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Erdogan's Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East
Gradually since 2003, Turkey's autocratic leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sought to make Turkey a great power -- in the tradition of past Turkish leaders from the late Ottoman sultans to Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. Here the leading authority Soner Cagaptay, author of The New Sultan -- the first biography of President Erdogan -- provides a masterful overview of the power politics in the Middle East and Turkey's place in it.
Erdogan has picked an unorthodox model in the context of recent Turkish history, attempting to cast his country as a stand-alone Middle Eastern power. In doing so Turkey has broken ranks with its traditional Western allies, including the United States and has embraced an imperial-style foreign policy which has aimed to restore Turkey's Ottoman-era reach into the Arabian Middle East and the Balkans.
Today, in addition to a domestic crackdown on dissent and journalistic freedoms, driven by Erdogan's style of governance, Turkey faces a hostile world. Ankara has nearly no friends left in the Middle East, and it faces a threat from resurgent historic Russia and Iran. Furthermore, Turkey cannot rely on the unconditional support of its traditional Western allies. Can Erdogan deliver Turkey back to safety? What are the risks that lie ahead for him, and his country? How can Turkey truly become a great power, fulfilling a dream shared by many Turks, the sultans, Ataturk, and Erdogan himself?
Erdogan has picked an unorthodox model in the context of recent Turkish history, attempting to cast his country as a stand-alone Middle Eastern power. In doing so Turkey has broken ranks with its traditional Western allies, including the United States and has embraced an imperial-style foreign policy which has aimed to restore Turkey's Ottoman-era reach into the Arabian Middle East and the Balkans.
Today, in addition to a domestic crackdown on dissent and journalistic freedoms, driven by Erdogan's style of governance, Turkey faces a hostile world. Ankara has nearly no friends left in the Middle East, and it faces a threat from resurgent historic Russia and Iran. Furthermore, Turkey cannot rely on the unconditional support of its traditional Western allies. Can Erdogan deliver Turkey back to safety? What are the risks that lie ahead for him, and his country? How can Turkey truly become a great power, fulfilling a dream shared by many Turks, the sultans, Ataturk, and Erdogan himself?
392 pages, Hardcover
First published September 19, 2019
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497 people want to read
About the author
Soner Çağaptay
6 books23 followersSoner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.
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August 18, 2021
Erdogan's Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East, by Soner Çağaptay, is a fascinating geopolitical analysis of Turkey's political strategies from the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Prime Minister in 2003-2014, and his Presidential position from 2014 to the present. Erdogan's party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), is a right of centre political Islamist party that has moved Turkey away from its secularist/authoritarian leanings under the Kemalist political traditions of the country. Erdogan's start began to rise both domestically and internationally in his early tenure. Fresh out of prison as the former Mayor of Istanbul in the early 2000's - sent to jail for reading an Islamic poem on television that was deemed "dangerous to secularism", Erdogan portrayed the down and out democrat who represented a large amount of Turkey's faithful, and usually poorer constituents, over and beyond the wealthy secularists that often inhabited the cities. In his early tenure, he played this part well. He made overtures to the European Union, taking Turkey further into the accession process than any previous leader. He also attempted to broker a deal that would have seen the reunification of Cyprus, then also slotted for EU membership. His opposition to the Kemalist agenda, usually backed by force of arms from the then all-powerful Turkish Armed Forces, made him a darling at home, and in the Western world.
Erdogan, however, leaned heavily into his political Islam. He, and his foreign minister until 2014, Ahmet Davutoğlu, looked to alter Turkey's trajectory in the post-Cold War era. They sought to deepen ties with all neighbours and increase Turkey's standing and power in the region. After the Cyprus talks fell through, with Cypriot Greeks voting against reunification, whereas the Turkish Republic in the north voted strongly in favour. The EU also went ahead and granted Cyprus membership anyway, with the dispute unresolved, and slapped Turkey with new restrictions that were not present in other nations' accession talks. Although there were good reasons for both choices from the EU's standpoint, Europe effectively lost Turkey, and Erdogan made a decisive move away from the West at this point, ratcheting up political rhetoric about the "perfidious West." Erdogan sought a new foreign policy, that was based on closer and growing connections to fellow Muslim countries across the region, especially the old provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
This book examines Erdogan's track record in the region since this decisive shift. I will list some of the key points below. For one, Erdogan began to make overtures to Kurdish politicians, both within and without Turkey's borders. This is one of the key foreign policy challenges, as well as domestic security challenges, faced by Turkey in the modern world. Turkey has fought a war with the PKK, a Kurdish Revolutionary movement within Turkey, for decades. Its neighbours in Iran, Iraq, and Syria have historically used their own Kurdish populations as points of disruption for Turkey or for each other, harbouring neighbouring militant groups and using them as political leverage against the other nations. The modern history of Kurdish nationalism is complicated; there are three distinct, and largely mutually unintelligible languages amongst Kurdish groups across the region. This, coupled with the political grooming that many groups have gotten from opposing camps, and competition amongst the many factions in the region, makes Kurdish nationalism a difficult prospect. Turkey has long faced incursions from PKK militants and their allies from their borderlands with Iraq and Syria, especially during the cold war. In retaliation, Turkey has closely aligned itself with an Iraqi Kurdish group that is historically close to Baghdad and has sent troops in, mostly with Iraq's blessing, to counter PKK/ally insurgents on its own borders, occupying key mountain passes in Iraq. Erdogan sought to somehow make peace in these regions, but when that failed, moved to a harder line. Turkish troops in Iraq have been more active in recent years than in decades proceeding, and with the Syrian War ongoing, Turkey has occupied key border areas either with its own troops or with Syrian proxies.
Turkey's outreach across the region is similarly mixed. Following both the EU fallout, and the 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan by elements of the TAF, Turkey has taken a more authoritative leaning. This is not unusual perse throughout Turkish post-Cold War history, but Erdogan is a political Islamist, which does add an element to the novel. In response, Turkey has reached out in support of fellow political Islamist parties across the region, with mixed results. Initially, the Arab spring sought to bring many of these parties to power across the Middle East. Turkish-Egyptian relations soared to new heights under Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood but soured strongly with al-Sisi's coup in Egypt. Turkey heavily supported Syria's rebel groups in order to oust the Assad family, which, to this point, has not worked out well for Turkey. They have achieved few of their objectives in Syria, instead of having an angry dictator on their borders, and increasingly small amounts of territory under the control of their proxies. In Iraq, similarily, their support for a coalition of Sunni parties failed when Shia majority parties took power under Barham Salih.
Some notable successes have occurred, however. Turkey has assisted the UN-backed coalition government in closing down a violent chapter in the Libyan Civil War. This coalition includes Islamist parties, as well as democrats, against a secularist dictator who was backed by Saudi Arabia and arch-rival, the United Arab Emirates. Tunisia has also been a Turkish success story, and it remains to be seen how the recent coup in Tunisia will alter events in the region. Finally, Turkey has made great strides with one of its most important allies, Qatar. It supported Qatar against other GCC countries during the 2016 blockade, a dismal failure of Saudi policy up to this point, and a stepping stone for Turkey (and Iran) into the region. Turkey has often been supporting movements across the region with diplomacy, military might, intelligence services, religious services, and infrastructure deals. The money is often coming from Qatar. These two nations are in lockstep as of this writing on foreign policy and look to spoil GCC machinations across the region.
A big part of this book is also focused on Turkey's relations with its two most dangerous naighbours; Russia and Iran. Turkey, as a member of NATO, has historically viewed Russia/USSR as its main threat in the region. This feeling has returned in force after the Cold War, as modern Russia annexed the Crimean Penninsula abutting the Black Sea Region, moved heavily into Georgia, and propped up the Assad regime in Syria, subsequently building a massive Russian military base, naval port, and numerous missile systems in the area. Turkey is almost literally surrounded by Russian troops. Even so, Russia and Turkey have seen a tentative rapprochement in recent years. After a low point in 2016, when Turkey shot down a Russian jet, ties have revived. Erdogan and Putin both have a lot in common; anti-Westernism, authoritarian leanings, and trouble on their borders. They have been at odds in Syria, and seemingly on opposing sides in the recent Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Even so, Turkey has purchased Russian S-400 missile systems, much to the chagrin of the United States. Turkey and Russia also cooperate diplomatically in a big way - both the Syrian conflict and the Azerbaijani conflict appear to show this well. On one hand, Turkey and Russia agreed on rebel troop withdrawals from the south of Syria, moving them into the Turkish enclave of Idlib. On the other, Russia held off from supporting Armenia in the early conflict, allowing Azerbaijan to complete all of its immediate military objectives. Both seem orchestrated. Even so, the author posits a more tenuous relationship between the two states. Russia may see Turkey as an enemy in general, due to their NATO membership and US leveraging tactics. Turkey sees Russia as a threat full-stop and may be placating Russia in a time of international isolation. Both are not permanent states of being.
As for Iran, Turkey has often seen Iran as a threat, but also a rival in the region. Right now, the Middle East/North Africa seems to be in conflict between three parties, the Turkey-Qatar "Axis", the GCC "Bloc" lead by Saudi Arabia, and Iran and its allies in the region. Iran has been successful at spreading its reach across to the Mediterranean Sea, with proxies and allies in power in Syria and Iraq, and with large amounts of political sway in Lebanon. It has also seen a successful shift in Yemen's political situation, with Houthi allies holding sway in a huge chunk of the country. As both Iran and the "Axis" are at odds with Saudi Arabia, they may see eye to eye in a sense of countering Bloc moves across the region. Turkey and Iran also share a long border, and so trade is a tangible political issue. As Iran is under international sanctions, the author notes that Turkey has assisted in some ways by offering Turkish banks as clearinghouses for Iranian goods and avoiding sanctions. These good relations were soured by Turkey and Iran taking opposing sides during the Syrian War, with renewed pressure coming toward Turkey from Iran's Kurdish community.
The author discusses other foreign policy moves and geopolitical maneuvers by Erdogan, these with more success. Turkey has been a prevalent player in African politics as of late, investing heavily in trade pacts with African states, and heavily supporting the Somali government in Mogadishu against their breakaway states in Somaliland and Puntland, which are backed by the UAE. Turkey has also made moves into Central Asia, where Turkey shares a language and culture with other Turkic states. These moves were tarnished by Erdogan's falling out with the Gulen movement, but have recovered somewhat in recent years. Erdogan has also been successful in the Balkans (barring Greece) where he has supported Kosovan independence and created a friendly political party in Bulgaria. The Turkish intelligence services, with blessings from each respective nation, have also been able to rendition Gulenist activists and political opponents from Moldova, North Macedonia, and Ukraine.
This was a fascinating book that touched on both domestic Turkish politics, and the geopolitics of modern Turkey during the era of Erdogan. The author posits Neo-Ottoman sympathies in the new regime but is also critical of much foreign policy analysis' of Turkey, which often have anti-Islamist leanings. Although much of Turkey's current isolation is its own fault, it is also true that the poor political decisions of the EU accession process have pushed Turkey much further away from Europe than it has been in years; a win of right-wing nationalists in Europe, but certainly a poor policy for long term stability in the EU. America under Obama has also done much to alienate Turkey, with the author noting the mistakes and blunders the US has made in the region over the past decade. With Russia looming, and help from NATO allies mercurial at best, Turkey's turn back to attaining regional power seems rather understandable in a sense. It is definitely true that Turkey will continue to work to shape the region to support its own security and stability, as the recent conclusions of conflicts in Libya and Azerbaijan - both in Turkey's favour, have shown. Outstanding issues abound, however. Its disputes with Greece, the Cyprus issue, the war in Syria, Iraqi stability, Iran/Saudi rivalries, UAE maneuvers in Yemen and Somalia, and of course, Israel, which the author does discuss, are all present. Turkey's future will be challenging, and its turn to authoritarianism may be the norm for the foreseeable future. A fascinating book through and through, and one to check out for a deep and nuanced perspective of Turkish geopolitics.
Erdogan, however, leaned heavily into his political Islam. He, and his foreign minister until 2014, Ahmet Davutoğlu, looked to alter Turkey's trajectory in the post-Cold War era. They sought to deepen ties with all neighbours and increase Turkey's standing and power in the region. After the Cyprus talks fell through, with Cypriot Greeks voting against reunification, whereas the Turkish Republic in the north voted strongly in favour. The EU also went ahead and granted Cyprus membership anyway, with the dispute unresolved, and slapped Turkey with new restrictions that were not present in other nations' accession talks. Although there were good reasons for both choices from the EU's standpoint, Europe effectively lost Turkey, and Erdogan made a decisive move away from the West at this point, ratcheting up political rhetoric about the "perfidious West." Erdogan sought a new foreign policy, that was based on closer and growing connections to fellow Muslim countries across the region, especially the old provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
This book examines Erdogan's track record in the region since this decisive shift. I will list some of the key points below. For one, Erdogan began to make overtures to Kurdish politicians, both within and without Turkey's borders. This is one of the key foreign policy challenges, as well as domestic security challenges, faced by Turkey in the modern world. Turkey has fought a war with the PKK, a Kurdish Revolutionary movement within Turkey, for decades. Its neighbours in Iran, Iraq, and Syria have historically used their own Kurdish populations as points of disruption for Turkey or for each other, harbouring neighbouring militant groups and using them as political leverage against the other nations. The modern history of Kurdish nationalism is complicated; there are three distinct, and largely mutually unintelligible languages amongst Kurdish groups across the region. This, coupled with the political grooming that many groups have gotten from opposing camps, and competition amongst the many factions in the region, makes Kurdish nationalism a difficult prospect. Turkey has long faced incursions from PKK militants and their allies from their borderlands with Iraq and Syria, especially during the cold war. In retaliation, Turkey has closely aligned itself with an Iraqi Kurdish group that is historically close to Baghdad and has sent troops in, mostly with Iraq's blessing, to counter PKK/ally insurgents on its own borders, occupying key mountain passes in Iraq. Erdogan sought to somehow make peace in these regions, but when that failed, moved to a harder line. Turkish troops in Iraq have been more active in recent years than in decades proceeding, and with the Syrian War ongoing, Turkey has occupied key border areas either with its own troops or with Syrian proxies.
Turkey's outreach across the region is similarly mixed. Following both the EU fallout, and the 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan by elements of the TAF, Turkey has taken a more authoritative leaning. This is not unusual perse throughout Turkish post-Cold War history, but Erdogan is a political Islamist, which does add an element to the novel. In response, Turkey has reached out in support of fellow political Islamist parties across the region, with mixed results. Initially, the Arab spring sought to bring many of these parties to power across the Middle East. Turkish-Egyptian relations soared to new heights under Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood but soured strongly with al-Sisi's coup in Egypt. Turkey heavily supported Syria's rebel groups in order to oust the Assad family, which, to this point, has not worked out well for Turkey. They have achieved few of their objectives in Syria, instead of having an angry dictator on their borders, and increasingly small amounts of territory under the control of their proxies. In Iraq, similarily, their support for a coalition of Sunni parties failed when Shia majority parties took power under Barham Salih.
Some notable successes have occurred, however. Turkey has assisted the UN-backed coalition government in closing down a violent chapter in the Libyan Civil War. This coalition includes Islamist parties, as well as democrats, against a secularist dictator who was backed by Saudi Arabia and arch-rival, the United Arab Emirates. Tunisia has also been a Turkish success story, and it remains to be seen how the recent coup in Tunisia will alter events in the region. Finally, Turkey has made great strides with one of its most important allies, Qatar. It supported Qatar against other GCC countries during the 2016 blockade, a dismal failure of Saudi policy up to this point, and a stepping stone for Turkey (and Iran) into the region. Turkey has often been supporting movements across the region with diplomacy, military might, intelligence services, religious services, and infrastructure deals. The money is often coming from Qatar. These two nations are in lockstep as of this writing on foreign policy and look to spoil GCC machinations across the region.
A big part of this book is also focused on Turkey's relations with its two most dangerous naighbours; Russia and Iran. Turkey, as a member of NATO, has historically viewed Russia/USSR as its main threat in the region. This feeling has returned in force after the Cold War, as modern Russia annexed the Crimean Penninsula abutting the Black Sea Region, moved heavily into Georgia, and propped up the Assad regime in Syria, subsequently building a massive Russian military base, naval port, and numerous missile systems in the area. Turkey is almost literally surrounded by Russian troops. Even so, Russia and Turkey have seen a tentative rapprochement in recent years. After a low point in 2016, when Turkey shot down a Russian jet, ties have revived. Erdogan and Putin both have a lot in common; anti-Westernism, authoritarian leanings, and trouble on their borders. They have been at odds in Syria, and seemingly on opposing sides in the recent Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Even so, Turkey has purchased Russian S-400 missile systems, much to the chagrin of the United States. Turkey and Russia also cooperate diplomatically in a big way - both the Syrian conflict and the Azerbaijani conflict appear to show this well. On one hand, Turkey and Russia agreed on rebel troop withdrawals from the south of Syria, moving them into the Turkish enclave of Idlib. On the other, Russia held off from supporting Armenia in the early conflict, allowing Azerbaijan to complete all of its immediate military objectives. Both seem orchestrated. Even so, the author posits a more tenuous relationship between the two states. Russia may see Turkey as an enemy in general, due to their NATO membership and US leveraging tactics. Turkey sees Russia as a threat full-stop and may be placating Russia in a time of international isolation. Both are not permanent states of being.
As for Iran, Turkey has often seen Iran as a threat, but also a rival in the region. Right now, the Middle East/North Africa seems to be in conflict between three parties, the Turkey-Qatar "Axis", the GCC "Bloc" lead by Saudi Arabia, and Iran and its allies in the region. Iran has been successful at spreading its reach across to the Mediterranean Sea, with proxies and allies in power in Syria and Iraq, and with large amounts of political sway in Lebanon. It has also seen a successful shift in Yemen's political situation, with Houthi allies holding sway in a huge chunk of the country. As both Iran and the "Axis" are at odds with Saudi Arabia, they may see eye to eye in a sense of countering Bloc moves across the region. Turkey and Iran also share a long border, and so trade is a tangible political issue. As Iran is under international sanctions, the author notes that Turkey has assisted in some ways by offering Turkish banks as clearinghouses for Iranian goods and avoiding sanctions. These good relations were soured by Turkey and Iran taking opposing sides during the Syrian War, with renewed pressure coming toward Turkey from Iran's Kurdish community.
The author discusses other foreign policy moves and geopolitical maneuvers by Erdogan, these with more success. Turkey has been a prevalent player in African politics as of late, investing heavily in trade pacts with African states, and heavily supporting the Somali government in Mogadishu against their breakaway states in Somaliland and Puntland, which are backed by the UAE. Turkey has also made moves into Central Asia, where Turkey shares a language and culture with other Turkic states. These moves were tarnished by Erdogan's falling out with the Gulen movement, but have recovered somewhat in recent years. Erdogan has also been successful in the Balkans (barring Greece) where he has supported Kosovan independence and created a friendly political party in Bulgaria. The Turkish intelligence services, with blessings from each respective nation, have also been able to rendition Gulenist activists and political opponents from Moldova, North Macedonia, and Ukraine.
This was a fascinating book that touched on both domestic Turkish politics, and the geopolitics of modern Turkey during the era of Erdogan. The author posits Neo-Ottoman sympathies in the new regime but is also critical of much foreign policy analysis' of Turkey, which often have anti-Islamist leanings. Although much of Turkey's current isolation is its own fault, it is also true that the poor political decisions of the EU accession process have pushed Turkey much further away from Europe than it has been in years; a win of right-wing nationalists in Europe, but certainly a poor policy for long term stability in the EU. America under Obama has also done much to alienate Turkey, with the author noting the mistakes and blunders the US has made in the region over the past decade. With Russia looming, and help from NATO allies mercurial at best, Turkey's turn back to attaining regional power seems rather understandable in a sense. It is definitely true that Turkey will continue to work to shape the region to support its own security and stability, as the recent conclusions of conflicts in Libya and Azerbaijan - both in Turkey's favour, have shown. Outstanding issues abound, however. Its disputes with Greece, the Cyprus issue, the war in Syria, Iraqi stability, Iran/Saudi rivalries, UAE maneuvers in Yemen and Somalia, and of course, Israel, which the author does discuss, are all present. Turkey's future will be challenging, and its turn to authoritarianism may be the norm for the foreseeable future. A fascinating book through and through, and one to check out for a deep and nuanced perspective of Turkish geopolitics.
April 25, 2021
Review to follow.
December 21, 2021
مع قرب إسدال الستار على مسرحية الفتنة الدامية ...!!
■الظهور الأول كان في صفقة العدوان الأمريكي على بغداد و خروج الطائرات من تركيا و قطر لتدك البلد العربي الشقيق ، و الثمن دم الشعب العراقي ، و كانت البداية الفعلية لربيع الدم العربي
■المخطط المعلوم المجهول العبقري وجد ضالته في رجب طيب أردوغان ، المصنوع حسب كتالوج صدام الحضارات ، وجه سينمائي صالح لمخاطبة الشعوب العربية الإسلامية العاشقة للعنتريات و الحنجوري ، يعمل وفق كتالوج أمريكي
■ خطة تلميع أردوغان كانت أكبر حملات التسويق السياسي في تاريخ العالم ، مليارات المليارات من الدولارات و تنسيق أجهزة إستخباراتية كبري و محطات تليفزيونية و مواقع إخبارية و أقلام ماجورة و كتب ترويجية ، كل ذلك من اجل القيام بدوره في جحيم العرب المخطط لإعادة التشكيل الجيوسياسي للمنطقة
■ عشنا أحداث سيناريوهات صورة ملائكية مرسومة بإحترافية في العلن ، من فيلم منتدي دافوس الهزلي 2009 و مشهد بيريز و عمرو موسي ، و بداية التجارة بغزة و فيلم المعابر المصرية ، ثم قصة سفينة الحرية 2010 و بداية التطاول الصريح على الدولة المصرية مع إقتراب ساعة الصفر للخطة الجهنمية
■عشنا سيناريوهات أحداث صورة ملائكية مكتوبة بعناية في الظاهر ، من الغزل في حركتي حماس و حزب الله منذ عام 2005 ، و تشكيل جبهة الصمود الجديدة بقيادة سوريا بشار الاسد و عضوية تركيا و إيران و قطر عام 2006 ، و كسر متانة العلاقات المصرية السورية التاريخية ، و تجاوز بشار الاسد في حق القاهرة
■عشنا سيناريوهات أحداث صورة ملائكية مكتوبة بعناية في الظاهر ، مشاهد قراءة القرآن من أجل مغازلة المتدييين و فتنتهم ، و هو مشهد مقتبس من أفلام مصطفى كمال أتاتورك القديمة بالأبيض و الأسود ، و تكرر حرفيا في قصة الجيش التركي المحمدي ، المنقول من تراث سليم الأول
■عرفنا حقيقة أحداث شيطانية ملعونة في الخفاء ، الدخول في نظام الدرع الصاروخي الأمريكي مقابل مليارات الدولارات سنويا ، تأجير تركيا لأمريكا وسط سعادة و رضا العرب و المسلمين
■عرفنا حقيقة أحداث شيطانية ملعونة في الخفاء ، التحالف العسكري التركي الإسرائيلي الرهيب في عهد خليفة المسلمين ، إسرائيل المورد الرئيسي لسلاح المدرعات التركي ، و أكبر مناورة بحرية تتم بين قوات البلدين ، و أردوغان مستمر في التجارة بغزة
■ العميل التاريخي الناجح بات كارتا محروقا باليا ، دارات الأيام و خسر سادته و محركيه بعد فشله في مهمته المكلف بها ، و اصبح عبئا على الجميع مع حجم عداوات مريعة في المنطقة كلها
■في مصر و سوريا و العراق و لبنان و تونس و لبييا و اليمن
أنهار من الدماء
جبال من الألم و الحزن و الحسرة ....
أطنان من الفتن....
سنوات من التآمر و الخسة ....
تسبب فيها رجل واحد ممسوك بخيوط عديدة....
يشبه الممثل المصري عادل أدهم
اسمه رجب طيب أردوغان ....
و لقد حان وقت العقاب و الحساب ....
■ من يذكر قصة ذلك الضبع العجوز المتسخ كريه الرائحة ؟! ...
الذي ظل ينتظر لحظة موته في رعب و حسرة ....
بعد سنوات طويلة من الإفساد و القتل في الغابة ....
يبدو إنها تتحقق الآن على أرض الواقع ....
العدالة الشرعية الإلهية مرضية .....
لا أحد ينكر ذلك ....
✍ الأستاذ Mohamed Qoreish
■الظهور الأول كان في صفقة العدوان الأمريكي على بغداد و خروج الطائرات من تركيا و قطر لتدك البلد العربي الشقيق ، و الثمن دم الشعب العراقي ، و كانت البداية الفعلية لربيع الدم العربي
■المخطط المعلوم المجهول العبقري وجد ضالته في رجب طيب أردوغان ، المصنوع حسب كتالوج صدام الحضارات ، وجه سينمائي صالح لمخاطبة الشعوب العربية الإسلامية العاشقة للعنتريات و الحنجوري ، يعمل وفق كتالوج أمريكي
■ خطة تلميع أردوغان كانت أكبر حملات التسويق السياسي في تاريخ العالم ، مليارات المليارات من الدولارات و تنسيق أجهزة إستخباراتية كبري و محطات تليفزيونية و مواقع إخبارية و أقلام ماجورة و كتب ترويجية ، كل ذلك من اجل القيام بدوره في جحيم العرب المخطط لإعادة التشكيل الجيوسياسي للمنطقة
■ عشنا أحداث سيناريوهات صورة ملائكية مرسومة بإحترافية في العلن ، من فيلم منتدي دافوس الهزلي 2009 و مشهد بيريز و عمرو موسي ، و بداية التجارة بغزة و فيلم المعابر المصرية ، ثم قصة سفينة الحرية 2010 و بداية التطاول الصريح على الدولة المصرية مع إقتراب ساعة الصفر للخطة الجهنمية
■عشنا سيناريوهات أحداث صورة ملائكية مكتوبة بعناية في الظاهر ، من الغزل في حركتي حماس و حزب الله منذ عام 2005 ، و تشكيل جبهة الصمود الجديدة بقيادة سوريا بشار الاسد و عضوية تركيا و إيران و قطر عام 2006 ، و كسر متانة العلاقات المصرية السورية التاريخية ، و تجاوز بشار الاسد في حق القاهرة
■عشنا سيناريوهات أحداث صورة ملائكية مكتوبة بعناية في الظاهر ، مشاهد قراءة القرآن من أجل مغازلة المتدييين و فتنتهم ، و هو مشهد مقتبس من أفلام مصطفى كمال أتاتورك القديمة بالأبيض و الأسود ، و تكرر حرفيا في قصة الجيش التركي المحمدي ، المنقول من تراث سليم الأول
■عرفنا حقيقة أحداث شيطانية ملعونة في الخفاء ، الدخول في نظام الدرع الصاروخي الأمريكي مقابل مليارات الدولارات سنويا ، تأجير تركيا لأمريكا وسط سعادة و رضا العرب و المسلمين
■عرفنا حقيقة أحداث شيطانية ملعونة في الخفاء ، التحالف العسكري التركي الإسرائيلي الرهيب في عهد خليفة المسلمين ، إسرائيل المورد الرئيسي لسلاح المدرعات التركي ، و أكبر مناورة بحرية تتم بين قوات البلدين ، و أردوغان مستمر في التجارة بغزة
■ العميل التاريخي الناجح بات كارتا محروقا باليا ، دارات الأيام و خسر سادته و محركيه بعد فشله في مهمته المكلف بها ، و اصبح عبئا على الجميع مع حجم عداوات مريعة في المنطقة كلها
■في مصر و سوريا و العراق و لبنان و تونس و لبييا و اليمن
أنهار من الدماء
جبال من الألم و الحزن و الحسرة ....
أطنان من الفتن....
سنوات من التآمر و الخسة ....
تسبب فيها رجل واحد ممسوك بخيوط عديدة....
يشبه الممثل المصري عادل أدهم
اسمه رجب طيب أردوغان ....
و لقد حان وقت العقاب و الحساب ....
■ من يذكر قصة ذلك الضبع العجوز المتسخ كريه الرائحة ؟! ...
الذي ظل ينتظر لحظة موته في رعب و حسرة ....
بعد سنوات طويلة من الإفساد و القتل في الغابة ....
يبدو إنها تتحقق الآن على أرض الواقع ....
العدالة الشرعية الإلهية مرضية .....
لا أحد ينكر ذلك ....
✍ الأستاذ Mohamed Qoreish
September 27, 2021
چقدر کتاب خوبی بود. یک کانال خوب و روان برای شناخت اردوغان و اون چیزایی که توی ذهنش می گذره. این شناخت البته در بستر تاریخ دو قرن اخیر ترکیه صورت میگیره تا وضعیت امروز این کشور دقیقا براتون جا بیفته.
May 31, 2022
One of the more formative pieces for me to understand the pre-Ukraine war Turkey. More heavy on the state to state interactions than on internal politics, but very informative. Would argue with few parts on the Turkey - EU realtionship, but agree with the overall point. A great book and clear recomendation!
June 20, 2021
Soner Cagaptay shares a detailed and informed vision of modern Turkey's geopolitical challenges in the 21st Century.
Pivoting Erdogan's figure, he is able to describe the large variety of stakeholders shaping Turkey's future.
Great read.
Pivoting Erdogan's figure, he is able to describe the large variety of stakeholders shaping Turkey's future.
Great read.
May 21, 2023
خیلی جامع نبود کتاب و گذرخلاصه ای از هر جهت بود که تمرکز رو سخت میکرد
August 6, 2020
A few comments.
1. A good proportion of the early sections of this book are shared with another of Cagaptay’s books, which is a little disappointing. Some fresh approached to the shared topics would have been appreciated.
2. The coverage of the Gulen movement is rather flimsy. It is approached by what Erdogan did in response to the movement and failed to discuss the platform of the Gulen movement and the Gulen attitude to domestic and foreign policy.
3. I would like to read a rigorous academic appraisal of the information and approach taken in this book. I feel that Cagaptay’s analysis suffers from his standpoint of an expatriate critic with a chip on his shoulder, and the chip having flown off an American block of wood, before landing on his shoulder.
4. Small point but irritating. Macedonia is not a country; the country of Northern Macedonia and Bosnia is not a country, the name is Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1. A good proportion of the early sections of this book are shared with another of Cagaptay’s books, which is a little disappointing. Some fresh approached to the shared topics would have been appreciated.
2. The coverage of the Gulen movement is rather flimsy. It is approached by what Erdogan did in response to the movement and failed to discuss the platform of the Gulen movement and the Gulen attitude to domestic and foreign policy.
3. I would like to read a rigorous academic appraisal of the information and approach taken in this book. I feel that Cagaptay’s analysis suffers from his standpoint of an expatriate critic with a chip on his shoulder, and the chip having flown off an American block of wood, before landing on his shoulder.
4. Small point but irritating. Macedonia is not a country; the country of Northern Macedonia and Bosnia is not a country, the name is Bosnia and Herzegovina.
February 5, 2021
كتاب موجز لرحلة أردوغان في الحكم، وما كان قبله من "كماليين" وطبيعة علاقتهم المشحونة.
يستعرض أيضًا مشاكل الدولة الحديثة في كل جانب ومحاولاتها لتكون لاعب إقليمي وأحيانا دولي.
الفصل الأخير كان متميزًا عن غيره، إذ عرض الكاتب رأيه الشخصي بعد طول موضوعية وناقش فكرة قابلية تركيا أن تكون الدولة التي يحلم بها الرجل منذ عقدين في الحكم.
أنصح به لكل من يرى أردوغان بعدسة واحدة ويزعم أنه "الخليفة" أو حتى "عميل الغرب"
هذه تجربتي الأولى في كتب السياسة، وأجد أن قناعتي الأولى بعد قرائتي له أن كتابًا مثله يُقرأ في حالتين:
- فور صدوره
- أو بعد مرور تغير واضح في ماجريات الأمور
فالسياسة متغيرة دائمًا، ومرور زمن قصير على الكتاب يستدعي إعادة التفكير في كل احتمال جديد يطرأ على الساحة مع العلم أنه لن يكون الأخير، فالسياسة تتغير بتغير المصالح.
أو ببساطة قراءته بعد انطواء صفحة الشخصية الرئيسية كي تكون الموازين ثابتة، وتتضح الرؤية كاملة عن مسيرة السياسي.
يستعرض أيضًا مشاكل الدولة الحديثة في كل جانب ومحاولاتها لتكون لاعب إقليمي وأحيانا دولي.
الفصل الأخير كان متميزًا عن غيره، إذ عرض الكاتب رأيه الشخصي بعد طول موضوعية وناقش فكرة قابلية تركيا أن تكون الدولة التي يحلم بها الرجل منذ عقدين في الحكم.
أنصح به لكل من يرى أردوغان بعدسة واحدة ويزعم أنه "الخليفة" أو حتى "عميل الغرب"
هذه تجربتي الأولى في كتب السياسة، وأجد أن قناعتي الأولى بعد قرائتي له أن كتابًا مثله يُقرأ في حالتين:
- فور صدوره
- أو بعد مرور تغير واضح في ماجريات الأمور
فالسياسة متغيرة دائمًا، ومرور زمن قصير على الكتاب يستدعي إعادة التفكير في كل احتمال جديد يطرأ على الساحة مع العلم أنه لن يكون الأخير، فالسياسة تتغير بتغير المصالح.
أو ببساطة قراءته بعد انطواء صفحة الشخصية الرئيسية كي تكون الموازين ثابتة، وتتضح الرؤية كاملة عن مسيرة السياسي.
Currently reading
May 28, 2022Atarurk - social engineering using education to promulgate secularism and Western values
Kemalists - supporters of Ataturk
Inonun - successor to Ataturk
Ankara - capital of Turkey
Attempted coup of 2016 - Putin showed support - gulenists
Diyanet- government department
Suleyman Demirel- promoted soft secularism
Became Istanbuls mayor in 1994
Kasimpasa Golden Horn - explains Erdogan
Nisantasi
Welfare Party (RP)
Virtue Party (FP)
Both rooted in National Outlook - anti-western - denounced dissenting Turks as proxies for foreigners- also took anti-semitic turn (Zionism made them join EU so they can disassociate with their identity)
AKP won 34.4% of popular support - citizens abandoning DYP and ANAP - a year later AKP won 2/3 of seats despite 1/3 of voting population
Kisakurek- poet Erdogan reveres - anti-semitic
Muslims are the "real children" of Turkey - Western conspiracy that they USA, the West, Jews, the Cabal are tirelessly undermining good Muslims
3 - Strategic Depth
Race for Europe to seize Ottomon territory during its collapse
During Ottoman Empire collapse
- France seized Algeria and Tunisia
- British took Cyprus, Persian gulf (Aden to Kuwait) - guarding approaches to India
- Russia subjugated Ottoman Northern Caucasus- mass killings of Muslims - legacy of hostility towards Russia among Balkars, Chechens, Circassians, Daghestanis, Karachays, Ingushes and other Northern Caucasus Muslim nations and diasporas in Turkey
Strategic Depths:
-Nearby land zones
-Nearby sea zones
-Nearby continental zones
Davutoglu- "Straegic Depths" and "Zero Problems with Neighbors" (this also includes good relationship with Chrisitia countries I.e. Armenia, Cyprus, Bulgaria)
- broke ties with Isreal in 2010 and USA in Syria in 2010
1937 - Treaty of Saadabad - non aggression pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan
Davutoglu Ottomonism pitted Muslims against Chrisitians
Kemalists weren't pure either though
Erogan and AKP have a distorted view of Ottoman as being devout conservative Muslims (result of Kemalist teachings)
Turkey - took in 3 million Syrian refugees - couldn't take down Assad (thought they had US support but they vacillated)
Young Turks - wanted Ottoman guy ousted and the triumvirate took control
Turkey German partnership - led to Ottoman collapse
Davutoglu foreign policy turned out to not work - weaker d ties with West and Middle East
Soft power - brokering peace deals, cementing trade agreements
- early example from Turky after the businesses built oversees after fall of communism
Erdogon soft power - strong export sector - heavy duty trucks to canned tomatoes. Also Turkish soap operas with 200 million viewers
Quran Belt - turkeys most conservative cities - Anatolian Togers grew economically
Service sector - Turkish airlines - top European carriers
2005 - year of African ties - Erdogan visited Somalia in 2011 following its famine, good optics - walking in refugee camps - Turkey had 40 embassies in Africa by 2018
Turkey has far influence of Somalia and Mongolia
Turkey has dozens of neighbors in Europe (located in Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, and the Middle East)
Ottoman collapse in Firdt Balkan War (1913-1914) - lost 83 % of land, 69% of population in Europe
Turkeys neighbors - across by land (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iran, Iraq and Syria) and across sea (Cyprus in Mediterranean, Romania, Ukraine and Rissia around Black Sea). Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) van be considered 13th neighbor)
Turkey has 82 million citizens - larger than all neighbors except Russia
Turkeys literacy rate, population and economy grew from the least to the second most influential compared to its neighbors and the rest of Europe.
EEC - predecessor to the EU (rejected Turkey until recently)
EU joined NATO, founded OECD
Talks between Turkeys membership with EU leveraged Erdogans status and hope - had strong approval from Turkish people
EU has been in accession talks with Turkey for many years. Brussels and Washington gave their support but not France and Germany - Turkey and Eu formed a union, Turkey did not meet political conditions for membership, but this was good for Erdogan since he didn't need to compromise much to the EU whilst retaining Turkish support and soft power over the middle East, because it seems they were preventing Turkey unfairly since 2005. Turkey became more authoritarian, despite secularist military and TAF losing power over civilian government, making EUs assumption that military loss means better democracy was wrong.
Joke about Turkeys prospects of EU accession. Poland could be asked "when did WW1 start?" "1914", then asks Montenegro "when did WW1 end?" "1918". Then they gets asked "how many died in WW1, and name them all".
Cyprus didn't want to unify (had greek presence)
America wanted Turkey to gibe them a gateway to Iraq but after a parliment split vote, Erdogan managed to scathe away from potential consequences by blaming the fault in Turkish political system. Turks rationale was America didn't guarantee defense from Northern Iraq (which the PKK were once stationed and killed many Turks).
"Hood incident" involved America troops detaining Turks and Turkish memeber (Turks saw this as a retaliation if refusing their offer to help regarding Iraq War) and this incident was publicised in a movie - antiamerican extended beyond leftists and went mainstream
Erdogan and AKP were antiAmerican and antisemitic but those things went relatively unnoticed by America and Israel until Erdogan started embracing Hamas member after winning Gaza election and praised Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood. Before then Erdogan was seen as moderate Muslim who wanted to moderate extremists.
Ankara US and NATO saw PKK as a terrorist organisation. So did most of Turkish Kurdish population
Bush and Obama had a cordial relationship with Erdogan except for a few hurdles with Obama. Turkeys 'no vote' for sanctioning Iran Nuclear weapons, and Flotilla incident where Turkey deployed a ship to Gaza prompting a blockade from Israel which detained 700 activists tainted Turkish-Israeli relations.
But in G20 2010, Obama and Erdogsn made up until the Arab Spring (Arab uprising) where to reduce instability in many middle eastern regions, Erdogan saw an opportunity gain allies from the Muslim Brotherhood by letting them follow Ankaras model.
Ankara and Washington joined efforts in Syria and Libya.
Big roadblocks between Obama and Erdogan...
- Turkey cracked down violently on the liberal Gezi Park protest which was broadcast widely
- After Egyptian leader (part of Brotherhood) fell, Erdogan blamed Obama and Obama wanted Ankara to move on
- Obama supplied weapons to YPG (of shoot of PKK) to the dismay of Turkey to fight off ISIS in 2015.
Syria Turkey relationship
- dispute over Hatar region which the French assigned as independent territory was taken by Turkey
- Syria funded PKK (funding a group in Lebanon) during Cold War - Turkey amassed troops against leftists at Syrian border
- Turkey occupied that land, Syria Regime harboured PKK members which Bashad Assads dad made a deal with Ankara to let go for a water reserve and Turkeys threat to take over
- Turkish Kurds moved over to Syria after Kurish uprising failed
- after Assad violently shut down anti Assad protests, this upset Erdogan for not listening to him
- After Erdogan lost hope in Obama for not dorectly intervening militarily by having no-fly zones in northern syria to overtake Demascus, Erdogan funded rebel support by basing them in Turkey and travel to Syria (resulted in ISIS) - Syria acquired YPG and PKK groups - PYD (made up of Turkish and Syrian kurds) who never left Syria (Erdogan had fake control)
Battle of Kobane - ISIS took control in a disputed battle between Ankara, Washington, PKK (YPG and PYD) - Erdogan refused to help PKK against ISIS despite US pleading. Arabs and Kurdish fighter eventually drove ISIS out - US YPG relationship solidified
Erdogan delayed action against ISIS to get back Turkish hostages - Turkey removed Turkish tomb n Syria away from ISIS
Erdogan allowed US to use airbases on Turkish soil - ISIS retaliated by nassacring 103 ppl in pro-peqce antierdogan rally at railway station
Assad Regime has Russian support which no one saw coming - Erdogan couldn't use UN intervention as Russia would've vetoed
Sunni Muslims were backed by antiassad groups supported by Turkey
Turkeys priorities: YPG, Assad and then ISIS
American priorities: ISIS, Iran and then Assad Regime a distant third
Turkey had a deep rooted fear of Russia than any if its other neighbors - long history with Ottoman vs Russian Empire
- too scared to help Turkish ppl in Soviet
During collapse of soviet, Turkey started helping out its own people. Russia and Turkey opened to each other via trade and tourism. Ankara thought they were equal partners, Putin saw them as inferior.
Russia built a pipeline in Tirkey so they could leverage it against them , Turkey had a plan to diversify with East and West.
- crossing pipelines - BTC, Blue Stream, TANAP, Akkuyu Nuclear Power Station
Turkey claimed to stay out of Chechen war and claimed not to harbour them.
Russia allowed Turkey to advance in northern syria but intervened later. When US and YPG connected, Turkey saw strong Russian alliance as a solution.
Russia tried to dilute Turkeys NATO alliance
Turkey and Russia continued to negotiate during the Syrian civil war - Putin didn't want Turkey to be the winner
Ankara and Moscow became close after 2016 coup - post 2016 antiamerican sentiment rose. Putin wants division in Turkey and destabilise NATO.
Russia has ties to PKK and YPG, Turkey has Chichen ties
Russia's defeat of Ottoman Empire kick-started the europinization of the Sultans and Turkey.
Ottoman and Safavid became neighbors and after neither side winning, settled for parity (Mutually Assured Destruction)
Turkey and Iran had a traditional power parity resulting in no attacks and a permanent border that lasted a very long time.
Turkish political Islamisation were torn with Iran - Shiites were suspicious but admired their Islamic revolution in 1979
Erdogan and Iran President had a good relationship, like brothers.
Turkey and Iran were on opposite sides of the Syrian War and their control of Iraq resulting in Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Sunni Arabs to push back against rising Shiite perisan influence in Baghdad.
When US led Iran Deal passed in 2015, Erdogan was relieved after feeling effts of Iran sanctions.
Turkey sought to balance Russia China and US partnership via purchase of missiles and defense systems.
Tehran took advantage of the failed 2016 coup attempt - make US seem like the enemy
Tehran and Ankara have their Kurdish groups to take care of, the PKK and PKAK. Iran historically tried to spoil Turkeys peace with Kurds to not gain them influence in Syria Iraq etc, I.e. Qassem Soloumani met with Kurdish leader
Tehran and Ankara consolidated on the Saudi Arabia (Riyadh) isolating Qatar (Doha) issue citing Dora's support of Muslim Brotherhood as terrorism.
The reason for conflict is the continuing sentiment of antiemperial war between Sultans, Tsars and Shahs. Iran looks at Syria and Iraq to gain status but Turkey blocks it.
Novelty of Erdogans policy hasn't eliminated memories of antipathy towards Iranians.
Erdogans policy seemed to transcend racist Arab sentiment - but his severed ties with UAE, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt after Sisis rise hasn't helped.
Erdogans pro Ikhawan stance was successful in Tunisia but Erdogan threw his support for pro Islamist faction in Libya against internationally recognised government
Middle East divided between Bloc (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahran, Jordan woth Israel behind the scenes) and Axis (Turkey and Qatar)
Erdogan had initial success in ME with Assad Regime in demascus, Mubarak Regime in Cairo and Gadaffi regime in Trippoli
Ottoman history explains why Egypt looks to compete against Turkey - and why Morsi rejected Erdogans advice (egypt was hard to control - had autonomy) . It also explains its close ties with Qatar (Qatar housed Ottoman soldiers for a long time, and now Tuekey implicitly defends it)
Erdogan used Gulen alliance in taking over TAF and establishing Turkish institutions around the world, but after the coup, Erdogan wanted to close Gulen led institutions which benefited Turkey before
Turkeys value came from being the West of East and East of West. By undermining EU and NATO relations, it inadvertently undermined their middle Eastern relations
Turkey had no real hard power
Turkey should've realised some countries view Ottoman in a negative light (they treated non Muslims as second class). Being Ottoman 2.0 wasn't a good look
Erdogan course corrected with Ira1, Israel and Greece after Davutoglu
Erodgan had good ties with KDP (Kursish Democratoc Party) despite its weakening relationship with Baghdad, until its leader was replaced. Turkey and Iraq united in opposition to Kurdish independence in Iraq, and given Kurds reside in 4 countries with 3 dialectical and 2 languages (and a dozen radical political movements) Kurdish groups can always be used as a tool by regional capitals
Kemalists - supporters of Ataturk
Inonun - successor to Ataturk
Ankara - capital of Turkey
Attempted coup of 2016 - Putin showed support - gulenists
Diyanet- government department
Suleyman Demirel- promoted soft secularism
Became Istanbuls mayor in 1994
Kasimpasa Golden Horn - explains Erdogan
Nisantasi
Welfare Party (RP)
Virtue Party (FP)
Both rooted in National Outlook - anti-western - denounced dissenting Turks as proxies for foreigners- also took anti-semitic turn (Zionism made them join EU so they can disassociate with their identity)
AKP won 34.4% of popular support - citizens abandoning DYP and ANAP - a year later AKP won 2/3 of seats despite 1/3 of voting population
Kisakurek- poet Erdogan reveres - anti-semitic
Muslims are the "real children" of Turkey - Western conspiracy that they USA, the West, Jews, the Cabal are tirelessly undermining good Muslims
3 - Strategic Depth
Race for Europe to seize Ottomon territory during its collapse
During Ottoman Empire collapse
- France seized Algeria and Tunisia
- British took Cyprus, Persian gulf (Aden to Kuwait) - guarding approaches to India
- Russia subjugated Ottoman Northern Caucasus- mass killings of Muslims - legacy of hostility towards Russia among Balkars, Chechens, Circassians, Daghestanis, Karachays, Ingushes and other Northern Caucasus Muslim nations and diasporas in Turkey
Strategic Depths:
-Nearby land zones
-Nearby sea zones
-Nearby continental zones
Davutoglu- "Straegic Depths" and "Zero Problems with Neighbors" (this also includes good relationship with Chrisitia countries I.e. Armenia, Cyprus, Bulgaria)
- broke ties with Isreal in 2010 and USA in Syria in 2010
1937 - Treaty of Saadabad - non aggression pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan
Davutoglu Ottomonism pitted Muslims against Chrisitians
Kemalists weren't pure either though
Erogan and AKP have a distorted view of Ottoman as being devout conservative Muslims (result of Kemalist teachings)
Turkey - took in 3 million Syrian refugees - couldn't take down Assad (thought they had US support but they vacillated)
Young Turks - wanted Ottoman guy ousted and the triumvirate took control
Turkey German partnership - led to Ottoman collapse
Davutoglu foreign policy turned out to not work - weaker d ties with West and Middle East
Soft power - brokering peace deals, cementing trade agreements
- early example from Turky after the businesses built oversees after fall of communism
Erdogon soft power - strong export sector - heavy duty trucks to canned tomatoes. Also Turkish soap operas with 200 million viewers
Quran Belt - turkeys most conservative cities - Anatolian Togers grew economically
Service sector - Turkish airlines - top European carriers
2005 - year of African ties - Erdogan visited Somalia in 2011 following its famine, good optics - walking in refugee camps - Turkey had 40 embassies in Africa by 2018
Turkey has far influence of Somalia and Mongolia
Turkey has dozens of neighbors in Europe (located in Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, and the Middle East)
Ottoman collapse in Firdt Balkan War (1913-1914) - lost 83 % of land, 69% of population in Europe
Turkeys neighbors - across by land (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iran, Iraq and Syria) and across sea (Cyprus in Mediterranean, Romania, Ukraine and Rissia around Black Sea). Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) van be considered 13th neighbor)
Turkey has 82 million citizens - larger than all neighbors except Russia
Turkeys literacy rate, population and economy grew from the least to the second most influential compared to its neighbors and the rest of Europe.
EEC - predecessor to the EU (rejected Turkey until recently)
EU joined NATO, founded OECD
Talks between Turkeys membership with EU leveraged Erdogans status and hope - had strong approval from Turkish people
EU has been in accession talks with Turkey for many years. Brussels and Washington gave their support but not France and Germany - Turkey and Eu formed a union, Turkey did not meet political conditions for membership, but this was good for Erdogan since he didn't need to compromise much to the EU whilst retaining Turkish support and soft power over the middle East, because it seems they were preventing Turkey unfairly since 2005. Turkey became more authoritarian, despite secularist military and TAF losing power over civilian government, making EUs assumption that military loss means better democracy was wrong.
Joke about Turkeys prospects of EU accession. Poland could be asked "when did WW1 start?" "1914", then asks Montenegro "when did WW1 end?" "1918". Then they gets asked "how many died in WW1, and name them all".
Cyprus didn't want to unify (had greek presence)
America wanted Turkey to gibe them a gateway to Iraq but after a parliment split vote, Erdogan managed to scathe away from potential consequences by blaming the fault in Turkish political system. Turks rationale was America didn't guarantee defense from Northern Iraq (which the PKK were once stationed and killed many Turks).
"Hood incident" involved America troops detaining Turks and Turkish memeber (Turks saw this as a retaliation if refusing their offer to help regarding Iraq War) and this incident was publicised in a movie - antiamerican extended beyond leftists and went mainstream
Erdogan and AKP were antiAmerican and antisemitic but those things went relatively unnoticed by America and Israel until Erdogan started embracing Hamas member after winning Gaza election and praised Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood. Before then Erdogan was seen as moderate Muslim who wanted to moderate extremists.
Ankara US and NATO saw PKK as a terrorist organisation. So did most of Turkish Kurdish population
Bush and Obama had a cordial relationship with Erdogan except for a few hurdles with Obama. Turkeys 'no vote' for sanctioning Iran Nuclear weapons, and Flotilla incident where Turkey deployed a ship to Gaza prompting a blockade from Israel which detained 700 activists tainted Turkish-Israeli relations.
But in G20 2010, Obama and Erdogsn made up until the Arab Spring (Arab uprising) where to reduce instability in many middle eastern regions, Erdogan saw an opportunity gain allies from the Muslim Brotherhood by letting them follow Ankaras model.
Ankara and Washington joined efforts in Syria and Libya.
Big roadblocks between Obama and Erdogan...
- Turkey cracked down violently on the liberal Gezi Park protest which was broadcast widely
- After Egyptian leader (part of Brotherhood) fell, Erdogan blamed Obama and Obama wanted Ankara to move on
- Obama supplied weapons to YPG (of shoot of PKK) to the dismay of Turkey to fight off ISIS in 2015.
Syria Turkey relationship
- dispute over Hatar region which the French assigned as independent territory was taken by Turkey
- Syria funded PKK (funding a group in Lebanon) during Cold War - Turkey amassed troops against leftists at Syrian border
- Turkey occupied that land, Syria Regime harboured PKK members which Bashad Assads dad made a deal with Ankara to let go for a water reserve and Turkeys threat to take over
- Turkish Kurds moved over to Syria after Kurish uprising failed
- after Assad violently shut down anti Assad protests, this upset Erdogan for not listening to him
- After Erdogan lost hope in Obama for not dorectly intervening militarily by having no-fly zones in northern syria to overtake Demascus, Erdogan funded rebel support by basing them in Turkey and travel to Syria (resulted in ISIS) - Syria acquired YPG and PKK groups - PYD (made up of Turkish and Syrian kurds) who never left Syria (Erdogan had fake control)
Battle of Kobane - ISIS took control in a disputed battle between Ankara, Washington, PKK (YPG and PYD) - Erdogan refused to help PKK against ISIS despite US pleading. Arabs and Kurdish fighter eventually drove ISIS out - US YPG relationship solidified
Erdogan delayed action against ISIS to get back Turkish hostages - Turkey removed Turkish tomb n Syria away from ISIS
Erdogan allowed US to use airbases on Turkish soil - ISIS retaliated by nassacring 103 ppl in pro-peqce antierdogan rally at railway station
Assad Regime has Russian support which no one saw coming - Erdogan couldn't use UN intervention as Russia would've vetoed
Sunni Muslims were backed by antiassad groups supported by Turkey
Turkeys priorities: YPG, Assad and then ISIS
American priorities: ISIS, Iran and then Assad Regime a distant third
Turkey had a deep rooted fear of Russia than any if its other neighbors - long history with Ottoman vs Russian Empire
- too scared to help Turkish ppl in Soviet
During collapse of soviet, Turkey started helping out its own people. Russia and Turkey opened to each other via trade and tourism. Ankara thought they were equal partners, Putin saw them as inferior.
Russia built a pipeline in Tirkey so they could leverage it against them , Turkey had a plan to diversify with East and West.
- crossing pipelines - BTC, Blue Stream, TANAP, Akkuyu Nuclear Power Station
Turkey claimed to stay out of Chechen war and claimed not to harbour them.
Russia allowed Turkey to advance in northern syria but intervened later. When US and YPG connected, Turkey saw strong Russian alliance as a solution.
Russia tried to dilute Turkeys NATO alliance
Turkey and Russia continued to negotiate during the Syrian civil war - Putin didn't want Turkey to be the winner
Ankara and Moscow became close after 2016 coup - post 2016 antiamerican sentiment rose. Putin wants division in Turkey and destabilise NATO.
Russia has ties to PKK and YPG, Turkey has Chichen ties
Russia's defeat of Ottoman Empire kick-started the europinization of the Sultans and Turkey.
Ottoman and Safavid became neighbors and after neither side winning, settled for parity (Mutually Assured Destruction)
Turkey and Iran had a traditional power parity resulting in no attacks and a permanent border that lasted a very long time.
Turkish political Islamisation were torn with Iran - Shiites were suspicious but admired their Islamic revolution in 1979
Erdogan and Iran President had a good relationship, like brothers.
Turkey and Iran were on opposite sides of the Syrian War and their control of Iraq resulting in Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Sunni Arabs to push back against rising Shiite perisan influence in Baghdad.
When US led Iran Deal passed in 2015, Erdogan was relieved after feeling effts of Iran sanctions.
Turkey sought to balance Russia China and US partnership via purchase of missiles and defense systems.
Tehran took advantage of the failed 2016 coup attempt - make US seem like the enemy
Tehran and Ankara have their Kurdish groups to take care of, the PKK and PKAK. Iran historically tried to spoil Turkeys peace with Kurds to not gain them influence in Syria Iraq etc, I.e. Qassem Soloumani met with Kurdish leader
Tehran and Ankara consolidated on the Saudi Arabia (Riyadh) isolating Qatar (Doha) issue citing Dora's support of Muslim Brotherhood as terrorism.
The reason for conflict is the continuing sentiment of antiemperial war between Sultans, Tsars and Shahs. Iran looks at Syria and Iraq to gain status but Turkey blocks it.
Novelty of Erdogans policy hasn't eliminated memories of antipathy towards Iranians.
Erdogans policy seemed to transcend racist Arab sentiment - but his severed ties with UAE, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt after Sisis rise hasn't helped.
Erdogans pro Ikhawan stance was successful in Tunisia but Erdogan threw his support for pro Islamist faction in Libya against internationally recognised government
Middle East divided between Bloc (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahran, Jordan woth Israel behind the scenes) and Axis (Turkey and Qatar)
Erdogan had initial success in ME with Assad Regime in demascus, Mubarak Regime in Cairo and Gadaffi regime in Trippoli
Ottoman history explains why Egypt looks to compete against Turkey - and why Morsi rejected Erdogans advice (egypt was hard to control - had autonomy) . It also explains its close ties with Qatar (Qatar housed Ottoman soldiers for a long time, and now Tuekey implicitly defends it)
Erdogan used Gulen alliance in taking over TAF and establishing Turkish institutions around the world, but after the coup, Erdogan wanted to close Gulen led institutions which benefited Turkey before
Turkeys value came from being the West of East and East of West. By undermining EU and NATO relations, it inadvertently undermined their middle Eastern relations
Turkey had no real hard power
Turkey should've realised some countries view Ottoman in a negative light (they treated non Muslims as second class). Being Ottoman 2.0 wasn't a good look
Erdogan course corrected with Ira1, Israel and Greece after Davutoglu
Erodgan had good ties with KDP (Kursish Democratoc Party) despite its weakening relationship with Baghdad, until its leader was replaced. Turkey and Iraq united in opposition to Kurdish independence in Iraq, and given Kurds reside in 4 countries with 3 dialectical and 2 languages (and a dozen radical political movements) Kurdish groups can always be used as a tool by regional capitals
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 6, 2025
Informal Review:
Çağaptay's book is a well-organized and accessible survey of Erdoğan's era which also provides some historical context for his rise. Readers will find this book particularly useful for understanding of Turkish politics in the first 2 decades of the 21st century as the country moves to become a major influence in the Middle East after the Fall of Assad.
Çağaptay's book is a well-organized and accessible survey of Erdoğan's era which also provides some historical context for his rise. Readers will find this book particularly useful for understanding of Turkish politics in the first 2 decades of the 21st century as the country moves to become a major influence in the Middle East after the Fall of Assad.
May 20, 2020
Informative, but I found it hard to follow.
January 2, 2023
Important review of regional role in Turkey and influence of Neo-Ottomanism
February 23, 2020
Soner Çağaptay writes a vivid portrait of contemporary Turkey which is easy to read even for those who are not experts in the history of the country or the region. The book is divided into sixteen chapters which can be read easily be read separately if you are interested only in some aspects of the book. Furthermore, the text is structured into short sections which have their own titles and are usually no more than one page long. While this might add to the general readability of the book, I found it somehow disturbing to the general flow of the text and leading to occasional repetitiveness.
Overall, the book provides a comprehensive image of Erdogan's goals, policies, and ideology while also putting it into a historical context of modern Turkey, carefully explicating both the Ottoman and the Kemalist legacies that are so important for comprehending the contemporary Turkish society.
Overall, the book provides a comprehensive image of Erdogan's goals, policies, and ideology while also putting it into a historical context of modern Turkey, carefully explicating both the Ottoman and the Kemalist legacies that are so important for comprehending the contemporary Turkish society.
July 23, 2025
Soner Çağaptay's 'Erdogan's Empire' covers a lot of ground- the book essentially documents Erdoğan's rise to power and every major political episode of his career up to when the book was written in the early 2020s.
Unfortunately, the text is seriously lacking in any kind of literary flair. The book is about as dry as can be- just an onslaught of dates, events, different political factions, and international relations. Without many firsthand sources or evocative writing, it reads a bit like an extremely long Wikipedia article.
Don't get me wrong, there's a wealth of information here, but it makes no effort to cater to the casual reader- it's much more like a lengthy academic dissertation. There are probably more fun Erdoğan reads out there.
Unfortunately, the text is seriously lacking in any kind of literary flair. The book is about as dry as can be- just an onslaught of dates, events, different political factions, and international relations. Without many firsthand sources or evocative writing, it reads a bit like an extremely long Wikipedia article.
Don't get me wrong, there's a wealth of information here, but it makes no effort to cater to the casual reader- it's much more like a lengthy academic dissertation. There are probably more fun Erdoğan reads out there.
December 16, 2020
Good Overview of Turkish Foreign Policy and Thinking before and after Erdogan.Filled my gaps in a lot of issus,especially the turkish view of Syria(although I think the author has a bit of a bias for the Turkish view).Erdogans views of the past really are shaped by the Kemalist (very Flawed) portray of the Ottoman empire,trying to restore a cliche than actual reality. Ottomanism the author points out is not some secret plan or coherent strategy but of a feeling (For Turks) or perception (For Outsiders) what Turkey is and should do.
Reads a bit dry,almost like a textbook.
Recommended for beginners
Reads a bit dry,almost like a textbook.
Recommended for beginners
June 21, 2020
Dry and too sparse in criticism IMO, but quite informative. The book explores recent Turkish political history, particularly since Erdogan came to power, and the country's pivot away from the West and towards the Middle East under his rule. While I assume the many short sections with occasionally rather "creative" headings were meant to make to give the reader a better overview, I found it rather hinders the reading flow.
September 16, 2020
Warts in all in relation to his Foreign Policy of the last 20 years.
Great book
Great book
July 23, 2021
an informative book, kind a messy, easy to read even for non-experts though doesn't look super appropriate for academic use
December 18, 2021
A book about the worst dictator
August 31, 2022
Informative but "ill-structured".
February 19, 2023
Excellent
August 30, 2023
Soner's book gives a good overview of Turkey's contemporary issues and Erdoğan's attempt at dealing with them.
Read
November 28, 2024How turkey become a developed country in less time?Erdogan play a vital role in the politics of turkey.Due to Erdogan turkey keep good relation with the other countries.
April 24, 2021
I am not a fun of politics but I thought it would be nice to read this book to learn some things. I did learn many things about Turkey and Erdogan. The books contains so much information that is not easy to remember everything. But I know have a better understanding of Turkey’s relation with many different countries (Russia, US, Iran, Syria etc.) and organisations (PKK, YPG etc.).
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