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朝鲜战争：未曾透露的真相
《朝鲜战争：未曾透露的真相》是一部研究朝鲜战争的全面又精彩的综合性著作。美国政论家约瑟夫·古尔登充分利用1970年代末开始解密的有关朝战的官方档案，收集到美国政府重要决策所依赖的原始情报数据，此后四年间采访众多当事者和知情人，经过精准梳理和敏锐把握，完成了这部内幕之作。而这批“五角大楼朝战文件”资料已经被小布什政府重新加密，这使得本书所揭示的真相更为难得可贵。
本书循着战争决策和实施的主线，从党派政治、国际关系、军事战略、战役以至战术等角度，详尽地描述和分析了朝鲜战争的起因、背景、发展和结局，全景式地再现了决策和作战的真实进程。
书中更有很多美国最高决策当局的内幕情节，着力刻画了诸多军政要员的独特性情和手段，如杜鲁门的固执轻率、艾奇逊的聪明傲慢、麦克阿瑟的乖戾戏剧化等，栩栩如生，如在眼前，向读者提供了一个观察美国军事政治决策出台、运行的极佳视窗，以及理解政治、战略和战场“互动”的全新视角。
1953年的一纸协定，朝鲜半岛分野依然。60多年后回头再看这场战争，以及围绕这场战争的种种国际间的纵横捭阖，对于我们把握现实和预测未来，仍然具有现实和深远的意义。
本书循着战争决策和实施的主线，从党派政治、国际关系、军事战略、战役以至战术等角度，详尽地描述和分析了朝鲜战争的起因、背景、发展和结局，全景式地再现了决策和作战的真实进程。
书中更有很多美国最高决策当局的内幕情节，着力刻画了诸多军政要员的独特性情和手段，如杜鲁门的固执轻率、艾奇逊的聪明傲慢、麦克阿瑟的乖戾戏剧化等，栩栩如生，如在眼前，向读者提供了一个观察美国军事政治决策出台、运行的极佳视窗，以及理解政治、战略和战场“互动”的全新视角。
1953年的一纸协定，朝鲜半岛分野依然。60多年后回头再看这场战争，以及围绕这场战争的种种国际间的纵横捭阖，对于我们把握现实和预测未来，仍然具有现实和深远的意义。
696 pages, Kindle Edition
First published February 1, 1982
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
October 30, 2020
While there is a great deal of factual information in this book (for which I gave it a second star), it is all provided with one goal - to prove that we (the US) should have done nothing in response to the invasion of South Korea by the North. This is shown early on in the book where the author states that, "During a beery discussion" the statement was made: " Boys, there's two things we gotta avoid: Korea and gonorrhea." This college statement sets the tone for the rest of the book.
The author likes Major General Oliver Smith (First Marine Division) - probably because he disagreed with some of the high-level decisions made with respect to fighting the war, but poorly of everyone else. He believes that the JCS should have censured General of the Army Douglas MacArthur - ignoring the fact that, as W.E.B. Griffin stated in his book Under Fire (a work of fiction, but this is a factual statement): "MacArthur respects the office of the chief of staff - and understands its problems - because he served as chief of staff. He has five stars - he had them when General Collins [the chief of staff at the time, a four-star general] had two. During World War Two, when Collins was a corps commander, MacArthur was a theater commander. He had more men under his command then - and I don't think anyone faults his command of them - than are now in the entire U.S. Army. Under those circumstances, I think it's understandable that MacArthur is not as awed by the chief of staff as the chief of staff might prefer. ..he has been taking, and will take, his orders from the chief of staff... So far as MacArthur is concerned, the officeholder is just one more general, junior to him in rank and experience." In criticizing the way the JCS handled the theater commander, the author ignores later events (and the current situation) where the JCS advise theater commanders, but lack command authority over them. In ignoring these issues. the author shows a lack of knowledge of the chain of command at the highest levels of the military. (His treatment of MacArthur is but one example of his antipathy of anyone involved in prosecuting the war - he calls Harry Truman the "accidental" president, blasts the members of the JCS by name, etc.)
This is not to say that General MacArthur was perfect - he was not. He deserved to be relieved, and probably much earlier. However, the decision to relieve him has no bearing on how we got into the Korean War - and discussions of the congressional hearings on his relief do not bear on how we got into the war, nor on how it was fought.
Continuing with one further example. The author clearly dislikes (intensely) General Almond. I quote from a telegram sent to General Almond (at the time retired) by Lieutenant General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller: "...you were the finest combat commander under whom I was ever privileged to serve."
The author's distaste of the Korean war has interfered so much with his writing that I cannot give credence to his book. Facts about combat, yes. But even quotations have sections emphasized that illustrate the author's points, and some are presented out of order and out of context. Example: Early in the book, trying to show that the US knew it should never have been involved in the war, the author quotes General Bradley as saying it was the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time. The quotation shows up again toward the end of the book, where more context is provided - making it apparent that General Bradley made the statement late in the war, after the Chinese had intervened, and when the potential existed for it to become a war with Communist China (who had many more troops under arms than we did, short supply lines while ours were trans-pacific, making it the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time).
