What do you think?
Rate this book
Das Russische Imperium: Eine Geschichte
Dieses Buch ist ein Zeitzeugnis: Eine Geschichte Russlands vom Aufstieg zur europäischen Großmacht bis zum Untergang des sowjetischen Imperiums im Jahr 1991. Dietrich Geyer, einer der bedeutendsten deutschen Osteuropahistoriker hat in seiner letzten Tübinger Vorlesung die Geschichte Russlands von der Thronbesteigung der Romanovs 1613 bis zum Zerfall des Sowjetreiches betrachtet. Das Buch spricht von den Herrschern des Zarenreiches, von Adligen und Bauern, von Reichsbildung und Nationalitätenpolitik, von der Revolution und ihren Folgen. Geyers Darstellung ist der Versuch, die Grundzüge russischer Staatlichkeit und Mentalität sichtbar zu machen. Mit der ihm eigenen Sprachgewalt, dem Kenntnisschatz aus fünf Jahrzehnten Russlandforschung und großer Souveränität führt Geyer den Leser durch vier Jahrhunderte russischer als europäischer Geschichte.
die letzte große Vorlesung von einem der bedeutendsten deutschen Osteuropahistoriker
Russlands Geschichte, quellenreich und faszinierend erzählt
Europäische Geschichte im Spiegel des russischen Vielvölkerreiches
die letzte große Vorlesung von einem der bedeutendsten deutschen Osteuropahistoriker
Russlands Geschichte, quellenreich und faszinierend erzählt
Europäische Geschichte im Spiegel des russischen Vielvölkerreiches
468 pages, Hardcover
Published April 20, 2020
2 people are currently reading
12 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 of 1 review
August 22, 2020
Dietrich Geyer's late work "The Russian Empire" is much more than a manual of Russian history. Co-editor Rainer Lindner rightly calls it a “great narrative about Russia”. Lindner deserves great credit for having recorded the last Tübingen lectures of his then academic teacher for posterity’s sake. With great foresight, as a student, he made a recording of these lectures in the course of four semesters from 1992 to 1994, which spanned a wide spectrum from Ivan IV's coronation in 1547 to the fall of the Soviet Empire. From the transcript of these lectures and after Lindner's intensive editing, a unique document has emerged, not just a carefully researched and elegantly written book, but also a life's work by this important German Eastern European historian, the sum of a long and fruitful scholarly life.
With his stupendous expertise, Geyer makes a unique contribution to Russian-Soviet history. He focuses on the "view from the inside". Sober, calm and considerate, he paints a critical but undistorted picture of Russia and the Soviet Union. Without the usual ideological veils, he makes the winding paths of Russian domestic politics understandable and brings the reader closer to the respective circumstances, although he always maintains the necessary critical distance - a successful balancing act.
From the outset, Geyer takes into account the rather unfavorable framework conditions under which Russia's development began. Hardly escaped from the Tatar rule, Moscovia had to resist the intrusions of the Swedes, the Teutonic Order and Poland-Lithuania in order to "come closer to Europe under Peter the Great" (p. 21). The author does refer to the “fear and threat complexes” that sparked the expansion of Russian power in the Baltic Sea region in the West (p. 22). It can, however, be responded, that Peter did not strive for hegemony, but for an equal status in Europe. His insistence on the same rank, however, was harshly repelled by the current status powers England and France - one of the reasons for the "resentment of an excluded", from which Russia suffered again and again on on the road to becoming a great power (Schulze Wessel, Martin: Systembegriff und Europapolitik der russischen Diplomatie im 18. Jahrhundert, in: HZ, Bd. 266, H. 3 (Juni 1998), S. 649-669, hier: 657). To this day, this has been a permanent thorne in the flesh of Russia! This “inferiority complex” was also the reason why, as Geyer notes, Petersburg, in contrast to the West, believed in “the distinctive special nature of Russia” (p. 31) and that Tchaadayev spoke of the non-belonging of Russia to neither the West nor the East (P. 32). Nonetheless, Geyer admits that Russia became closer to Europe under Catherine the Great; because she wanted to transform Russia into "a European power". But Geyer blames her grandson Alexander I, the celebrated "Liberator and Savior of Europe from the despotism of the Corsican", for having turned out to be a pillar of the Metternich regime (p. 24). Unjustly! Because Alexander resisted this shift to the right as long as he could, until he finally failed and died mysteriously. Fatal to him were certain forces in England, who condemned him in 1817, with an ominous pamphlet penned by Robert Wilson, a general and intelligence officer. Thus, in the English public a negative image of Russia was created, an enemy image that stuck in the mind for a very long time (A sketch of the military and political power of Russia in the year 1817). This is how the proverbial Russophobia of the European Liberals and Democrats emerged, mentioned by Geyer (p. 26). He himself, of course, stands far above such distorted perceptions.
Geyer's approach focuses on portraying Russia in its entirety and letting the country have its own dignity. This basic idea has to be supported to a high degree, because it keeps together what belongs together. It should, however, not be overlooked that Russia has never developed completely autonomously, quasi “under a glass bell”. Russian foreign policy has always been more than just the corollary of domestic politics. It was integrated into the network of power relations in Europe. The interlocking with other powers was certainly reciprocal, but because of the prominent position of England in Europe and in the world, the "British connection" dominated also Russia for a long time. The best example of the impact of British conflicts of interest and power struggles on the Russian policy was the expansion of Russian power during the second half of the 19th century up to the Afghan border. Admittedly, this territorial gain provoked angry protests among the Conservatives under Disraeli; but this expansion would not have been conceivable without the benevolent toleration and final approval by the Liberals under Gladstone (see p. 270/271). A similar effect on Russia and the Soviet Union had the internal French and German convulsions, right up to the forward policy of the United States of America in the late 19th and in the 20th century.
Geyer's work is completed by an informative epilogue of Jörg Baberowski, which embeddes the book into Dietrich Geyer's oeuvre as a whole and into the historiography on Russia. The book deserves a large readership, not only among students and experts on Eastern European history, but also among many interested laypersons and students in the „studium generale“. The book is a valuable contribution to deepening the knowledge about Russia, which unfortunately has declined in recent years. It would also be desirable to have the book published in English in order to reach an even larger audience.
Wolfgang Brett
With his stupendous expertise, Geyer makes a unique contribution to Russian-Soviet history. He focuses on the "view from the inside". Sober, calm and considerate, he paints a critical but undistorted picture of Russia and the Soviet Union. Without the usual ideological veils, he makes the winding paths of Russian domestic politics understandable and brings the reader closer to the respective circumstances, although he always maintains the necessary critical distance - a successful balancing act.
From the outset, Geyer takes into account the rather unfavorable framework conditions under which Russia's development began. Hardly escaped from the Tatar rule, Moscovia had to resist the intrusions of the Swedes, the Teutonic Order and Poland-Lithuania in order to "come closer to Europe under Peter the Great" (p. 21). The author does refer to the “fear and threat complexes” that sparked the expansion of Russian power in the Baltic Sea region in the West (p. 22). It can, however, be responded, that Peter did not strive for hegemony, but for an equal status in Europe. His insistence on the same rank, however, was harshly repelled by the current status powers England and France - one of the reasons for the "resentment of an excluded", from which Russia suffered again and again on on the road to becoming a great power (Schulze Wessel, Martin: Systembegriff und Europapolitik der russischen Diplomatie im 18. Jahrhundert, in: HZ, Bd. 266, H. 3 (Juni 1998), S. 649-669, hier: 657). To this day, this has been a permanent thorne in the flesh of Russia! This “inferiority complex” was also the reason why, as Geyer notes, Petersburg, in contrast to the West, believed in “the distinctive special nature of Russia” (p. 31) and that Tchaadayev spoke of the non-belonging of Russia to neither the West nor the East (P. 32). Nonetheless, Geyer admits that Russia became closer to Europe under Catherine the Great; because she wanted to transform Russia into "a European power". But Geyer blames her grandson Alexander I, the celebrated "Liberator and Savior of Europe from the despotism of the Corsican", for having turned out to be a pillar of the Metternich regime (p. 24). Unjustly! Because Alexander resisted this shift to the right as long as he could, until he finally failed and died mysteriously. Fatal to him were certain forces in England, who condemned him in 1817, with an ominous pamphlet penned by Robert Wilson, a general and intelligence officer. Thus, in the English public a negative image of Russia was created, an enemy image that stuck in the mind for a very long time (A sketch of the military and political power of Russia in the year 1817). This is how the proverbial Russophobia of the European Liberals and Democrats emerged, mentioned by Geyer (p. 26). He himself, of course, stands far above such distorted perceptions.
Geyer's approach focuses on portraying Russia in its entirety and letting the country have its own dignity. This basic idea has to be supported to a high degree, because it keeps together what belongs together. It should, however, not be overlooked that Russia has never developed completely autonomously, quasi “under a glass bell”. Russian foreign policy has always been more than just the corollary of domestic politics. It was integrated into the network of power relations in Europe. The interlocking with other powers was certainly reciprocal, but because of the prominent position of England in Europe and in the world, the "British connection" dominated also Russia for a long time. The best example of the impact of British conflicts of interest and power struggles on the Russian policy was the expansion of Russian power during the second half of the 19th century up to the Afghan border. Admittedly, this territorial gain provoked angry protests among the Conservatives under Disraeli; but this expansion would not have been conceivable without the benevolent toleration and final approval by the Liberals under Gladstone (see p. 270/271). A similar effect on Russia and the Soviet Union had the internal French and German convulsions, right up to the forward policy of the United States of America in the late 19th and in the 20th century.
Geyer's work is completed by an informative epilogue of Jörg Baberowski, which embeddes the book into Dietrich Geyer's oeuvre as a whole and into the historiography on Russia. The book deserves a large readership, not only among students and experts on Eastern European history, but also among many interested laypersons and students in the „studium generale“. The book is a valuable contribution to deepening the knowledge about Russia, which unfortunately has declined in recent years. It would also be desirable to have the book published in English in order to reach an even larger audience.
Wolfgang Brett
Displaying 1 of 1 review