Looming trade wars and rising nationalism have stirred troubling memories of the 1930s. Will history repeat itself? Do we face the chaotic breakdown of the global economic system in the face of stagnation, protectionism and political tumult?
Jeremy Green argues that, although we face grave problems, globalization is not about to end. Setting today’s challenges within a longer historical context, he demonstrates that the global economy is more interconnected than ever before and the costs of undoing it high enough to make a complete breakdown unlikely. Popular analogies between the 1930s and today are misleading. But the governing liberal ideology of globalisation is changing. It is mutating into a hard-edged nationalism that defends free markets while reasserting sovereignty and strengthening borders. This ‘national liberalism’ threatens a much more dangerous disintegration, fuelled by inequality and ecological crisis, unless we radically rethink the international status quo.
This brilliantly original account of the discontents of globalization is a must-read both for concerned citizens and students of global political economy.
Green clarified the 2 globalisation: the process (rate of increase), and the state (existing amount). He posited that the process is going to slow down, but as the state is already huge, there is no turning back. One only needs to learn about how a smart phone or T shirt is made across countries to agree to that. So globalisation is going to stay with us, albeit with slower rate of increase.
Unfortunately, because globalisation has mainly benefited the very rich in the developed world, and the middle class and poor in developing world (Elephant curve again), it has led to anger and disillusionment of the powerful middle class and poor in the developed world. This has led to Brexit, Donald Trump and AfD etc. These populist leaders in turn blame migrants and trade deals for the problem, resulting in xenophobia and trade protectionism. These however will not solve the underlying problem. Meanwhile, the real bugbear is climate change.
So what will help? A financial transaction tax to slow down useless hot money flow, but letting the useful foreign direct investment alone. A government directed investment in green investment to attenuate climate change. Much higher taxation for the highest income. A wealth tax. None of these are being implemented by populist leaders, so their supporters are in for a rude shock and further disappointment.
I was quite satisfied with the balanced analytical rigour provided by this book. As the book was written by a professor of political economy, it was replete with technical jargon that may gatekeep its contents from the casual reader. A bulk of it could have been simplified.
However, the contention within ideological liberalism and parallels drawn to contemporary economic deglobalisation was fascinating and well-discussed. The conclusion was considerably abrupt and seemingly lacking; it doesn't take an expert to conclude that globalisation is not over, but I do wish that Green made greater strides to prove it to make for a more meaningful conclusion.
Nevertheless, I appreciate the relevance of the book in its use of Trump, Bolsonaro, Ocasio-Cortez etc. as focal examples of the varying attitudes towards globalisation. It gave a contemporary perspective to an issue that is generally characterised by anachronistic knowledge regarding the 1930s/1970s and their respective 'deglobalist' zeitgeists.