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Chancellorsville
One of the most dramatic battles of the Civil War, Chancellorsville was Robert E. Lee's masterpiece. Outnumbered two to one, Lee violated a cardinal rule of military strategy by dividing his small army, sending Stonewall Jackson on his famous twelve-mile march around the Union flank. Charging out of the Wilderness with Rebel yells, Jackson's troops destroyed one entire corps of the Union army, and Lee drove the rest across the Rappahannock River. Lee's great victory came at great cost, however: Jackson, making a night reconnaissance, was accidentally shot by his own troops and died eight days later. And ironically, the momentum of Lee's greatest triumph pushed him to launch an aggressive campaign that led to his greatest defeat, at Gettysburg.
593 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 1996
487 people are currently reading
2020 people want to read
About the author
Stephen W. Sears
61 books220 followersStephen Ward Sears is an American historian specializing in the American Civil War.
A graduate of Lakewood High School and Oberlin College, Sears attended a journalism seminar at Radcliffe-Harvard. As an author he has concentrated on the military history of the American Civil War, primarily the battles and leaders of the Army of the Potomac. He was employed as editor of the Educational Department at the American Heritage Publishing Company.
Sears resides in Norwalk, Connecticut.
A graduate of Lakewood High School and Oberlin College, Sears attended a journalism seminar at Radcliffe-Harvard. As an author he has concentrated on the military history of the American Civil War, primarily the battles and leaders of the Army of the Potomac. He was employed as editor of the Educational Department at the American Heritage Publishing Company.
Sears resides in Norwalk, Connecticut.
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April 27, 2016
The bloodiest war in American history began with a battle in which there were no combat casualties; it ended with the death of a single man, the martyrdom of the near-biblical leader of the victorious country.
It is factoids like these, told and retold a hundred thousand times, until the stories are woven into the fabric of the nation, that makes the Civil War into something like a myth. It feels, sometimes, almost inevitable, an event controlled by the gods of fate.
This myth-like quality, the sense of destiny playing out as foreordained, is perfectly encapsulated by the Battle of Chancellorsville. Fought May 1-3, 1863, in the Wilderness of Virginia, the battle arguably gave General Robert E. Lee his greatest victory (at least it’s in the running with Second Bull Run). However, it came at the cost of Lee’s chief lieutenant, General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, who was blasted off his horse by his own men, lost his arm, contracted pneumonia, and died raving in the midst of a terrible fever.
In short, at the height of Confederate powers, as they displayed their greatest mastery over the Union, they lost one of two indispensable men to a series of flukes. If that doesn’t feel fated, scripted, I don’t know what does.
In Chancellorsville, though, Stephen Sears strips away all the romances and myths to give a grounded account of an extraordinarily fierce engagement. Sears might be the best Civil War historian working today. His research is tremendous, his judgments acute, and though he doesn’t have the soaring prose of Shelby Foote, he writes clearly and vividly, skillfully meshing his own words with the descriptions of the participants. When I read Sears, I believe what he’s written; I feel he’s come as close to historical truth as possible. I can’t say the same thing for all historians.
The Civil War is well trod ground. There is very little new to be discovered, and I’d be wary of anyone claiming such. To his credit, Sears doesn’t set out to reinvent the wheel. He doesn’t drastically alter what we know about the battle; he doesn’t stumble onto any secrets that have been hidden away for a hundred and fifty years. (In other words, those hoping for support for their Time-Traveling-Ninjas-Killed-Stonewall-Jackson Theory will have to look elsewhere…perhaps to the book I’m writing called Stonewall Jackson & the Ninjas: What Really Happened).
What Sears brings to this oft-told tale is his vast knowledge, his considerable intellect, and his ability to pierce the patina of received wisdom that coats so much of Civil War lore. By the time I got done reading this book, I had a lot more respect for Union General Joseph Hooker, a bit less respect for General Lee, and the sneaking suspicion that dumb luck played as big a role as anything in this battle’s outcome.
Chancellorsville begins with Hooker’s ascendance to the command of the Army of the Potomac, replacing the rotund, courageous, beautifully-bewhiskered and woefully out-of-his-depth Ambrose Burnside. It is in these early pages that Hooker’s virtues – so often forgotten after his drubbing at Chancellorsville – shine through. He reorganized the Army and boosted morale to an extent not seen since the time of George McClellan. He also turned the Bureau of Military Intelligence (BMI) into a force to be reckoned with. Not only did the BMI gather accurate information on Lee’s army – in stark contrast to the phantom legions McClellan always attributed to the Rebels – but they even engaged in some 19th century counterespionage by telegraphing and semaphoring false intel.
Hooker also came up with a plan to beat Lee. While holding Lee in check at Fredericksburg, he took the bulk of his army on a wide flanking march to the west. His intent was to ford the Rappahannock and the Rapidan Rivers, march through the Wilderness, and fall on Lee from behind.
At the start, things went swimmingly, and credit is due to Joe Hooker for his execution.
Yet more credit is due to his opposite, General Lee. A thousand forests have been destroyed in writing of the greatness of Lee; and to be sure, the man had his talents. He was, above all, a shrewd psychologist, able to gauge the temper of his opponent, and ruthlessly willing to exploit that man’s weaknesses. (He played McClellan like a cheap violin; he toyed with John Pope like a marionette).
To Sears’ undying credit, though, he isn’t in thrall to Lee’s legend. Lee was, after all, just a man (a man already suffering the heart ailments that would kill him at the age of 63). In Sears tale, he has testicles roughly the size of the solid shot fired from a 12-pound Napoleon cannon. At Chancellorsville, he defied (sneered at) the conventional wisdom that you never divide a smaller force in the face of the enemy. Not only did Lee split his force (leaving a skeleton crew at Fredericksburg) in order to match Hooker’s flanking movement, he split his already-divided force again, in order to flank Hooker. Give Lee this: he had guts.
He also had luck. And this saved Lee, as much as his over-developed, steel-hard balls.
And luck should not be underestimated. Because even though Lee was confident, competent, and a reader of men, he was also a smug, condescending figure. He was not infallible. For instance, he made the near-fatal blunder of allowing General James Longstreet’s Corps to be sent to Norfolk. He also had this maddening habit of relaying ambiguous orders to his subordinates. When that subordinate was the mostly-competent Stonewall Jackson, things were fine. When that subordinate was someone else, say General Richard Ewell at Gettysburg, things could turn out disastrously.
Furthermore, Lee’s confidence often turned to overconfidence. He had so little respect for the Union Army – “those people,” he often called them, scornfully – that he allowed Hooker, whom he derisively referred to as “Mr. F.J. Hooker,” to steal a march on him. He thought he’d read Hooker; he was wrong, and almost disastrously so.
It helped Lee that Hooker’s Corps commanders, with some exceptions, were woefully short of competent (among Hooker’s lieutenants was Dan Sickles of III Corps, a loose cannon on the best of days, who nearly lost the war at Gettysburg; and Oliver Otis Howard, the one-armed “Christian General,” who turned to the Good Book for guidance, and ended up as good a general as Jesus Christ… which is to say, not awesome).
When the vanguard of Hooker’s force met the Confederates in the dense tangle of the Wilderness, the Union advance was thwarted. Hooker still felt he had the initiative; he was still confident, right up until the moment when Lee split his forces for a second time, sending Stonewall Jackson on his famous end-around.
Sears does a fine job of taking a Brillo pad to the finely-wrought saga of Jackson’s coup de main. Certainly, it was a bold maneuver, effectively carried out. Aside from Confederate skill, though, it required absolute cooperation on the part of the Union Army, especially on the part of Oliver Otis Howard, who evidently missed the part in the Bible about not being having your flank turned. Sightings of Jackson’s movements were ignored; Union troop displacements were inadequate; and Howard refused to acknowledge the possibility – or probability – of an attack on his position.
Jackson’s flanking movement proved a smashing success, and sent the Union Army fleeing.
For the casual student of the Civil War, or anyone unfortunate to have seen the movie Gods and Generals, Jackson’s attack on Howard’s flank is Chancellorsville. Jackson attacked; the Rebels won. That’s not the case. Despite its wild success, the Union Army remained viable after its May 2 thrashing. The Union cause also received a boost when, that night, Jackson was mortally wounded by his own men while conducting a reconnaissance.
Of all people, it fell to Jeb Stuart to press the Confederate advantage on May 3. Sears’ in-depth coverage of the post-Jackson phase of Chancellorsville is much appreciated, as is his sense of balance. Look anywhere for information on this battle, and you will see it described in terms such as “lopsided,” a general thrashing that saw the Yankees fold like the 2011 Boston Red Sox. (Baseball wordplay very much intended).
The reality was different, and belied the intensity of the back-and-forth struggle in the thick forests of the Wilderness. (The Rebs actually lost more men killed than the Union Army; a large number of Union “casualties” were actually prisoners-of-war).
Amidst this vast conflict, Sears is able to pinpoint those hinge-moments where the tide turned one way or the other. One was the decision (for which Hooker must take the blame) to abandon Hazel Grove, a pullback that allowed Porter Alexander and the Confederate artillery to rain shot and shell upon the Union Army. Another was Hooker’s concussion (and near death), which left him stunned and insensible. Hooker would forever be dogged by allegations that he hadn’t been in control of his Army, that he might even have been drunk. The reality is that he’d suffered a traumatic brain injury and was physiologically incapable of exerting command.
(I recall, once, watching Aaron Rodgers, quarterback of the Green Bay Packers, try to play after receiving a concussion. The bewildered look in his eyes, as he tried to navigate 100 yards and 22 players, spoke volumes as to his mental state. That was a football game. A game – for all the talk of football as war – only a game. Hooker had to issue orders for tens of thousands of men, hundreds of whom were dying that instant, without the aid of satellite, radar, telephones, or even a decent map, all after his brain has been shaken inside his skull following a near-death experience. Not an easy task).
Hooker didn't perform flawlessly. But after reading Chancellorsville, I am left with a more rounded view of his performance and of his qualities, as well as his vices. If he’d had a bit of Lee’s luck – if the telegraph lines weren’t down at important moments; if his messages had been delivered on time; if he didn't have to deal with such dawdling squares as John Sedgewick – Hooker might just have bagged General Lee for once and for all.
It’s a fuller story than that told in general histories of the Civil War. And it’s a story worth reading. Sears gives you a comprehensive take on the Chancellorsville campaign, paying full attention not only to the main event, but to the sideshow battles at Fredericksburg and Salem Church (where General Sedgewick proved himself quite a literalist when it came to orders; he wouldn’t put on his hat without Hooker commanding it). The oft-complicated maneuvers are made easier to follow by numerous maps. Above all, Sears constantly reminds you that the battle did not play out in the pages of a history book, but unfolded in real time, with fallible humans making difficult decisions based on grossly imperfect data.
Up above, I noted how the Civil War has a certain quality to it, that everything that happened – the victories and the losses – were written in the stars. Lincoln seemed to recognize this, as he came to see the bloodletting as a national expurgation of sins.
Chancellorsville was a great Confederate triumph. It sent the Union Army fleeing. It cost Joe Hooker his job. Soon, a new commander, dour George Meade, took control of the Army of the Potomac.
Flush with victory, General Lee planned another invasion of the north. He set his troops on the long road to Pennsylvania, minus Stonewall Jackson and 12,000 dead and wounded soldiers. And at the end of that road was Gettysburg and the eventual doom of Lee’s enterprises.
It is factoids like these, told and retold a hundred thousand times, until the stories are woven into the fabric of the nation, that makes the Civil War into something like a myth. It feels, sometimes, almost inevitable, an event controlled by the gods of fate.
This myth-like quality, the sense of destiny playing out as foreordained, is perfectly encapsulated by the Battle of Chancellorsville. Fought May 1-3, 1863, in the Wilderness of Virginia, the battle arguably gave General Robert E. Lee his greatest victory (at least it’s in the running with Second Bull Run). However, it came at the cost of Lee’s chief lieutenant, General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, who was blasted off his horse by his own men, lost his arm, contracted pneumonia, and died raving in the midst of a terrible fever.
In short, at the height of Confederate powers, as they displayed their greatest mastery over the Union, they lost one of two indispensable men to a series of flukes. If that doesn’t feel fated, scripted, I don’t know what does.
In Chancellorsville, though, Stephen Sears strips away all the romances and myths to give a grounded account of an extraordinarily fierce engagement. Sears might be the best Civil War historian working today. His research is tremendous, his judgments acute, and though he doesn’t have the soaring prose of Shelby Foote, he writes clearly and vividly, skillfully meshing his own words with the descriptions of the participants. When I read Sears, I believe what he’s written; I feel he’s come as close to historical truth as possible. I can’t say the same thing for all historians.
The Civil War is well trod ground. There is very little new to be discovered, and I’d be wary of anyone claiming such. To his credit, Sears doesn’t set out to reinvent the wheel. He doesn’t drastically alter what we know about the battle; he doesn’t stumble onto any secrets that have been hidden away for a hundred and fifty years. (In other words, those hoping for support for their Time-Traveling-Ninjas-Killed-Stonewall-Jackson Theory will have to look elsewhere…perhaps to the book I’m writing called Stonewall Jackson & the Ninjas: What Really Happened).
What Sears brings to this oft-told tale is his vast knowledge, his considerable intellect, and his ability to pierce the patina of received wisdom that coats so much of Civil War lore. By the time I got done reading this book, I had a lot more respect for Union General Joseph Hooker, a bit less respect for General Lee, and the sneaking suspicion that dumb luck played as big a role as anything in this battle’s outcome.
Chancellorsville begins with Hooker’s ascendance to the command of the Army of the Potomac, replacing the rotund, courageous, beautifully-bewhiskered and woefully out-of-his-depth Ambrose Burnside. It is in these early pages that Hooker’s virtues – so often forgotten after his drubbing at Chancellorsville – shine through. He reorganized the Army and boosted morale to an extent not seen since the time of George McClellan. He also turned the Bureau of Military Intelligence (BMI) into a force to be reckoned with. Not only did the BMI gather accurate information on Lee’s army – in stark contrast to the phantom legions McClellan always attributed to the Rebels – but they even engaged in some 19th century counterespionage by telegraphing and semaphoring false intel.
Hooker also came up with a plan to beat Lee. While holding Lee in check at Fredericksburg, he took the bulk of his army on a wide flanking march to the west. His intent was to ford the Rappahannock and the Rapidan Rivers, march through the Wilderness, and fall on Lee from behind.
At the start, things went swimmingly, and credit is due to Joe Hooker for his execution.
Yet more credit is due to his opposite, General Lee. A thousand forests have been destroyed in writing of the greatness of Lee; and to be sure, the man had his talents. He was, above all, a shrewd psychologist, able to gauge the temper of his opponent, and ruthlessly willing to exploit that man’s weaknesses. (He played McClellan like a cheap violin; he toyed with John Pope like a marionette).
To Sears’ undying credit, though, he isn’t in thrall to Lee’s legend. Lee was, after all, just a man (a man already suffering the heart ailments that would kill him at the age of 63). In Sears tale, he has testicles roughly the size of the solid shot fired from a 12-pound Napoleon cannon. At Chancellorsville, he defied (sneered at) the conventional wisdom that you never divide a smaller force in the face of the enemy. Not only did Lee split his force (leaving a skeleton crew at Fredericksburg) in order to match Hooker’s flanking movement, he split his already-divided force again, in order to flank Hooker. Give Lee this: he had guts.
He also had luck. And this saved Lee, as much as his over-developed, steel-hard balls.
And luck should not be underestimated. Because even though Lee was confident, competent, and a reader of men, he was also a smug, condescending figure. He was not infallible. For instance, he made the near-fatal blunder of allowing General James Longstreet’s Corps to be sent to Norfolk. He also had this maddening habit of relaying ambiguous orders to his subordinates. When that subordinate was the mostly-competent Stonewall Jackson, things were fine. When that subordinate was someone else, say General Richard Ewell at Gettysburg, things could turn out disastrously.
Furthermore, Lee’s confidence often turned to overconfidence. He had so little respect for the Union Army – “those people,” he often called them, scornfully – that he allowed Hooker, whom he derisively referred to as “Mr. F.J. Hooker,” to steal a march on him. He thought he’d read Hooker; he was wrong, and almost disastrously so.
It helped Lee that Hooker’s Corps commanders, with some exceptions, were woefully short of competent (among Hooker’s lieutenants was Dan Sickles of III Corps, a loose cannon on the best of days, who nearly lost the war at Gettysburg; and Oliver Otis Howard, the one-armed “Christian General,” who turned to the Good Book for guidance, and ended up as good a general as Jesus Christ… which is to say, not awesome).
When the vanguard of Hooker’s force met the Confederates in the dense tangle of the Wilderness, the Union advance was thwarted. Hooker still felt he had the initiative; he was still confident, right up until the moment when Lee split his forces for a second time, sending Stonewall Jackson on his famous end-around.
Sears does a fine job of taking a Brillo pad to the finely-wrought saga of Jackson’s coup de main. Certainly, it was a bold maneuver, effectively carried out. Aside from Confederate skill, though, it required absolute cooperation on the part of the Union Army, especially on the part of Oliver Otis Howard, who evidently missed the part in the Bible about not being having your flank turned. Sightings of Jackson’s movements were ignored; Union troop displacements were inadequate; and Howard refused to acknowledge the possibility – or probability – of an attack on his position.
Howard’s Eleventh Corps…extended the line a mile and a half farther west along the Plank Road from Dowdall’s Tavern, past Wilderness Church and the point where the Orange Turnpike branched off, to the farmstead of James Talley. Throughout its length this line was on dominating high ground and faced to the south. Some 500 yards beyond Talley’s on the Turnpike it simply ended, where Howard ran out of men. There was no natural feature here on which to anchor a defense, nor any formidable force with which to make a defense, only two regiments and two guns pointing to the west down the narrow road through the dark, silent forest. Fighting Joe Hooker’s right flank, in the phrase of the military textbooks, was “in the air…”
Because of what Howard described as “much extension” of his line, there were gaps noticeable…Engineer Comstock took Howard aside and cautioned him, “General, do close in those spaces!” Howard pointed out that everywhere the forest was “thick and tangled; will anybody come through here?” Comstock was quick to answer: “Oh, they may!”
Jackson’s flanking movement proved a smashing success, and sent the Union Army fleeing.
For the casual student of the Civil War, or anyone unfortunate to have seen the movie Gods and Generals, Jackson’s attack on Howard’s flank is Chancellorsville. Jackson attacked; the Rebels won. That’s not the case. Despite its wild success, the Union Army remained viable after its May 2 thrashing. The Union cause also received a boost when, that night, Jackson was mortally wounded by his own men while conducting a reconnaissance.
Of all people, it fell to Jeb Stuart to press the Confederate advantage on May 3. Sears’ in-depth coverage of the post-Jackson phase of Chancellorsville is much appreciated, as is his sense of balance. Look anywhere for information on this battle, and you will see it described in terms such as “lopsided,” a general thrashing that saw the Yankees fold like the 2011 Boston Red Sox. (Baseball wordplay very much intended).
The reality was different, and belied the intensity of the back-and-forth struggle in the thick forests of the Wilderness. (The Rebs actually lost more men killed than the Union Army; a large number of Union “casualties” were actually prisoners-of-war).
