When President Clinton sent Richard Holbrooke to Bosnia as America's chief negotiator in late 1995, he took a gamble that would eventually redefine his presidency. But there was no saying then, at the height of the war, that Holbrooke's mission would succeed. The odds were strongly against it. As passionate as he was controversial, Holbrooke believed that the only way to bring peace to the Balkans was through a complex blend of American leadership, aggressive and creative diplomacy, and a willingness to use force, if necessary, in the cause for peace. This was not a universally popular view. Resistance was fierce within the United Nations and the chronically divided Contact Group, and in Washington, where many argued that the United States should not get more deeply involved. This book is Holbrooke's gripping inside account of his mission, of the decisive months when, belatedly and reluctantly but ultimately decisively, the United States reasserted its moral authority and leadership and ended Europe's worst war in over half a century. To End a War reveals many important new details of how America made this historic decision. What George F. Kennan has called Holbrooke's "heroic efforts" were shaped by the enormous tragedy with which the mission began, when three of his four team members were killed during their first attempt to reach Sarajevo. In Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb, Paris, Athens, and Ankara, and throughout the dramatic roller-coaster ride at Dayton, he tirelessly imposed, cajoled, and threatened in the quest to stop the killing and forge a peace agreement. Holbrooke's portraits of the key actors, from officials in the White House and the Elysee Palace to the leaders in the Balkans, are sharp and unforgiving. His explanation of how the United States was finally forced to intervene breaks important new ground, as does his discussion of the near disaster in the early period of the implementation of the Dayton agreement. To End a War is a brilliant portrayal of high-wire, high-stakes diplomacy in one of the toughest negotiations of modern times. A classic account of the uses and misuses of American power, its lessons go far beyond the boundaries of the Balkans and provide a powerful argument for continued American leadership in the modern world.
Richard C. Holbrooke was the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan under President Barack Obama. He served as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, where he was also a member of President Clinton’s cabinet (1999-2001). As Assistant Secretary of State for Europe (1994-1996), he was the chief architect of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia. He later served as President Clinton’s Special Envoy to Bosnia and Kosovo and Special Envoy to Cyprus on a pro-bono basis while a private citizen. From 1993-1994, he was the US. Ambassador to Germany.
During the Carter Administration (1977-1981), he served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and was in charge of U.S. relations with China at the time Sino-American relations were normalized in December of 1978.
After joining the Foreign Service in 1962, he served in Vietnam (1963-66), including a tour of duty in the Mekong Delta for AID. He worked on Vietnam issues at the Johnson White House (1966-68); wrote one volume of the Pentagon Papers; and was a member of the American delegation to the Vietnam Peace Talks in Paris (1968-69).
He was Peace Corps Director in Morocco (1970-72), Managing Editor of Foreign Policy (1972-77), and held senior positions at two leading Wall Street firms, Credit Suisse First Boston (Vice Chairman) and Lehman Brothers (Managing Director). He has written numerous articles and two best-selling books: To End a War, a memoir of the Dayton negotiations, and co-author of Counsel to the President, Clark Clifford’s memoir. He previously wrote a monthly column for The Washington Post.
He has received over twenty honorary degrees and numerous awards, including several Nobel Peace Prize nominations. He was the Founding Chairman of the American Academy in Berlin, a center for U.S.-German cultural exchange; formerly President and CEO of the Global Business Coalition, the business alliance against HIV/AIDS; and former Chairman of the Asia Society. Previous NGO board memberships have included the American Museum of Natural History, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Citizens Committee for New York City, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Refugees International. He was Director Emeritus of The Africa-America Institute, was on the Advisory Board of MEMRI, was a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and formerly a member of the U.S. Board of Governors of Interpeace, and a former Professor-at-Large, Brown University. (source: http://www.state.gov)
Richard Holbrooke’s account of his efforts to bring peace to the Balkans--To End A War--is a candid, detailed, and thoughtful study of the practical challenges diplomats (helped by soldiers and backed-up by policymakers) face in the post-Cold War world. When what we used to know as Yugoslavia broke up in the early 1990s, violent struggles broke out engaging Croatians, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croatians, and the major remaining power in the region, Serbia. These struggles were as bad as what we now see in Syria and Afghanistan. They pitted neighbors against one another along ethnic and religious lines that had been peaceful for decades, even centuries. The GHW Bush administration saw these Balkans’ clashes as the first chance for “Europe” to step up during the post-Cold War era and take on a problem in its backyard. But as Henry Kissinger famously said, if someone could give you “Europe’s” phone number, there would be someone to call. To this day there is no such number. As a consequence Bill Clinton’s first administration cautiously tip-toed into the breach. Horrors called “ethnic cleansing” occurred, largely perpetrated by Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims. In mid-1994 Richard Holbrooke left Germany (where I was one of his senior advisors) for Washington to assume responsibility for European affairs at the State Department. His number one concern was that murky, tortured, foggy, beautiful, violent, mountainous region called “the Balkans.” The strength of his book, leading to the famous Dayton Accords that put an end to fighting (more or less) in the Balkans, lies in its detailed account of how difficult and dangerous diplomacy can be in the midst of war. Holbrooke, who died in 2010, was a superb writer (and the best extemporaneous speaker I’ve ever heard). He successfully conveys the nightmarish ups and downs of his shuttle missions through the Balkans leading to the Dayton negotiations. These missions involved deaths, freezing nights in unheated hotels, visits to presidents whose inner office walls were pockmarked with bullet holes, theatrics, temper tantrums, bureaucratic struggles, and a persistent reluctance on the part of the U.N. and to some degree “Europe” to use force--drop bombs--as a way of getting combatants’ attention. As someone who served as an American diplomat for twenty-five years, I often wonder if Americans know how difficult it is for “Washington” to deal with problems abroad. When foreigners are at each others’ throats--as in Syria or Libya--they don’t want to listen to reason...they want to gain the last inch of land possible before they stop fighting. Holbrooke was a theatrical man himself. He put on multiple acts all the time, raising and lowering his voice, laughing at himself, bullying others, issuing threats, mocking threats, and drawing on seemingly endless energy to not give in. He was a humanitarian; and he believed in the U.N.; yet he didn’t hesitate to call for military backup when needed. Did he always get it? No, this book shows another difficult facet of diplomacy: the State Department doesn’t order the Pentagon around. In fact, even a man of Holbrooke’s caliber couldn’t always get a seat in the highest councils when key decisions about the Balkans (for which he was responsible) were being made. There are endless fascinating portraits of Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian leaders in this book. None is better than the picture Holbrooke paints of Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia’s strongman. Milosevic was almost a Balkan Holbrooke when it came to schmoozing, haggling, and playing out discussions for five, ten, or more hours, looking for just a little something that hitherto had eluded him. He prided himself on his English, his knowledge of the U.S., and his ability to sing old pop songs from the Fifties. And in this book, because of the time period covered, he is not portrayed as what he ultimately was revealed to be: a war criminal. In fact, Milosevic’s trial at The Hague went on five years; he defended himself; he medicated himself; and when he was worn out, he took himself off the playing field with a fatal heart attack. Holbrooke’s effectiveness in bringing about the Dayton Accords revolved around his own talents, his understanding that he had to surround himself with a small group of talented aides, and exceptional support from Warren Christopher, in particular. Bill Clinton made the ultimate decisions, but Holbrooke had Christopher at his side for long decisive encounters that overwhelmed historic animosities and put Bosnia on a new path. I’ve dealt with many secretaries of state. Until I read this book, I never knew how far Christopher would go--just as far as Holbrooke and with more on the line. At the top of all great public issues, one tends to find just a few men and women. Bureaucracies don’t negotiate peace; bureaucracies tend to perpetuate negotiations forever like the lawyers in Dickens’ Bleak House. There are lots of stories about Richard Holbrooke that aren’t flattering. In many respects, he brought this upon himself by being a very rough guy to deal with. I won’t dwell on that, however. The final point I want to make, which is a double-edged sword, was Holbrooke’s constant reference (in this book and elsewhere) to “history.” He was always finding something historical in everything he did and everything he wanted someone else to do. I thought about that this afternoon as I was finishing his book. Part of his emphasis on history had to do with vanity and ego, no question. People at the top are full of vanity and ego, and it’s not always pleasant to be around. But Holbrooke did have a broad strategic vision of how individual pieces constituted the foundation of U.S. foreign policy, which during the last century was (and remains) our relationship with Europe. He was right about the slaughter in the Balkans. That slaughter was an offense to our collective conscience; it represented a virulent nationalism that can spread; it was a challenge to our diplomatic, military, political, and economic skills as peacemakers. If we couldn’t bring peace to the Balkans, ill winds would keep blowing. Was that the history we wanted to pass on? Definitely not. This is a very good book about diplomacy under the worst conditions with time not on the good guys’ side.
I started this over a year ago and somehow put it down without getting very far, but not because it wasn't good. I think my French Revolution enthusiasm took me away from my Balkan enthusiasm - temporarily. Now that we have so sadly lost this brilliant diplomat, I think it's time to begin the book again.
This book is excellent, and especially interesting in these days of debating whether or not WikiLeaks is a good or bad thing. The amount of negotiating and diplomacy that Holbrooke had to undertake in order to bring about the Dayton Accords and some kind of peace in Bosnia is mindboggling. One wonders how far he would have come if everything had been completely out in the open. (I have very mixed feelings about what Assange has done, but I'm sure I have some bias as the daughter and sister of career diplomats). Of what Holbrooke has done I am awestruck, and wondering who is going to take over from him in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Holbrooke was an immensely intelligent man with a lot of heart.
I have ordered several more books from amazon which I hope will bring me more up-to-date on Bosnia. I also highly recommend Brian Hall's The Impossible Country.
Richard Holbrooke was an interesting character and probably one of the US's most influential diplomats - so devoted to the job that he pretty much died in Hillary Clinton's office (had a heart attack there, died later at the hospital). I've been wanting to read this memoir for a while; its a staple for any diplomat's bookshelf.
It's a memoir so I'll leave off rating it. It does a bang up job of detailing the intense negotiations, and Holbrooke is at his best when he's recounting the grueling details of the formation of the Dayton Accords. The gritty moment-to-moment narration of this process is fascinating and interesting, and supported with first-hand documentation and accounts.
The book does tend to drag, though, and it seriously lacks any amount of historical information. If you aren't already familiar with this severely complex issue, you will get lost trying to keep up with Holbrooke's story, because he assumes the reader knows the intricacies of Bosnian Serbs vs. Bosnian Muslims vs. Catholic Croats and everything in between - he also assumes you already have knowledge of what exactly caused the ethnic conflict and the war to flare up. This is not a history book, but it really could have used some time taken to expand on the key people, their goals, and what a brief history of the tensions was.
Holbrooke also had a tendency to meander into too much personal detail re: his life, and the life of others, and the timeline could sometime be confusing. I also thought the accident at Mt. Ingman was used too many times as an overblown device to garner sympathy for the negotiations; the deaths of those men, while unspeakably tragic, was due to a traffic accident, so conflating them as victims of this vicious war seemed a bit disingenuous.
Overall, I liked the book and find what was achieved at Dayton to be one of the pinnacles of 20th century American diplomatic feats.
Reading this book was interesting with the given perspective. It took familiar events that I was moderately aware of and provided a unique point of view from the eyes of Richard Holbrooke. The book covered diplomacy and political strategy that you just could not read elsewhere. Holbrooke spoke of his strategical mission in which was a risk that may have redefined the entire Clinton presidency. There was no saying if his mission would be a success. The book was not the easiest read but had value nonetheless. I would not recommend this book to everyone, but to those in search of a branched story regarding the war in the Clinton candidacy.
Valuable documentation of U.S. (and international) engagement in the Balkans in the 90ies. Super interesting facts from Holbrooke’s “diary” and at times good reminder of the atrocities that happened in Bosnia. 4,5 stars mostly due to some seriously wrong judgment of characters.
I was in elementary school when the Bosnian War was being fought and therefore do not have any memories and did not learn anything in older grades as it was not considered history and the aftermath was still being deliberated. In recent years, this particular war has fascinated me and there is still new information being turned out.
To End a War was one of the books recommended in a list, but this was written for those who have a good handle on the events at the time, whether in memory or consuming enough information because Holbrooke jumps back and forth through the 1990s, his personal thoughts, and events. One chapter will be an excerpt from his journal while the next will be bullet points from certain events in the war, the next will be a section of months from 1992 followed by a section of events in 1995, etc. He also stop to talk about certain things like the 1992 presidential campaign, his wedding, and other family events. There is no explanation of why events and battles happening, but rather a report on something occurring and Holbrooke's response.
Another big point to me is how Holbrooke would tell a story and then pick it back up again much later. The beginning of the book starts with a horrific tale (in 1995) of a diplomatic caravan being struck with and some of the group dying. The survivors managed to get their location, but talks were halted and then sent back to Washington. I thought this was the end of the tale, but the rest of the story was picked up more than sixty pages later. It skips around too much for me to really have a handle on the events.
The collapse of Yugoslavia. Ethnic cleansing on the doorstep of Europe. Richard Holbrooke is the man that the US government under President Clinton, drafted in to deal with the Bosnia crisis. From the bomb-wrecked ruins of Sarajevo to the high diplomacy of Dayton, this is a clearly written account of the efforts that the international community underwent in order to bring peace to tha Balkans region. The list of characters brings in all the major players of the region and Holbrooke gets close to Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, Croat President Franjo Tudjman and leader of the Bosnians, Alija Izetbegovic. There is an ongoing hunt for war criminals such as Karadzic and Mladic which undermines a lot of the peace process once it is implemented. For a student of the Bosnian conflict and the Balkans region, this book is an unparalleled insight into the whole conflict and its resolution. The details are factual, well-presented and one gains an insight into the high level shuttle diplomacy and its overbearing physically draining efforts as one of the most serious armed conflicts of the twentieth century is resolved. A five star read.
Holbrooke makes a powerful case for aggressive, high-stakes diplomacy as he delineates in surprising detail the path to the Dayton Agreement and its implementation. Though his writing is utilitarian to a fault, his candid remarks on his own failures as well as on those of his superiors is refreshing. In his extraordinarily prescient concluding remarks (given the explosion of the Middle East and his own involvement more than a decade later in Afghanistan and Pakistan) he states, "There will be other Bosnias in our lives, different in every detail but similar in one overriding manner: they will originate in distant and ill-understood places, explode with little warning, and present the rest of the world with difficult choices—choices between risky involvement and potentially costly neglect." It is easy to wonder what could have happened had Holbrooke not died at the end of 2010, in the middle of arbitrating AfPak relations.
Great insight into the Bosnian War and Dayton. Stunning how much was able to get accomplished with the idiots in Bosnia. This is coming from a Bosnian. Incredible.
Not much has changed since 1995 and many of the same issues and same characters still remain.
Holbrooke exemplifies the intricate web of hoops American diplomats must jump through in foreign peacemaking. Besides getting Washington to agree on important details, such as where peace talks will take place to approving military action, Holbrooke gives insight into what goes on inside the individuals negotiating peace in the face of war: the grief when colleagues are taken by the ongoing violence, the fears and disappointments when other actors don't make the expected move, the personal biases or preferences towards one side, and more.
This book is representative of the conventional top-down approach to peacekeeping, as the dialogue takes place with the top actors in the story: the presidents, ministers, etc. Little (if any) is heard about what is taking place where the actual action is happening, who is getting bombed, how are they reacting, and what is the response from those other than the leaders. Towards the beginning of the book, Holbrooke explains how the tensions between the different ethnic groups in the Balkans was only recently spurred through aggressive rhetoric broadcasted on television yet did not expand much on the growing tensions. From time to time a quick anecdote of a civilian would be sprinkled in but it was clear that the focus of these negotiations was on those who would be included in the room where agreements will be signed and, in their understanding, peace will occur.
However, this gap also exemplifies Washington’s outlook on American diplomacy’s involvement in peacemaking: that the efforts made will prioritize these top actors. Even within these top circles much has to be worked out with the other nations and alliances interested in ending the war, as they each hold their own stake in the fight. This book gives insight into these complicated negotiations between governments, state leaders, and on an interpersonal level. It shows the critical role America held in European peace following the Cold War and the intricate line of involvement played by American diplomats such as Holbrooke to produce something like the Dayton Agreement.
This is a gripping memoir. It is at its peak as Holbrooke recounts the three weeks at Dayton in search of the 1995 peace agreement, but also highly entertaining as he describes the ‘shuttle diplomacy’ that preceded it.
I was expecting it to be too biased to be engaging: George Packer’s excellent biography of Holbrooke criticises his retelling of the tragedy of Mount Igman, in which he erased lesser-known heroes and attributed their actions to himself. He starts the book with that, and one wonders how much he takes credit for others’ success throughout. Sometimes he will credit a side conversation he initiated for making progress on important issues, and there’s often doubt about whether he omits other sides of the story to promote his own narrative.
That said, even if we suppose some of it is inflated, he deserves admiration. There is so much insight into the tactics of high-stakes diplomacy that his reputation as a political mastermind survives even those doubts over his self-promotion. It’s a privilege to get inside his head, and see how he deals with the ego of Milosevic and the stubbornness of Izetbegovic. His sixth sense for what is genuine, and what is bluster, is fantastic. However self-aggrandising the title To End A War may sound, it seems a fair claim in the end: Bosnia would be a different place without Holbrooke.
Read for my US Foreign Policy class. Unfortunately well timed as war breaks out in Europe again, and this book features some hindsight with Mr. Holbrooke's naivety about the expansion of NATO and Russia's passivity going forward. Regardless, this book is a personal account of what it takes to achieve peace, and the many petty and illogical reasons that hold up trying to save the lives of others. The best part is easily the day-by-day breakdown of the Dayton Accords, as each moment feels so staged but so, so real. It's easy to get frustrated at the Balkin Presidents repeatedly setting themselves back, yet their reasons make sense once you filter it through the journey each person has gone on to reach where they are. Diplomacy often requires you to interact with the worst of humanity in order to achieve the greater good. Holbrooke is willing to acknowledge the flaws of Dayton, and I certainly disagree with some of his philosophy, but learning to build an actual peace (not a temporary one like Versaillies) takes tremendous effort to achieve, and that is what occurred. The glossary at the back was extremely helpful in keeping track of names.
An inside account of the Dayton Accords that ended the war in Bosnia were arrived at, written by the man who negotiated them. While at times a bit self-aggrandizing (Holbrooke admits this in the introduction) the book provides a through account of what went on during the lead up to the Balkan peace talks. However, what was especially informative and valuable is the fact that the book paints a vivid picture of what it was like to sit across from the major players in the conflict. It even includes accounts of some key conversations during the diplomatic shuttle and the negotiations. This was especially useful as I prepared to write an alternative history novel set during the war in Bosnia. Further, Holbrooke's detailed account of the process required to go behind Serb lines and sneak over Mount Igman -- the only land access to Sarajevo during most of the Bosnian war -- was also quite helpful. Overall, a very informative read; while the author's pride in himself and his team seems almost pompous or fake at times, this in itself tells one something about the author.
Holbrooke placed himself at the center of the Bosnian war.
From shuttle diplomacy to sitting down at Dayton to returning to the Balkans to get the Dayton accords implemented, Holbrooke carries us through the whole process.
It is interesting. Little tidbits like how much Milosevic dislike the Bosnian Serbs comes out through the work.
What also comes out through the work is Holbrooke's arrogance. He places the fault of every plan on the military. He attempts to brush off every NYT opinion piece that disagrees with him while complimenting each NYT, WP one that agrees with him.
Don't get me wrong, I'm sure he is very good at his job and I couldn't have pulled it off. However, we get to the prescriptions part and sure enough he finds one glaring problem. That is that diplomats have to answer too much to the Executive and Legislative Branches and that the military doesn't just fall in line with those diplomatic decisions.
It's a rating for his honesty, story details and rather gripping narrative. A star less because the same honesty hurts and sometimes made my skin crawl. You want to save lives, just save lives. You want to make USA great - again - for whatever reason, well don't tell me - here it's where everything he says he did could be construed as double edge sword. To End a War, yes but for the USA, for you maybe? But all this doesn't wipe away the great stories, either personal private and intimate, or political and military that you can savour and wolf down in all their minute details. The whole recounter of the Dayton peace negotiations and final agreement, its turbulent aftermath is so precious that it must be cherished and re-told over and over for future references.
Excellent view into US negotiations with Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian political figures. The book starts out quite strong in terms of literary skill. Then it gets a little dry. Holbrooke is obviously Americentric and for an active US foreign policy in post Cold War world. The book was a way to remember several fallen comrades who died in the negotiations. However, I think the author went overboard with the tribute. I could imagine a Bosniak reader getting annoyed that the three Americans receive more attention than the many thousands lost in the war. Holbrooke’s character description of the leaders, especially the Serbs, was quite entertaining. A great starting point for anyone interested in US involvement with the conflict in Bosnia.
A detailed comprehensive perspective of the diplomatic process used and implemented into stopping one of the worst conflicts in Modern History. Holbrooke takes you on a personal journey of determination and endless time and effort to bring to an end the crisis in the Balkans, whilst taking into account the views of the those who primarily caused the war. Unfazed by the destruction and terror Holbrooke and his team pull out all the stops to prevent any further suffering. Whilst at the same time answering the most asked question when it comes to warfare. Could the war of ended sooner?.
This was an easy read, though a bit long. There were areas that Holbrooke no doubt added to justify a full length book but didn't really add much to the overall narrative. This is a great book to read for someone who wants a gateway into understanding the Balkans and the conflict existing in that region. I do think Holbrooke allows his political views to influence his writing and he has a rather uncharitable view of the US military. All that being said, I do recommend this book.
Никад јаснији приказ униполаризма, моћи и престижа САД који треба задржати у периоду Југословенске кризе оличен кроз дрскост и подмуклост једног човјека. Ови мемоари Холбрука показују право значење дипломатије силе и главног циља Америке у БиХ, политика видљива и данас. Поред тог јасно приказују америчко виђење Сарајева, Српског народа и наклоности према једној страни. Препоруке за све које занима Југословенска криза и спољна политика Америке.
This was a really in depth look at the peace process for the former Yugoslavia. I really enjoyed all the detail about the people and the places and the negotiation strategies Holbrook used. This book is pretty long and pretty dense, however, and that made it harder to get through than some of the other nonfiction and/or negotiation books I’ve read recently.
If you are at all interested in the conflict in Yugoslavia, relations in the Balkans, or just the region in general, read this book. Holbrooke is a phenomenal story teller and once you start you will not be able to put this book down.
A self-serving account of the handling of the Bosnia negotiations, both during the lead up and Dayton meeting. The book basically drops off after the peace agreement is signed, though he does try to answer major failures of implementation.
A good book from the negotiating perspective of Richard Holbrooke. It really shows the breakdown of Government expectations and bureaucracy red-tape. Great perspective in the personal personalities of all persons involved and the unseen biases at the negotiation table.
Incredibly detailed play-by-play account of international diplomacy. It’s maddening to observe from first hand how political leaders of warring nations play with people’s lives as puppeteers only accountable for their personal agendas and ambitions.
I’ve read all I care to read of this (required reading for a course). American diplomats think they can make peace amongst peoples that hate each other. Of course, it doesn’t work out in the end, but the book would never say that.
As autobiographical works by major figures go, this is one of the most readable. Holbrook was not know for his humility, but in this book he is humble.