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Modern Wars
The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914 - 1918
This book draws on ten years of archival research to provide the first comprehensive treatment in English of how Germany and Austria-Hungary conducted World War I and what defeat meant to them.
512 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 1997
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361 people want to read
About the author
Holger H. Herwig
34 books12 followersHolger Herwig holds a dual position at the University of Calgary as Professor of History and as Canada Research Chair in the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. He received his BA (1965) from the University of British Columbia and his MA (1967) and Ph.D. (1971) from the State University of New York at Stony Brook. Dr. Herwig taught at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, from 1971 until 1989. He served as Head of the Department of History at Calgary from 1991 until 1996. He was a Visiting Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, in 1985-86, and the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Distinguished Visiting Professor of Judaic Studies at The College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia in 1998.
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Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
October 19, 2015
A great history of the war from the perspective of Germany and its junior partner Austria-Hungary. Herwig argues that the war became a stalemate due to Germany’s ill-advised alliance with the inept Habsburgs. He is also critical of the German high command and its handling of the western front. Herwig argues that Germany, despite its reputation for Prussian-style militarism, was no more prepared for war than any of the other belligerents, and he is particularly good at describing the roles of the German and Habsburg commanders in planning and executing the campaigns.
Herwig’s book is mainly focused on the foreign policy of the Central Powers, with a heavy focus on military operations and diplomacy, while naval operations, war aims, and the effects on the Central Powers’ society is not given as in-depth treatment. Herwig writes that much of the relevant documentation was destroyed during the Second World War, although it seems that this may be exaggerated given the level of detail Alexander Watson was able to compile in his more recent Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I.
Herwig does not cover internal politics much. More detailed and better-placed maps could certainly have helped, there are a few typos here and there, and the exclamation points were a little excessive. Also, a glossary for the various acronyms would have been a good idea. And at one point Herwig writes that “On 19 February Admiral Sir Sackville Carden was ordered to bombard the outer forts of the Dardanelles; the following month he broke down from the strain.” The strain of what? Someone familiar with the operation will recall that the operating environment was difficult and that Carden suffered from ulcers, but Herwig never mentions this.
Still, a straightforward and accessible history well worth a read.
Herwig’s book is mainly focused on the foreign policy of the Central Powers, with a heavy focus on military operations and diplomacy, while naval operations, war aims, and the effects on the Central Powers’ society is not given as in-depth treatment. Herwig writes that much of the relevant documentation was destroyed during the Second World War, although it seems that this may be exaggerated given the level of detail Alexander Watson was able to compile in his more recent Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I.
Herwig does not cover internal politics much. More detailed and better-placed maps could certainly have helped, there are a few typos here and there, and the exclamation points were a little excessive. Also, a glossary for the various acronyms would have been a good idea. And at one point Herwig writes that “On 19 February Admiral Sir Sackville Carden was ordered to bombard the outer forts of the Dardanelles; the following month he broke down from the strain.” The strain of what? Someone familiar with the operation will recall that the operating environment was difficult and that Carden suffered from ulcers, but Herwig never mentions this.
Still, a straightforward and accessible history well worth a read.
November 23, 2009
This book is one of the best you'll find in detailing the war from the view point of the Central Powers. It is also one of the very few that gives an account of the role played by Austrian-Hungarian forces. The author provides the reader equal coverage of the fighting on the Russian & Italian Fronts along with the Western Front. Overall a very well researched & detailed account and well worth the time to sit down and read!
July 3, 2020
While much has been written on the Great War, few works focus on the two main partners of the Central Powers with which to tell the tale.
More than just a mere narrative history of the war from the German and Hapsburg position, this is a very deep analysis of the strategic, military operational, industrial, diplomatic-political, and cultural aspect of the war. A close reading of this work confirms some already prevalent biases regarding the war.
