This is a history of operation Frantic in 1944-1945, the basing of American aircraft in Soviet territory, at and near Poltava in the Ukraine. Plokhy's account is focused on the signs of the emerging Cold War, driven as it is by study of the archives both Soviet and American intelligence and counter-intelligence services, as well as personal recollections. Through the archives of the SMERSH and MGB, a harsh light is cast on the attitudes of Stalin's regime.
Frantic is usually treated as a footnote in the history of WWII. Accounts of USAAF operations will briefly mention that with some difficulty the services obtained rights to base aircraft in the USSR, that on 22 June 1944 German bombers successfully attacked and destroyed many American aircraft on the ground, and that the operation was ended soon afterwards. From a purely operational and military perspective, that may not be a bad summary, but this book digs deeper and shows that there was a lot more to it.
Plokhy does not mention it, but this was not the USSR's first encounter with foreign soldiers operating from its bases. Secret clauses attached to the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 provided training opportunities for German soldiers at bases in the USSR, as the terms of the Treaty of Versailles did not allow this to happen in Germany itself. German officers ordered fifty Fokker D.XIII fighters in the Netherlands (officially for export to Brazil) to establish a secret flying school at Lipetsk, in western Russia. It remained operational until Hitler came to power, and you could say that for the USSR, this story did not play out well.
Thus there were at least some plausible reasons for suspicion when the Americans sought, and finally obtained, bases for their aircraft in the USSR. Soon, the repression and paranoia of Stalin's regime bred some more. While reading this detailed study, one gets to pity the Red Army officers at Poltava: If they were too friendly to the Americans, they became suspect as potential American spies in the eyes of the SMERSH; if they were too unfriendly, the counter-espionage service would entertain the idea that they were German spies or contra-revolutionaries trying to undermine the war effort. There was no way out and they naturally fell back on seeking approval for everything from Moscow, an attitude which infuriated the Americans. Plokhy's detailed accounting of the many twists and turns, suspicions and obstacles, shows how a relationship that at least locally started out with good will on both sides, comradeship and growing mutual respect, quickly sourced.
Plokhy sees the seeds of conflict in an incompatibility of political and cultural traditions. This seems a bit too generous. As he highlights in ample detail, an important reason for the failure of the personalities at Poltava to maintain good relations, was that the regime regarded such good relations as fundamentally undesirable. Any close contact with these foreigners, regardless of whether it was professional, social or sexual, made Soviet citizens and soldiers automatically suspect. These were not conditions that allowed the Russians, Ukrainians and Americans much leeway to resolve whatever differences they had about food, flying, sanitary conditions, or girls. I'd like to be a bit more optimistic than the author and surmise that in a friendlier environment, cultural bridges could have been built. While Plokhy suggests that the experience of Poltava seeded the Cold War in the minds of many of the people who participated in it, he is wise enough to mention that there were also other, bigger factors in the background, such as the fate of Poland.
Of course the Americans were in a privileged position, by and large - they could leave, and indeed the worst the SMERSH could do to them was to have them sent home. Plokhy extends his study to the post-war fate of some of the people who appear in his story. For the Soviet citizens and soldiers, there was no escape, and it makes for grim reading. One can see the twisted logic behind the secret service monitoring of women whose parents had been killed in Stalin's purges, who had dated German and American soldiers, and obviously had little reason to be loyal to the regime. But it was also relentlessly petty, the obsessive intrusiveness of a police state, designed more to intimidate than to prevent real espionage.
There are some downsides the focus of this book. I read this book in a translation to Dutch by Fred Reurs, which is good overall (there are some mangled sentences) and this may have introduced some errors that are not the original author's. Still, the books seems confused about the roles and responsibilities of the various USAAF officers, has some weird designation errors such as the "C-17" Skymaster (the C-47), and in general gives only the briefest possible account of the operations conducted as part of the project. But those are nitpicks.
This is a very readable and very human account of a forgotten corner of the war.