This book has charts and footnotes. It was published September 2018, and is part of a series but can be read standalone.
“Three lessons are interwoven throughout the historical case studies of information operations during large-scale combat operations: 1. the focus is the information regardless of the capabilities employed to effect it; 2. successful information operations are operations integrated, synchronized, resourced and commander-led from inception to execution; and 3. information operations are, at their core, adversary/enemy-focused operations conducted to gain a relative advantage for friendly decision-makers…There is one final lesson or theme that runs through the case studies of LSCO: information operations are, at their core, adversary-focused. The 17 years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations gave rise to a population-centric focus for information operations while almost completely subsuming the adversary command and control elements of the doctrine. Only recently has this begun to change. Unified land operations occur in an operational environment dominated by civilians; their presence cannot be ignored or bypassed. However, first, the adversary must be defeated… Warfare is a human endeavor; it is a contest of wills. The focus of information operations during LSCO must be on defeating the adversary’s will. This can be accomplished directly, as during Operation Desert Storm where combined bombing and psychological operations dispirited thousands of Iraqi troops causing their surrender. Or more indirectly, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, US and Allied application of deception, electronic warfare, physical destruction, and cyberspace operations disrupted Iraqi command and control causing an absolute lack of situational understanding and inability to coordinate a defense by Iraqi leadership.
“…the first 10 chapters explore historical case studies of information operations during LSCO while the final chapter considers the future implications of information operations for LSCO. While many information-related capabilities are explored in the case studies, by no means do they present the definitive accounting. Some of the more technical or sensitive capabilities are not treated in as much depth as I would prefer due to considerations of security and classification. The case studies cover LSCO from World War II through recent conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. While the United States is prominent in most of the case studies, other nations’ operations in the information environment are explored as well, particularly those of the Russian Federation.”
This book includes: Chapter 1 The Logic of Information Operations (IO) in Large-Scale Combat Operations, Col. Christopher W. Lowe; Chapter 2 US Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Challenges and Implications for the Future Force, Maj. Justin B. Gorkowski; Chapter 3 The Fog of Russian Information Warfare, Lionel M. Beehner, Col. Liam S. Collins, and Robert T. Person; Chapter 4 Operation Starkey: The Invasion that Never Was, Col. Michael R. Taylor, Jr.; Chapter 5 The 1948 War For Palestine: “What Kind of War Was This?”, Sgt. First Class Brandon S. Riley, Michael E. Kitchens, and Col. Matthew J. Yandural; Chapter 6 Leaflets and Loudspeakers: The Role of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Large-Scale Combat Operations, Lt. Col. Andrew D. Whiskeyman; Chapter 8 Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations Operation Iraqi Freedom I, Col. (Retired) Carmine Cicalese; Chapter 9 The Cyber Crucible: Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Development of Modern Warfare, Wesley P. White; Chapter 10 Botnet Evolution during Modern-Day Large-Scale Combat Operations, Lt. Col. Rick A. Galeano, Katrin Galeano, Samer Al-Khateeb, Nitin Agarwal, and Lt. Col. James N.
The nature of war has not changed, but the character of war has inched further into the cognitive domain. This book does a great job capturing the concepts of information operations in large scale combat operations.