A leading political theorist’s groundbreaking defense of ideal conceptions of justice in political philosophy
Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian?
Utopophobia argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. David Estlund does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does he assert that justice is indeed unrealizable―only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. Estlund engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, he counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated.
Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, Utopophobia stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.
Wow! I must admit it took me a while to really get on the same conceptual level as Estlund (and to be honest, I probably have only approximated this), but this book has vastly changed my perspective on the value of 'idealised' political philosophy. I used to be seduced by a 'non-ideal' view of political philosophy that suggests that normative theorising is only valuable insofar as it is directly practical for the world, that it is plainly OBVIOUS that we should focus on the world and its agents AS THEY ARE, and not as we WOULD LIKE THEM TO BE. However, the idea that you ought to focus on people as they are (whatever that means) and the world as it is, is VERY DIFFERENT from the idea that you should ONLY focus on that way of realistic theorising. That the concept of social justice might be unrealistic, impractical, not consistent with human nature etc. simply does NOT prove that it is false or lacking in value.
The basic idea in 'Utopophobia' is not to outline a particular theory of justice or what social justice might require. Estlund's concern is with the NATURE of justice rather than its CONTENT. I think he has forcefully shown that it is not necessary for justice to be concessive to facts about human nature or whatever the world happens to be like. Basically, it might be true that if we will not Comply with certain institutions that we ought not Build them. But this is NOT logically equivalent to the point that it still might be true that we ought to Build and Comply with those institutions. Estlund carefully and methodically rebuffs the points that hardcore non-ideal theorists make about political philosophy, and shows that there is no reason to think that non-concessive or aspirational philosophy is any less valuable.
Many will have heard of Kant's famous dictum that "out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made." As intuitive (and beautifully worded for Kant, right?) as that is, it is also true, as the Confucian philosopher Mencius points out: "Never has a man who has bent himself been able to make others straight." I think these two quotes highlight the two ways for thinking about political philosophy, and what limits such thinking might have (if any).
I found this book very abstract even for someone who has spent a lot of time in normative ethics. The book mostly defends unrealistic theorising about justice against common criticisms, but positive arguments are more scarce. The arguments were very methodologically conservative. I found the authors writing style difficult. For example, sentences were very long and interrupted by excessive parentheses and dashes.
Very interesting ideas, tackling some very fundamental questions about the use of ideal theory in political theory, moral philosophy more broadly, and thinking about human society and justice. An enriching read, especially for anyone interested in utopianism as a contemporary school of thought and a method of theorizing. It is at times quite dense and complicated, as are many works of this kind- but worth it, in my opinion.
Amazing work of philosophy. Estlund is definitely one of the best political philosophers out there, and it is very hard not to be persuaded by every single argument he makes. The book is massive, dense, and quite ambitious, but Estlund makes few (if any) wrong moves . He starts with a great case against political realism, 95% convincing me to abandon my realist-critical theory inclinations. He then dives into some very interesting debates in meta-ethics, namely on the diference between ability and willingness to, and on the importance of facts for ideas of justice. From this, Estlund moves to some considerations on the relation between principles of justice and the institutions, before finalising with a fascinating discussion on justice and collective agency. This final part could (and should) be a book of its own. Estlund raises and addresses questions (on agency, cooperation, priority, etc.) that have barely been discussed elsewhere and that become ever more relevant as some claims of justice demand immediate attention. Utopophobia is an unmissable book for philosophers, and I doubt many will finish it without becoming utopians/idealists/moralists.