian nations fighting for a common goal. This was of course nonsense as Japan maintained its grip on power, but it was used as propaganda meant to present an image of a united Asia against the Allies.

The second half of the book focuses on the Philippines and Burma as case studies of how countries within the Sphere navigated their relationship with Japan. While "collaborationist" is usually seen as synonymous with "traitor", Yellen shows that the elite collaborationists in the Philippines and Burma were actually nationalists who fiercely believed in their countries' independence. In Burma, the primary motivation for collaboration with Japan was ousting their British overlords. In the Philippines, elites collaborated with Japan in order to maintain some peace and order while they waited for the Allies to win the war. In both cases, collaborationist leaders used the sham independence granted to them by Japan to begin a process of post-colonial state-building, creating institutions and administrative capacity that had been denied to them by their colonial past. Some of this even involved getting help from Japan through funding and training. Thus, the Sphere was a way for nationalist leaders in the Philippines and Burma to chart out a future of post-war independence. Although the Sphere was the locus of brutal Japanese imperialistic domination, it also inadvertently contributed to post-war Asian independence.
Profile Image for Riley Mcgee.
4 reviews
October 29, 2026
A very good political history from the point of views and examination of the Elites. Goes into the development of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, where it originated, and into colonization in areas such as Burma and the Philippines
92 reviews2 followers
November 30, 2023
A good book about the process of planning the Co-Prosperity Sphere let down by the very disjointed bridge between it's two halves.
Profile Image for Dan Trubman.
43 reviews4 followers
July 12, 2020
If you're looking for a straight-forward history of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, you'll likely find this book disappointing. Instead, it largely focused on the evolving and contested conception & ideology supporting the sphere. The first half largely focused on how the Sphere was intellectually conceived and considered domestically within Japan. The second half uses case studies of the Philippines & Burma to review how local leaders operated within a scheme largely imposed upon them, attempting to pursue their own goals. Specifically focusing on their attempts to build state capacity, and build foundations for actual independence in the future.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews