Mid 3. The writer undoubtedly possesses great knowledge of their subject, but could have profited from more judicious editing of the material. Cartledge details how Sparta played a key role in defending Greece from foreign conquest, thereby preserving forms of culture which lie at the root of Western civilisation. The period covered by this work, 480BC to 360BC witnessed an intense rivalry with Athens, and the eventual fall of Sparta due to it overreaching itself after defeating its main rival for political hegemony on the Greek mainland. Despite serving as a role-model for More's Utopia, Sparta was a repressive and authoritarian society. Spartans claimed that their political order, like those of other Greek city-states,resulted from the vision of one man - Lycurgus. Historians have no accurate records to determine if he truly existed, or whether he was a composite of several individuals, or whether he was simply a mythological figure. What is apparent is that some 'Year Zero' event led to the introduction of a system of socialisation, named the 'agoge', where boys were removed from their families at the age of 7 to undertake years of military training in which the individual was subsumed into the 'pack' or 'herd'. This creation of a society of fighting men and constant combat readiness was essential given the fact that there was always the threat of disorder or open rebellion from the subject population of 'helots'. These were conquered and enslaved neighbouring communities whose impact economically was to free Spartans from the woes of land hunger which afflicted their rivals and which forced overseas colonisation. Though a hereditary kingship was left in place, Sparta profited from a dual monarchy, which had no independent law-making powers. Such responsibility lay with the ruling council or 'Gerousia', consisting of 30 aristocratic members, including both kings. Only laws and decisions decided by this body were disseminated down to the 'Damos' or assembly of all Spartan warriors. The ruling council also acted as supreme court, capable of putting one of the kings on trial. Yet, the chief executive power lay jointly between the kings and the 'Ephors' - five annually selected officials who ensured the former respected the laws. Thus, when the monarchy exercised their prerogative powers of military command, two of the 'ephors' would accompany them on expedition, reporting back on their performance. Aside from his political legacy, Lycurgus was also credited with imbibing Spartan society with the psychology of absolute loyalty to the state, no better illustrated than by the creation of the 'Crypteia' or secret police, the principal aim of which was espionage on the subject 'helots' and murder of any reactionary elements arising within them. The author also provides great detail on the role of women in Spartan society. Though they enjoyed access to education denied to their counterparts in other 'polis', could own land, and participated openly in sporting competition,they had no voice in the machinery of government. Yet, despite the fact that Sparta regarded their primary function as motherhood and did in no shape or form create a feminist utopia, Aritotle would reflect external contemporary opinion in crediting their influence as the prime factor behind Sparta's demise. Sparta's rise to prominence can be dated to the growth of the Peloponnesian League between 550-500BC. This was never an alliance of equal partners, but rather constituted commitment to undertake military action under Spartan command for any action the latter regarded as necessary, with no reciprocal commitment to the member-states from Sparta. The first notable incident whereby Spartan and Athenian paths cross was in 510 when a Spartan army unseated the tyrant Hippias from rule in Athens, which paved the way for Cleisthenes to put in place a package of political reforms which ushered in democracy. The reason behind this Spartan involvement lay with Cleisthenes' acumen in sweetening the oracle at Delphi by paying for the refurbishment of the principal temple, and thereby, whenever Sparta consulted the oracle their fortune depended on coming to the Athenians' aid. Yet, in pattern with the character of their future enmity,such popularist leanings in Athens met with Spartan diapproval, leading to their renewed intervention to send Cleisthenes and his allies into exile. The puppet regime they established so incensed the Athenian population that an uprising ensued to restore democracy. The next major chapter in Spartan-Athenian relations opened with their joint refusal to pay homage to Persian overtures for submission. Not only did Athens lend support to the Ionian revolt against Persian suzerainty, but Sparta murdered the heralds sent by King Darius, and issued warnings to him of Spartan retribution should he threaten the Greek mainland. However, the Spartans missed out on the glorious victory of David over Goliath achieved by Athens at Marathon, stating religious obsrvance of awaiting a full moon before setting out on expedition. Consequently, when news arrived of the amassing of a comprehensive land and naval force by Xerxes in 481, Sparta was determined to redeem itself and achieve military glory. As such, at an emergency meeting of the main city-states held in Corinth, it was agreed to jointly face the Persian threat under Spartan command. It is amazing to think that the lasting fame of the events at Thermopylae could have had such a different outcome, as Sparta and her allies were only able to field a holding force of 300 Spartan champions with a small contingent of allied forces. This was because the Spartans were once more celebrating a religious festival, while the allies were involved in the Olympic Games. Yet,the heroics displayed by Leonidas and his brothers-in-arms in the face of such insurmountable odds gave no better example of Sparta's military strength and valour. Indeed, such was the need for Spartan warriors to achieve military honour that of the two who couldnt fight that day due to illness the first would hang himself from shame, while the second would redeem himself through his virtual suicidal death in the front-line at Plataea the following year. The heroic defeat at Thermopylae served to galvanise Greek efforts, leading to a string of victories at sea and land. An interesting footnote is provided by Cartledge in the fate of the victorious Spartan commander at Plataea, Pausanias. Regent to the underage successor to Leonidas, Pausanias allowed the victory to go to his head, and when he was removed from command, he chose exile in Byzantium, and according to legend, sought and was promised the hand of Xerxes' daughter with a view to making himself satrap of all Greece. Yet, his recall to Sparta in disgrace in 469 would be on what was regarded as the far more serious charge of inciting revolt amongst the helots. Having attempted to escape his fate, Pausanius was walled up in the temple where he had sought sanctuary and starved to death. Conflict between Sparta and Athens was almost inevitable as they were incompatible political entities. Whereas Athens represented a democratic, individualistic, mercantile, and sea-based society, Sparta embodied an oligarchic, hierarchical, traditionalist, land-based one. Their rivalry intensified almost as soon as the Persian threat was removed with Sparta wishing to have no part in the Delian League's continued struggle against Persian interests, regarding this as an attempt by Athens to establish political hegemony. Worse for their relationship, Themistocles, architect of the naval victories at Salamis and Mycale, had decided that Sparta now constituted a greater threat than Persia, and though his voicing of such ideas led to his own ostracism in 470, he appeared in Argos, and the latter's history of rivalry with Sparta received new impetus. Nevertheless, it was an act in support of their former alliance which sowed the seeds for what became known as the Peloponnesian War. In the wake of a violent and devastating earthquake in 464, Sparta became wracked by open revolt from the 'Helots', which would last for four years, and Athens was among its allies who came to its support. The sending of a large Athenian force was largely down to the influence of the pro-Spartan Cimon, who had taken over naval command after Themistocles' removal, and who was at the height of his powers. However, increasingly alarmed at the risk of democratically-minded Athenian soldiers sowing unease among the subject population, the Spartans sent their Athenian allies packing and the die was cast. For their part, the Athenians were outraged by the suppression of fellow Greeks. For his role and eventual failure,, Cimon was discredited and exiled. In 458 the former allies fought a pitched battle at Tanagra, with Sparta enjoying a pyrrhic victory, and though peace ensued, it came as no surprise that after decades of 'cold war' stand-off, hostilities eventually broke out in 431.Troubled by the expanse of the Athenian imperial authority, Sparta wrongfully accused the Athenians of breaching the conditions of the truce and the Peloponnesian War started with misplaced high hopes on the part of the Spartans for a quick and decisive victory. Yet, it would end 27 years later and only due to the assistance of the Persians. As the author notes, the Spartans' tried and tested military tactics were null and void from the outset. Slaves to their former success of hoplite campaigns laying waste to the land around Athens, they did not appreciate that they could not starve the Athenians into subjugation nor force them to enter pitched battle as they had former enemies. Pericles, like his mentor Themistocles, had long foreseen that this common Spartan approach would end in failure as Athens was not dependent on domestic grain supplies, and was protected by its walls all the way to its port at Piraeus. As such, as long as Athens maintained its naval supremacy it could be replenished by access to the breadbasket of the Black Sea region. The war would prove savage and destructive, and in no way could Athenian strategy be summed up as defensive. In 425 they launched an invasion of Messenia, establishing a base camp in the heart of Spartan-controlled territory. Not only did this force Sparta to recall its troops, but also led to one of the most extraordinary incidents of the whole conflict. This surrounds the unheard-of spectacle of a strong Spartan force blockaded on a small island off the coast surrendered on mass rather than face being starved out. The Athenian invasion had other repercussions which would determine great shifts in Spartan policy, and would bring to the fore the next influential Spartan commander, Brasidas. Firstly, the invasion persuaded Sparta of the need to open a second front in the north, with Brasidas leading a campaign to destabilise the Athenian grain route. Secondly, given the cunning strategy of the Athenians to employ soldiers of Messenian descent, and in particular those helots liberated during the revolt of the 460s, Brasidas, a non-royal himself, was able to persuade the Spartans to recruit helots into their own forces in return for manumission, together with the employment of other paid mercenaries. Indeed, Brasidas' victories in the north allowed the Spartan hawks to derail any proposals for peace. Yet, the Spartan final victory owed to a combination of factors. Firstly, there was the disastrous change in Athenian policy in 415 by launching a campaign to support allies on Sicily, draining men and resources. This was the brainchild of the Athenian political leader of the day, Alcibiades, who would seek refuge in Sparta to avoid being put on trial for treason. Secondly,Spartan prospects wee given an enormous boost by securing an alliance with their erstwhile enemy, Persia. More than anything, the latter aided Sparta in funding the creation of a fleet to outmatch the hitherto invincible Athenian navy. A third contributory factor was the internal disorder that wracked Athens in the wake of the Sicilian debacle, leading to an oligarchic coup overthrowing the democratic regime in 411. A fourth factor lay in the defections of former allies, no longer subservient to a weakened power. Finally, the emergence of Lysander cannot be underestimated. He would rise from the ranks to secure the appointment of Admiral of the Fleet, and his acumen and tactical awareness would play a major role in the final defeat of Athens in 404. The defeated rival would be deprived of its fleet and its empire, while Lysander ensured that the political price paid by Athens and many of its allies would be the loss of democracy in favour of a ruling oligarchy, answerable to Sparta. Yet, the extent to which Lysander had succeeded, given his vaulting ambition, would antagonise conservative elements of Spartan society. Ousted by those seeking less of an imperial future for Sparta, his fall was only temporary with the succession to the throne of his former lover, Agesilaus. Though lame, this king had passed through the 'agoge' with flying colours. Nevertheless, Spartan tradition had it that doom would ensue should a lame monarch ever ascend one of the thrones. During the 390s, Sparta pursued a far more expansionist policy than ever before, conducting overseas campaigns on the Asian continent against its former ally, Persia, but Agesilaus, despite enjoying both command of the army and navy, lacked the drive to venture into the Asian mainland. Then, in 394 he suffered a humiliating naval defeat at the hands of the Persians, while in the same year his beloved Lysander was killed in battle on the Greek mainland by a coalition force of domestic enemies, financed by Persia. Despite attaining two victories against the Greek coalition, the high costs of adventure led to a reversal in Spartan policy in the 380s. The price for accepting another alliance with Persia would be extremely high, surrendering the Ionian Greek cities to Persian suzerainty in return for having a free rein on the Greek mainland. This abandonment of fellow Greeks stiffened domestic resistance, leading to a fresh alliance between Athens and Thebes, and their joint forces would deliver the coup de grace for any future Spartan pretension of power with the humiliating defeat at Leuctra in 371, and the support of a fresh helot uprising in Messenia.