اخلاقی برای زندگی امروز

by Richard Rorty, علی سیاح (Translator)

آیا چیزی به نام «ذات» یا «طبیعت» انسانی وجود دارد؟ چیزی که بتواند مبنا و اساس داوری ها و احکام اخلاقی ما قرار گیرد؟ بدیهی است که هر پاسخی به این پرسش، که هسته ی اصلی فلسفه ی اخلاق را تشکیل میدهد، پیامدهای خاص خود را داراست. به عقیده ی رورتی اثبات یا نفی «دات انسان» تلاشی نافرجام و بیهوده است. تنها کاری که میتوان کرد آن است که ببینیم کدام پاسخ، شادکامی و سعادت بیشتری را برای جامعه بشری به ارمغان خواهد آورد. از این منظر، «اخلاق زندگی امروز» عبارت است از به رسمیت شناختن هرچه بیشتر دیگران، لحاظ کردن هرچه بیشتر خواست های دیگری- اعم از زنان، فرودستان، اقلیت ها- و در یک کلام، گستراندن هرچه بیشتر «دایره ی ما»

Genres: Philosophy, Religion, Nonfiction

94 pages, Paperback

First published October 8, 2010

About the author

Richard Rorty (1931–2007) developed a distinctive and controversial brand of pragmatism that expressed itself along two main axes. One is negative—a critical diagnosis of what Rorty takes to be defining projects of modern philosophy. The other is positive—an attempt to show what intellectual culture might look like, once we free ourselves from the governing metaphors of mind and knowledge in which the traditional problems of epistemology and metaphysics (and indeed, in Rorty's view, the self-conception of modern philosophy) are rooted. The centerpiece of Rorty's critique is the provocative account offered in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979, hereafter PMN). In this book, and in the closely related essays collected in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982, hereafter CP), Rorty's principal target is the philosophical idea of knowledge as representation, as a mental mirroring of a mind-external world. Providing a contrasting image of philosophy, Rorty has sought to integrate and apply the milestone achievements of Dewey, Hegel and Darwin in a pragmatist synthesis of historicism and naturalism. Characterizations and illustrations of a post-epistemological intellectual culture, present in both PMN (part III) and CP (xxxvii-xliv), are more richly developed in later works, such as Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989, hereafter CIS), in the popular essays and articles collected in Philosophy and Social Hope (1999), and in the four volumes of philosophical papers, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991, hereafter ORT); Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991, hereafter EHO); Truth and Progress (1998, hereafter TP); and Philosophy as Cultural Politics (2007, hereafter PCP). In these writings, ranging over an unusually wide intellectual territory, Rorty offers a highly integrated, multifaceted view of thought, culture, and politics, a view that has made him one of the most widely discussed philosophers in our time.

Reviews

[Brad Lyerla · Rating 2 out of 5]

This very short book consists of a Foreword by Jeffrey Robbins, an Introduction by Gianni Vattimo, a short lecture by Richard Rorty delivered in September 2005, a transcript of some questions put to Rorty after the lecture and a conclusion by Elijah Dann. Robbin's Foreword is appropriate and informative. Vattimo's Introduction is fatuous, but fairly standard. Rorty's lecture displays his nimble intelligence and personal charm entertainingly. And Dann's Conclusion is incoherent.

I don't understand why this book exists. The subtitle is "Finding Common Ground Between Philosophy and Religion." But there is nothing here that remotely comes close to achieving 'common ground'. In fact, the take away for me is that two years before his death, when this lecture was delivered, Rorty was pleased that commercial democracies have made progress in limiting appeals to religion or the transcendant in public affairs. And that he hoped the trend would continue.

This book seems to want to soften that message. I am going to think about this further and reserve the right to revise my evaluation after pondering it a bit. I will probably re-read Dann's afterword too. Maybe I can make sense of it with another try.

[Mark Derderian · Rating 5 out of 5]

The depth of Rorty's cultural relativism seems unsustainable philosophically, even though it might be useful in the short term to discourage fundamentalism and redemptive politics that lead to various kinds of social oppression. However, the role of reason in philosophy and social discourse can't be dismissed with the declaration that sentiment and sympathy is adequate to build a politics.

[John Reis · Rating 1 out of 5]

This is a very short little work published after Rorty’s death.