The Imperial German Army was vastly superior to the Entente forces for much of the war, but was hamstrung by having an utterly bankrupt strategic framework for the war, and fought the war in a haphazard manner. Vienna lost its grip on the war before it ever began, with the Emperor Franz Josef being too weak to rein in his loose cannon Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf. And from the first weeks of the war, the Hapsburg forces were reliant upon the Germans, exponentially, to stay afloat.
There were, however, some few genuinely unique observations.
Despite having Emperor's as heads of state, both Germany and Austria-Hungary were at the mercy of strong willed Staff Officers, who had a habit of bullying their civilian overseers, and even at times their monarchs, in order to get their way. While it is common knowledge that Luddendorff and von Hindenburg ran Germany as an undeclared dictatorship from late 1916 onwards, this book makes clear that both men were machinating for their own high positions as early as the victory at Tannenberg against the Russians.
And if the Russians suffered under the indecisive leadership of a lackluster Czar, at least Russia wasn't held hostage by overly ambitious Staff Officers who all too often stopped caring over their national good, and played to their own ambitions.
Herwig demonstrates conclusively the fact that the Germans had, by late 1916, defeated Russia to the point of their collapse being a mere measure of time. But what Herwig showcases that I found revealing, was von Hindenburg and Luddendorff's non sanctioned plans to extend German control far to the east, for the object of a greater German Empire (the same project the National Socialists would carry over into the Second War). Following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Germans grabbed a huge swath of territory, to include all of Ukraine, much of Belarus, and the entirety of the Donbas region including Rostov as well as a springboard position into the Caucasus.
Even as early as 1917, many pre-Nazi Germans were already contemplating Lebensraum at Slavic expense.
Beyond military matters, the book delves deep into the economic aspects of the war, showcasing how much of the myth of the Entente Naval Blockade was fact, and what has been blown out of proportion. Germany, for example had the raw materials to make so many guns and small arms, that massive quantities rusted on rail cars due to lack of availability of manpower to use it all. Meanwhile, children starved and died from the lack of imported food goods.
Austria-Hungary failed to make nearly like enough to support itself, and for most of the war relied on Germany for all of their equipping needs.
The Germans grumbled that the Austro-Hungarian Army was a poor second rate hand me down force.
Perhaps the best parts of the book are the parts devoted to strategic analysis, and in detailing the planning that went on in Berlin, Vienna, and the numerous Staff and field Army HQ's.
Both Berlin and Vienna-Budapest entered the war with abysmal strategic planning. In fact, only Russia had a strategic framework that was as ultimately disastrous as was that of the two main Central Powers states. All three Imperial powers suffered from weak and or incompetent Monarchical leadership, but at least the Russian High Command wasn't as badly riven by personal animosities, grudges, professional disputes and rivalries, and naked ambitions. (Though they, too, had their problems with this). After reading this work, it's a wonder that the Central Powers, specifically Germany, performed as well as they did, all things considered. One almost expects to read of a firefight breaking out amidst General Staff Officers any time their mentioned.
In the end, German tactical brilliance, and operational genius, a hallmark of both Wars, could not save them from a wretched strategy that doomed them. And while it's a familiar enough refrain, it is unique enough in the telling that makes this a valuable work.
Highly recommended.
More than just a mere narrative history of the war from the German and Hapsburg position, this is a very deep analysis of the strategic, military operational, industrial, diplomatic-political, and cultural aspect of the war. A close reading of this work confirms some already prevalent biases regarding the war.
The Imperial German Army was vastly superior to the Entente forces for much of the war, but was hamstrung by having an utterly bankrupt strategic framework for the war, and fought the war in a haphazard manner. Vienna lost its grip on the war before it ever began, with the Emperor Franz Josef being too weak to rein in his loose cannon Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf. And from the first weeks of the war, the Hapsburg forces were reliant upon the Germans, exponentially, to stay afloat.
There were, however, some few genuinely unique observations.
