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Cigarette Papers
Around-the-clock tobacco talks, multibillion-dollar lawsuits against the major cigarette companies, and legislative wrangling over how much to tax a pack of cigarettes―these are some of the most recent episodes in the war against the tobacco companies. The Cigarette Papers shows what started it revelations that tobacco companies had long known the grave dangers of smoking, and did nothing about it.
In May 1994 a box containing 4,000 pages of internal tobacco industry documents arrived at the office of Professor Stanton Glantz at the University of California, San Francisco. The anonymous source of these "cigarette papers" was identified only as "Mr. Butts." These documents provide a shocking inside account of the activities of one tobacco company, Brown & Williamson, over more than thirty years. Quoting extensively from the documents themselves and analyzing what they reveal, The Cigarette Papers shows what the tobacco companies have known and galvanizes us to take action.
In May 1994 a box containing 4,000 pages of internal tobacco industry documents arrived at the office of Professor Stanton Glantz at the University of California, San Francisco. The anonymous source of these "cigarette papers" was identified only as "Mr. Butts." These documents provide a shocking inside account of the activities of one tobacco company, Brown & Williamson, over more than thirty years. Quoting extensively from the documents themselves and analyzing what they reveal, The Cigarette Papers shows what the tobacco companies have known and galvanizes us to take action.
562 pages, Paperback
First published May 2, 1996
68 people want to read
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October 9, 2021
Covid-19 is the deadliest pandemic in 100 years. In the first 20 months, the pandemic killed more than 600,000 Americans. By contrast, during the same period, smoking killed about 700,000 Americans, which makes smoking the leading preventable cause of death, even during a pandemic. A natural question is why an addictive product that, when used as intended, causes disease and death is legally sold and advertised? How does Big Tobacco justify what it does?
We have some answers thanks to the anonymous leak of 4,000 pages of internal documents from the Brown and Williamson tobacco company (B&W) and its parent, British American Tobacco (BAT), the world’s second largest tobacco company. The Cigarette Papers were mailed in 1994 to Professor Stanton Glantz, at the University of California, one of the world’s leading researchers on tobacco. He and four colleagues wrote this book examining in detail what the secret, internal documents reveal, and explaining their significance.
In a nutshell, the documents show that by the early 1960s, the cigarette manufacturers knew that the product they sold was both addictive and harmful. In public, however, they denied for decades to come that nicotine was addictive, and claimed the evidence was inconclusive about any harm caused by smoking. They knew better due to their own research, whose negative results they concealed. They vigorously fought against public policies designed to protect public health. In other words, they deceived the public for half a century to preserve their profits. Here are a few illustrative details:
Following the advice of the public relations firm Hill and Knowlton, Inc, the industry formed the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) in 1954. It was later renamed the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR). The published announcement of the TIRC states, “We accept an interest in people’s health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business.” The Cigarette Papers reveal what a hollow commitment that was.
Ernest Pepples, B&W’s vice president and general counsel, admitted that “originally, CTR was organized as a public relations effort…the industry research effort has included special projects designed to find scientists and medical doctors who might serve as industry witnesses in lawsuits or in a legislative forum.” The special projects Pepples refers to were research approved not by the CTR but by industry lawyers, so research was done in secret so negative results could be concealed.
A different B&W VP and general counsel, Addison Yeaman, wrote in 1964 that research was needed to study carcinogens. “Certainly one would hope to prove there is no etiological factor in smoke but the odds are greatly against success in that effort. At the best, the probabilities are that some combination of constituents of smoke will be found conducive to the onset of cancer or to create an environment in which cancer is more likely to occur.” Yeaman also recommended that the industry voluntarily agree to warning labels on cigarette packs as a way to protect the industry from liability.
In an internal memo dated July 17, 1963, VP Yeaman wrote, “Moreover, nicotine is addictive. We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug effective in the release of stress mechanisms.” Industry research made clear that consumers wanted a certain level of nicotine in their cigarettes. What was said privately contrasts with Big Tobacco’s public statements. The industry has long defended itself from product liability lawsuits by asserting that smoking is a matter of personal choice, since people can quit. It also denies smoking is addictive and having the intent to create addiction. Yet half of smokers start by age 14, and the vast majority before age 21.
At a 1978 research conference of BAT and B&W scientists, the minutes affirm there is no longer controversy about “the case against smoking. Additional evidence of smoke-dose related incidence of some diseases has been published. But generally, this has long ceased to be an area for scientific controversy.” In public, the industry claimed just the opposite. The doctors and scientists who were usually funded by the industry testified that the case against tobacco remained unproved.
In addition to denial, the chief industry tactic was selling doubt by nitpicking at research relied upon by the Surgeon General, claiming the evidence was inconclusive, and that much more research was necessary before reaching conclusions.
By the 1980s, the American industry faced a new wave of product liability lawsuits. Industry attorneys wanted to prevent damaging documents from being disclosed during discovery. One tactic was to make sure information sent from BAT to B&W would become covered under lawyer-client privilege and not subject to discovery. The other method was to get rid of damaging documents. In 1981, attorneys combed through company files to remove “deadwood” that would be shipped out of the country. This specifically included research results demonstrating that tobacco tar is carcinogenic. In other words, the industry knew the truth, but didn’t want to be held accountable for its subsequent behavior.
When public pressure grew for regulation of indoor tobacco smoke, the industry launched the smokers’ rights movement. In 1978, Pepples admitted internally that constitutional rights were not at issue with regulating indoor smoking. When evidence of harm from passive smoke was published, the industry likewise used denial and doubt. Hirayama’s 1981 study showed higher incidence of lung cancer in nonsmoking wives of smoking spouses than of nonsmoking spouses. Though the industry attacked Hirayama, there were industry scientists who privately admitted Hirayama was right.
The strategy of Big Tobacco was subsequently followed by the lead industry, the chemical industry, and the fossil fuel industry. All denied harm is caused by their products, created doubt about damaging research, and insist much more study is needed before any conclusions may be reached or restrictions imposed. These methods effectively delay government regulations, often many years after regulations have been adopted by the EU.
It is probably foolish to expect any industry to actually “accept an interest in people’s health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business.” In the real world, profits come first. ###
We have some answers thanks to the anonymous leak of 4,000 pages of internal documents from the Brown and Williamson tobacco company (B&W) and its parent, British American Tobacco (BAT), the world’s second largest tobacco company. The Cigarette Papers were mailed in 1994 to Professor Stanton Glantz, at the University of California, one of the world’s leading researchers on tobacco. He and four colleagues wrote this book examining in detail what the secret, internal documents reveal, and explaining their significance.
In a nutshell, the documents show that by the early 1960s, the cigarette manufacturers knew that the product they sold was both addictive and harmful. In public, however, they denied for decades to come that nicotine was addictive, and claimed the evidence was inconclusive about any harm caused by smoking. They knew better due to their own research, whose negative results they concealed. They vigorously fought against public policies designed to protect public health. In other words, they deceived the public for half a century to preserve their profits. Here are a few illustrative details:
Following the advice of the public relations firm Hill and Knowlton, Inc, the industry formed the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) in 1954. It was later renamed the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR). The published announcement of the TIRC states, “We accept an interest in people’s health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business.” The Cigarette Papers reveal what a hollow commitment that was.
Ernest Pepples, B&W’s vice president and general counsel, admitted that “originally, CTR was organized as a public relations effort…the industry research effort has included special projects designed to find scientists and medical doctors who might serve as industry witnesses in lawsuits or in a legislative forum.” The special projects Pepples refers to were research approved not by the CTR but by industry lawyers, so research was done in secret so negative results could be concealed.
A different B&W VP and general counsel, Addison Yeaman, wrote in 1964 that research was needed to study carcinogens. “Certainly one would hope to prove there is no etiological factor in smoke but the odds are greatly against success in that effort. At the best, the probabilities are that some combination of constituents of smoke will be found conducive to the onset of cancer or to create an environment in which cancer is more likely to occur.” Yeaman also recommended that the industry voluntarily agree to warning labels on cigarette packs as a way to protect the industry from liability.
In an internal memo dated July 17, 1963, VP Yeaman wrote, “Moreover, nicotine is addictive. We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug effective in the release of stress mechanisms.” Industry research made clear that consumers wanted a certain level of nicotine in their cigarettes. What was said privately contrasts with Big Tobacco’s public statements. The industry has long defended itself from product liability lawsuits by asserting that smoking is a matter of personal choice, since people can quit. It also denies smoking is addictive and having the intent to create addiction. Yet half of smokers start by age 14, and the vast majority before age 21.
At a 1978 research conference of BAT and B&W scientists, the minutes affirm there is no longer controversy about “the case against smoking. Additional evidence of smoke-dose related incidence of some diseases has been published. But generally, this has long ceased to be an area for scientific controversy.” In public, the industry claimed just the opposite. The doctors and scientists who were usually funded by the industry testified that the case against tobacco remained unproved.
In addition to denial, the chief industry tactic was selling doubt by nitpicking at research relied upon by the Surgeon General, claiming the evidence was inconclusive, and that much more research was necessary before reaching conclusions.
By the 1980s, the American industry faced a new wave of product liability lawsuits. Industry attorneys wanted to prevent damaging documents from being disclosed during discovery. One tactic was to make sure information sent from BAT to B&W would become covered under lawyer-client privilege and not subject to discovery. The other method was to get rid of damaging documents. In 1981, attorneys combed through company files to remove “deadwood” that would be shipped out of the country. This specifically included research results demonstrating that tobacco tar is carcinogenic. In other words, the industry knew the truth, but didn’t want to be held accountable for its subsequent behavior.
When public pressure grew for regulation of indoor tobacco smoke, the industry launched the smokers’ rights movement. In 1978, Pepples admitted internally that constitutional rights were not at issue with regulating indoor smoking. When evidence of harm from passive smoke was published, the industry likewise used denial and doubt. Hirayama’s 1981 study showed higher incidence of lung cancer in nonsmoking wives of smoking spouses than of nonsmoking spouses. Though the industry attacked Hirayama, there were industry scientists who privately admitted Hirayama was right.
The strategy of Big Tobacco was subsequently followed by the lead industry, the chemical industry, and the fossil fuel industry. All denied harm is caused by their products, created doubt about damaging research, and insist much more study is needed before any conclusions may be reached or restrictions imposed. These methods effectively delay government regulations, often many years after regulations have been adopted by the EU.
It is probably foolish to expect any industry to actually “accept an interest in people’s health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business.” In the real world, profits come first. ###
February 11, 2018
The definitive history of the archive of tobacco documents proving the industry's full knowledge of their product and deadly consequences it has on humans.
June 29, 2012
its amazing how the tobacco companies knew all the hazards and thought up ways to make cigarrettes even more appealing like adding caffeine to the formula, plus all the dangers they tried to hush up!
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews