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Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War
Throughout the Gulf War of 1991, unprecedented restrictions on the media's access to the battlefield kept the true story of that brief, brutal conflict from being told. Now, after two years of intensive research, Rick Atkinson has written what will surely come to be recognized as the definitive chronicle of the war. Crusade follows the unfolding battle from the first night to the final day, providing vivid accounts of bombing runs and White House strategy sessions, firefights and bitter interservice conflicts. Weaving individual stories into the larger narrative, Atkinson represents the allied campaign against Saddam Hussein as a wholly new kind of war, one that has transformed the nature of modern warfare.
Running time: 24.52 hours
Running time: 24.52 hours
Audiobook
First published January 1, 1993
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About the author
Rick Atkinson
41 books1,805 followersRick Atkinson is the #1 New York Times bestselling author of seven works of history, including The Long Gray Line, the Liberation Trilogy (An Army at Dawn, The Day of Battle, and The Guns at Last Light), and The British Are Coming, the first volume of the Revolution Trilogy. His work as a historian and journalist has won numerous awards, including three Pulitzer Prizes.
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July 15, 2023
“The watchstander mashed the button. Nothing happened. Three seconds passed, four, five. The missile crewmen exchanged nervous glances. Seven, eight. With a low roar, white flame licked through three narrow exhaust vents securing the Tomahawk. The blunt nose burst through a yellow membrane covering the launcher and the eighteen-foot missile vaulted across the port beam. For an instant it hung tail down, the molten plume silvering the dark water, before springing toward the stars. A mile from the ship, the rocket booster fell away. Stubby wings popped from the fuselage and the jet engine ignited in a coil of thick smoke. The missile climbed to a thousand feet – high enough to clear any oil platforms in the gulf – and headed northwest…”
- Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War
For all its long-term consequences, the First Gulf War – pitting Iraq against a half dozen coalition nations, led by the United States – does not loom large in America’s national memory. After a brief, intense bout of flag-waving, the public started to forget almost immediately. They forgot so quickly that the patriotic boost in popularity for George H.W. Bush did not even last long enough for him to get a second term.
There are several reasons for this. For one, the war lasted only six weeks, and caused negligible American – and coalition – casualties. For another, the First Gulf War was followed by another war, much longer, much bloodier, and with far larger geopolitical consequences that arguably reordered the world.
Today, if the First Gulf War is recalled at all, it is as a precise, high-tech, relatively bloodless affair that demonstrated America’s newfound military prowess in the wake of the Vietnam War.
In Crusade, Rick Atkinson shows in great detail that this perception is far from the truth.
***
On August 2, 1990, Iraq – under the leadership of Saddam Hussein – invaded Kuwait, a much smaller, oil-rich nation roughly the size of the State of New Jersey. There were many reasons for Hussein’s precipitous decision, including a long-running border dispute, but the ultimate result was the annexing of Kuwait as an Iraqi province.
In making his move, Hussein banked on both Arab and Western apathy. This turned out to be a miscalculation. However, if you want to know about the work that went into building a coalition that included the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, France, and Saudi Arabia, you have to look elsewhere. What context Atkinson gives is extremely brief, amounting to only a handful of pages in a 500-page book.
Instead, Crusade unfolds in a purely chronological fashion that starts with the first day of battle. Given the brevity of the conflict, Atkinson is able to break it into discrete time periods. Parts one and three each cover a single week, while the middle section encompasses a month.
By the time I finished, I had a wonderful understanding of the war’s progression, of the planning that went into it, and of the strategic, operational, and tactical execution. Of why it started in the first place, though, I learned little.
***
The First Gulf War is an example of the concept of limited war. The most intense periods of combat came at the start, when coalition forces began dismantling Iraq’s air defense systems, and at the end, when the ground war – featuring the famed “Left Hook” – was finally unleashed.
With his background as a journalist, Atkinson chooses to tell his story through the people involved, from General H. Norman Schwarzkopf at the top, to the lowest ranking soldiers at the bottom. He introduces you to a lot of different characters, some who only show up briefly, others – such as captured American pilot David Eberly – given extended arcs.
This makes for an extremely vivid book. Though this is one of Atkinson’s earlier works, all the skills that he’d later bring to his epic, bestselling “Liberation Trilogy” are on display. He has a gift for description that makes his battle scenes come terribly alive, spectacles of horror and confusion and controlled panic. Obviously, no mere words can do justice to what Civil War veteran Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once called “the incommunicable experience of war,” but Atkinson probably comes as close as any other writer.
***
While this is chiefly a military history, Atkinson does not neglect the political angle during the war. For example, there are lengthy sections devoted to the United States’s attempt to keep Israel from responding to Iraq’s scud missile attacks, which Hussein believed might lead to a fracturing of the coalition. There is also the ongoing discussion of war aims, with certain civilian hawks wanting to depose Hussein, while the post-Vietnam military establishment sought only to throw Iraq out of Kuwait.
Published in 1993, Atkinson wrote this with absolutely no idea of what would happen ten years later, when America invaded Iraq without any endgame in mind. Thus, the issues he raises here are startlingly prescient.
***
Crusade is obviously a rather provocative title, given the real-life religious wars that began in the eleventh century. It’s important to note that Atkinson borrows the word from President Bush’s own formulation of the war as a moral crusade, and employs it with no small amount of skepticism.
Atkinson is writing as an American, and tells his story from that perspective. Crusade is massively researched, and is largely based on 500 interviews that he conducted. Most of those interviews, though, were with other Americans, meaning there is a noticeable imbalance to the presentation.
Despite that point of view, this is not reflexively jingoistic, even though it arrived in the shadow of the war’s aftermath. Atkinson is very clear-eyed about the war’s brutal reality, which was obscured at the time by the military’s effective propaganda campaign. He writes about the failures of the Patriot missile system; the questionable strategy of pounding Baghdad’s infrastructure; and the numerous civilian casualties caused by the coalition air campaigns, both directly and indirectly. Atkinson also devotes a lot of space to coalition friendly-fire incidents, which were rampant. As he notes, Americans were often in more danger from other Americans than from Iraq.
Atkinson is extremely good at finding the balance of honoring soldiers without glorifying battle, and is unafraid to criticize when it’s warranted. An example of this is the portrayal of General Schwarzkopf, who comes across as a temperamental jerk.
When the First Gulf War began, it pitted the world’s most sophisticated military against the world’s fourth largest army. It was hyped as a “modern” war, with precision munitions that allowed for surgical strikes so unlike the blunt, city-destroying air campaigns of the Second World War. Crusade lays bare the falsity of these claims. Now, as then, homes were destroyed, children were killed, and young men died screaming in the arms of their friends.
***
Crusade is necessarily a book without an ending, overtaken by subsequent events. Atkinson raises a lot of concerns about the war’s handling – and about the decision to undertake the war in the first place – but he obviously could not foresee the planes hitting those towers in New York one September day, those towers falling, and the endless wars that would follow, spawning terrorist networks, spreading paranoia, and knocking a superpower right off its perch.
Still, this is a riveting tale, told by the best narrative historian working today.
It is also – in light of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War – a helpful reminder that warfare remains much the same as when Sumer fought Elam some 4,700 years ago. Adding smart-bombs and computers and drones and cruise missiles does not change the underlying metrics of uncertainty, error, and misunderstanding that follows in the wake of stress, fear, and blood-lust. “War is cruelty,” General William T. Sherman once said, “And you cannot refine it.” It comes down to killing, a lot of it, and the innocent tend to die with the rest.
- Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War
For all its long-term consequences, the First Gulf War – pitting Iraq against a half dozen coalition nations, led by the United States – does not loom large in America’s national memory. After a brief, intense bout of flag-waving, the public started to forget almost immediately. They forgot so quickly that the patriotic boost in popularity for George H.W. Bush did not even last long enough for him to get a second term.
There are several reasons for this. For one, the war lasted only six weeks, and caused negligible American – and coalition – casualties. For another, the First Gulf War was followed by another war, much longer, much bloodier, and with far larger geopolitical consequences that arguably reordered the world.
Today, if the First Gulf War is recalled at all, it is as a precise, high-tech, relatively bloodless affair that demonstrated America’s newfound military prowess in the wake of the Vietnam War.
In Crusade, Rick Atkinson shows in great detail that this perception is far from the truth.
***
On August 2, 1990, Iraq – under the leadership of Saddam Hussein – invaded Kuwait, a much smaller, oil-rich nation roughly the size of the State of New Jersey. There were many reasons for Hussein’s precipitous decision, including a long-running border dispute, but the ultimate result was the annexing of Kuwait as an Iraqi province.
In making his move, Hussein banked on both Arab and Western apathy. This turned out to be a miscalculation. However, if you want to know about the work that went into building a coalition that included the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, France, and Saudi Arabia, you have to look elsewhere. What context Atkinson gives is extremely brief, amounting to only a handful of pages in a 500-page book.
Instead, Crusade unfolds in a purely chronological fashion that starts with the first day of battle. Given the brevity of the conflict, Atkinson is able to break it into discrete time periods. Parts one and three each cover a single week, while the middle section encompasses a month.
By the time I finished, I had a wonderful understanding of the war’s progression, of the planning that went into it, and of the strategic, operational, and tactical execution. Of why it started in the first place, though, I learned little.
***
The First Gulf War is an example of the concept of limited war. The most intense periods of combat came at the start, when coalition forces began dismantling Iraq’s air defense systems, and at the end, when the ground war – featuring the famed “Left Hook” – was finally unleashed.
With his background as a journalist, Atkinson chooses to tell his story through the people involved, from General H. Norman Schwarzkopf at the top, to the lowest ranking soldiers at the bottom. He introduces you to a lot of different characters, some who only show up briefly, others – such as captured American pilot David Eberly – given extended arcs.
This makes for an extremely vivid book. Though this is one of Atkinson’s earlier works, all the skills that he’d later bring to his epic, bestselling “Liberation Trilogy” are on display. He has a gift for description that makes his battle scenes come terribly alive, spectacles of horror and confusion and controlled panic. Obviously, no mere words can do justice to what Civil War veteran Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once called “the incommunicable experience of war,” but Atkinson probably comes as close as any other writer.
***
While this is chiefly a military history, Atkinson does not neglect the political angle during the war. For example, there are lengthy sections devoted to the United States’s attempt to keep Israel from responding to Iraq’s scud missile attacks, which Hussein believed might lead to a fracturing of the coalition. There is also the ongoing discussion of war aims, with certain civilian hawks wanting to depose Hussein, while the post-Vietnam military establishment sought only to throw Iraq out of Kuwait.
Published in 1993, Atkinson wrote this with absolutely no idea of what would happen ten years later, when America invaded Iraq without any endgame in mind. Thus, the issues he raises here are startlingly prescient.
***
Crusade is obviously a rather provocative title, given the real-life religious wars that began in the eleventh century. It’s important to note that Atkinson borrows the word from President Bush’s own formulation of the war as a moral crusade, and employs it with no small amount of skepticism.
Atkinson is writing as an American, and tells his story from that perspective. Crusade is massively researched, and is largely based on 500 interviews that he conducted. Most of those interviews, though, were with other Americans, meaning there is a noticeable imbalance to the presentation.
Despite that point of view, this is not reflexively jingoistic, even though it arrived in the shadow of the war’s aftermath. Atkinson is very clear-eyed about the war’s brutal reality, which was obscured at the time by the military’s effective propaganda campaign. He writes about the failures of the Patriot missile system; the questionable strategy of pounding Baghdad’s infrastructure; and the numerous civilian casualties caused by the coalition air campaigns, both directly and indirectly. Atkinson also devotes a lot of space to coalition friendly-fire incidents, which were rampant. As he notes, Americans were often in more danger from other Americans than from Iraq.
Atkinson is extremely good at finding the balance of honoring soldiers without glorifying battle, and is unafraid to criticize when it’s warranted. An example of this is the portrayal of General Schwarzkopf, who comes across as a temperamental jerk.
When the First Gulf War began, it pitted the world’s most sophisticated military against the world’s fourth largest army. It was hyped as a “modern” war, with precision munitions that allowed for surgical strikes so unlike the blunt, city-destroying air campaigns of the Second World War. Crusade lays bare the falsity of these claims. Now, as then, homes were destroyed, children were killed, and young men died screaming in the arms of their friends.
***
Crusade is necessarily a book without an ending, overtaken by subsequent events. Atkinson raises a lot of concerns about the war’s handling – and about the decision to undertake the war in the first place – but he obviously could not foresee the planes hitting those towers in New York one September day, those towers falling, and the endless wars that would follow, spawning terrorist networks, spreading paranoia, and knocking a superpower right off its perch.
Still, this is a riveting tale, told by the best narrative historian working today.
It is also – in light of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War – a helpful reminder that warfare remains much the same as when Sumer fought Elam some 4,700 years ago. Adding smart-bombs and computers and drones and cruise missiles does not change the underlying metrics of uncertainty, error, and misunderstanding that follows in the wake of stress, fear, and blood-lust. “War is cruelty,” General William T. Sherman once said, “And you cannot refine it.” It comes down to killing, a lot of it, and the innocent tend to die with the rest.
May 31, 2020
This is the first of Rick Atkinson's books that I've read. Amazing research. He manages to make the historical account of the Persian Gulf War seem almost like reading a Tom Clancy novel. From a fly-on-the-wall perspective in planning sessions, to combat on the ground and air, this chronicles events, political influences, and the personalities involved in the decision-making and fighting. Atkinson also does a great job of explaining strategy, and weapons systems without getting overly technical. Can't wait to read some of his works on World War II.
April 2, 2017
As a veteran of the Gulf War and a fan of Rick Atkinson's work, I was 24 years late in reading this book. I'm glad I finally did. There was much I learned that I had either forgotten or never knew about what was happening in other parts of the theater, including the two Navy ships that were severely damaged by mines. The accounts of all the friendly fire incidents--more than one quarter of Allied fatalities--were especially sobering. My only criticism is that there seemed to be some baffling omissions; for example, in spite of devoting several chapters to the plight of Col. David Eberly and other American POWs, Atkinson never once mentioned the occasions on which the Iraqis forced POWs to renounce the war on TV, for propaganda purposes. He also, incredibly, failed to mention the Battle of Kuwait International Airport and gave relatively little attention to the combat the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions experienced during their drive into Kuwait.
Still, overall this is a solid work of journalism and well worth reading for anyone wanting to learn more about the war.
Still, overall this is a solid work of journalism and well worth reading for anyone wanting to learn more about the war.
January 1, 2025
An unavoidably one-sided account of the Gulf War, which lays bare a few years after the events its major flaws: the faux ideological justification in a WWII veneer, the overkill born of overestimating the enemy, juxtaposed against the impossibility of toppling Saddam without sinking into a civil war quagmire.
On the plus side, the U.S. military got its groove back after nursing a decade of Vietnam syndrome. And Atkinson hones the pen he'll later apply to the EOT & the American Revolution. He knows how to zoom out to weigh the high command decisions, zoom in to tracers & sabots, with the occasional historical comparison for flavour. He always keeps the entertainment flowing.
On the plus side, the U.S. military got its groove back after nursing a decade of Vietnam syndrome. And Atkinson hones the pen he'll later apply to the EOT & the American Revolution. He knows how to zoom out to weigh the high command decisions, zoom in to tracers & sabots, with the occasional historical comparison for flavour. He always keeps the entertainment flowing.
November 19, 2023
A 25 hour unabridged audiobook.
How does one rate a book that covers such a broad period. The beginning was a slog. I believe the author wanted an authoritative book on the conflict, but naturally that could not be achieved without access to Iraqi commanders and archives. Overall I liked it. But there were moments where I found my attention drifting elsewhere.
How does one rate a book that covers such a broad period. The beginning was a slog. I believe the author wanted an authoritative book on the conflict, but naturally that could not be achieved without access to Iraqi commanders and archives. Overall I liked it. But there were moments where I found my attention drifting elsewhere.
May 25, 2016
This is probably the best military history of the Gulf War that I've come across. Atkinson is a fantastic writer. There's not a lot on the policy side, but Atkinson gives an engaging account of the war from multiple perspectives: American generals, field commanders, prisoners of war, and ordinary soldiers. He doesn't hold back on the brutality of what has been remembered as a clean war, but he's also very fair to the genuine desire of the leadership to limit casualties and collateral damage. The US military comes across as unbelievably deadly and effective in this book despite major ego and bureaucratic problems in the leadership. I could have used a little less detail in some areas (500 pages is a lot for a 1 month conflict), but overall I can strongly recommend this book to general enthusiasts in military history. It's more engaging than Trainor and Gordon's "The Generals' War," although that account is better if you want a more systematic exploration of how policies and strategies were made.
November 17, 2023
High-quality and well-written military history. Rick Atkinson, of Liberation Trilogy fame, first made a major name for himself with this comprehensive and thoughtful account of Gulf War I from a military (and, especially, American) perspective. And, just to make things fun, Atkinson has a talent for finding and telling entertaining stories about his characters, like when General Schwarzkopf appropriated one of only two toilets in the CENTCOM headquarters, that had a staff of hundreds, for his personal use. Or when the commander of XVII Airborne Corps, General Gary Luck, after being exhaustively briefed by the staff of the 101st on the plans for a massive and unprecedented helicopter assault, stood up and said, "Well men, you're about to make airmobile history. Don't fuck it up." Great stuff.
August 3, 2017
Excellent. I read Atkinson's trilogy on the US Army a few years ago and enjoyed them immensely. Atkinson's style is engaging and never dry. Crusade was no different.
The first Iraq War turned out to be a cake walk but Crusade illustrates that few recognized that at the time. As a result there is much tension, misgivings and not a few mistakes. I also learned that the technology was not what I thought it was when I watched the war unfold on TV.
Sadly, 340 Americans did die and many were "blue on blue" meaning they were killed by friendly fire in the confusion of battle.
In Crusade you get the high level view from Bush, Cheney, Powell and Schwarzkopf and rhe view from the pilots, sailors, Marines and grunts on the ground as well as insights into our allies.
This book will not disappoint.
The first Iraq War turned out to be a cake walk but Crusade illustrates that few recognized that at the time. As a result there is much tension, misgivings and not a few mistakes. I also learned that the technology was not what I thought it was when I watched the war unfold on TV.
Sadly, 340 Americans did die and many were "blue on blue" meaning they were killed by friendly fire in the confusion of battle.
In Crusade you get the high level view from Bush, Cheney, Powell and Schwarzkopf and rhe view from the pilots, sailors, Marines and grunts on the ground as well as insights into our allies.
This book will not disappoint.
November 26, 2020
One of the foremost aspects of contemporary historiography is the matter of untold stories. There seems to be an obsession among many who are historians or are interested in history that there are a lot of untold stories that need to be told. And yet in reading this ample-sized book, it is not as if the stories here have not, largely, been told. To give but a few examples of many, no one needs to be told that George H.W. Bush had the wimp strong about him, or that 93% of the bombs that were dropped on Iraq were dumb bombs and not smart bombs, or that the Iraqis did not seek to use hostages, including prisoners of war, as means of trying to secure the survival of buildings of military interest in the face of bombing. Nor is this book's study of friendly fire anything that is particularly new or striking in light of the fact that friendly fire was responsible for a considerable portion of the deaths of the Gulf War, which were also not nearly as much as was expected. Nor even was the bristly attitude of Schwarzkopf particularly surprising. Indeed, as far as the desire of the author to distinguish himself from any number of books that were written in the early to mid 1990's in the aftermath of the Gulf War, this book does not contain much in the way of new information that was not previously known.
This book begins in media res with a prologue and is then divided into three parts. The first part of the book covers the first week of the war, including chapters that deal with such matters as the dramatic bombing of the first night (1), the following day of conflict (2), the effect of the Scud missiles on Israel (3), the planning of the left hook against the Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq (4), and the Delta force efforts to chase down and eliminate the Scud missile launching areas (5). After this the second part of the book discusses the middle month of the war, from the special forces units that were operating in what was labeled as Mesopotamia (6), the Iraqi assault on Khafji and its aftermath (7), the war in Riyadh (8), the thought of the desert as a sea (9), the attack on Al Firdos (10), the political misadventures among coalition military command (11), and the preparation for the ground war (12). The last part of the work then consists of the last week of the war (III), with the life of prisoners at the Biltmore (13), the start of the ground assault (14), the success of the coalition in quickly reaching the Euphrates (15), the march of the coalition forces upcountry (16), the liberation of Kuwait (17), and the closing of the gates to surround the retreating Iraqi forces (18), after which the book ends with an author's note, acknowledgements, chronology, battle maps, notes, a bibliography, and an index.
What this book does, and does well, is tell a large amount of stories that have been gathered from a large amount of interviews. It is not so much the novelty of what has been told as much as the intimacy and the feeling that one is there listening to arguments taking place in the Allied camp or among journos upset at missing the big stories while the war is going on. What is perhaps most telling is that the interviews and thus the story are heavily slanted towards the side of the coalition forces, since there have not been the sorts of interviews with Saddam or the leaders of the Republican Guard divisions or the ordinary foot soldiers on the Iraqi side who faced the terror of being bombed to bits, buried under in their trenches if they did not surrender fast enough, and being strafed while they retreated. That would have been the sort of untold story of the Gulf War that was worth telling, the wide gulf between soldiers whose logistical systems worked and who could operate in basic safety from the threat of the opponent and the side which was so afraid of the lack of morale of its soldiers that there were rumors that soldiers were having their Achilles tendons cut to make it impossible for them to run away. That is an untold story that deserves to be told, indeed.
This book begins in media res with a prologue and is then divided into three parts. The first part of the book covers the first week of the war, including chapters that deal with such matters as the dramatic bombing of the first night (1), the following day of conflict (2), the effect of the Scud missiles on Israel (3), the planning of the left hook against the Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq (4), and the Delta force efforts to chase down and eliminate the Scud missile launching areas (5). After this the second part of the book discusses the middle month of the war, from the special forces units that were operating in what was labeled as Mesopotamia (6), the Iraqi assault on Khafji and its aftermath (7), the war in Riyadh (8), the thought of the desert as a sea (9), the attack on Al Firdos (10), the political misadventures among coalition military command (11), and the preparation for the ground war (12). The last part of the work then consists of the last week of the war (III), with the life of prisoners at the Biltmore (13), the start of the ground assault (14), the success of the coalition in quickly reaching the Euphrates (15), the march of the coalition forces upcountry (16), the liberation of Kuwait (17), and the closing of the gates to surround the retreating Iraqi forces (18), after which the book ends with an author's note, acknowledgements, chronology, battle maps, notes, a bibliography, and an index.
What this book does, and does well, is tell a large amount of stories that have been gathered from a large amount of interviews. It is not so much the novelty of what has been told as much as the intimacy and the feeling that one is there listening to arguments taking place in the Allied camp or among journos upset at missing the big stories while the war is going on. What is perhaps most telling is that the interviews and thus the story are heavily slanted towards the side of the coalition forces, since there have not been the sorts of interviews with Saddam or the leaders of the Republican Guard divisions or the ordinary foot soldiers on the Iraqi side who faced the terror of being bombed to bits, buried under in their trenches if they did not surrender fast enough, and being strafed while they retreated. That would have been the sort of untold story of the Gulf War that was worth telling, the wide gulf between soldiers whose logistical systems worked and who could operate in basic safety from the threat of the opponent and the side which was so afraid of the lack of morale of its soldiers that there were rumors that soldiers were having their Achilles tendons cut to make it impossible for them to run away. That is an untold story that deserves to be told, indeed.
July 14, 2024
This was pretty good. I learned a decent amount about this war and how it shaped the Middle East. Frankly, it is not particularly interesting period for me and the book made it more appealing which was nice. The author used lots of different quotes and excerpts which was helpful because it gave these “characters” depth, especially men like Stormin’ Norman and Richard Cheney.
Honestly, this entire war was just one big bombing campaign. Fly high, hit some electrical stations, and fly home. Hit some oil fields and fly faster. The F-15E’s and F-16’s are fun to read about and the role they played cannot be underscored. Great aircraft.
Unsurprisingly, we killed tens of thousands of Iraqis and Kuwaitis. Lots of civilians. Highway of Death certainly was not our proudest moment. Events like that are typical when you understand that the people pushing for this war were named Bush and Thatcher.
The immediate goal of “liberating” Kuwait was accomplished but what else? Did the US establish its dominance in the ME? We certainly secured more oil interests, shocking. The limited scope and objectives of the war prevented Saddam from being killed. We would need and want a much larger war to do that, of course.
Certainly an important historical event and the book was a good read but not the most compelling historical event for me. The chapters and structure of the book were a bit odd but overall the style was nice.
Honestly, this entire war was just one big bombing campaign. Fly high, hit some electrical stations, and fly home. Hit some oil fields and fly faster. The F-15E’s and F-16’s are fun to read about and the role they played cannot be underscored. Great aircraft.
Unsurprisingly, we killed tens of thousands of Iraqis and Kuwaitis. Lots of civilians. Highway of Death certainly was not our proudest moment. Events like that are typical when you understand that the people pushing for this war were named Bush and Thatcher.
The immediate goal of “liberating” Kuwait was accomplished but what else? Did the US establish its dominance in the ME? We certainly secured more oil interests, shocking. The limited scope and objectives of the war prevented Saddam from being killed. We would need and want a much larger war to do that, of course.
Certainly an important historical event and the book was a good read but not the most compelling historical event for me. The chapters and structure of the book were a bit odd but overall the style was nice.
June 15, 2020
Solid, readable history. Very US-centric point-of-view but well written.
October 17, 2025
Rick Atkinson’s *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* is a paradox of clarity — a vast war seen through the narrowing lens of human intent and systemic confusion. It’s a book that does not merely record the events of 1991; it dissects them with surgical patience, like a post-mortem of modern warfare’s soul.
Atkinson writes not as a war correspondent scavenging for adrenaline or heroism, but as a chronicler of systems — the kind of writer who knows that wars are fought as much by logistics officers and analysts as by soldiers in the sand. His prose is dry in tone but electric in implication, the kind that strips away the mirage of patriotism and replaces it with something far more disturbing — competence colliding with chaos in real time.
The first thing that strikes a reader about *Crusade* is its architecture. Atkinson is obsessed with sequence — not simply in terms of chronology but in terms of consequence. The book is structured like a long, unbroken report of interlinked nerve impulses, where each decision made in an air-conditioned command center in Riyadh or Washington echoes miles away in the cracked helmets and bombed convoys of the Iraqi desert.
This structure has the rhythm of inevitability: the war, once begun, seems to move forward by inertia rather than moral conviction. Atkinson crafts this sense deliberately — by flattening the grandeur of battle into a bureaucratic process, he forces the reader to confront how technological warfare dehumanizes not only the enemy but also its own architects.
Atkinson’s craft thrives in juxtaposition. He lets small moments of absurdity and irony rise to the surface of vast geopolitical machinery. A commander’s clipped briefing contrasts with the shell-shocked testimony of a soldier on the ground; the precision of the Patriot missile is offset by the vagueness of political objectives.
What he achieves is a tone of deliberate dissonance, a kind of quiet moral exhaustion that permeates every page. This tone sets *Crusade* apart from other Gulf War chronicles — it neither glorifies nor condemns outright; it simply observes until the observation itself becomes an indictment. His reportage works like a long-range reconnaissance mission — distant enough to see the whole, close enough to notice the dust in the gears.
In one sense, *Crusade* is about language — about how the vocabulary of modern war distorts reality. Atkinson captures how phrases like “surgical strike” or “collateral damage” became the linguistic armor of a conflict waged under television lights. His sentences often sound clinical, yet they hide an undertow of bitterness.
When he writes of precision bombing or air dominance, there’s always a shadow of irony — an awareness that precision is still destruction, that dominance is still death. The book’s tone is a strange blend of detachment and grief, as if Atkinson knows that truth can only be spoken once emotion is disciplined out of it.
The strength of *Crusade* lies in its layered perspective. Atkinson moves from the Pentagon to the desert, from the generals’ psychological profiles to the soldiers’ field anecdotes, without losing narrative cohesion. This movement is not merely a change of scene — it’s a moral oscillation. He refuses to let the reader stay comfortable in one viewpoint.
Just when you start to see the war as strategy, he drags you back into the mud and sand of Basra. When you start feeling pity for the foot soldiers, he brings you face to face with the cold intelligence of war planning. The effect is dizzying — deliberately so. Atkinson wants his readers to feel the vertigo of modern command: the sense that you’re both in control and lost inside your own systems.
One of Atkinson’s most subtle achievements is his portrayal of leadership. He avoids caricatures — the generals are neither villains nor heroes but men trapped inside the momentum of their own competence. Schwarzkopf, Powell, and Cheney appear not as mythic figures but as components of a large operational algorithm.
Their decisions, stripped of rhetoric, often feel procedural, like inputs into a machine that cannot be turned off. Atkinson’s tone toward them is one of wary respect tinged with melancholy — he seems to admire their efficiency while mourning the moral emptiness that efficiency breeds. In that sense, *Crusade* is not a war book; it’s a systems novel disguised as military history.
The prose itself is both muscular and restrained. Atkinson’s sentences are taut, occasionally lyrical but never indulgent. His metaphors are sparse, his imagery sharp but unsentimental. This restraint is crucial — it mirrors the very discipline the war demanded from its participants. Yet beneath that restraint lies an almost elegiac rhythm.
There’s a quiet mourning that runs through his descriptions of night raids, fuel convoys, or desert encampments. He writes with the awareness that every operational success hides an emotional loss, that every victory briefing echoes against the silence of something unnamed. His narrative voice doesn’t shout; it hums — a low, constant vibration of unease.
What distinguishes *Crusade* from Swofford’s *Jarhead* or McNab’s *Bravo Two Zero* is its distance from personal confession. Atkinson doesn’t participate; he curates. His authority comes from observation, from the precision of details rather than the heat of experience. Yet paradoxically, this distance produces a deeper intimacy with the truth.
He exposes the patterns of behaviour, the machinery of command, the rituals of war reporting — and in doing so, he turns war into a study of institutional psychology. The Gulf War, in his telling, is not about bravery or trauma but about organization — how human emotion is processed, categorized, and sterilized by policy. It’s the ultimate modern paradox: a moral event turned into a managerial task.
Reading *Crusade* in hindsight, one realizes how prophetic Atkinson was. The precision wars of the twenty-first century — Afghanistan, Iraq, the drone operations — all echo the patterns he identified in 1993. His descriptions of command hierarchies, technological overconfidence, and media manipulation read today like premonitions. Atkinson wasn’t merely reporting the Gulf War; he was diagnosing the future of warfare itself.
The way he frames the military’s obsession with control feels eerily relevant in an age where algorithms decide targeting and wars are livestreamed. The book’s structure — analytical yet narrative — thus becomes its own moral argument: that modern war, no matter how mechanized, remains a deeply human failure of imagination.
Atkinson’s sense of irony is devastating. He documents how the so-called “clean war” left behind toxic remnants — not just ecological, but psychological and political. The coalition’s triumph, so gloriously televised, gave birth to myths of invincibility that would later fracture in Iraq and Afghanistan. Atkinson doesn’t say this directly, but you can feel it between the lines: the seeds of future disasters were sown in the precision of 1991. This subtle layering of hindsight and immediacy is one of the book’s greatest strengths. *Crusade* reads like both history and premonition, as if Atkinson is writing about a ghost war that hasn’t ended yet.
There’s also a strange beauty in his neutrality. He refuses to moralize overtly, yet his restraint becomes its own moral stance. When he describes the bombing campaigns, the long convoys of Iraqi soldiers surrendering, or the diplomatic theater in Washington, his voice never trembles — but the reader’s does. The emotional impact comes not from sentiment but from precision. Every statistic, every radio code, every operational update carries a quiet weight. Atkinson understands that numbers can be more haunting than adjectives. He uses data like a poet uses silence — to make absence felt.
The title, *Crusade*, is deliberately ironic. It evokes the moral grandeur that the Gulf War sought to project — a righteous intervention to liberate Kuwait, restore order, and reassert American power. But Atkinson’s narrative dismantles that illusion. There’s no crusade here, only logistics. The soldiers march not under banners of faith but under spreadsheets of supply. The irony cuts deep: the war that promised clarity ends up defining ambiguity. The very term “crusade” becomes a historical parody, revealing how language sanctifies violence.
Atkinson’s eye for the absurd is impeccable. He captures the moments when technology betrays its users, when high command misreads terrain data, when soldiers joke to keep madness at bay. These moments, though small, humanize the machinery. They remind us that beneath every acronym — CENTCOM, AWACS, J-STARS — there are bodies, voices, and fears. Atkinson’s genius lies in balancing this scale — he neither romanticizes nor dehumanizes, but allows irony and empathy to coexist. That duality gives the book its lingering tension.
As the narrative unfolds, Atkinson’s restraint begins to feel like sorrow. You can sense his disbelief at how detached warfare has become — how a generation trained on Vietnam’s chaos has now perfected the art of antiseptic destruction. There’s a passage-like rhythm in his pacing, a deliberate slowing down during moments of success, as if he’s forcing the reader to notice the moral stillness behind the noise. When he describes the end of the war — the ceasefire, the jubilation, the televised speeches — there’s no catharsis, only a sense of unfinished reckoning. The war is over, but the questions remain suspended in the air, unresolved and unanswered.
By the time one finishes *Crusade*, what remains is not just knowledge of the Gulf War but an understanding of how narrative can itself be an act of resistance. Atkinson refuses the easy arc of victory; instead, he builds a narrative of complexity, contradiction, and fatigue. His style, though restrained, carries the emotional force of someone who knows that clarity can wound more deeply than outrage. The book’s power lies in its refusal to dramatize — it confronts the reader with the raw geometry of decisions, the cold syntax of command, and the faint moral tremors beneath every line of official speech.
