The original basis for the thoroughgoing rejection of usury was generally the primitive custom of economic assistance to one's fellows, in accordance with which the taking of usury "among brothers" was undoubtedly regarded as a serious breach against the obligation to provide assistance. The fact that the prohibition against usury became increasingly severe in Christianity, under quite different conditions, was due in part to various other motives and factors. The prohibition of usury was not, as the materialist conception of history would represent it, a reflection of the absence of interest on capital under the general conditions of a natural economy. On the contrary, the Christian church and its servants, including the Pope, took interest without any scruples even in the early Middle Ages, i.e., in the very period of a natural economy; even more so, of course, they condoned the taking of interest by others. It is striking that the ecclesiastical persecution of usurious lending arose and became ever more intense virtually as a concomitant of the incipient development of actual capitalist instruments and particularly of acquisitive capital in overseas trade. What is involved, therefore, is a struggle in principle between ethical rationalization and the process of rationalization in the domain of economics. As we have seen, only in the nineteenth century was the church obliged, under the pressure of certain unalterable facts, to remove the prohibition in the manner we have described previously.
The real reason for religious hostility toward usury lies deeper and is connected with the attitude of religious ethics toward the imperatives of rational profitmaking. In early religious, even those which otherwise placed a high positive value on the possession of wealth, purely commercial enterprises were practically always the objects of adverse judgment. Nor is this attitude confined to predominantly agrarian economies under the influence of warrior nobilities. This criticism is usually found when commercial transactions are already relatively advanced, and indeed it arose in conscious protest against them.
We may first note that every economic rationalization of a barter economy has a weakening effect on the traditions which support the authority of the sacred law. For this reason alone the pursuit of money, the typical goal of the rational acquisitive quest, is religiously suspect. Consequently, the priesthood favored the maintenance of a natural economy (as was apparently the case in Egypt) wherever the particular economic interests of the temple as a bank for deposit and loans under divine protection did not militate too much against a natural economy.
But it is above all the impersonal and economically rationalized (but for this very reason ethically irrational) character of purely commercial relationships that evokes the suspicion, never clearly expressed but all the more strongly felt, of ethical religions. For every purely personal relationship of man to man, of whatever sort and even including complete enslavement, may be subjected to ethical requirements and ethically regulated. This is true because the structures of these relationships depend upon the individual wills of the participants, leaving room in such relationships for manifestations of the virtue of charity. But this is not the situation in the realm of economically rationalized relationships, where personal control is exercised in inverse ratio to the degree of rational differentiation of the economic structure. There is no possibility, in practice or even in principle, of any caritative regulation of relationships arising between the holder of a savings and loan bank mortgage and the mortgagee who has obtained a loan from the bank, or between a holder of a federal bond and a citizen taxpayer. Nor can any caritative regulation arise in the relationships between stockholders and factory workers, between tobacco importers and foreign plantation workers, or between industrialists and the miners who have dug from the earth the raw materials used in the plants owned by the industrialists. The growing impersonality of the economy on the basis of association in the market place follows its own rules, disobedience to which entails economic failure, and in the long run, economic ruin.
Rational economic association always brings about depersonalization, and it is impossible to control a universe of instrumentally rational activities by charitable appeals to particular individuals. The functionalized world of capitalism certainly offers no support for any such charitable orientation. In it the claims of religious charity are vitiated not merely because of the refractoriness and weakness of particular individuals, as it happens everywhere, but because they lose their meaning altogether. Religious ethics is confronted by a world of depersonalized relationships which for fundamental reasons cannot submit to its primeval norms. Consequently, in a peculiar duality, priesthoods have time and again protected patriarchalism against impersonal dependency relations, also in the interest of traditionalism, whereas prophetic religion has broken up patriarchal organizations. However, the more a religious commitment becomes conscious of its opposition to economic rationalization as such, the more apt are the religion's virtuosi to end up with an anti-economic rejection of the world.