Another issue. Having belabored the point that we should not have become involved in Korea, the author then faults the US for its positions during the peace talks. He paints the senior leadership of the US (the President, his staff, and the JCS) as waffling while General Ridgeway (and later General Clark) are trying to get as much as they can out of the negotiations. The only way (as is pointed out in the book) to have gotten more out of the negotiations was to have been willing to commit to a military solution - and the book is based on the position that the military solution was wrong.
With respect to research, the author seems to believe the idea that China came into the war from a sense of concern that the US might continue the war across the Yalu River into their territory - in other words, self-defense, prompted by the advancement of US troops above the 38th parallel. However, in one biography of Chairman Mao the author points out that the reason China got involved was because Mao wanted nuclear weapons, the only place he could get them was from the Soviet Union - but the Soviets were not interested in providing China with nukes. To convince the Soviets that they should provide him (I would say China, but Mao was for, above all else, Mao) with said nukes, Mao needed a credible threat. So he sent his troops to die in Korea in the hopes of provoking a response from the US that would allow him to show the Soviets that there they should give him nukes to defend against the US. Fortunately the US chose not to play that game.
One last point. The author, in making his case that we did not belong in Korea, fails to consider the alternative. Had we stayed out of Korea, what would have happened? Obviously Korea would be a single, unified, Communist country - and the Soviet Union would have been convinced that they could continue taking smaller countries with impunity, just as the Allies failure to respond to Germany's takeover of the Sudetenland gave Adolf Hitler to believe that the Allies would continue to let him move in and take over whatever he wanted.
The author likes Major General Oliver Smith (First Marine Division) - probably because he disagreed with some of the high-level decisions made with respect to fighting the war, but poorly of everyone else. He believes that the JCS should have censured General of the Army Douglas MacArthur - ignoring the fact that, as W.E.B. Griffin stated in his book Under Fire (a work of fiction, but this is a factual statement): "MacArthur respects the office of the chief of staff - and understands its problems - because he served as chief of staff. He has five stars - he had them when General Collins [the chief of staff at the time, a four-star general] had two. During World War Two, when Collins was a corps commander, MacArthur was a theater commander. He had more men under his command then - and I don't think anyone faults his command of them - than are now in the entire U.S. Army. Under those circumstances, I think it's understandable that MacArthur is not as awed by the chief of staff as the chief of staff might prefer. ..he has been taking, and will take, his orders from the chief of staff... So far as MacArthur is concerned, the officeholder is just one more general, junior to him in rank and experience." In criticizing the way the JCS handled the theater commander, the author ignores later events (and the current situation) where the JCS advise theater commanders, but lack command authority over them. In ignoring these issues. the author shows a lack of knowledge of the chain of command at the highest levels of the military. (His treatment of MacArthur is but one example of his antipathy of anyone involved in prosecuting the war - he calls Harry Truman the "accidental" president, blasts the members of the JCS by name, etc.)
This is not to say that General MacArthur was perfect - he was not. He deserved to be relieved, and probably much earlier. However, the decision to relieve him has no bearing on how we got into the Korean War - and discussions of the congressional hearings on his relief do not bear on how we got into the war, nor on how it was fought.
Continuing with one further example. The author clearly dislikes (intensely) General Almond. I quote from a telegram sent to General Almond (at the time retired) by Lieutenant General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller: "...you were the finest combat commander under whom I was ever privileged to serve."
The author's distaste of the Korean war has interfered so much with his writing that I cannot give credence to his book. Facts about combat, yes. But even quotations have sections emphasized that illustrate the author's points, and some are presented out of order and out of context. Example: Early in the book, trying to show that the US knew it should never have been involved in the war, the author quotes General Bradley as saying it was the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time. The quotation shows up again toward the end of the book, where more context is provided - making it apparent that General Bradley made the statement late in the war, after the Chinese had intervened, and when the potential existed for it to become a war with Communist China (who had many more troops under arms than we did, short supply lines while ours were trans-pacific, making it the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time).
Another issue. Having belabored the point that we should not have become involved in Korea, the author then faults the US for its positions during the peace talks. He paints the senior leadership of the US (the President, his staff, and the JCS) as waffling while General Ridgeway (and later General Clark) are trying to get as much as they can out of the negotiations. The only way (as is pointed out in the book) to have gotten more out of the negotiations was to have been willing to commit to a military solution - and the book is based on the position that the military solution was wrong.
With respect to research, the author seems to believe the idea that China came into the war from a sense of concern that the US might continue the war across the Yalu River into their territory - in other words, self-defense, prompted by the advancement of US troops above the 38th parallel. However, in one biography of Chairman Mao the author points out that the reason China got involved was because Mao wanted nuclear weapons, the only place he could get them was from the Soviet Union - but the Soviets were not interested in providing China with nukes. To convince the Soviets that they should provide him (I would say China, but Mao was for, above all else, Mao) with said nukes, Mao needed a credible threat. So he sent his troops to die in Korea in the hopes of provoking a response from the US that would allow him to show the Soviets that there they should give him nukes to defend against the US. Fortunately the US chose not to play that game.