If Swofford’s *Jarhead* was the soldier’s scream and McNab’s *Bravo Two Zero* the operative’s confession, then *Crusade* is the historian’s sigh — an exhale of precision that turns into lament. It is the necessary counterpart to those first-person narratives: the macro to their micro, the logic to their emotion. But Atkinson’s logic is not cold; it’s haunted. He writes with the kind of lucidity that only comes from moral exhaustion — the understanding that the more one knows about war, the less sense it makes.
And that’s the lasting brilliance of *Crusade*: it turns the machinery of reportage into a meditation on knowledge itself. What does it mean to “understand” a war that was designed to be understood only through sanitized media images and Pentagon briefings?
Atkinson’s book becomes an act of reclamation — of truth from spectacle, of narrative from propaganda. He gives us the war not as it was shown but as it was lived, layered, and misremembered. In doing so, he restores the one thing war always erases — nuance.
Atkinson writes not as a war correspondent scavenging for adrenaline or heroism, but as a chronicler of systems — the kind of writer who knows that wars are fought as much by logistics officers and analysts as by soldiers in the sand. His prose is dry in tone but electric in implication, the kind that strips away the mirage of patriotism and replaces it with something far more disturbing — competence colliding with chaos in real time.
The first thing that strikes a reader about *Crusade* is its architecture. Atkinson is obsessed with sequence — not simply in terms of chronology but in terms of consequence. The book is structured like a long, unbroken report of interlinked nerve impulses, where each decision made in an air-conditioned command center in Riyadh or Washington echoes miles away in the cracked helmets and bombed convoys of the Iraqi desert.
This structure has the rhythm of inevitability: the war, once begun, seems to move forward by inertia rather than moral conviction. Atkinson crafts this sense deliberately — by flattening the grandeur of battle into a bureaucratic process, he forces the reader to confront how technological warfare dehumanizes not only the enemy but also its own architects.
Atkinson’s craft thrives in juxtaposition. He lets small moments of absurdity and irony rise to the surface of vast geopolitical machinery. A commander’s clipped briefing contrasts with the shell-shocked testimony of a soldier on the ground; the precision of the Patriot missile is offset by the vagueness of political objectives.
What he achieves is a tone of deliberate dissonance, a kind of quiet moral exhaustion that permeates every page. This tone sets *Crusade* apart from other Gulf War chronicles — it neither glorifies nor condemns outright; it simply observes until the observation itself becomes an indictment. His reportage works like a long-range reconnaissance mission — distant enough to see the whole, close enough to notice the dust in the gears.
In one sense, *Crusade* is about language — about how the vocabulary of modern war distorts reality. Atkinson captures how phrases like “surgical strike” or “collateral damage” became the linguistic armor of a conflict waged under television lights. His sentences often sound clinical, yet they hide an undertow of bitterness.
When he writes of precision bombing or air dominance, there’s always a shadow of irony — an awareness that precision is still destruction, that dominance is still death. The book’s tone is a strange blend of detachment and grief, as if Atkinson knows that truth can only be spoken once emotion is disciplined out of it.
The strength of *Crusade* lies in its layered perspective. Atkinson moves from the Pentagon to the desert, from the generals’ psychological profiles to the soldiers’ field anecdotes, without losing narrative cohesion. This movement is not merely a change of scene — it’s a moral oscillation. He refuses to let the reader stay comfortable in one viewpoint.
Just when you start to see the war as strategy, he drags you back into the mud and sand of Basra. When you start feeling pity for the foot soldiers, he brings you face to face with the cold intelligence of war planning. The effect is dizzying — deliberately so. Atkinson wants his readers to feel the vertigo of modern command: the sense that you’re both in control and lost inside your own systems.
One of Atkinson’s most subtle achievements is his portrayal of leadership. He avoids caricatures — the generals are neither villains nor heroes but men trapped inside the momentum of their own competence. Schwarzkopf, Powell, and Cheney appear not as mythic figures but as components of a large operational algorithm.
Their decisions, stripped of rhetoric, often feel procedural, like inputs into a machine that cannot be turned off. Atkinson’s tone toward them is one of wary respect tinged with melancholy — he seems to admire their efficiency while mourning the moral emptiness that efficiency breeds. In that sense, *Crusade* is not a war book; it’s a systems novel disguised as military history.
The prose itself is both muscular and restrained. Atkinson’s sentences are taut, occasionally lyrical but never indulgent. His metaphors are sparse, his imagery sharp but unsentimental. This restraint is crucial — it mirrors the very discipline the war demanded from its participants. Yet beneath that restraint lies an almost elegiac rhythm.
There’s a quiet mourning that runs through his descriptions of night raids, fuel convoys, or desert encampments. He writes with the awareness that every operational success hides an emotional loss, that every victory briefing echoes against the silence of something unnamed. His narrative voice doesn’t shout; it hums — a low, constant vibration of unease.
What distinguishes *Crusade* from Swofford’s *Jarhead* or McNab’s *Bravo Two Zero* is its distance from personal confession. Atkinson doesn’t participate; he curates. His authority comes from observation, from the precision of details rather than the heat of experience. Yet paradoxically, this distance produces a deeper intimacy with the truth.
He exposes the patterns of behaviour, the machinery of command, the rituals of war reporting — and in doing so, he turns war into a study of institutional psychology. The Gulf War, in his telling, is not about bravery or trauma but about organization — how human emotion is processed, categorized, and sterilized by policy. It’s the ultimate modern paradox: a moral event turned into a managerial task.
Reading *Crusade* in hindsight, one realizes how prophetic Atkinson was. The precision wars of the twenty-first century — Afghanistan, Iraq, the drone operations — all echo the patterns he identified in 1993. His descriptions of command hierarchies, technological overconfidence, and media manipulation read today like premonitions. Atkinson wasn’t merely reporting the Gulf War; he was diagnosing the future of warfare itself.
The way he frames the military’s obsession with control feels eerily relevant in an age where algorithms decide targeting and wars are livestreamed. The book’s structure — analytical yet narrative — thus becomes its own moral argument: that modern war, no matter how mechanized, remains a deeply human failure of imagination.
Atkinson’s sense of irony is devastating. He documents how the so-called “clean war” left behind toxic remnants — not just ecological, but psychological and political. The coalition’s triumph, so gloriously televised, gave birth to myths of invincibility that would later fracture in Iraq and Afghanistan. Atkinson doesn’t say this directly, but you can feel it between the lines: the seeds of future disasters were sown in the precision of 1991. This subtle layering of hindsight and immediacy is one of the book’s greatest strengths. *Crusade* reads like both history and premonition, as if Atkinson is writing about a ghost war that hasn’t ended yet.
There’s also a strange beauty in his neutrality. He refuses to moralize overtly, yet his restraint becomes its own moral stance. When he describes the bombing campaigns, the long convoys of Iraqi soldiers surrendering, or the diplomatic theater in Washington, his voice never trembles — but the reader’s does. The emotional impact comes not from sentiment but from precision. Every statistic, every radio code, every operational update carries a quiet weight. Atkinson understands that numbers can be more haunting than adjectives. He uses data like a poet uses silence — to make absence felt.
The title, *Crusade*, is deliberately ironic. It evokes the moral grandeur that the Gulf War sought to project — a righteous intervention to liberate Kuwait, restore order, and reassert American power. But Atkinson’s narrative dismantles that illusion. There’s no crusade here, only logistics. The soldiers march not under banners of faith but under spreadsheets of supply. The irony cuts deep: the war that promised clarity ends up defining ambiguity. The very term “crusade” becomes a historical parody, revealing how language sanctifies violence.
Atkinson’s eye for the absurd is impeccable. He captures the moments when technology betrays its users, when high command misreads terrain data, when soldiers joke to keep madness at bay. These moments, though small, humanize the machinery. They remind us that beneath every acronym — CENTCOM, AWACS, J-STARS — there are bodies, voices, and fears. Atkinson’s genius lies in balancing this scale — he neither romanticizes nor dehumanizes, but allows irony and empathy to coexist. That duality gives the book its lingering tension.
As the narrative unfolds, Atkinson’s restraint begins to feel like sorrow. You can sense his disbelief at how detached warfare has become — how a generation trained on Vietnam’s chaos has now perfected the art of antiseptic destruction. There’s a passage-like rhythm in his pacing, a deliberate slowing down during moments of success, as if he’s forcing the reader to notice the moral stillness behind the noise. When he describes the end of the war — the ceasefire, the jubilation, the televised speeches — there’s no catharsis, only a sense of unfinished reckoning. The war is over, but the questions remain suspended in the air, unresolved and unanswered.
By the time one finishes *Crusade*, what remains is not just knowledge of the Gulf War but an understanding of how narrative can itself be an act of resistance. Atkinson refuses the easy arc of victory; instead, he builds a narrative of complexity, contradiction, and fatigue. His style, though restrained, carries the emotional force of someone who knows that clarity can wound more deeply than outrage. The book’s power lies in its refusal to dramatize — it confronts the reader with the raw geometry of decisions, the cold syntax of command, and the faint moral tremors beneath every line of official speech.
If Swofford’s *Jarhead* was the soldier’s scream and McNab’s *Bravo Two Zero* the operative’s confession, then *Crusade* is the historian’s sigh — an exhale of precision that turns into lament. It is the necessary counterpart to those first-person narratives: the macro to their micro, the logic to their emotion. But Atkinson’s logic is not cold; it’s haunted. He writes with the kind of lucidity that only comes from moral exhaustion — the understanding that the more one knows about war, the less sense it makes.
And that’s the lasting brilliance of *Crusade*: it turns the machinery of reportage into a meditation on knowledge itself. What does it mean to “understand” a war that was designed to be understood only through sanitized media images and Pentagon briefings?
Atkinson’s book becomes an act of reclamation — of truth from spectacle, of narrative from propaganda. He gives us the war not as it was shown but as it was lived, layered, and misremembered. In doing so, he restores the one thing war always erases — nuance.
April 27, 2021
This book was perfectly mediocre. It didn't blow my mind, but I also listened to the whole thing in seven straight days. The narrator consistently mispronounced things, but his American accent combined with an apparent disregard for proper pronunciation and emphasis made me feel like I was listening the story straight from the mouth of one of the war's generals.
This book isn't bad nor is it boring. But somewhere between the writing and the delivery, it failed to impress me. I did, however, learn a great deal about the Gulf War, the politics behind it, and the brief-but-effective ground campaign that left many feeling we left Iraq with the job still undone. My greatest takeaway is that the Gulf War deserves the almost-footnote status it possesses in current American thought. But at the time, the war proved to many Americans that our military was still very capable after the debacle in Vietnam. It was the first war the United States had engaged in since Vietnam and it was an absolutely stunning victory. But still it was overblown. President George HW Bush insisted Saddam Hussein was the worst person since Hitler (an assertion the author never fails to ridicule for its hyperbole).
Second only to the above, the next biggest takeaway was how awful General Schwarzkopf was. As a commander, he excelled. But as a boss and a person, I can't help but think that his power and prestige went straight to his head. His proud and haughty demeanor really turned me off. I can't imagine working for someone as stubborn, angry, and belligerent as General Schwarzkopf. If only half the stories in this book are true, he would be an absolute nightmare to work under.