Despite having Emperor's as heads of state, both Germany and Austria-Hungary were at the mercy of strong willed Staff Officers, who had a habit of bullying their civilian overseers, and even at times their monarchs, in order to get their way. While it is common knowledge that Luddendorff and von Hindenburg ran Germany as an undeclared dictatorship from late 1916 onwards, this book makes clear that both men were machinating for their own high positions as early as the victory at Tannenberg against the Russians.
And if the Russians suffered under the indecisive leadership of a lackluster Czar, at least Russia wasn't held hostage by overly ambitious Staff Officers who all too often stopped caring over their national good, and played to their own ambitions.
Herwig demonstrates conclusively the fact that the Germans had, by late 1916, defeated Russia to the point of their collapse being a mere measure of time. But what Herwig showcases that I found revealing, was von Hindenburg and Luddendorff's non sanctioned plans to extend German control far to the east, for the object of a greater German Empire (the same project the National Socialists would carry over into the Second War). Following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Germans grabbed a huge swath of territory, to include all of Ukraine, much of Belarus, and the entirety of the Donbas region including Rostov as well as a springboard position into the Caucasus.
Even as early as 1917, many pre-Nazi Germans were already contemplating Lebensraum at Slavic expense.
Beyond military matters, the book delves deep into the economic aspects of the war, showcasing how much of the myth of the Entente Naval Blockade was fact, and what has been blown out of proportion. Germany, for example had the raw materials to make so many guns and small arms, that massive quantities rusted on rail cars due to lack of availability of manpower to use it all. Meanwhile, children starved and died from the lack of imported food goods.
Austria-Hungary failed to make nearly like enough to support itself, and for most of the war relied on Germany for all of their equipping needs.
The Germans grumbled that the Austro-Hungarian Army was a poor second rate hand me down force.
Perhaps the best parts of the book are the parts devoted to strategic analysis, and in detailing the planning that went on in Berlin, Vienna, and the numerous Staff and field Army HQ's.
Both Berlin and Vienna-Budapest entered the war with abysmal strategic planning. In fact, only Russia had a strategic framework that was as ultimately disastrous as was that of the two main Central Powers states. All three Imperial powers suffered from weak and or incompetent Monarchical leadership, but at least the Russian High Command wasn't as badly riven by personal animosities, grudges, professional disputes and rivalries, and naked ambitions. (Though they, too, had their problems with this). After reading this work, it's a wonder that the Central Powers, specifically Germany, performed as well as they did, all things considered. One almost expects to read of a firefight breaking out amidst General Staff Officers any time their mentioned.
In the end, German tactical brilliance, and operational genius, a hallmark of both Wars, could not save them from a wretched strategy that doomed them. And while it's a familiar enough refrain, it is unique enough in the telling that makes this a valuable work.
Highly recommended.
February 15, 2014
The popular academic study of World War One in English has long suffered a deficit in the number of publications that use German sources. Herwig's hefty tome comes as a welcome change to this. At 450 dense pages, only serious history buffs need apply.
Those willing to make the effort, however, will find their understanding of the war enriched and changed. While we are long accustomed to hearing criticisms of the Entente's General staff, the commanders of the Central Powers are shown to have made many key blunders and to be grossly out of touch with the reality on the ground.
Herwig goes through each year and campaign in detail, backed up with a wealth of primary sources. I could have used some more personal accounts--the ones he gives are gripping--but that's not really the focus here. He shows how the high command was influenced by politics, posturing, and unrealistic expectations. The incapacity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to wage war is well drawn, and Herwig knows just when to bring out a telling detail. For example, rubber was in such shortage that in 1917 the Hapsburg government requisitioned the pockets from all billiard tables!
Herwig takes us step by step through the evolving political, strategic, and tactical situations. A glossary of terms and key figures and some more detailed maps would have been helpful, but I can't bring myself to give this book fewer than five stars. It's essential reading for anyone who wants to truly understand the Great War in detail.
Those willing to make the effort, however, will find their understanding of the war enriched and changed. While we are long accustomed to hearing criticisms of the Entente's General staff, the commanders of the Central Powers are shown to have made many key blunders and to be grossly out of touch with the reality on the ground.
Herwig goes through each year and campaign in detail, backed up with a wealth of primary sources. I could have used some more personal accounts--the ones he gives are gripping--but that's not really the focus here. He shows how the high command was influenced by politics, posturing, and unrealistic expectations. The incapacity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to wage war is well drawn, and Herwig knows just when to bring out a telling detail. For example, rubber was in such shortage that in 1917 the Hapsburg government requisitioned the pockets from all billiard tables!
Herwig takes us step by step through the evolving political, strategic, and tactical situations. A glossary of terms and key figures and some more detailed maps would have been helpful, but I can't bring myself to give this book fewer than five stars. It's essential reading for anyone who wants to truly understand the Great War in detail.
November 23, 2017
Supposed to be a general history of WWI from the point of view of the two Germanic combatants. It's mostly an operational-level discussion (i.e., it treats campaigns). There is a fair amount of discussion of food shortages, but not much on politics overall. The author apparently wishes to disown the so-called "stab-in-the back" interpretation of the collapse of Germany (the notion put forward in the '20 by the senior military people in Germany who were in charge of the war that the German defeat was caused by leftist defeatism on the home front rather than by a straightforward defeat of the army in the field, which is sort of true, or by the failure of the strategic decisions of those military leaders, which is false), and so downplays any role of politics in the mutinies and loss of moral in 1918, which he wishes to attribute to purely local reasons rooted in people getting personally fed up with the war for merely material (rather than ideological) motives. While the endless privations no doubt were a contributing factor, it's absurd to make out that the troops and civilians who began to stop cooperating with the established order were not influenced by the events in Russia. In particular, the collapse is viewed from a purely military perspective, with the clear "villain" being Ludendorff and his unrealistic expectations and lack of a clear strategy in his last "toss of the dice" with the spring offensive in 1918. The empire just sort of ups and collapses in the fall, and there is only a cursory discussion of the actual (and somewhat surprising) way that the main stream social SPD party took over (and no discussion at all of what they'd been up to previously or who the USPD, the more hardcore Marxists, who actively advocated an end of the war, were).
It's sort of nice to see a reasonably detailed discussion of how the war looked from the Austrian side. The author actually gives a reasonable (or at least not openly hostile) discussion of the Hungarian side. He has no doubt that the war was generally bungled by the incompetence of the Austrian military establishment in general and the mind-boggling stupidity of Conrad von Hotzendorff in particular, but there's no particular discussion of why exactly the Austrian set-up was so defective to begin with or why they could never adopt the methods of their Prussian cousins to the north (whose military superiority was both obvious to the Austrian generals and resented by them). Oddly, while the Austrian point of view is described at some length in the earlier phases of the war and the German collapse in the west and at home is treated at some length, the Austrian collapse is treated in a rather cursory fashion.
As I said, the book concentrates on operations (that is, campaigns) and doesn't talk too much about overall strategy. There is, it is true, some discussion of both the failure of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914 and the squabbles involving Falkenhayn and the pair of Hindenburg/Ludendorff about how to win the war overall, but such issues don't get much prominence. There is virtually no discussion of naval issues (apart from some talk of the u-boat campaign and its implications). While there is of course a bit on the eventual conquest of Serbia and Romania and the defeat of the allied invasion of the Ottoman empire at Gallipoli, the overall strategic situation in the Balkans gets no treatment. The allied intervention in Greece and the involvement of both Bulgaria and Turkey pass practically unnoticed. To some extent this is understandable in a book that concentrates on Germany and the Dual Monarchy, but nonetheless, the decisions that were actually taken in terms of efforts to win the war (and the reasons for its loss) aren't put in proper perspective if you entirely omit important aspects of the conflict. Another reflex of this perspective is that not much is said about what the Germans were actually up to in Russia after the collapse of the old Tsarist military in the summer of 1918 (though Ludendorff is again blamed for tying up large numbers of troops in the east in the effort to secure territorial gains there rather than ship them all west to win the war in France).
Overall, I'd say the book would be better entitled something like, The German Powers in the First World War: How They Fought.
It's sort of nice to see a reasonably detailed discussion of how the war looked from the Austrian side. The author actually gives a reasonable (or at least not openly hostile) discussion of the Hungarian side. He has no doubt that the war was generally bungled by the incompetence of the Austrian military establishment in general and the mind-boggling stupidity of Conrad von Hotzendorff in particular, but there's no particular discussion of why exactly the Austrian set-up was so defective to begin with or why they could never adopt the methods of their Prussian cousins to the north (whose military superiority was both obvious to the Austrian generals and resented by them). Oddly, while the Austrian point of view is described at some length in the earlier phases of the war and the German collapse in the west and at home is treated at some length, the Austrian collapse is treated in a rather cursory fashion.
As I said, the book concentrates on operations (that is, campaigns) and doesn't talk too much about overall strategy. There is, it is true, some discussion of both the failure of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914 and the squabbles involving Falkenhayn and the pair of Hindenburg/Ludendorff about how to win the war overall, but such issues don't get much prominence. There is virtually no discussion of naval issues (apart from some talk of the u-boat campaign and its implications). While there is of course a bit on the eventual conquest of Serbia and Romania and the defeat of the allied invasion of the Ottoman empire at Gallipoli, the overall strategic situation in the Balkans gets no treatment. The allied intervention in Greece and the involvement of both Bulgaria and Turkey pass practically unnoticed. To some extent this is understandable in a book that concentrates on Germany and the Dual Monarchy, but nonetheless, the decisions that were actually taken in terms of efforts to win the war (and the reasons for its loss) aren't put in proper perspective if you entirely omit important aspects of the conflict. Another reflex of this perspective is that not much is said about what the Germans were actually up to in Russia after the collapse of the old Tsarist military in the summer of 1918 (though Ludendorff is again blamed for tying up large numbers of troops in the east in the effort to secure territorial gains there rather than ship them all west to win the war in France).
Overall, I'd say the book would be better entitled something like, The German Powers in the First World War: How They Fought.
August 1, 2020
Great history of the First World War from the perspective of Germany and Austria-Hungary. It does what the title says.
p. 11: "The Emperor had disliked Franz Ferdinand's morganatic marriage to Sophie Chotek."
p. 49: Clausewitz: "War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty."
p. 58: "It was said that Europe had created five perfect institutions: the Russian curia, the British Parliament, the Russian ballet, the French opera and the Prussian General Staff."
p. 99: "By 25 August Moltke was sufficiently confident of victory to detach two army corps to help hold the east against the Russians. He later conceded that this was his greatest mistake of the campaign."
p. 105: "Wilhelm II was 'very depressed' over the Marne, viewing the lost battle as 'the great turning point' in his life."
p. 114: "Open field warfare has degenerated into a sort of siege warfare -- without really being siege warfare."
p. 116: Falkenhayn's new maxim: "Hold on to what you have and never surrender a square foot of that which you have won."
p. 116: "Flexibility, one of the hallmarks of German military doctrine, was a victim of the war."
p. 131: "'Pillage like death,' as the historian John Lynn noted of an earlier struggle, 'arrives hand in hand with war'."
p. 181: "The main objective was to 'bleed' the French Army 'to death' (Blutabzapfung)."
p. 183: Falkenhayn: "The object is not to defeat but to annihilate France."
p. 197: Haig: The machine gun was a "much overrated weapon."
p. 198: "After Verdun and the Somme, military writers spoke of Materialschlachten (battles of material) that pitted machines and material against men."
p. 202: "Aleksei Alekseevich Brusilov was probably Imperial Russia's best officer of the Great War."
p. 207: "The disaster at Lutsk to all intents and purposes marked the end of Austria-Hungary as a great and independent power."
p. 231: "Attempts to mobilize the economy for war had foundered on political infighting, corruption, favouritism and the renowned Austrian Schlamperei (carelessness)."
p. 241: "Once more Conrad refused to allow reality to interfere with planning."
p. 247: "Army Corps VI, for example, reported that it fired one million artillery shells per month during the offensive -- with an effectiveness of one enemy casualty for 100 rounds."
p. 315: On April 6, 1917 the USA declared war on Germany.
p. 323: "'Third Ypres' became forever associated with Passchendaele, in the words of the military historian B.H. Liddell Hart, 'a synonym for military failure -- a name black-bordered in the records of the British army'."
p. 333: "The Battle of Caporetto was one of the Great War's most spectacular operational successes."
p. 334: On December 7, 1917 the USA declares war on Austria-Hungary.
p. 341: "Basically, this war comes down simply to killing one another." -- General Erich Ludendorff, April 1917
p. 347: "The annual loss of 100 per cent of pilots."
p. 355: "In June Vienna witnessed what has been called the 'great potato war' of 1918."
p. 366: "patriotic instruction" (Vaterlaandisher Unterrichtp. 406: "Whereas Lundendorff would later claim that 8 August … constituted the 'black day' of the German Army, Lossberg (and Groener) moved that date back to 18 July. With historical highsight, one can well argue that the tide had turned already by 29 March."
p. 410: "'stab-in-the-back' (Dolchstoss) legend that was to dog German politics in the post-war period."
p. 431: "One German soldier had died nearly every minute … of the war."
p. 434: Kriegshandwerk -- the planning and conducting of war
p. 11: "The Emperor had disliked Franz Ferdinand's morganatic marriage to Sophie Chotek."
p. 49: Clausewitz: "War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty."
p. 58: "It was said that Europe had created five perfect institutions: the Russian curia, the British Parliament, the Russian ballet, the French opera and the Prussian General Staff."
p. 99: "By 25 August Moltke was sufficiently confident of victory to detach two army corps to help hold the east against the Russians. He later conceded that this was his greatest mistake of the campaign."
p. 105: "Wilhelm II was 'very depressed' over the Marne, viewing the lost battle as 'the great turning point' in his life."
p. 114: "Open field warfare has degenerated into a sort of siege warfare -- without really being siege warfare."
p. 116: Falkenhayn's new maxim: "Hold on to what you have and never surrender a square foot of that which you have won."
p. 116: "Flexibility, one of the hallmarks of German military doctrine, was a victim of the war."
p. 131: "'Pillage like death,' as the historian John Lynn noted of an earlier struggle, 'arrives hand in hand with war'."
p. 181: "The main objective was to 'bleed' the French Army 'to death' (Blutabzapfung)."
p. 183: Falkenhayn: "The object is not to defeat but to annihilate France."
p. 197: Haig: The machine gun was a "much overrated weapon."
p. 198: "After Verdun and the Somme, military writers spoke of Materialschlachten (battles of material) that pitted machines and material against men."
p. 202: "Aleksei Alekseevich Brusilov was probably Imperial Russia's best officer of the Great War."
p. 207: "The disaster at Lutsk to all intents and purposes marked the end of Austria-Hungary as a great and independent power."
p. 231: "Attempts to mobilize the economy for war had foundered on political infighting, corruption, favouritism and the renowned Austrian Schlamperei (carelessness)."
p. 241: "Once more Conrad refused to allow reality to interfere with planning."
p. 247: "Army Corps VI, for example, reported that it fired one million artillery shells per month during the offensive -- with an effectiveness of one enemy casualty for 100 rounds."
p. 315: On April 6, 1917 the USA declared war on Germany.
p. 323: "'Third Ypres' became forever associated with Passchendaele, in the words of the military historian B.H. Liddell Hart, 'a synonym for military failure -- a name black-bordered in the records of the British army'."
p. 333: "The Battle of Caporetto was one of the Great War's most spectacular operational successes."
p. 334: On December 7, 1917 the USA declares war on Austria-Hungary.
p. 341: "Basically, this war comes down simply to killing one another." -- General Erich Ludendorff, April 1917
p. 347: "The annual loss of 100 per cent of pilots."
p. 355: "In June Vienna witnessed what has been called the 'great potato war' of 1918."
p. 366: "patriotic instruction" (Vaterlaandisher Unterrichtp. 406: "Whereas Lundendorff would later claim that 8 August … constituted the 'black day' of the German Army, Lossberg (and Groener) moved that date back to 18 July. With historical highsight, one can well argue that the tide had turned already by 29 March."
p. 410: "'stab-in-the-back' (Dolchstoss) legend that was to dog German politics in the post-war period."
p. 431: "One German soldier had died nearly every minute … of the war."
p. 434: Kriegshandwerk -- the planning and conducting of war
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 5, 2022
Growing up in Canada and as an English-speaking person, my sense of the First World War was largely from the Anglo-Canadian perspective. Early on in my understanding of the First World War the war was the Western Front. The Western Front was the central stage of the war and the importance of other locations paled in comparison. Overtime I learned that was an ignorant way to perceive the war. Even still, I found it easy to consider the war mostly from familiar perspectives.
For example, the German side of World War I is obviously a critical one, as is Austro-Hungary's, but in most histories those empires just suddenly collapse. The internal conditions with those two empires were clearly critical in understandingly the outcome of the war.
Holger H. Herwig writes the book to fill in, for English language readers, the other side of the war. The book is a detailed account of the diplomatic, political, military, economic, and social impacts of the First World War on the Central Powers. Though I consider myself reasonably well-versed in this subject I found myself learning new things each chapter. The home front components in particular were very enlightening, especially where Austria was concerned.
In many ways this book brought the tragedy of the war into a new light for me by humanizing and portraying in detail the suffering and meaninglessness of the loss for the Germans and Austrians on top of those of the Allies.
Herwig does an excellent job in building the narrative of the war as well as presenting detail and depth of the figures and events behind it.
I would highly recommend this book for those with an interest in World War I, German or Austrian history.
For example, the German side of World War I is obviously a critical one, as is Austro-Hungary's, but in most histories those empires just suddenly collapse. The internal conditions with those two empires were clearly critical in understandingly the outcome of the war.
Holger H. Herwig writes the book to fill in, for English language readers, the other side of the war. The book is a detailed account of the diplomatic, political, military, economic, and social impacts of the First World War on the Central Powers. Though I consider myself reasonably well-versed in this subject I found myself learning new things each chapter. The home front components in particular were very enlightening, especially where Austria was concerned.
In many ways this book brought the tragedy of the war into a new light for me by humanizing and portraying in detail the suffering and meaninglessness of the loss for the Germans and Austrians on top of those of the Allies.
Herwig does an excellent job in building the narrative of the war as well as presenting detail and depth of the figures and events behind it.
I would highly recommend this book for those with an interest in World War I, German or Austrian history.
November 20, 2017
Great Book... Ominous Story
This book about World War 1 caught my eye when I was looking for a new book for school. When I looked at it I thought it was going to be just another history book with nothing new to say, but I was pleasantly surprised. What will happen to The great empires of Germany and Austria-Hungry during and after World War 1?