One last point. The author, in making his case that we did not belong in Korea, fails to consider the alternative. Had we stayed out of Korea, what would have happened? Obviously Korea would be a single, unified, Communist country - and the Soviet Union would have been convinced that they could continue taking smaller countries with impunity, just as the Allies failure to respond to Germany's takeover of the Sudetenland gave Adolf Hitler to believe that the Allies would continue to let him move in and take over whatever he wanted.
September 23, 2015
Rather than a chronological description of the Korea war, this book is more about a story of MacArthur and Truman. It's based on disclosed cables during the war, connected with the author's imaginations to make an interesting reading.
The arguments are always there that you are either pro-MacArthur or pro-Truman, though the author tried to be objective, his personal opinion against MacArthur is strong.
The involvement of Chinese in the war is unavoidable in the big picture of conflicts between communism and capitalism, and it is not about justice or injustice, or who broke the balance first. It seems either side wants to break the balance to be dominant. Tactically, Chinese army did show their strength against US army during the war, with limited weapons available, though they lost more people—152000 dead for Chinese vs. 36574 dead for American.
The arguments are always there that you are either pro-MacArthur or pro-Truman, though the author tried to be objective, his personal opinion against MacArthur is strong.
The involvement of Chinese in the war is unavoidable in the big picture of conflicts between communism and capitalism, and it is not about justice or injustice, or who broke the balance first. It seems either side wants to break the balance to be dominant. Tactically, Chinese army did show their strength against US army during the war, with limited weapons available, though they lost more people—152000 dead for Chinese vs. 36574 dead for American.
October 15, 2020
能看到较多的美国总统、军方和国务院的决策过程的描写，很有价值。对所有参战方来说都是极度苦涩，只有金日成背后的苏联是唯一得益方。而斯大林的死去才使得停战协议成为可能，唉。
May 24, 2011
Joseph C. Goulden used the FOIA to great advantage, using sources unavailable before. The book gives an account of MacArthur which makes me put him in the company of other commanders whose press outran their performance, such as McClennen in the Civil War, another case of legend in his own mind.
The Marines, whose service was almost disbanded after WWII, were once again there, ready to fight despite lack of equipment, support and intelligence they could rely upon.
The Army suffers in this account, as they were NOT ready to fight, having gone soft on Occupation Duty in Japan in the five years since VJ Day.
Military Intelligence, filtered through the lens of what MacArthur wanted to hear by Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby caused almost as much trouble as the plans of General Peng Teh Huai, Commander of the 'People's Volunteer Army'.
That we learned so little from this war and managed to make so many of the same mistakes in Vietnam only proves there are too many people fighting the last war and the one before that. Sadly, this is STILL going on. At least the Marines can be counted on...
The Marines, whose service was almost disbanded after WWII, were once again there, ready to fight despite lack of equipment, support and intelligence they could rely upon.
The Army suffers in this account, as they were NOT ready to fight, having gone soft on Occupation Duty in Japan in the five years since VJ Day.
Military Intelligence, filtered through the lens of what MacArthur wanted to hear by Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby caused almost as much trouble as the plans of General Peng Teh Huai, Commander of the 'People's Volunteer Army'.
That we learned so little from this war and managed to make so many of the same mistakes in Vietnam only proves there are too many people fighting the last war and the one before that. Sadly, this is STILL going on. At least the Marines can be counted on...
July 9, 2010
This book is rocking with MacArthur dominating shit up in Korea, until he has to fight the Chinese coming from Manchuria. US only had 5 atomic bombs for this war, and it does not affect millions of chinks hiding in the mountains, waiting for the round eye in Korea to march to their hood. Americans suck battling in the night, because we smell of beef, while the gooks smell of noodles. Didn't know one stunk more, but night battles had Americans airless in this war so no air strikes were being conducted. The removal of MacArthur was necessary otherwise we would have invaded China with everything we got and woke up the sleeping Giant (Russia) and WWIII would have started without John Conner. If you ever play the board game "Risk", the land of Korea is kind of like owning the continent Australia to the game. Stalemate existed cause they both new whoever won this piece of land, wins the game 9 out of 10 times.
December 10, 2015
A very well researched book about the conflict itself, including the life of some of the troops living through the Korean war and the political arena where it played out. Unfortunately, too much is spent on the who's-to-blame game (main targets being President Truman, Sec of State Acheson and, for obvious reasons, general MacArthur). Sad thing is that this messy war from 60+ years ago, which was fought for the right reasons at the time, appears so clean compared with today's urban warfares and suicide bombers, ran by criminal organizations hiding behind so-called religious duties to simply disregard and trample human life.
February 17, 2007
Had to read it for a research paper...
October 6, 2013
Great resource.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews