الجمهوريانية (النظام الجمهوري) نظرية الحرية والحكومة

by Philip Pettit, هيثم غالب الناهي (Translator)

يعتبر هذا الكتاب الذي هو واحد من سلسلة كتب نظرية أكسفورد السياسية (Oxford Political Theory)، أول عرض مطول كامل، كبديل جمهوري للفلسفات الليبرالية والمجتمعية. فهو يقدم نظرة عامة موحدة، مستخدماً فروع كثيرة في الفكر الجمهوري، وهو يقدم نظرة فلسفية جديدة على شكل دراسات في المجالات ذات الصلة، بما في ذلك النظرية السياسية، والتاريخ الفكري، والفقهي، وعلوم الجريمة. فقد افتتح الكتاب بدراسة المفهوم الجمهوري التقليدي للحرية باعتبارها عدم سيطرة، مناقضاً وجهات النظر المطروحة حول السلبية والإيجابية القائسمة على الحرية، ليدرس من بعد ذلك ما سينطوي عليه تنفيذ المثل الأعلى على وضع السياسات الموضوعية والتصميم الدستوري والديمقراطي، والرقابة التنظيمية، والعلاقة بين الدولة والمجتمع المدني.

Genres: Philosophy, Politics, Nonfiction, History, Political Science

621 pages, Paperback

First published May 8, 1997

About the author

Philip Noel Pettit (born 1945) is an Irish philosopher and political theorist. He is Laurence Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University and also Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. He was a Guggenheim Fellow.

He was educated at Garbally College, the National University of Ireland, Maynooth (BA, LPh, MA) and Queen's University, Belfast (PhD). He was a lecturer at University College, Dublin, a Research Fellow at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and professor at the University of Bradford. He was for many years Professorial Fellow in Social and Political Theory at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He is the recipient of numerous honours, including an honorary doctorate from the National University of Ireland. He was keynote speaker at Graduate Conference, University of Toronto.

Pettit defends a version of civic republicanism in political philosophy. His book Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government provided the underlying justification for political reforms in Spain under José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Pettit detailed his relationship with Zapatero in his A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism in Zapatero's Spain, co-authored with José Luis Martí.

Pettit holds that the lessons learned when thinking about problems in one area of philosophy often constitute ready-made solutions to problems faced in completely different areas. Views he defends in philosophy of mind give rise to the solutions he offers to problems in metaphysics about the nature of free will, and to problems in the philosophy of the social sciences, and these in turn give rise to the solutions he provides to problems in moral philosophy and political philosophy. His corpus as a whole was the subject of a series of critical essays published in Common Minds: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit (Oxford University Press, 2007).

Reviews

[Alexei · Rating 3 out of 5]

I am not a professional philosopher, but the topic is of great interest to me. The first third of the book I found rather engaging and convincing. However, further on it turns into a kind of freedom calculus that the reader is invited to believe on the merit of sheer logic, with no examples or mental experiments. I am not sure social mechanisms work like abstract equations.

[Michel Lamblin · Rating 5 out of 5]

I'll sidestep commentary on the actual content of the book (which is top-notch, and I believe little 'r' republicanism - freedom as non-domination - is in some sense more 'liberal' than classical liberalism), and will just say that, though I haven't read other works by Pettit, his style is quite easy to follow - reiterating the main points of previous paragraphs and making his argument clear. And why don't more philosophers include a Propositional Summary at the end of their treatises - it just makes sense!

[Arbitrista · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm not entirely persuaded that Pettit's theory is incompatible with Rawlsian liberalism, but an instructive work nonetheless. Freedom as non-domination may be a synthetic principle combining elements of liberty as non-interference and equality. My biggest concern is Pettit's consequentialim and focus on "contestation" rather than consent - which makes me wonder how individual rights would fare in such a regime.

[mwr · Rating 2 out of 5]

Meh. I prefer classical republicanism and find that the phrase 'non-domination' is stretched to the point of meaninglessness here.

[A. B. · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very clearly written, insightful book on how political institutions should be founded.

I give a basic outline of my main take-aways from the book.

Beyond the twin concepts of negative liberty, understood as freedom from interference, and positive liberty, understood as self-mastery, Pettit proposes a third understanding of freedom -- freedom as non-domination. Non-domination is understood as the capacity for arbitrary interference. Such a capacity, even if it is not actualised out of the kindness of the hearts of those in power, should not exist. This understanding of freedom was dominant for long in the Republican tradition and counts as its forbears the Roman tradition (Cicero, Livy) and Machiavelli. It was with Hobbes that freedom as non-interference became central to political philosophy. The emphasis on freedom understood in this manner became core to modern liberalism.

Interference is defined as the intentional or quasi-intentional worsening of someone's choice situation. Domination may occur without interference if the capacity for interference is not actualised. Interference may occur without domination if the interference is legitimate and not arbitrary. A state oriented around non-domination is also conducive to the value of positive liberty, autonomy. However, the notion is opposed to the conception of negative liberty. Freedom as non-domination is a better structure to organise society around it due to three reasons: the absence of uncertainty, the absence of a need to defer strategically to the powerful, and the absence of a social subordination to others. This non-domination, when it is promoted by certain political and other institutions, that effect is not causally distinct from the institutions per se.

Freedom as non-domination is significantly egalitarian as it requires that all people enjoy non-domination with equal intensity. Even children and dependent adults should not be dominated, although they can be justifiably interfered with in order to support their development. Freedom as non-domination is also significantly communitarian as it can be realised only under an arrangement involving people in communal interaction. People should be able to identify with a state that supports such non-domination.

Republicanism can offer the state a pluralistic language in which to formulate the grievances that it should seek to rectify. There are five large areas of policy-making: external defence, internal protection, personal independence, economic prosperity, public life. Republicanism can play a role in all these. The republican state should guard against dominium domination (the domination of private actors) and imperium (domination by government). There are a few conditions that government must fulfill in order to not dominate. First, empire-of-law, according to which the government should operate by law. Second, the dispersion-of-power, according to which power should be distributed widely among the three branches, bicameral legislatures, and federal structures. Third, counter-majoritarianism, it should be made more rather than less difficult for the majority to change certain fundamental features of the law. Government, in order to be accountable, should not be seen to rest on the alleged consent of the people, but rather on the contestability by the people of everything that the government does. Instead of the prevalent tendency towards inter-group pluralism that puts reason in the background, reason should be foregrounded.

Instead of treating people as knaves, which will only encourage them to be so, we should treat them as tending more towards compliance than knavery. The laws of the republic need to be supported by widespread norms of civility. Widespread personal trust should reign, implying the establishment of a flourishing civil society.

[Philip Chaston · Rating 5 out of 5]

Philip Pettit rescues the definition of freedom from the eighteenth century and pivots its revival for the twenty-first century. Useful engagement with freedom and power through the medium of law, though the author does not pay enough attention to the size of the state or the corrosive nature of identity politics in undermining his ideal.

[Aicha Ben · Rating 5 out of 5]

شكرا لكم

[Elizabeth Catherine · Rating 3 out of 5]

For class, enjoyed discussions by my professor on the topic much more than reading this by itself.

[Joshua · Rating 3 out of 5]

Pettit argues that he wants a republic that brings the best of the old republican tradition and interpret it with a radical theory of freedom as non-domination. His theory is alright but falls flat when he tries to bring the theory into a practical framework. He has suggestions for how a republic that espouses non-domination but nothing concrete. Perhaps my reading of political philosophy is too limited and this is a flaw of the literature but it did not feel as he was initiating a plan of action but rather an ideal theory. When he tries to talk practically it seems that his suggestions were not all that radical indeed but rather a retelling of any republican system we have today.

There is also something to be said in that he avoids the question of economic dominance. He covers it briefly when he tries to absorb socialists into his worldview but he focuses more so on the employers rather than the role of capitalism upon society which I would argue is a greater threat to republicanism than he gives credit for.

Ultimately he does not give much practical room for his theory and when he enters the practical realm he falters.

[Jed · Rating 4 out of 5]

I don't have a lot to compare this book to. I've read a bit about John Rawls political philosophy and of course more classical political philosophers, but not much else contemporary.

I'd say this book would be too dry for anyone not enthusiastic for wading into the waters of an academic discipline they don't know much about. Being the liberal-arts college graduate I am, I don't mind. While reading it, I found that I had a clearer picture and vocabulary to describe of a position I've espoused since my college days: namely that the majority isn't always right and that government interference in and of itself is not always undesirable.

I look forward to finding some more to read on this topic. And I welcome your suggestions.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

I've got all kinds of problems with Pettit's vision, but it's certainly inspired me, and unlike other recent contribution to republican thought, Pettit here successfully shows how Republican political thought might very well offer a superior vision of freedom to liberal thought.

[Marco O · Rating 4 out of 5]

Clear and well stablished. A neccesary reference for any discussion on liberty and governmennt. It certaintly shedds concise light on the political dimention of liberty.

[Leonardo]

En los primeros dos capítulos de Republicanismo, Pettit se encarga de mostrar que la no-dominación no puede ser reducida ni a la no-interferencia privilegiada por Berlin ni a la libertad positiva defendida (supuestamente) por los republicanos neo-Atenienses y los marxistas.

Filosofía Política Contemporánea. Clase 8