An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: with Hume's Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature and A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh

by David Hume, Eric Steinberg (Editor)

A landmark of Enlightenment thought, Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is accompanied here by two shorter works that shed light on it: A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh, Hume's response to those accusing him of atheism, of advocating extreme skepticism, and of undermining the foundations of morality; and his Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature, which anticipates discussions developed in the Enquiry.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, School, Classics, Empiricism, College, Psychology

142 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1748

About the author

David Hume was a Scottish historian, philosopher, economist, diplomat and essayist known today especially for his radical philosophical empiricism and scepticism.

In light of Hume's central role in the Scottish Enlightenment, and in the history of Western philosophy, Bryan Magee judged him as a philosopher "widely regarded as the greatest who has ever written in the English language." While Hume failed in his attempts to start a university career, he took part in various diplomatic and military missions of the time. He wrote The History of England which became a bestseller, and it became the standard history of England in its day.

His empirical approach places him with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others at the time as a British Empiricist.

Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably René Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour. He also argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience. He argued that inductive reasoning and therefore causality cannot be justified rationally. Our assumptions in favour of these result from custom and constant conjunction rather than logic. He concluded that humans have no actual conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with the self.

Hume's compatibilist theory of free will proved extremely influential on subsequent moral philosophy. He was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on feelings rather than abstract moral principles, and expounded the is–ought problem.

Hume has proved extremely influential on subsequent western philosophy, especially on utilitarianism, logical positivism, William James, the philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive philosophy, theology and other movements and thinkers. In addition, according to philosopher Jerry Fodor, Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive science". Hume engaged with contemporary intellectual luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Boswell, and Adam Smith (who acknowledged Hume's influence on his economics and political philosophy). Immanuel Kant credited Hume with awakening him from "dogmatic slumbers".

Reviews

[Orhan Pelinkovic · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Nothing is more free than the imagination of man."

David Hume (1711-1776), a Scottish philosopher and a radical and uncompromising empiricist, discusses epistemology in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748).

Hume's central argument is that knowledge cannot be attained through reasoning a priori and that ancient and modern philosophers are most guilty of this exaggerated claim. Instead, knowledge can only occur through experience and no conclusion can be drawn without the assistance of observation and experience through our senses, hence, nothing can be proved a priori.

Furthermore, Hume goes on to discuss how the experiences from our past can only act as suppositions for our future claims and that: "These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science."

A concise and comprehensible read that I enjoyed and a philosophy that entirely shifts us away from metaphysics. This edition also includes Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh (1745) and An Abstract of A Treatise of Nature (1740).

[Genni · Rating 4 out of 5]

I love rereading things. The last time I read this, I was in the middle of moving. At the time it felt all over the place, but I thought it was because *I* was all over the place.

This second time around, I see that it was not quite as chaotic as my first experience had me believe. It did become clear that Hume was not so much in the business of constructing a solid argument as he was poking holes in the rationalism of his day. As a work of deconstruction, it asks very good questions.

[Samuel Bierig · Rating 1 out of 5]

Good writer. Super bitter and angry. He is not correct at all.

[Dylan Jones · Rating 4 out of 5]

Book club read for April, my first time picking what work we'd do (I really just picked Hume and we settled on this) and I enjoyed it. Read it online which sucked and I feel like I could read this again and find more to chew on, but I liked Hume for his fairly pragmatic approach to philosophy. He articulates the difference between reasoning and intuition very well, and fits belief nicely into his concepts of how we come to understanding and make sense of the world around us. I came into this influenced by Haidt and his appreciation for Hume grasping how our mind wanders and gives automatic replies based on sensory information, rather than a deliberate, situation-specific understanding of information. That analysis definitely colored how I approached the text, and I think I had a harder time digesting this than I would with a physical copy. That being said, it led to some fun discussions,

[Ella McLaughlin · Rating 2 out of 5]

It was nice to read a metaphysician (even if he denies being so) that doesn’t use the existence of a god as a means of explaining everything. But like, is it ever really nice to read metaphysics?

[Emilio Rabell · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Enquiry is a classic of Modern philosophy, being a prime example of the skepticism that was developing in that era. The biggest strength of this book is the amazing prose that Hume employed. It is a huge accomplishment for any influential philosopher to write in a manner that is comprehensive, understandable, and concise. The method of argumentation, simply laying out premises and logical conclusions from those premises, was easy to follow and engaging. The biggest weakness of the book, I perceived, was the seeming jump in logic in certain parts of some arguments (I'm thinking specifically in the section regarding miracles). And, from my understanding, this line of reasoning paved the way for the craziness that can be found in contemporary philosophy. This is why I could not endorse the fullness of propositions that Hume advocates for in this book. However, I believe this book is a must read for anyone who is interested in the study of philosophy, as it is a great example of philosophical reasoning, and it is relatively accessible for people who are not extremely familiar with the subject matter.

[Diem · Rating 5 out of 5]

This guy. He's on to something. Just when I was completely fed up with metaphysics along comes Hume to say that everyone needs to just stop with the trying to explain religion syllogistically because religion always has and always will fail that test. Miracles are not proofs because there are no miracles, only phenomena that we can't explain because we lack the knowledge to explain them. Not because a natural explanation doesn't exist.

Hume goes on to explain that the only miracles are those attested to in scripture and the miracle of faith. The faith in something that can't be proven, yet survives from generation to generation. Faith is the miracle.

I don't agree. But his is the first view of religion that hasn't made me sputter with exasperation over its profound and obvious lack of logic in spite of thousands of words trying to convince me of its watertight logic. Of course, Hume was rejected as an atheist and a sceptic because you put a lot of people out of work when you start talking about miracles not being real. Like the makers of eucharist wafers (available on Amazon).

So far, Leibniz and Hume are my favorite philosophers. Not that they're similar. Just that they had the courage to challenge illogical Christian dogma at a dangerous time for such activity.

[Daniel Stepke · Rating 5 out of 5]

despite disagreeing with it in its fundamental essence, especially concerning the foundation of religion (it's not faith), the epistemic state of custom (he's not consistent here), the analysis of free will (obviously false, read pride and prejudice), and the assessment of skepticism (people acting contrary to their beliefs doesnt mean the beliefs are wrong), hume can provide us with good reasons for hope (if one thing does not necessarily follow the other, we will not be determined in our current state) and an appropriate humility, slashing through many bad arguments and being careful to not claim to know what we do not.

[isabela baldini · Rating 3 out of 5]

queria estar lendo leibniz

[Richard Sarkisian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Across my years, I find I agree with a lot of things Hume put down, but he's slightly too reserved/conservative for me. He wanted to rebalance and temper the outright attacks on metaphysical belief but I think sometimes one should get that sweet ass off the fence. "The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation." True! The excitement of touch or the taste of honey can get better with memory though, even if it's not as True/Real. Even if my sense-memory of Cinnabon is wildly vivid, me imagining I'm eating one (as I'm often doing to save calories) isn't the move. Sometimes memory embellishes and gives a certain glow to impressions - both good and bad. But I think going beyond Objects, that zingy quote doesn't work. Famed Wise Alec David Hume never factored in Extreme Cringe. I find I've frequently bitten and screamed into my knuckle to sweep away deeply shameful or embarrassing actions I've made, and I know for a fact those memories carry more power than the action did in the moment. But an action is only cringe if you see it as cringe. I don't know man. I don't think this is a good summary of his arguments. Anyway. Berkeley seems more extremely ostrich-hole refusing than Hume. Descartes doesn't sound at all appealing- that guy needs to relax. Good job David Hume, keep up the good work man. I love that you wrote a "friend" pretending to be Epicurus saying what a crock of shit the argument for a God's existence is, just so you could doubly cover your ass from backlash. Dork king. Stand up brother.

[Lauren Collins · Rating 2 out of 5]

Enemy #1. Philosophy is DEAD and Hume killed it. No wonder, no pursuing a desire to know the Whole. Just making obvious observations about experiences.

Eerie similarities with Pascal and probably Kierkegaard. All agree reason is entirely shut out from deep things of the world, from causation, from God, from how things might fit together in a harmonious whole. And all agree it’s the pitch of presumption and arrogance to try philosophizing about such things. (I’m not sure what specific problems with philosophical arrogance Hume has in mind. For Pascal, it’s a vice that keeps one from God.)

True philosophy can’t remain faithful to itself without being open to religion! Hume’s efforts to cut out religious philosophizing turn philosophy itself into mere science.

[Aman · Rating 4 out of 5]

All our thoughts are either: ideas or impressions. Impressions are that which we perceive due to the forces which act upon our senses; what we may call our stream-of-consciousness. Ideas are copies of our impressions, and thus, are weaker in their liveliness.

Hume's epistemology begins by distinguishing between necessary truths and inductive truths (i.e. relations of ideas and matters of fact, respectively). Next, he discusses the association of matters of fact into cause-and-effect relationships. Finally, he lays out the problem of induction:

Logical: the move from "every observed member of set x is y" to "every member of set x is y" is circular.

Temporal: the move from "x has been y in the past" to "x is y" is circular.

The "problem of induction" frames much of the Enquiry from then on.

This is evident when Hume posits his theory of inductive knowledge as custom: As we see things appear before us, one instance is not sufficient to raise any eyebrows. While we cannot know for certain the nature of cause-and-effect (due to the problem of induction), we nonetheless feel certain in our belief that a given x causes the subsequent y. How is that? Constant conjunction, or when “the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation” in our beliefs, without being provoked by any reasoning or process of the understanding (Sec V.I).

This naturally leads us to claims about probability. Given any situation x, the probability of an outcome y is determined to be more likely than z if and only if y has followed x more frequently than z has followed x in our past experience. This is different from constant conjunction, because the latter is that every past experience of x has been followed by y. Nonetheless, both secure a strong feeling--belief--in humans.

Hume's compatibilism also incorporates the problem of induction. In "Of Liberty and Necessity", he argues that liberty is compatible with our knowledge of necessity, because necessary connection or cause-and-effect are inductive inferences based on constant conjunction. Nothing about cause-and-effect is true a priori, and thus, Hume's conception of necessity (as custom) does not preclude liberty.

How about miracles? Well, since they are by definition subversions of the laws of nature, they cannot, by definition, display constant conjunction. Thus, it makes no sense to believe in miracles, and still no sense to have faith in them:

"And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." (X, II)

From the Epicurean dialogue, the central point is that, starting from an effect, one cannot infer there to exist more in its cause than what is present in said effect.

Then some words on the skepticism of Descartes, Berkeley and the weaker skeptics of the senses, Pyrrhonists, and his own academic (or mitigated) skepticism. His conclusion is that excessive skepticism (that of the Pyrrhonists) cannot be truly held because one must eventually commit an action.

Ultimately, the Enquiry traverses empiricism and skeptical philosophy with comfort and ease, it provides an impetus for the scientific method, and its written by one of the geniuses of the Enlightenment, who was nonetheless a virulent racist.

[Tanya Jones · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting, you could see where his thoughts came from, but also where these thoughts bely what feels like personal contempt for anything outside of his simultaneously too wide and too narrow and inhuman purview. For instance, we get a whole lot on miracles and the reason of animals in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, but far too little on why he thinks poetry and other arts are inferior (to the real (not morally, but in perception)), for example. Regardless, these are equally derided in Hume's central thesis - by the end it felt like he was flinging his issues at the reader with less care for his prose than the good stuff at the start. Not a fun read when the author writes bitterness into his points, or when little things clearly feel missing...

[Bumbles · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was already aware of Humes's central argument but I loved this nonetheless. Highly recommend. The idea is such a simple tweek about the ways in which we see the world but its realization has a profound effect on human understanding.

1. "It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder."

2. "The experienced train of events is the great standard, by which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in the field, or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school, or in the closet."

3. "If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

[Richard Newton · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am really re-reading this book, having read it first several years ago and having studied some parts in great detail for my original degree in philosophy. When I first read it, I enjoyed it but found it moderately hard work. Now coming back to it after several more years of reading philosophy books and I find it a paragon of clarity and easy reading. His 18th century writing style can take a little getting into - it is hardly punchy in the modern sense, but full of long elegant sentences. I think it is worth getting into, and although what Hume believed is not always agreed with in modern philosophy (well, it has always been disputed by some people), his thinking process is worth examining and he remains relevant.

I have to admit to a small bias in that I like David Hume - I find his thinking generally enlightening and without all the deep complexity of many modern philosophers. Mostly, I also find his writing a pleasure to read irrespective of whether I agree with the precise arguments he is making. Probably not everyones cup of tea, but certainly at the enjoyable end of philosophical texts.

[Nick Grammos · Rating 5 out of 5]

My philosophical training was limited to passing first year at university. Even though I had two tutors who later became renowned Princeton professors. One, spent an hour with my one afternoon going over nuclear deterrence and as a result I felt relatively calm about the whole nuclear proliferation of the Reagan years. Philosophy works that some level to calm us and contain our irrational bits, ie the dominant bits. I had acquired knowledge, though not by sensory experience. But I didn’t want to be tested by actual experience on that occasion.

The 18thC Scot, David Hume, wanted no more than to state clearly and elegantly the way we acquire knowledge. For that he ran afoul of the church authorities that campaigned behind the scenes and openly to block his access to proper university posts. And that makes him as contemporary as can be. In any age.

How do we get knowledge? Hume wants to understand the simplest thing really, that we learn by experiencing. And the world of senses and stimuli take us there. Ie, we experience first then gain knowledge. The one phrase I recall fondly from PH101 is a priori. It refers to knowledge that is reasoned to exist before or prior to experience. As though it always existed. It’s a tempting idea that we receive by some pool of collective wisdom much of what we know. But, perhaps we can accept that we can also learn by absorbing knowledge through education as custom and practice. Which is like being given guiding principles to apply to experiences. But a priori knowledge sounds like a way of staying ignorant by not learning from what we sense, or apply our reasoning to through experiences. Hume instead wants to explore that knowledge is acquired by observation. Here is the idea in a Hume nutshell:

A man must be very sagacious, who could discover by reasoning, that crystal is the effect of heat, and ice of cold, without being previously acquainted with the operation of these qualities.

Though our senses can’t necessarily tell us that what we see, smell, taste etc allows us to gain knowledge. After all, knowing that bread once fed us, doesn’t explain how it will do so again. What is bread’s secret power to nourish, asks Hume. The mind takes certain processes to know that.
It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain and a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event. or further:

From a body of like colour and consistence with bread we accept like nourishment and support.

While that sounds good, he goes on wanting to enquire further:

But this surely is a step or progress of mind which wants to be explained.

I can see how he ran into trouble with the received wisdom of his day:

I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance, who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess, that, though all the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still perhaps be rash to conclude positively, that the subject must, therefore, pass all human comprehension.

You can see why the church might want to obscure his work by denying him paid employment in his chosen field.

Of course, one’s senses cannot be fully sufficient, nor can one’s reasoning ability. When facts and reasoning meets the human imagination, it can go off anywhere. I like this part of Hume’s argument very much, because he is acutely aware of the nonsense that can spring from our wanton thinking. He says:

Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas, furnishing by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision. It can feign a train of events, with all the appearance of reality, ascribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint them out to itself with every circumstance that belongs to historical fact, which it believes with the strongest certainty.

You can see here how today’s dilemmas about facts and fictions, information dissembling, control and manipulation would’ve torn out Hume’s hair. And who hasn’t heard this spurious defence of just about any murderous intent in our own times:

There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. NOT just philosophical disputes I wanted to add…

Hume lived through perhaps the era of the best English prose, too. He is quite a joy to read for the balance of his ideas contained in each sentence. He gives credit to the idea that the elegance of the idea should be delivered through an equivalent elegance of a sentence. As the above sentence demonstrates.

Hume is an interesting read today simply because I can read lines in his work that stimulate reflection on the contemporary world. But then, how we acquire knowledge is a timeless question. We fail or rise to the occasion continuously, too. Here’s a nice line:

The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us, at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or evade it.

Hume would likely walk down the street today looking for lampposts to beat his head against. We humans repeat ourselves, hence the problem of philosophical enquiry is relevant to each age. Hence Hume doesn’t get old.

All my review can offer is a sampler. He’s worth reading. His ideas are clean and polished as anything that survived 250 or so years.

Anyway, by the end of this work, I was calmed into understanding the faculty of using experience and reason to guide thinking on the one hand. Much as I had calmed myself that afternoon 40 years ago about nuclear deterrence. And on the other hand, I saw around me the absence of critical observation on the world and the proliferation of believing before knowing. I’m off to find a lamp post. At least I have a good idea why I want to beat my head against it. One pain distracts the mind from the other, perhaps worse pain. At least I read that in a credible medical article on pain. Someone had done the actual research on pain.

[Nat · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hume's predictions for what works of literature and philosophy will withstand the test of time are always absurdly wrong. Here's what he says in §1 to illustrate his claim that it is philosophers of common sense who will, by sticking to saying things that make sense and can actually be confirmed or disconfirmed, withstand the test of time:

"CICERO flourishes at present; but that of ARISTOTLE is utterly decayed.
LA BRUYERE passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of MALEBRANCHE is confined to his own nation, and to his own age.
And ADDISON, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when LOCKE shall be entirely forgotten".

[Khalid · Rating 4 out of 5]

بالنسبة لهيوم فإن الانسان عبارة عن مجموعة أحاسيس وعواطف تترجم اغلب سلوكياته وان عقله مجرد خادم لاحول له ولاقوة أمام هذه الأحاسيس لذلك عشان الانسان يفهم تصرفاته فلازم عليه يدرس احاسيسه عواطفه..

‏تكلم أيضا عن دور العقل في الاعتقاد وقال انه لايمكن للعقل وحده ان يصل ل اي اعتقاد.


وبعدها قسم ادراكاتنا الذهنية لقسمين
١- إنطباعات ٢-أفكار
‏الانطباعات هي الاحاسيس اللي نختبرها بأنفسنا مثل الرؤية الالم الجوع الخ
‏أفكارنا هي مجرد تصور وخيالات ضعيفة لتلك الانطباعات

‏بعدها تكلم في أمور معقدة لست متأكد حقيقة ان كنت فهمتها جيدًا 😅

[May Ling]

I enjoyed this piece on skepticism and would recommend it for those attempting to work in this area. The perspective Hume takes at piecing together his argument that knowledge is relative is nice. It speaks volumes about what was going on around the time of the revolution. It makes sense given how much the world was changing at the time.

[Sotiris Makrygiannis · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book, Hume covers Empiricism, Impressions and Ideas, Causation and Induction, Scepticism, Limits and reasons, miracles and religion. Did he cover all of them well? I don't think so. Nevertheless, especially the part of miracles is rather interesting.

[lauren]

only read the good bits (ch4+5)

[Tarun Rattan · Rating 5 out of 5]

David Hume is considered the greatest British philosopher and, through his influence on have been one of the major names in philosophy of the last 250 years. Kant famously said that Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber. Though his first book, A Treatise of Human Nature, “fell dead-born from the press,” hardly noticed by anyone, it was a remarkable achievement, especially since it was written in his twenties. However, Hume’s views on religion saw him passed over for academic philosophy posts, and it was only his History of England and Political Discourses, published in his forties, that led to him becoming well known and well off.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is a mature version of the Treatise, and in its relatively easy, non-academic style is an excellent starting point for exploring Hume.

Hume start his enquiry by looking at the different species of philosophy. He brackets it into two species, one set of philosophers treat man as chiefly born for action and endeavour to cultivate his manners whereas another species consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than active being and instead endeavour to form his understanding. The members of the former species believe man to be influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, avoiding other, according to the value or virtue which these objects seems to possess. The other species regard human nature as a subject of speculation, and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action of behaviour. Man being a reasonable being, receives from science proper food and nourishment for mind, but narrow bounds of science provides but little satisfaction. The author concedes that being an active man and from the various necessities of human life; he must submit to business and occupation. But the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot always support its bent to care and industry, so nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to human race. Indulge your passion for science, but let your science be human with direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches are prohibited in nature and would be punished by pensive melancholy and cold reception for those pretended discoveries. Be a philosopher; but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man. The author said that he would be happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty.

Next the author outlays his theory of the origin of ideas. According to him the perceptions of the mind can again be divided into two species distinguished primarily by their different degrees of force and vivacity. A person can definitely feel the real pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth. But when he afterwards recalls to his memory these sensations, or anticipates these by his imaginations, he never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment. Similarly when we reflect on our past sentiments and affections like fit of anger, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its object truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed. The author denominates the less forcible and lively of the mind perceptions as THOUGHTS or IDEAS. For the other species he employs the term IMPRESSIONS. By the term impression author means all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are less lively perceptions, of which we’re conscious, when we reflect on any of these sensations.

The author further articulates that, at first view, nothing may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is anything beyond the power of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction. But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, upon a nearer examination, we find that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold and mountain with which we were formerly acquainted. In short, all the material of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. For Hume, ancient and modern philosophers had all thought too highly of the powers of human reason. Great systems had been built to understand humans, God, and the universe, while forgetting that, ultimately, all we can know is what we observe directly through our five senses. Going completely against Descartes, Hume argued that there are no timeless, abstract ideas. Rather, all concepts are a second hand rendering of initial perceptions or impressions of things from our senses; we cannot have a notion of something until we have experienced it.

When we analyse our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime we always find, that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those ideas, which , at first view seem the most wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression. This is also proven from the fact that if from a defect of the organ, a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation, then he is also little susceptible of the corresponding ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore them with that sense and you also open an inlet for the ideas; and they find no difficulty in conceiving these objects.

The author then propound his primary proposition that he believes can be used for any metaphysical reasonings. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure: The mind has but a slender hold of them: They are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea, annexed to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: The limits between them are more exactly determined. When we entertain, therefore any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea, we need to enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?

Next Hume explores the principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind. To him, there appears to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original i.e. resemblance. The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others i.e. contiguity. And if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it i.e. cause and effect.

After the principles of connexion among ideas have been deduced, the author then tries to address sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding. He suggests that all the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally de divided into two kinds, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition, which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of his kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, these truths would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor in our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so con formable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.

The author further says that it may be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is the nature of evidence, which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the record of the memory. He suggests that all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. There is always a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. Why? Because these are the effects of the human make and fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other. If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.

Here Hume venture to affirm, as a general proposition, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find, that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able to discover any of its cause or effects. Our reason, unassisted by experience, would never ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.

Hume’s proposition, that causes and effect are discoverable, not by reason, but by experience, still begs a further question i.e. What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: But why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar? needs further enquiry.

Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover any thing farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by which all-natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore one is the cause, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other. And in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses. Suppose again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived so long in the world as to have observed similar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together; what is the consequence of this experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired an idea or knowledge of the secret power, by which the one object produces the other, for example why a tiny seed produces a huge tree in few years? What is this principle that determines him to form such conclusion?

According to Hume, this principle is CUSTOM or HABIT. For wherever the repletion of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; this propensity is the effect of Custom. This definitely is not the ultimate reason of such propensity but has to be accepted as only a principle of human nature. The author at this point acknowledges that perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther, but must rest contended with it as ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from experience. According to author, it is sufficient satisfaction, that we can go only so far, without repining at the narrowness of our faculties, but at least we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least that we are determined by custom alone to expect the one e.g. heats from the appearance of the other e.g. flame. Custom, then is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone, which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past.

This is the essence of the book, there are more chapters on miracles, animals and liberty but explanations are more or less based on the philosophical framework articulated above. The author concludes the book by giving an explicit call to readers for rigor in philosophy and for all metaphysical works to be taken with a grain of salt. If we take in hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. This focus on relation of ideas and matter of fact made Hume a patron saint of every kind of philosophical school that stands for empiricism and disavows metaphysical speculation.

Hume observed that “All sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature.” We fool ourselves if we think that the natural sciences are an objective realm of knowledge outside humankind. In fact, by knowing human nature, Hume believed that you could create “a complete system of the sciences.” He felt that questions of logic, morals, and politics should be at least at the same level as natural science, and if he had been alive today he would no doubt have been a great supporter of psychology and the social sciences, because, as he put it in the Treatise, “The science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences.”

[path · Rating 5 out of 5]

“If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (114)

Such a remarkable book, this sturdy pillar of western philosophy.

Going in, I knew something of Hume’s basic arguments for empiricism and how he positioned that work in contrast with arguments for a reason-focused approach to knowledge and understanding. What I had not anticipated was how direct and plain spoken the arguments would be, how solid the thought experiments would be, and how close to the surface Hume’s atheism (or religious skepticism) would run.

The essential argument of the book is easily summarized and it begins with a distinction between the ways that mind perceives. One way is through IMPRESSIONS which are the sense data coming from direct experience. The other is IDEAS which are representations of impressions. Ideas are more unbounded than sense impressions in that we can imagine things that do not exist, but they are ultimately grounded in impressions and are the medium through which we apply reason to order and make sense of impressions. Hume writes that the “creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience” (11). If we trace the origins of ideas they always lead back to impressions.

To this point, Hume offers his famous thought experiment about the missing swatch of blue on a gradient of other blue shades. Questioning if a person could apply reason to determine the shade of that missing blue, the answer is “yes” but only because of the sense data provided by the darker and lighter swatches and the sense information from the gradient itself. In the absence of that sense data, the answer would be no. This observation raises all kinds of interesting questions about the necessity of sense information for knowing. Can we know things that are insensible? Can we know things that others have sensed but we have not? How does knowledge survive through successive generations in the absence of a chain of sense impressions?

This argument is also interesting for how it democratizes philosophical pursuits. The philosophical pursuit that Hume describes doesn’t require preternatural skill with reasoning to properly access our innate ideas about the nature of universe — it requires access to our senses and a few simple rules about how ideas about sense impressions form. We build up knowledge by considering how ideas about impressions 1) resemble other impressions, 2) are contiguous with other ideas, and 3) how that contiguity suggests cause and effect relationships. These are the moves of understanding that rationalize a connection between pieces of sense data. And this then opens up other interesting questions like how do go from this kind of understanding to conclusions that we can call knowledge or facts? And how do we establish facts that we can then build into more complex facts? Surely lines of inquiry need not always start from raw sense data and move up to complexity. Instead, it is an accumulation of inferences, grounded in an accumulation of sensory impressions that allows us to form expectations about what is true, probabilistically (you’ll recognize the move to inductive reasoning here; although Hume doesn’t use the term). Without the sense data, however, we would have no basis upon which to form these rational beliefs. Here, Hume uses another of his famous thought experiments about colliding billiard balls to show how we form beliefs about cause and effect based on past sense data. Imagine never having seen billiard balls collide before … where would our beliefs above effects and causes arise from? Would we have any reason to believe that the balls would do something other than collide and stop?

Latter sections of the book take on how knowledge becomes integrated into and preserved through civilization. He also takes on divine providence and miracles showing them to be impossibilities.

Well worth a read.

[Moofish · Rating 5 out of 5]

Debatably *the* masterpiece of English-language philosophy. When I was taking a course in modern philosophy, I found Hume the most intuitive figure, both stylistically and philosophically. The classic textbook delineation of modern philosophy is rationalism vs. empiricism. Rationalism held that knowledge could be attained through a priori reasoning, that is, independent of experience. Philosophers like Descartes argued that the human mind possesses innate ideas--for instance, the idea of God or the idea of self--and that these ideas are perceived clearly and distinctly. And therefore, these ideas are secure foundations for certain knowledge. Our sensory experience can lie to us, but reason certainly can't, right?

Empiricists like Hume blew a clear and distinct hole through this kind of reasoning. Hume argues that all ideas, yes even ideas of God and the self, are derived from experience. Our conception of the self is merely a nervous bundle of perceptions. Hume divides perceptions of the mind into two fundamental categories: impressions and ideas. Impressions are vivacious, forceful, for instance: the sensation of drinking hot tea or getting punched in the stomach. The idea is the less lively perception, usually serving as a recollection of impressions, instead, *thinking about* drinking the hot tea. All of our simple ideas are merely copies of these greater impressions, constituting the Copy Principle.

Hume then divides propositions into two categories: relations of ideas and matters of fact. Relations of ideas *are* knowable a priori. 2+2 always equaling 4 is a necessary truth that you can arrive at with pure operation of thought. The opposite of a relation of ideas is always contradictory, 2+2 cannot equal 5 and will never equal 5.

Matters of fact are known a posteriori (through experience), and the opposite of a matter of fact is always possible. Matters of fact depend on causal reasoning. For instance, if I say, "the sun will rise tomorrow," while that seems obviously true, I have no reason to believe it to be true other than my experience of waking up every day to the sun rising. The tendency to infer the future from the past from accumulated experience is referred to as custom or habit. Our ideas of cause and effect, and the factuality/necessity of cause and effect, arises from us always observing one thing happening. We assume because something has always happened that it will continue happening, and that is what Hume refers to as customary conjunction. We then falsely assume that this connection is necessary. Because causal reasoning depends solely on habit, Hume argues that inductive reasoning has no rational justification.

That might not seem revolutionary, but effectively, it upended our notions of metaphysics and science: if repeated, controlled observation doesn't yield certain knowledge, then what *does* ground certain knowledge about external reality? Nothing! You can see why the folks who read this found it really disconcerting, right? One Immanuel Kant certainly thought so, and in response, he became the entire foundation of Western philosophy for 300 years. His project responds to Hume by showing that the mind structures experience in such a way that certain knowledge of external reality *is* possible, because the basic framework of experience is supplied by none other than the mind. Hume thought inference was uncertain because our supposed certainty of external reality came from our habit. Kant essentially says, "Yes, that certainty does come from us, and that's *why* it's certain."

Of course, this is just me trying to dredge up the little I managed to learn in college... After rereading this, I think we all know what must come next.

Time to serve some Kant.

[Omar Z · Rating 4 out of 5]

I originally heard of Hume several years ago, in a course concerning Western history, where we were taught to remember him and his contributions by, essentially, attributing the word 'Human' to his surname, 'Hume,' in a non-serious manner, so when one thought of the word Human, they'd immediately think of Hume: a surefire way to remember the name and, somewhat, his M.O.; apart from that, I never had the pleasure to actually read a book from him--I've his Treatise of Human Nature on the table opposite me, and I'm not sure when I'll read that, but his Enquiry, at least the Hackett Classic edition, is a proper read complete with additional commentary and source references to ensure one never overlooked most references.

In the Enquiry, Hume consolidates most of the Treatise into a short, focused work concerning the boundaries of the mind, a more epistemological bend than the rest of the Treatise, illuming that several of the things people infer and, ultimately, take as truth or as evidences of things are nonsensical at best, for they're outside of human comprehension, or, in the way he puts it, their natural faculties, slighting the practice of the metaphysics of his time and of the time before his; the book is a restricting work, very much so that, when reading it, there were moments where one could feel Hume's airtight reason causing problems in real time, not to mention there were instances where I derived some form of fun from reading it, though I can't say that will be the case with any other philosophical work, those are much dryer, not as clear-cut either--anyhow, my reading experience would've been much better had my reading not been encroached on time and time again, causing me to lose most of the excitement I'd initially started out with; about his philosophy, I agreed with it for the most part, yet there were some parts I can't agree with (which is part of the reason why one should read books, it's fun to engage with other modes of thought) but entirely respect--the ending parts of the book are certainly amongst the weakest, at least past the part where Hume reconstructs a conversation he had with a friend where they took on the roles of Epicurus and a council had Epicurus been charged in his time, at least it was a council Hume played if I'm remembering correctly.

The only thing about Hume's book that caused any discomfort isn't so much the philosophy but the way in which he writes it: the punctuation, which I suppose was the standard of the time, is frequent and interrupting, causing me to lose my footing when caught in the flow of a sentence, when Hume tosses a semi-colon into the mix like a wrench to break it off into a new direction, but it's safe to say I adapted to it--all in all, it required a couple rereads here and there, and being dyslexic isn't that great an experience.

[89/100]

Lovely; I could pick up my copy of Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, as I skimmed through it and appreciate the writing far more than Hume's--funny--but I rather pick up something else for a change, perhaps Heidegger's Poetry, Language, Thought, before engaging with a couple of his lecture books I own, but then again, I've a copy of Baudrillard's essays on art, and that's just as interesting--decisions, decisions.

[anabel · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the great British empiricists! ABSOLUTELY LOVED IT because of his amazing description of miracles. He explains it so well and so simple for the ignorant like it’s CRAZY to me how people believe miracles. I also loved how he explains arguments against a divine providence and attributes of it!

“A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.”
“Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature.”
MY FAV QUOTE:
“For first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in themselves eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.”

[Lisa · Rating 1 out of 5]

A philosophical treatise by Scottish philosopher David Hume written in English and published in 1748.

S.1: Of the Different Species of Philosophy. He says moral philosophy (the science of human nature), can focus on two different aspects of human nature: "the one considers man chiefly as born for action;" the other considers "man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being." (1) He later goes on to argue that many consider philosophy too speculative and not grounded in scientific reasoning. But he refutes this by arguing that philosophy can indeed be scientific: "Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phenomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies. Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution." (8)

S.2: Of the Origin of Ideas. He divides "all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated THOUGHTS or IDEAS." The other species IMPRESSIONS, i.e. "all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will." (10) He further argues that "all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones." (11) He also argues that if a man has not experienced the underlying "impression" of an idea, then he is incapable of understanding the idea itself. He concludes: "When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?" "By bringing ideas into so clear a light, we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality." (13)

S.3: "To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect." (How do we make connection between ideas? when things resemble each other, occur together, cause/effect

S. 4: How do we know the existence of matters of fact, beyond what our senses or memory tells us? Seems to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. How do we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect? It "arises from experience, when we find, that any particular objects are constantly enjoined with each other." (17) And what is the foundation of all conclusions drawn from experience? ..."all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past." (23) That is, "From causes, which appear similar, we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions." (23)

S.5-6: "Let us, then, take in the whole compass of this doctrine, and allow that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and that his manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses." (33)

S. 7: "Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connexion. But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then feel a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for." (52)

Relations of Ideas: are intuitively or demonstrably certain (e.g. 2+2=4)
Matters of Fact: based on experience
Nature: something that is beyond our reason (we color, consistency...of bread through senses, but there's a deeper nature to it: no way to no through sense or reason that it's good for nourishing the body

S.8: "By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will;" (63) "Let any one define a cause, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a necessary connexion with its effect;" (64)

S.10: Miracles, as violations of the laws of nature, are matters of faith; they can't be proven, not even as probable, by reasoning alone. Not all effects follow from causes with the same degree of probability. Some events are constantly conjoined, others are conjoined with more variability. The testimonies of men are founded on past experience. They vary with experience and can be regarded either as a proof or a probability. No testimony is sufficient to prove a miracle unless the falsehood of the testimony would be more miraculous than the miracle itself. No miracle in all of history has ever established itself as such, because: (1) there's no miracle attested by a sufficient number of men (2) it would contradict the maxim that objects should resemble what we've experienced (3) miracles are found chiefly among "ignorant and barbarous nations" (4) there's no testimony of any miracle which has not been opposed by an infinite number of witnesses. Given this, Hume asserts that Christianity is founded on faith alone.

Religion: physical objects (customs, images) aid in belief; resemblance/contiguity are at play here: they make us think of something similar

[Grace Bouton · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5/5 - I mean yeah, he's right a lot of the time but the overly punctilious language at some points was kind of a lot. Just felt like his constructive account of causality was straight up rage bait, even though his take-down of the rationalist theory of understanding is pretty insightful. I'm partial to Woodward's interventionist theory here, which I think unfairly spoils my reading of Hume a bit. Although his abstract theories felt very convincing, his lack of practicality in terms of human behavior didn't serve him well in his later works in my opinion. Those critiques in mind, I found his criticisms of the argument by design to be refreshing and surprisingly progressive in comparison to his contemporaries. One of his better articulated works for me, def see why he felt a need to rewrite his Treatise of Human Nature.

[Zeke Taylor · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not a judgement of Hume as a whole since this is my first time reading him, but only of this short book. I think the Enquiry in this was published posthumously which is another reason to not judge Hume. This book isn’t great because the miracles section is too much of a contrast with the first section. He goes from recommending strict caution in what we think we know of the processes of nature to a pretty unshakable denunciation of “miracles” and almost anyone in the history of mankind who has advocated for them.

[Chris Double · Rating 5 out of 5]

fantastic piece of work, groundbreaking and still so today - struggled to disagree throughout though tried to be judgmental so as to counteract any national pride blurring my view

only thing i didnt totally get is the section about infinite divisibility - is he stating it is absurd because its unintuitive, or just that its another feature of reason/wit for curiosity with no bearings on our relation to the world?