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The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System, 1914-1945
The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System 1914-1945
- GenresHistory
192 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1983
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May 18, 2025
In 1914, Europe and most of the world were dominated by European powers: Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Austro-Hungary, and Italy. Those countries could impose settlements on lesser countries. By 1945, Europe was prostrate under the domination of the USA and USSR. This book narrates the international diplomacy of that development.
The book is quite short – 146 pages - and so does not give much background or analysis on the events. Domestic developments, the personalities of the leaders, structures and theories are very briefly treated or not at all. The book sometimes read like a recitation of facts. This happened and then this happened... But it shows how the European states’ Great Power system, which had been damaged during the First World War, was kept going in the inter-war period. Britain, France, Germany, the USSR, Italy, and the USA continued to bargain among themselves regarding international developments. Along came the Second World War, however, and by the end of it, the USA and USSR were clearly in control. Italy, Germany, and France were defeated. Britain was spent and Roosevelt went over Churchill’s head to talk to Stalin, who now controlled Eastern Europe.
I recently finished reading Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis and that very theoretical book on some of the same topics is a very good companion to this. That provides the theoretical background for the events that the author details here. They don’t always agree: Carr, for example, damns the League of Nations’ notion of collective security as unworkable because states will not use armed force if the situation is not important to them or if it goes against their interests. Ross claims, however, that that was not apparent until the early 1930s, when Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia showed that principal to be true. Nonetheless, anybody who reads this would benefit from reading Carr, and vice-versa.
I would not recommend this book for someone who does not have any background in this area. I studied it with a professor who was giving lectures at the same time, and if you do not have a vague idea of what the Locarno Pact or Wilson’s 14 Points were, this book is not for you.
The book’s strength is also its weakness. It is a swift narration of the most important European diplomacy of the period without much analysis or theory. It tells you how things happened but not why. If you want that as a reference, read it.
The book is quite short – 146 pages - and so does not give much background or analysis on the events. Domestic developments, the personalities of the leaders, structures and theories are very briefly treated or not at all. The book sometimes read like a recitation of facts. This happened and then this happened... But it shows how the European states’ Great Power system, which had been damaged during the First World War, was kept going in the inter-war period. Britain, France, Germany, the USSR, Italy, and the USA continued to bargain among themselves regarding international developments. Along came the Second World War, however, and by the end of it, the USA and USSR were clearly in control. Italy, Germany, and France were defeated. Britain was spent and Roosevelt went over Churchill’s head to talk to Stalin, who now controlled Eastern Europe.
I recently finished reading Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis and that very theoretical book on some of the same topics is a very good companion to this. That provides the theoretical background for the events that the author details here. They don’t always agree: Carr, for example, damns the League of Nations’ notion of collective security as unworkable because states will not use armed force if the situation is not important to them or if it goes against their interests. Ross claims, however, that that was not apparent until the early 1930s, when Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia showed that principal to be true. Nonetheless, anybody who reads this would benefit from reading Carr, and vice-versa.
I would not recommend this book for someone who does not have any background in this area. I studied it with a professor who was giving lectures at the same time, and if you do not have a vague idea of what the Locarno Pact or Wilson’s 14 Points were, this book is not for you.
The book’s strength is also its weakness. It is a swift narration of the most important European diplomacy of the period without much analysis or theory. It tells you how things happened but not why. If you want that as a reference, read it.
Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review