Where this book really shines is the brief ground campaign. While this section only last a few chapters (it only lasted a few weeks), I can't help but feel that the author would excel at writing WWII history. The military engagements recorded in these pages are rewarding to read and left me with a clear picture in my mind's eye as to what happened and what the consequences were. Unfortunately for the author, most of the footwork in Desert Storm seems to have been administrative and political, and Atkinson's retelling of those experiences was alright.
If you're interested in learning more about the Gulf War, this book is a good place to start. It isn't amazing, but it's not bad either. It just is.
This book isn't bad nor is it boring. But somewhere between the writing and the delivery, it failed to impress me. I did, however, learn a great deal about the Gulf War, the politics behind it, and the brief-but-effective ground campaign that left many feeling we left Iraq with the job still undone. My greatest takeaway is that the Gulf War deserves the almost-footnote status it possesses in current American thought. But at the time, the war proved to many Americans that our military was still very capable after the debacle in Vietnam. It was the first war the United States had engaged in since Vietnam and it was an absolutely stunning victory. But still it was overblown. President George HW Bush insisted Saddam Hussein was the worst person since Hitler (an assertion the author never fails to ridicule for its hyperbole).
Second only to the above, the next biggest takeaway was how awful General Schwarzkopf was. As a commander, he excelled. But as a boss and a person, I can't help but think that his power and prestige went straight to his head. His proud and haughty demeanor really turned me off. I can't imagine working for someone as stubborn, angry, and belligerent as General Schwarzkopf. If only half the stories in this book are true, he would be an absolute nightmare to work under.
Where this book really shines is the brief ground campaign. While this section only last a few chapters (it only lasted a few weeks), I can't help but feel that the author would excel at writing WWII history. The military engagements recorded in these pages are rewarding to read and left me with a clear picture in my mind's eye as to what happened and what the consequences were. Unfortunately for the author, most of the footwork in Desert Storm seems to have been administrative and political, and Atkinson's retelling of those experiences was alright.
If you're interested in learning more about the Gulf War, this book is a good place to start. It isn't amazing, but it's not bad either. It just is.
October 1, 2019
Crusade by Rick Atkinson is the book by which all other books about the Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) should be judged. It is an authoritative account of this war. A detailed and explicitly honest telling of a war many have forgotten. Once claimed a technological war, which it was, but also a gritty in your face ground war with very real human interactions between foes. In context of Afghanistan’s long war or the second Iraq war, the Gulf War may seem small or insignificant but those that were there would completely disagree. To them, their battles, friends lost or injured, or the memories that haunt them, this was was no less than any other. This book does a fantastic job of making sure the reader understands its significance. Crusade also does a great job of looking at this war from all aspects politically, militarily, socially, and monetarily. Of which Rick Atkinson does a superb job of explaining in such literary style as to keep the reader interested though it all. A great book, a must read if your interested in the Gulf War.
December 29, 2014
I've run out of superlatives to describe Rick Atkinson's skills as a war-history writer. His research is detailed, his writing is compelling, he's a good story-teller and his historical judgments are sound. The 1991 Persian Gulf war re-established the American military as a respected, competent and professional force following 20 years of ill-feelings and resentments following the Vietnam debacle. Atkinson shows the reader that the American military learned those hard Vietnam lessons very well. I know of no other war in American history where the US military was even close to being prepared - the story of those preparations was intriguing.
War is never executed flawlessly, but in Iraq 1 we came very close.
Its a really good book and a good story too.
War is never executed flawlessly, but in Iraq 1 we came very close.
Its a really good book and a good story too.
May 27, 2015
This is a revelatory look at the military planning and early execution of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the first Gulf War to free Kuwait. The inter-service rivalry is unnecessary and disheartening. The personal stories of coalition captives and the resourceful use of Vietnam-era infrared tech to locate and destroy Iraqi armor adds a lot of depth to this military history. This book adds a lot of depth to Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief, showing him to have his own curious affectation for niceties rather unexpected for this "stormin'" and ground-truth publicity. There is also the build-up to the publicity coup of the false planned amphibious landing.
November 22, 2015
This overview of the military events of the First War with Iraq contains a mostly American perspective and thus is familiar to me. To me, this conflict is seared into memory because of the precise destruction of targets as demonstrated by a military leader on television. Things like laser-guided munitions, bunker-penetrating bombs, and armed calvary speed were visually demonstrated every evening on the nightly televison programs. This book reveals the degree of planning and precision that made those events possible, and the book also demonstrates that war is cruel, deadly, and often filled with confusion and hunches.
I question what sources the author used as I listened to this in audio form.
I question what sources the author used as I listened to this in audio form.
July 12, 2023
Atkinson is one of the great historians in the tradition of Caro and McCullough. This account of the Gulf War taught me more, and in an entertaining way, than I learned at West Point as an undergrad. In fact, the analysis of Crusade should be the starting point for evaluating the Gulf War for all students. Atkinson is skilled at blending knowledge of tactics with the context of strategy. He brings to life all the characters - Powell, Schwartzkopf, Cheney, etc. He injects realism into the debates about right and wrong war acts by showing the complexity of the decision making process in a tense, constrained wartime environment. I learned so much and I'm so thankful this book exists.
July 2, 2009
It's a great look into not only the reasons behind the 1st Gulf War, but the personalities that made the war play out the way it did. It seems that Stormin' Norman had a very different persona than the one we all saw portrayed in the media.
I simply love the way Rick Atkinson writes, and I am in the process of reading all of his books. Very engaging, personal style that's easy to follow. He puts all of the characters into a human light, for better or worse.
I simply love the way Rick Atkinson writes, and I am in the process of reading all of his books. Very engaging, personal style that's easy to follow. He puts all of the characters into a human light, for better or worse.
December 21, 2022
Comprehensive and pretty engaging history of the oft-ignored (yet still consequential) 1991 Gulf War, but definitely one that tests the reader's patience at times. I think 200 pages could have been lopped off - the book is 500 pages minus endnotes - without hurting narrative cohesiveness or battlefield accounts, but instead you're treated to dry descriptions of the art of naval mine-clearing and exhaustive detailing of battles that were glorified turkey shoots: in one engagement, the US destroyed nearly 300 Iraqi armored vehicles at the cost of one American (not one American vehicle, one American life). Interestingly enough, HR McMaster, future Trump national security advisor, took part in one of these tank battles.
The book keeps the focus on the 40-something day period between the beginning of the air war in mid-January 1991 to the end of the ground offensive on the last day of February. Atkinson occasionally does flashbacks to the war's prelude, including the diplomatic negotiations, slow build-up of US forces in the Gulf, and preparation of the military plans, but these are abbreviated. He excels at presenting the macro and micro view of the war, weaving in the perspectives of Bush administration figures, the top generals in Saudi Arabia, and all the way down to the POWs languishing in Iraqi jails. Incisive mini-portraits of the war's key figures (Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Norman Schwarzkopf, etc.) are provided as well. Some impressions are clarified for me - despite its reputation as the Video Game war, over 90% of the bombs dropped by the coalition were conventional ones - while other facts are obfuscated (Bush rejected a reasonable Soviet peace plan, accepted by Iraq, that would have led to the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 3 weeks, and instead launched the ground offensive the next day; Atkinson indicates that he thinks this was just an Iraqi ploy to fracture the alliance. Given that the Soviet plan called for a total and unconditional withdrawal, I think this is a dubious conclusion).
One can't help while reading a book about Desert Storm but compare it to the war that followed in 2003. Everything that made the latter war such a foolish decision was apparent to policymakers in 1991: Cheney and Powell worried about the prospect of marching into Baghdad, overthrowing Saddam, and occupying a fractured country with a hostile population and no clear end in sight. They also worried about alienating key American allies and partners, while fearing that a power vacuum in Baghdad might very well tip the Middle Eastern balance of power to Iran. In other words, they basically predicted all of the things that happened in the future war. Why Cheney in particular (who comes across as the epitome of calm and rationality in this book) discarded these prescient views in 2003 and vocally advocated for an invasion of Iraq is bewildering to me. Atkinson agrees that the limited aims of the war (expelling Iraq from Kuwait while leaving Saddam in power) made it a justifiable war. I'm not so sure myself. Having written this book in 1993, Atkinson couldn't have known the baleful consequences of enmeshing the US's fortunes with those of Saudi Arabia: the presence of US troops on Saudi soil during the war angered the renegade Islamist Osama bin Laden and turned him into an implacable enemy of the United States. It is clear, however, that there was more of a raison d'etre for acting in 1991 than in 2003: one acted in defense of international law while the other flagrantly violated it.
And what about American conduct during the war? The world is currently watching with outrage as the Russians are systematically leveling Ukrainian civilian infrastructure with drones and cruise missiles. Blowing up Ukrainian power stations in the dead of winter is a clear war crime, after all. Yet it was also the US plan of attack from the very first night of the Gulf war: power stations, telecommunication centers, government buildings, and bridges were pounded day after day. 95% of Iraq's electrical capacity was destroyed by the war's end. The US even bombed a civilian bunker in downtown Baghdad, killing over 200 people. It's simultaneously possible to condemn Russia's conduct in the Ukraine war while also noting that the US lacks the moral high ground in this manner.
I'll close by saying that I think people should read accounts like these of "small wars" rather than the endless histories of WWII, since I think it's terrible for humanity that the latter conflict is pretty much people's sole point of reference on matters of war and peace. Not every adversary is Nazi Germany; not every enemy leader is Hitler. Heck, they're probably not even Saddam Hussein.
The book keeps the focus on the 40-something day period between the beginning of the air war in mid-January 1991 to the end of the ground offensive on the last day of February. Atkinson occasionally does flashbacks to the war's prelude, including the diplomatic negotiations, slow build-up of US forces in the Gulf, and preparation of the military plans, but these are abbreviated. He excels at presenting the macro and micro view of the war, weaving in the perspectives of Bush administration figures, the top generals in Saudi Arabia, and all the way down to the POWs languishing in Iraqi jails. Incisive mini-portraits of the war's key figures (Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Norman Schwarzkopf, etc.) are provided as well. Some impressions are clarified for me - despite its reputation as the Video Game war, over 90% of the bombs dropped by the coalition were conventional ones - while other facts are obfuscated (Bush rejected a reasonable Soviet peace plan, accepted by Iraq, that would have led to the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 3 weeks, and instead launched the ground offensive the next day; Atkinson indicates that he thinks this was just an Iraqi ploy to fracture the alliance. Given that the Soviet plan called for a total and unconditional withdrawal, I think this is a dubious conclusion).
One can't help while reading a book about Desert Storm but compare it to the war that followed in 2003. Everything that made the latter war such a foolish decision was apparent to policymakers in 1991: Cheney and Powell worried about the prospect of marching into Baghdad, overthrowing Saddam, and occupying a fractured country with a hostile population and no clear end in sight. They also worried about alienating key American allies and partners, while fearing that a power vacuum in Baghdad might very well tip the Middle Eastern balance of power to Iran. In other words, they basically predicted all of the things that happened in the future war. Why Cheney in particular (who comes across as the epitome of calm and rationality in this book) discarded these prescient views in 2003 and vocally advocated for an invasion of Iraq is bewildering to me. Atkinson agrees that the limited aims of the war (expelling Iraq from Kuwait while leaving Saddam in power) made it a justifiable war. I'm not so sure myself. Having written this book in 1993, Atkinson couldn't have known the baleful consequences of enmeshing the US's fortunes with those of Saudi Arabia: the presence of US troops on Saudi soil during the war angered the renegade Islamist Osama bin Laden and turned him into an implacable enemy of the United States. It is clear, however, that there was more of a raison d'etre for acting in 1991 than in 2003: one acted in defense of international law while the other flagrantly violated it.
And what about American conduct during the war? The world is currently watching with outrage as the Russians are systematically leveling Ukrainian civilian infrastructure with drones and cruise missiles. Blowing up Ukrainian power stations in the dead of winter is a clear war crime, after all. Yet it was also the US plan of attack from the very first night of the Gulf war: power stations, telecommunication centers, government buildings, and bridges were pounded day after day. 95% of Iraq's electrical capacity was destroyed by the war's end. The US even bombed a civilian bunker in downtown Baghdad, killing over 200 people. It's simultaneously possible to condemn Russia's conduct in the Ukraine war while also noting that the US lacks the moral high ground in this manner.
I'll close by saying that I think people should read accounts like these of "small wars" rather than the endless histories of WWII, since I think it's terrible for humanity that the latter conflict is pretty much people's sole point of reference on matters of war and peace. Not every adversary is Nazi Germany; not every enemy leader is Hitler. Heck, they're probably not even Saddam Hussein.
October 30, 2021
A few weeks ago, I completed Rick Atkinson’s Crusade - The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. To put into words a short book review that would be fitting of such a masterpiece has been difficult to say the least. That being said, I think it was Colin Powell’s recent passing that pushed me over the edge and really got me motivated to sit down and truly recount such an epic telling of this story. This is an account that has all but been overshadowed now by the Second Gulf War and any other interventions in the area, but still bears the roots of all these conflicts considering its conclusions (or lack thereof) and ultimately what it meant for the various involved nations moving forward from the war.
Within Crusade, Atkinson takes readers on several journeys among parallel yet differing stories. These mostly centre on the inner workings of the theatre operational war room better known as the “Black Hole”, the strategic implications during the back & forth between the theatre command, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (Colin Powell), and Washington’s inner decision circle, but also include direct level accounts of soldiers and airmen involved with the resulting actions from the higher echelon decisions. It is thus through the strategic level that the story is told, but it is certainly underlined with the first hand stories of shot down fighter pilots, marine casualties of fratricide, or tactical commanders seeing war for the first time since Vietnam.
Through his account of the war originally published in 1993, Atkinson explores a variety of topics that would become all too real & relevant to today’s methods of warfare. These include implication of the media, particularly considering the use of strategic bombing campaigns, as well as the constant battle between supreme destruction of the adversary and tempered violence to achieve specific aims which is aimed at allowing resumption of “normalcy” following the conflict. Accordingly, Atkinson does provide an account of the brief period following the First Gulf War, but even he would not have known when this book was published what would become of the country, the region, and the world as a result of the invasion. Consequently, that is part of the allure for such a text - in that it provides insight into what happened at the time, what the thinking was, and where the beliefs were supposed to carry from the events that took place.
One of the particular takeaways I took from this book was a passage towards the end of the book, quoted from James Fallows, speaking to the fact that “a nation’s military, especially in a democracy, can endure the hardships of war only if it feels tied to a nation by a sense of common purpose and respect”. To this effect, Atkinson spends a great deal of time evaluating the American military pre and post-conflict, seeing that it is through such a trial that, despite its mistakes in some regards, does re-establish it as a dominant fighting force following its earlier failures in Vietnam. Consequently, within the scope of my recent readings, I come to ask myself where this leaves other modern armies? Where does this leave the CAF? Are we missing some sort of trial to allow us redemption in a sense emerging from the current culture issues and pandemic restrictions? Regardless of the answer, the facts are there to be analyzed, and I like the idea that an author was able to use such an event as the Gulf War to identify differences in the organization before, then after, such a war.
Rightly so, Crusade was by far one of the best books I have ever read. It was truly a pleasure each time I had the opportunity to sit down and read, its narrative keeping me hooked with its page-turning drama unfolding. Atkinson’s vivid descriptions enable the reader to envision the bunker in Riyadh itself, amidst the busied operations from the coalition forces. This particular book surfaced many lessons, and has launched me down a plethora of other reading paths that I know will be keeping me in the fold of the Gulf War for the next few iterations of my reading cycles. Accordingly, I could not recommend this book more to peers and friends alike. It is a substantial endeavour in its size, but I promise that it is worth it from beginning to end.
Happy reading!
Within Crusade, Atkinson takes readers on several journeys among parallel yet differing stories. These mostly centre on the inner workings of the theatre operational war room better known as the “Black Hole”, the strategic implications during the back & forth between the theatre command, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (Colin Powell), and Washington’s inner decision circle, but also include direct level accounts of soldiers and airmen involved with the resulting actions from the higher echelon decisions. It is thus through the strategic level that the story is told, but it is certainly underlined with the first hand stories of shot down fighter pilots, marine casualties of fratricide, or tactical commanders seeing war for the first time since Vietnam.
Through his account of the war originally published in 1993, Atkinson explores a variety of topics that would become all too real & relevant to today’s methods of warfare. These include implication of the media, particularly considering the use of strategic bombing campaigns, as well as the constant battle between supreme destruction of the adversary and tempered violence to achieve specific aims which is aimed at allowing resumption of “normalcy” following the conflict. Accordingly, Atkinson does provide an account of the brief period following the First Gulf War, but even he would not have known when this book was published what would become of the country, the region, and the world as a result of the invasion. Consequently, that is part of the allure for such a text - in that it provides insight into what happened at the time, what the thinking was, and where the beliefs were supposed to carry from the events that took place.
One of the particular takeaways I took from this book was a passage towards the end of the book, quoted from James Fallows, speaking to the fact that “a nation’s military, especially in a democracy, can endure the hardships of war only if it feels tied to a nation by a sense of common purpose and respect”. To this effect, Atkinson spends a great deal of time evaluating the American military pre and post-conflict, seeing that it is through such a trial that, despite its mistakes in some regards, does re-establish it as a dominant fighting force following its earlier failures in Vietnam. Consequently, within the scope of my recent readings, I come to ask myself where this leaves other modern armies? Where does this leave the CAF? Are we missing some sort of trial to allow us redemption in a sense emerging from the current culture issues and pandemic restrictions? Regardless of the answer, the facts are there to be analyzed, and I like the idea that an author was able to use such an event as the Gulf War to identify differences in the organization before, then after, such a war.
Rightly so, Crusade was by far one of the best books I have ever read. It was truly a pleasure each time I had the opportunity to sit down and read, its narrative keeping me hooked with its page-turning drama unfolding. Atkinson’s vivid descriptions enable the reader to envision the bunker in Riyadh itself, amidst the busied operations from the coalition forces. This particular book surfaced many lessons, and has launched me down a plethora of other reading paths that I know will be keeping me in the fold of the Gulf War for the next few iterations of my reading cycles. Accordingly, I could not recommend this book more to peers and friends alike. It is a substantial endeavour in its size, but I promise that it is worth it from beginning to end.
Happy reading!
December 7, 2018
If you took a sight-seeing vacation via automobile, upon your return, I would love to have heard about the great things that you saw on your vacation. I would not love it if you would have, instead, popped the hood of your automobile and showed me every component of your car’s engine. If you videotaped your vacation, and had videotaped 120 hours of footage, I would like to see a 15-minute recap of the highlights, I would not like to have to sit through and watch all 120 hours of unedited footage.
I use these analogies because while I was reading this book, I sometimes felt like I was watching 120 hours of video of someone showing me every component of a car engine. I felt like this book was simply too much, and was way overdone in terms of detail.
This book is about the 1991 Gulf War. A war that lasted six weeks. Yet this book is 500 pages long. Think about that for a second – a 500-page book about a six-week war. I’m not sure anyone could do a good job giving such a drawn out narrative about such a brief moment of time, so safe to say, I would have enjoyed this book a lot better had it been carved in half. There’s just too much detail.
Too many descriptions of military movements, weapon specifics, battle positions, and detailed meetings of Norman Schwarzkopf constantly berating his generals. I was just mainly bored. This book actually took me longer to read the book than the actual conflict lasted. I had to force myself to read ten pages every day just so I could get through with it.
Then there’s the fact that most of this book focuses on the “here and now” and not enough on the causes of the war, and the backgrounds of the countries involved in the conflict. Some of this is here, but not enough. Had the author given us more background of the Middle East, and the turbulent histories, it would have made a much better book. Instead, it seems were transplanted immediately to the battlefield and we immediately start following all the tactical moves in precise detail without really knowing much about the “why”. This would have helped tremendously since most U.S. citizens had never even heard of Saddam Hussein until Kuwait was invaded.
Then, this book was written very shortly after the conclusion of the war, so there really isn’t any opportunity to reflect back on the conflict, and see where and why things happened the way that they did, and what many of the post war effects actually were. This probably would have been a better book had it been written five or six years after the conclusion of the war.
The author does give us some insights, however. He does talk in detail about the “goal” of the war – which was never to destroy Saddam Hussein and his evil regime, but to simply get them to withdraw from Kuwait. George Bush was very careful about minimizing U.S. casualties, and figured that ousting Hussein would be too costly, and wouldn’t be worth the battle. Plus, he earnestly believed that, after the war, Iraq would then dispose of their leader via a coup, and that would free the U.S. and its allies from having to do much of the bloody work. Of course, hindsight now tells us that such judgements were mistaken, but we don’t get to read too much of this here though because, again, this book was written so closely after the war ended.
This book will tell you just about everything that happened during the war on the battlefield, so if that’s your thing, this book gives a great synopsis. I just wanted “more” of some things, and definitely “less” of others – such as all the meticulous detail.
I use these analogies because while I was reading this book, I sometimes felt like I was watching 120 hours of video of someone showing me every component of a car engine. I felt like this book was simply too much, and was way overdone in terms of detail.
This book is about the 1991 Gulf War. A war that lasted six weeks. Yet this book is 500 pages long. Think about that for a second – a 500-page book about a six-week war. I’m not sure anyone could do a good job giving such a drawn out narrative about such a brief moment of time, so safe to say, I would have enjoyed this book a lot better had it been carved in half. There’s just too much detail.
Too many descriptions of military movements, weapon specifics, battle positions, and detailed meetings of Norman Schwarzkopf constantly berating his generals. I was just mainly bored. This book actually took me longer to read the book than the actual conflict lasted. I had to force myself to read ten pages every day just so I could get through with it.
Then there’s the fact that most of this book focuses on the “here and now” and not enough on the causes of the war, and the backgrounds of the countries involved in the conflict. Some of this is here, but not enough. Had the author given us more background of the Middle East, and the turbulent histories, it would have made a much better book. Instead, it seems were transplanted immediately to the battlefield and we immediately start following all the tactical moves in precise detail without really knowing much about the “why”. This would have helped tremendously since most U.S. citizens had never even heard of Saddam Hussein until Kuwait was invaded.
Then, this book was written very shortly after the conclusion of the war, so there really isn’t any opportunity to reflect back on the conflict, and see where and why things happened the way that they did, and what many of the post war effects actually were. This probably would have been a better book had it been written five or six years after the conclusion of the war.
The author does give us some insights, however. He does talk in detail about the “goal” of the war – which was never to destroy Saddam Hussein and his evil regime, but to simply get them to withdraw from Kuwait. George Bush was very careful about minimizing U.S. casualties, and figured that ousting Hussein would be too costly, and wouldn’t be worth the battle. Plus, he earnestly believed that, after the war, Iraq would then dispose of their leader via a coup, and that would free the U.S. and its allies from having to do much of the bloody work. Of course, hindsight now tells us that such judgements were mistaken, but we don’t get to read too much of this here though because, again, this book was written so closely after the war ended.
This book will tell you just about everything that happened during the war on the battlefield, so if that’s your thing, this book gives a great synopsis. I just wanted “more” of some things, and definitely “less” of others – such as all the meticulous detail.
September 17, 2019
In the book, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, by Rick Atkinson, we follow the forces of the coalition as they fight to liberate Kuwait from the invading Iraqi Army. As the story unfolds, the theme most prevalent in Crusade is that war is chaotic and confusion always reigns supreme on the battlefield. As Atkinson takes us through a journey of the war, both from the perspectives of the soldiers battling on the ground and from the perspectives of the commanders directing hundreds of thousands of men, his narrative paints a startling image of the war, and modern warfare in general. Even with the most modern targeting systems, cutting-edge communications equipment, and the best surveillance and reconnaissance assets in the world, it was a very common sight to see soldiers end up at the wrong destination miles away from where they were supposed to be. In fact, as Atkinson shows through his detailed depictions of numerous councils of war, it was not uncommon to see a commander not exactly sure where his troops actually were. Atkinson shows us the extent of the confusion during the war through cold statistics; half of all the coalition’s casualties were from friendly fire as soldiers and commanders received incorrect or incomplete reports, got confused, and fired on friendly forces. Atkinson also dispels the myth of a clean and clear war, giving us the sobering statistics on the supposed cleanliness of war. From massive number of missed bombs from air strikes, many from confusion and incorrect information, to the unintentional, but real civilian casualties of around three thousand. Throughout the book, Atkinson shows us that war has not changed into a version where only the baddies get killed and civilians cheer for the liberators. Rather, he shows us that it is just as chaotic and confusing as wars past, and no less devastating.
I gave this book five well-deserved stars. This book is written and narrated like a proper story with fleshed-out characters and a flowing narrative, rather than just a collection of names, dates, and numbers, something that many history books inadvertently become. The detailed descriptions given by Atkinson of the desert battlefields and of the machines of war paint a very vivid image of the war and the conditions it was fought in. Atkinson brings the people of the Persian Gulf War to life by truly letting their own distinct personalities come into the limelight. We go from the aggressive but loyal Norman Schwarzkopf whose frequent rages during war councils struck fear into his own staff, to the ambitious and thorough Frederick Franks, commander of the VII Corps that smashed the Iraqi defenders guarding the path into Iraq. We get to see the headaches of the coalition air force commanders as they try to maintain a state of twenty-four hour air supremacy over Iraq to protect the troops on the ground. I would recommend this book to anyone who is interested in history and wants to learn more about the obscure Persian Gulf War. I found that once you get invested into the book, it gets very hard to put down. One complaint I had about the book is that it rarely gives attention to the forces of the coalition other than the US, British, and French soldiers. The operations of the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian forces in the heartland of Kuwait are simply glanced over. Even more glaring than that is the severe lack of attention paid to the US Marines who were the ones to fight in and liberate Kuwait, the main objective of the war. Other than those complaints, I had no other major issues with this book and found that it was a very informative, yet entertaining book about one of the most obscure major conflicts in US history.
I gave this book five well-deserved stars. This book is written and narrated like a proper story with fleshed-out characters and a flowing narrative, rather than just a collection of names, dates, and numbers, something that many history books inadvertently become. The detailed descriptions given by Atkinson of the desert battlefields and of the machines of war paint a very vivid image of the war and the conditions it was fought in. Atkinson brings the people of the Persian Gulf War to life by truly letting their own distinct personalities come into the limelight. We go from the aggressive but loyal Norman Schwarzkopf whose frequent rages during war councils struck fear into his own staff, to the ambitious and thorough Frederick Franks, commander of the VII Corps that smashed the Iraqi defenders guarding the path into Iraq. We get to see the headaches of the coalition air force commanders as they try to maintain a state of twenty-four hour air supremacy over Iraq to protect the troops on the ground. I would recommend this book to anyone who is interested in history and wants to learn more about the obscure Persian Gulf War. I found that once you get invested into the book, it gets very hard to put down. One complaint I had about the book is that it rarely gives attention to the forces of the coalition other than the US, British, and French soldiers. The operations of the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian forces in the heartland of Kuwait are simply glanced over. Even more glaring than that is the severe lack of attention paid to the US Marines who were the ones to fight in and liberate Kuwait, the main objective of the war. Other than those complaints, I had no other major issues with this book and found that it was a very informative, yet entertaining book about one of the most obscure major conflicts in US history.
December 5, 2019
For all of the attention Americans pay to their military heroes, some warriors, and even whole wars, fizzle out of the American conscience. Perhaps no war is harder to recall than the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the seemingly tidy war waged by President George H.W. Bush to liberate Kuwait, hinder Saddam's Iraq, and restore geopolitical equilibrium to the Middle East.
Therefore, there is no better writer to shatter the myths and bring forth the ugly truth of that war than Rick Atkinson. From General Schwarzkopf down to privates, Atkinson depicts a war far from clean and precise, but rather one waged against a terribly outnumbered, outgunned and out-general-ed foe. Atkinson does much to break apart the mythos of the first technologically-precise war: while the missiles were certainly more accurate than their ancestors of Vietnam, Germany and Japan earlier in the 20th Century, they were far from 100% accurate, or even up to the standards set forth by those in the Pentagon hoping to establish US technological dominance via press release.
More importantly, though, Atkinson deploys the reader to the front line, right into skirmishes, tank battles, air sorties, and maneuvers that elicit all of the chills of grander battles. Soldiers are blown apart, struggle in captivity, and endure countless hardships, if only in smaller numbers than WWII, Korea, Vietnam and others.
Atkinson's analytical and writing skills extend up the chain of command, depicting the yin and yang relationship of Schwarzkopf and JCS Chairman Colin Powell, the inner workings of Bush and his administration, and the inter-service rivalries and ongoing debate about the efficacy of air power. Schwarzkopf in particular comes off as overbearing, tyrannical at times, but imbued with a common sense that outweighs the negative attributes, and which often appears sorely missing in the annals of great wartime leaders.
Atkinson's book, published in 1993, is a fascinating relic of the pre-9/11 world. The author weighs in towards the end of the book with the conclusion that Bush's decision to halt the war effort without toppling Saddam's regime and waging a broader war within the boundaries of Iraq seem prescient given the quagmire endured by American soldiers in Iraq from 2003 onward. One is left to ponder how men like Cheney, Powell, Wolfowitz, and others, who successfully prosecuted the limited war in 1991, could, with time, un-learn the lessons so dramatically under the presidency of George W. Bush. Americans, as Atkinson points out, may scoff at limited wars: they do not sync with the all-encompassing optimism of America nor the annihilative instincts of American combat from the Civil War through Vietnam.
However, in retrospect, the limited war of George H.W. Bush in Iraq grows in stature amidst the human, political and economic carnage of the later Iraq War. That the Persian Gulf War was so restrained may be its ultimate lesson and enduring glory.
Therefore, there is no better writer to shatter the myths and bring forth the ugly truth of that war than Rick Atkinson. From General Schwarzkopf down to privates, Atkinson depicts a war far from clean and precise, but rather one waged against a terribly outnumbered, outgunned and out-general-ed foe. Atkinson does much to break apart the mythos of the first technologically-precise war: while the missiles were certainly more accurate than their ancestors of Vietnam, Germany and Japan earlier in the 20th Century, they were far from 100% accurate, or even up to the standards set forth by those in the Pentagon hoping to establish US technological dominance via press release.
More importantly, though, Atkinson deploys the reader to the front line, right into skirmishes, tank battles, air sorties, and maneuvers that elicit all of the chills of grander battles. Soldiers are blown apart, struggle in captivity, and endure countless hardships, if only in smaller numbers than WWII, Korea, Vietnam and others.
Atkinson's analytical and writing skills extend up the chain of command, depicting the yin and yang relationship of Schwarzkopf and JCS Chairman Colin Powell, the inner workings of Bush and his administration, and the inter-service rivalries and ongoing debate about the efficacy of air power. Schwarzkopf in particular comes off as overbearing, tyrannical at times, but imbued with a common sense that outweighs the negative attributes, and which often appears sorely missing in the annals of great wartime leaders.
Atkinson's book, published in 1993, is a fascinating relic of the pre-9/11 world. The author weighs in towards the end of the book with the conclusion that Bush's decision to halt the war effort without toppling Saddam's regime and waging a broader war within the boundaries of Iraq seem prescient given the quagmire endured by American soldiers in Iraq from 2003 onward. One is left to ponder how men like Cheney, Powell, Wolfowitz, and others, who successfully prosecuted the limited war in 1991, could, with time, un-learn the lessons so dramatically under the presidency of George W. Bush. Americans, as Atkinson points out, may scoff at limited wars: they do not sync with the all-encompassing optimism of America nor the annihilative instincts of American combat from the Civil War through Vietnam.
However, in retrospect, the limited war of George H.W. Bush in Iraq grows in stature amidst the human, political and economic carnage of the later Iraq War. That the Persian Gulf War was so restrained may be its ultimate lesson and enduring glory.
December 22, 2023
I read the hard-cover, first edition of Rick Atkinson's "Crusade." I wanted to try to understand why Gen. Colin Powell's blunt statement about the Iraqi army in Kuwait ("First we're going to cut it off, then we're going to kill it.") didn't come true. As much as half of the Republican Guard escaped, along with other Iraqi units. Saddam Hussein stayed in power, put down rebellions, played hide and seek with UN inspectors, and suborned our allies. This strategic failure outweighed our tactical victories and was a factor, as Atkinson notes, in Bush's defeat in the 1992 election.
Atkinson's book has lots of detail about the campaign, both as it unfurled in and around Kuwait and about the decisions made by top military and civilian leadership. Here are some conclusions.
CINC Schwarzkopf's planned double envelopment might have bagged the Iraqis. But his plan delayed the launch of the army's "left hook" by the XVIII and VII Corps for 26 hours, to allow a "supporting attack" by the Marines which he hoped would fix the enemy's attention on Kuwait's southern border. As if the Iraqis wouldn't notice the massive force poised on their right flank! He also underestimated the Marines, who didn't see themselves as supporting players and plowed through the Iraqi lines much faster than anticipated. This triggered the beginning of a withdrawal by the Iraqis, which, in turn, caused Schwarzkopf to try to jump-start the delayed left-hook attack.
The left-hook was further delayed when the armored and mechanized divisions ran low on fuel short of their objectives. Somebody was responsible for this logistics failure, but "Crusade" doesn't lay blame.
However, the book makes clear that Powell's tough talk before the campaign was just talk. "Hardly had the rout begun when Colin Powell started searching for an appropriate moment to stop it," Atkinson wrote. With seemingly no thought for the double-envelopment plan, or for the escaping Republican Guard, Powell's only stated concern was "this is over; all we're doing is killing people."
President Bush was also eager to stop the combat, for public-relations reasons: he liked the sound of a "hundred-hour war." He was given the false impression that the Coalition had "closed the gate." Fighting occurred well after the odd unilateral cease-fire he ordered.
Whenever they encountered the enemy, our troops scored overwhelming tactical victories. But the failures of our top leadership ultimately led to the next war.
"Crusade" includes a good chronology. Its maps are helpful but could have been more detailed. It lacks an Order of Battle for either side, which necessitates cross-referencing other sources to understand the composition and command of the forces. On the whole, I enjoyed reading it.
Atkinson's book has lots of detail about the campaign, both as it unfurled in and around Kuwait and about the decisions made by top military and civilian leadership. Here are some conclusions.
CINC Schwarzkopf's planned double envelopment might have bagged the Iraqis. But his plan delayed the launch of the army's "left hook" by the XVIII and VII Corps for 26 hours, to allow a "supporting attack" by the Marines which he hoped would fix the enemy's attention on Kuwait's southern border. As if the Iraqis wouldn't notice the massive force poised on their right flank! He also underestimated the Marines, who didn't see themselves as supporting players and plowed through the Iraqi lines much faster than anticipated. This triggered the beginning of a withdrawal by the Iraqis, which, in turn, caused Schwarzkopf to try to jump-start the delayed left-hook attack.
The left-hook was further delayed when the armored and mechanized divisions ran low on fuel short of their objectives. Somebody was responsible for this logistics failure, but "Crusade" doesn't lay blame.
However, the book makes clear that Powell's tough talk before the campaign was just talk. "Hardly had the rout begun when Colin Powell started searching for an appropriate moment to stop it," Atkinson wrote. With seemingly no thought for the double-envelopment plan, or for the escaping Republican Guard, Powell's only stated concern was "this is over; all we're doing is killing people."
President Bush was also eager to stop the combat, for public-relations reasons: he liked the sound of a "hundred-hour war." He was given the false impression that the Coalition had "closed the gate." Fighting occurred well after the odd unilateral cease-fire he ordered.
Whenever they encountered the enemy, our troops scored overwhelming tactical victories. But the failures of our top leadership ultimately led to the next war.
"Crusade" includes a good chronology. Its maps are helpful but could have been more detailed. It lacks an Order of Battle for either side, which necessitates cross-referencing other sources to understand the composition and command of the forces. On the whole, I enjoyed reading it.
September 7, 2020
An excellent account of the Persian Gulf War. I highly recommend it.
The Persian Gulf War was an important event in American history. It was an early gauntlet for a superpower all but victorious from the Cold War and at a peak of political, global, and technological power. The war would help define, through it's victories and mistakes, America's role as global hegemon in the following years, not to mention the consequential developments in the Middle East. And yet many people, including myself, know so little about such an important and recent event.
A truly impressive effort, Atkinson has parsed through numerous interviews, reports, and documents to produce a history combining both the military and human aspects of the war. Atkinson also writes on the evolution of warfare by referencing previous conflicts throughout history and their consequences.
My only complaint is that such a comprehensive book inevitably gets lost in the many names and roles involved, further jumbled with the frequent use of military abbreviations and weaponry.
The addition of some sort of glossary including a "cast listing" would be helpful to quickly refresh reader's memories.
Also, since the book was published in 1993, it would be nice if another edition could be published with an afterward reflecting on new insights of the war and the long-term aftermath, most importantly the War in Iraq a decade later.
Perhaps Rick Atkinson has addressed this in another book or article, but I feel it would be most beneficial to include such a chapter in this book.
I end my review with the following quote. "Bush and his men concluded that the excessive price of total victory would be indefinite responsibility for rebuilding a hostile nation with no tradition of democracy but with immensely complex internal politics. This was - and remains in retrospect - a sensible strategic calculation."
The Persian Gulf War was an important event in American history. It was an early gauntlet for a superpower all but victorious from the Cold War and at a peak of political, global, and technological power. The war would help define, through it's victories and mistakes, America's role as global hegemon in the following years, not to mention the consequential developments in the Middle East. And yet many people, including myself, know so little about such an important and recent event.
A truly impressive effort, Atkinson has parsed through numerous interviews, reports, and documents to produce a history combining both the military and human aspects of the war. Atkinson also writes on the evolution of warfare by referencing previous conflicts throughout history and their consequences.
My only complaint is that such a comprehensive book inevitably gets lost in the many names and roles involved, further jumbled with the frequent use of military abbreviations and weaponry.
The addition of some sort of glossary including a "cast listing" would be helpful to quickly refresh reader's memories.
Also, since the book was published in 1993, it would be nice if another edition could be published with an afterward reflecting on new insights of the war and the long-term aftermath, most importantly the War in Iraq a decade later.
Perhaps Rick Atkinson has addressed this in another book or article, but I feel it would be most beneficial to include such a chapter in this book.
I end my review with the following quote. "Bush and his men concluded that the excessive price of total victory would be indefinite responsibility for rebuilding a hostile nation with no tradition of democracy but with immensely complex internal politics. This was - and remains in retrospect - a sensible strategic calculation."
February 27, 2020
To be reading this 30 years after the first germane events occurred is to experience a sublime mix of memory and text. Atkinson proves to have the stronger hand: his pages are imbued with facts, strong personal profiles, quotations from almost every noted warrior (except Sun Tzu), and a skillfully integrated story. The various fighting services, their leaders, the Washington, D.C. power club and a few individual actors all have speaking parts. The result is akin to a military thriller since the writing is far superior to most academic or journalistic efforts.
Balancing my memory of the early 1990s is the experience we have had during the 37 years since the book was published. Saddam may have survived the war described here, but we got to see him hiding in a hole of corruption like the cockroach he was. Later, he was hanged, which seemed enough at the time, but after refreshing memory with a revisit to the First Gulf War, it fell far short of what he deserved.
Atkinson's attempt to put it all in perspective seems stronger now than it was in 1993 because we know that neither the simplistic nor the convoluted paths offered as the war wound down or in the aftermath would have made much difference to the morass that is the Middle East.
Atkinson gives us a map section sequestered at the back of the book, as opposed to his usual approach of sprinkling them throughout the book. I found the use of a bookmark made this technique superior to spreading the maps throughout. We also are graced with a chronology; a list of his sources which must run close to a comprehensive list of the 500+ interviews he conducted, offered "With Appreciation"; and the usual Bibliography and Notes. The Author's Note carries its own special weight.
Highly recommended.
Balancing my memory of the early 1990s is the experience we have had during the 37 years since the book was published. Saddam may have survived the war described here, but we got to see him hiding in a hole of corruption like the cockroach he was. Later, he was hanged, which seemed enough at the time, but after refreshing memory with a revisit to the First Gulf War, it fell far short of what he deserved.
Atkinson's attempt to put it all in perspective seems stronger now than it was in 1993 because we know that neither the simplistic nor the convoluted paths offered as the war wound down or in the aftermath would have made much difference to the morass that is the Middle East.
Atkinson gives us a map section sequestered at the back of the book, as opposed to his usual approach of sprinkling them throughout the book. I found the use of a bookmark made this technique superior to spreading the maps throughout. We also are graced with a chronology; a list of his sources which must run close to a comprehensive list of the 500+ interviews he conducted, offered "With Appreciation"; and the usual Bibliography and Notes. The Author's Note carries its own special weight.
Highly recommended.
February 5, 2017
Exceptionally well written and covers everything from the opening Tomahawk and Apache strikes to the last hours of the war. Atkinson brings the weapons of war to life by describing in succinct detail the men and woman flying A-6s, F-117s; F-15Es; F-111s (the tank-planking section was particularly interesting to me); Bradley and Abram tanks; the specifics of the Hellfire, Tomahawk, SCUD, Silkworm, and Patriot missile systems; and the naval fighting force parked in the Persian Gulf. Atkinson also gets in an depth look at the personalities behind the conflict: Saddam, Bush, Powell, Schwarzkopf, the major players in the Coalition, and several other major generals in the various branches of the military. He also describes the POW conditions which was largely unknown to me. I think the ultimate conclusion you can draw from this book is that the Desert Storm conflict was largely a runaway success, but that there were several major hiccups that were never reported or acknowledged. "Misadventure" or friendly-fire accounted for several Coalition deaths, the Patriot missile systems did not work as well as advertised, the Navy was largely unprepared for the mine threat in the Gulf, Special Forces were probably not utilized to their full potential, inter-service rivalries hindered the war effort, and surgical strikes by stealth bombers with laser or TV guided bombs were scrubbed clean for CNN and other major television networks to hide any shortcomings of those systems that apparently missed frequently. I only have high praise for Atkinson's highly researched and very readable books.
July 17, 2019
From my favorite war historian is a recounting of the first war that occurred during my lifetime. I was a freshman in high school when this developed and recall with amazement how quick and devastating this war was against the Iraqi army.
Surprising to me was how arrogant Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf was and how he demeaned his commanders. We saw the confident and charismatic side but here we can see the vulnerabilities. What was most frustrating was to see that even though there was such a low number of casualties, so many of those were friendly fire. With all the technology in place, we still couldn't safeguard our own. Along with that, we learn of the massive shortcomings of the Patriot missiles, the inaccuracy of the bombs, and other issues of the "perfect battlefield".
The writing is stellar. Atkinson is easy to read and makes you feel like you are there. The book was a bit repetitive in its descriptions, but how else do you fill 500 pages with e a war that lasted about 6 weeks. I would have liked to see the maps located within the text, instead of grouped in the back. And many out posts and objectives were frequently mentioned but not located on the maps.
Surprising to me was how arrogant Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf was and how he demeaned his commanders. We saw the confident and charismatic side but here we can see the vulnerabilities. What was most frustrating was to see that even though there was such a low number of casualties, so many of those were friendly fire. With all the technology in place, we still couldn't safeguard our own. Along with that, we learn of the massive shortcomings of the Patriot missiles, the inaccuracy of the bombs, and other issues of the "perfect battlefield".
The writing is stellar. Atkinson is easy to read and makes you feel like you are there. The book was a bit repetitive in its descriptions, but how else do you fill 500 pages with e a war that lasted about 6 weeks. I would have liked to see the maps located within the text, instead of grouped in the back. And many out posts and objectives were frequently mentioned but not located on the maps.
March 30, 2021
If you're going to read 1 book about Desert Shield/Desert Storm this is the one. My naval reserve unit ,
Mobile Inshore/Undersea Warfare #103 was activated and called up to active duty, we were stationed in Al Jubayl. Saudia Arabia, about 333 km. south of Kuwait. "In the rear with the beer and the gear" as the saying goes. Like most Americans at home we received the latest war news on CNN.
I agree with the author that the Saudi military , in general, was sadly lacking in training & spirit.
With all of the general grade officers in theatre, the only one that visited our compound and gave us a briefing was Marine General Walter Boomer. As usual the Marines exceeded expectations. We had 3 women in our unit and they drove our vehicles- 5 Ton & 2.5 Ton trucks, weapons carriers & jeeps. The Saudi had fits over it.
The book details the temperament of the command staff, not always in a positive light.
Mobile Inshore/Undersea Warfare #103 was activated and called up to active duty, we were stationed in Al Jubayl. Saudia Arabia, about 333 km. south of Kuwait. "In the rear with the beer and the gear" as the saying goes. Like most Americans at home we received the latest war news on CNN.
I agree with the author that the Saudi military , in general, was sadly lacking in training & spirit.
With all of the general grade officers in theatre, the only one that visited our compound and gave us a briefing was Marine General Walter Boomer. As usual the Marines exceeded expectations. We had 3 women in our unit and they drove our vehicles- 5 Ton & 2.5 Ton trucks, weapons carriers & jeeps. The Saudi had fits over it.
The book details the temperament of the command staff, not always in a positive light.
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