This book is mainly about the German Empire and Austria-Hungary during WW1. It talks, not just about the armies, but also the governments and their respective people like Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Franz Joseph. It also talks about the industries, and their switch to wartime efforts. It points to the blunders of the leadership, and how they had a serious lack of food, fuel, and raw material, which hindered the ability to fight. It also tells how the economies of both countries during the war collapsed, and the collapse of the Empire of Austria-Hungary, and the defeat of Germany with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the repercussions after the war. I feel like this book shows how the countries often labeled the "bad guys" also had people who just lived their lives just like everyone else. In WW2 there was an obvious "bad" side, but in this war, WW1, it wasn't so black and white.
I believe that the author achieved most goals to portray what was happening in these countries during the war that ended them. This author, Holger H. Herwig, is a very credible author because he is a professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, and graduated from University of British Columbia, Stony Brook University. I feel like the biggest strength of this book was not trying to write about the whole war, but instead writing about just a fraction of the whole mess that was World War 1, but I believe that that was its greatest flaw as well because when the ideas went beyond the two countries it would abruptly stop to keep itself in the realm of what it was talking about instead of flushing out the whole idea.
This book left me with a good impression of the book. It was well crafted, and strongly written, though some things could be explored more. I would recommend this to anyone interested in history because it has some things that are less known about.
This book about World War 1 caught my eye when I was looking for a new book for school. When I looked at it I thought it was going to be just another history book with nothing new to say, but I was pleasantly surprised. What will happen to The great empires of Germany and Austria-Hungry during and after World War 1?
This book is mainly about the German Empire and Austria-Hungary during WW1. It talks, not just about the armies, but also the governments and their respective people like Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Franz Joseph. It also talks about the industries, and their switch to wartime efforts. It points to the blunders of the leadership, and how they had a serious lack of food, fuel, and raw material, which hindered the ability to fight. It also tells how the economies of both countries during the war collapsed, and the collapse of the Empire of Austria-Hungary, and the defeat of Germany with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the repercussions after the war. I feel like this book shows how the countries often labeled the "bad guys" also had people who just lived their lives just like everyone else. In WW2 there was an obvious "bad" side, but in this war, WW1, it wasn't so black and white.
I believe that the author achieved most goals to portray what was happening in these countries during the war that ended them. This author, Holger H. Herwig, is a very credible author because he is a professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, and graduated from University of British Columbia, Stony Brook University. I feel like the biggest strength of this book was not trying to write about the whole war, but instead writing about just a fraction of the whole mess that was World War 1, but I believe that that was its greatest flaw as well because when the ideas went beyond the two countries it would abruptly stop to keep itself in the realm of what it was talking about instead of flushing out the whole idea.
This book left me with a good impression of the book. It was well crafted, and strongly written, though some things could be explored more. I would recommend this to anyone interested in history because it has some things that are less known about.
August 17, 2018
I found this book to be interesting and informative, especially as it focuses on the (for English-speaking readers) largely unknown WW1 experience of Germany and Austria Hungary. That said, I must add that this is a book in desperate need of an editor. The author contradicts himself in several areas, and most irritatingly, he gives statistical information whose subtotals do not add up to the headline number. This is a shame, because it is clear Herwig did a lot of original research.
September 18, 2023
An interesting depiction of the war from Germany and Austria Hungary perspective. Highly detailed with descriptions of economic output, like eggs taken from conquest. The author does a good job of balancing fact and context. It does it’s job but maybe too dry if your not researching.
November 27, 2018
It's handy to have a WWI book that focuses on Germany and Austria-Hungary. You can learn about both the military and the home front.
August 3, 2021
Interesting read, will have to write a more detailed review in future.
February 7, 2024
3.75 / 5.0
Well written but overview wants for depth. Thought it would be more focused on Eastern Front and Austria-Hungary.
Well written but overview wants for depth. Thought it would be more focused on Eastern Front and Austria-Hungary.
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September 27, 2015Arguably the modern text on the subject of how the Central Powers conducted their end of the war and what the cultural impact of it upon them was. A sometimes heartbreaking work, but all the better for it.
January 7, 2014
Read this about a decade back. Changed my entire perspective on the war -- and much for the better!
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