Rorty was a pragmatist, relativist and utilitarian. He reminds me a little bit of Habermas, who saw a great deal of power in discourse.

He begins by mentioning Pope Benedict’s fear that in this modern era various church positions will become unspeakable, such as that on homosexuality. Rorty thinks this is a good thing and he hopes that it happens. Of course, from his position he has no place to stand. How, after all, does he know that Benedict’s stance on the issue does not lead to greater human happiness?

He does raise a question: “Is the church right that there is such a thing as the structure of human existence, which can serve as a moral reference point? Or, do we human beings have no moral obligations except helping one another satisfy our desires, thus achieving the greatest possible amount of happiness?” He agrees with the latter.

There have been many theories of happiness, not all of which equated it with the satisfaction of desires as utilitarianism does. Under Rorty, we are committed to a satisfaction of desires model. No of course, there are no perverse desires. There are no moral truths, after all. I am not clear on how the suffering of molested children, say in the case of pedophilia, is outweighed by the happiness of their molesters. I suppose the children are mistaken about their reaction to their situation.

This was apparently a speech and after he was done people asked questions. One asked a question about being stranded on an island of cannibals. Rorty had no real answer to this other than to simply say, as if a sociologist, well, that is what those people do.

Ultimately, there is no evil to the relativist. This is not quite right to Rorty. After all, he condemns Pope Benedict’s position on homosexuality and I imagine most other sexual teachings of the Catholic Church.

Relativism has a reputation for being urbane, sage-like and wise and yet that is not the case. There are evil practices on this earth and we must be able to recognize them in order to prevent them. After all, evil does hamper happiness. One cannot relativize it away.

Furthermore, how is it that we came to have the collection of virtues that Rorty admires? Isn’t it the case that the long pursuit of metaphysical truth over the millennia has led us to value certain things and disvalue others? Would Rorty claim that had we followed his course beginning two millennia ago we would be where we are now?

I do not see how there can be any common ground.

[Richard Thompson · Rating 2 out of 5]

I will have to read more of Richard Rorty. There is much to like about him, starting with his ability to express real ideas without the cloak of academic philosophical jargon. He was right to reject analytic philosophy. He was right to focus more on what works than on what is true. He was right that philosophy should not purport to provide ultimate answers, but more to search for answers and to provide a framework for the searching, but we have known that in the West since Socrates, and the Chinese have known it since Lao Tze. And I just like his attitude. I think that he was a good guy, and that counts for a lot for me.

However, all of the things that I like about Mr. Rorty were not enough to get me to like this short book. I'm fine that he doesn't provide answers, but in this case I felt that he wasn't even asking the right questions. He goes too far in his relativism. There are real ethical truths to be found beyond the Golden Rule. And he both overestimates and underestimates his opponents in this discussion. Maybe religions can become more ecumenical in accepting that other closely allied religions share essential truths and even acknowledging that distant religions share some key ideas, but you can't really expect them to be ecumenical about secularists who reject all faith and religious practice as superstition. If they do that, they lose much of their power. And religion is of course about a lot more than belief or non-belief in God. I felt that Mr. Rorty missed so much about religion, both good and bad as to substantially diminish the value of the discussion. I also thought that he diminished the value of secular ethics by reducing it to a sort of golden rule of toleration plus the utilitarian idea of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. I hope that all of this is due only to the shortness of this book. Mr. Rorty could not have been such an important and respected philosopher if there were not a lot more to his thinking than this book suggests.

[David Breeden · Rating 5 out of 5]

Rorty says things no one else can

[Shane Wagoner · Rating 3 out of 5]

A brief and simplistic but effective defense of post-philosophical religiosity. By encouraging greater secularism alongside greater respect for private religious commitments, Rorty and Co. find the narrow path that avoids the faults of both religious and atheistic fundamentalists.

[Ray Godfrey · Rating 4 out of 5]

A wonderful survey of post modern perspectives on the importance and function of religion in public conversations. It certainly motivated me me to read some of the work by Gianni Vattimo.

[Ariadna73 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Found it much heavier than it looks; but the topic has always fascinated me. It would have been a real pleasure see this man in person when he was talking. The energy is just oustanding.

[Luís Branco · Rating 5 out of 5]

Overall a very interesting book. The assumptions from G. ELIJAH DANN about atheism and their knowledge of faith is a keying response. Quick reading and enjoyable!