Amidst this vast conflict, Sears is able to pinpoint those hinge-moments where the tide turned one way or the other. One was the decision (for which Hooker must take the blame) to abandon Hazel Grove, a pullback that allowed Porter Alexander and the Confederate artillery to rain shot and shell upon the Union Army. Another was Hooker’s concussion (and near death), which left him stunned and insensible. Hooker would forever be dogged by allegations that he hadn’t been in control of his Army, that he might even have been drunk. The reality is that he’d suffered a traumatic brain injury and was physiologically incapable of exerting command.
(I recall, once, watching Aaron Rodgers, quarterback of the Green Bay Packers, try to play after receiving a concussion. The bewildered look in his eyes, as he tried to navigate 100 yards and 22 players, spoke volumes as to his mental state. That was a football game. A game – for all the talk of football as war – only a game. Hooker had to issue orders for tens of thousands of men, hundreds of whom were dying that instant, without the aid of satellite, radar, telephones, or even a decent map, all after his brain has been shaken inside his skull following a near-death experience. Not an easy task).
Hooker didn't perform flawlessly. But after reading Chancellorsville, I am left with a more rounded view of his performance and of his qualities, as well as his vices. If he’d had a bit of Lee’s luck – if the telegraph lines weren’t down at important moments; if his messages had been delivered on time; if he didn't have to deal with such dawdling squares as John Sedgewick – Hooker might just have bagged General Lee for once and for all.
It’s a fuller story than that told in general histories of the Civil War. And it’s a story worth reading. Sears gives you a comprehensive take on the Chancellorsville campaign, paying full attention not only to the main event, but to the sideshow battles at Fredericksburg and Salem Church (where General Sedgewick proved himself quite a literalist when it came to orders; he wouldn’t put on his hat without Hooker commanding it). The oft-complicated maneuvers are made easier to follow by numerous maps. Above all, Sears constantly reminds you that the battle did not play out in the pages of a history book, but unfolded in real time, with fallible humans making difficult decisions based on grossly imperfect data.
Up above, I noted how the Civil War has a certain quality to it, that everything that happened – the victories and the losses – were written in the stars. Lincoln seemed to recognize this, as he came to see the bloodletting as a national expurgation of sins.
Chancellorsville was a great Confederate triumph. It sent the Union Army fleeing. It cost Joe Hooker his job. Soon, a new commander, dour George Meade, took control of the Army of the Potomac.
Flush with victory, General Lee planned another invasion of the north. He set his troops on the long road to Pennsylvania, minus Stonewall Jackson and 12,000 dead and wounded soldiers. And at the end of that road was Gettysburg and the eventual doom of Lee’s enterprises.
August 31, 2025
I have been reading this on and off for quite a while now (it's long). Not because I found boring, but because I've read so many accounts of this battle (some recently). Also, I live very close to the battlefield (we walk our dog there daily), so I took a slower, more reflective approach. That said, this is easily the best book that I've read on the battle, probably because it's the only book I've read on that focused entirely on the battle. Other accounts, some superb, were sandwiched in to larger histories of the war. Sears takes things (never boringly) at times to small unit engagement. An individual death of soldier achieves a poignancy that one might not expect from such detailed canvas. Chancellorsville was an incredibly complex battle. The Confederate victory, as resounding as it was, was also something of Pyrrhic one, not so much because of the losses suffered by the Confederate army (with Stonewall Jackson being the most obvious), but with the false optimism infected into Lee that would prompt the invasion of the North. Gettysburg looms, and with it the fast-maturing Army of the Potomac.
September 6, 2021
I find Sears to be an engaging writer, and he's very good at digging down into the primary sources both to convey what happened but also to prove/disprove things that the generals said about the battle AFTER the war in efforts to lionize themselves or minimize their mistakes. (And there are some awful mistakes among the Union generals at Chancellorsville.) And he's good at letting the generals speak for themselves to portray their characters: Hooker's brash bravado, Lee's arrogance, Stonewall Jackson's piety.
July 9, 2025
All these years later I finally read a Sears book on the Civil War. Not sure what took me so long. This was an entertaining read about the Battle of Chancellorsville and while it is my first book on this battle, I believe it covers everything and anything about the battle. I particularly enjoyed the short biographical details on the major players, and the discussions on strategies dealing with the battle. Following the action was not always easy - there were maps but they felt few and far between. Overall a good read and I look forward to more by Sears.
September 2, 2018
In Chancellorsville, Stephen W. Sears charts the 1863 Chancellorsville Campaign, beginning with the recovery of the Union Army of the Potomac after the Battle of Fredericksburg and ending with two armies facing each other in much the same way as before the campaign began. In what was Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s most stunning victory, he divided his army in the face of a superior enemy, in violation of basic military rules, and sent Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s corps around the Union Army’s flank. Jackson’s death, accidentally shot by one of his own soldiers, has been recounted numerous places before, but less well-known is how Union General Joseph Hooker managed to lose a battle that looked so much in his favor.
One of the most stunning takeaways from this book was the Army of the Potomac’s condition after the Battle of Fredericksburg. Desertion, low morale, in-fighting among officers, and expired enlistments whittled the army down to an empty husk. On January 31, 1863, the Union Army counted 25,363 deserters (1/4 of the army!). In contrast, Lee had 91,000 men under his command. Why didn’t he move against the disorganized and demoralized Union Army?
One reason was lack of intelligence. Lee couldn’t be certain how many (or how few) enemy soldiers he faced. Another was lack of supply. Lee couldn’t stockpile enough supplies to go on the offensive with the trickle coming from Richmond. He actually sent 20,000 men south to relieve the burden. So his best opportunity to crush the Army of the Potomac slowly slipped away.
Chancellorsville is above all a vindication of Major General Joseph Hooker. Hooker is usually portrayed as the Union general on the losing end of Robert E. Lee’s most stunning victory. But he was a brilliant organizer and military innovator. Unfortunately, “Fighting Joe” didn’t get along well with his peers. He was outspoken, a rough character, and a middle-aged bachelor at a time when that was viewed suspiciously.
Hooker most famously implemented the “corps badges” that identified each corps in the Army of the Potomac by symbol and each division by color (suggested by Maj. Gen. Dan Butterfield), but he also created an improved furlough system, reformed the Army cooks and quartermasters, re-established paydays and improved camp sanitation, and consolidated the cavalry into a single corps. He organized several divisions into “flying columns,” units that would pack light and carry eight days’ rations rather than the standard three. By dispensing with wagons and extra gear, these light infantry units would be far more flexible in rough terrain.
Hooker’s most important achievement was to replace George McClellan’s old system of military intelligence with a professional army staff called the Bureau of Military Information. The B.M.I. was so effective that by the end of April, Hooker knew as much about the Army of Northern Virginia as its own commander. They slightly underestimated the number of men under Lee’s command, but were far more accurate than the wild over-estimates of McClellan’s Pinkerton detectives.
Sears makes a compelling case that the Union Army’s loss at the Battle of Chancellorsville was made so much worse by the fact Hooker likely suffered a concussion when a cannonball struck a porch he was standing on. Later, many of his subordinates accused him of being drunk during the battle, but his confusion and slurred speech was probably a result of the concussion. Because nothing was physically wrong with him, no one ever relieved him of command, leaving the Union Army without central leadership at a critical moment.
Stephen Ward Sears (born July 27, 1932), of Norwalk, Connecticut, is a graduate of Lakewood High School and Oberlin College. He began his writing career in the 1960s as a World War 2 historian but later found a niche writing about the Army of the Potomac in the American Civil War, and particularly its most famous commander, General George B. McClellan. His other books include Gettysburg (2003) and George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon (1988).
One of the most stunning takeaways from this book was the Army of the Potomac’s condition after the Battle of Fredericksburg. Desertion, low morale, in-fighting among officers, and expired enlistments whittled the army down to an empty husk. On January 31, 1863, the Union Army counted 25,363 deserters (1/4 of the army!). In contrast, Lee had 91,000 men under his command. Why didn’t he move against the disorganized and demoralized Union Army?
One reason was lack of intelligence. Lee couldn’t be certain how many (or how few) enemy soldiers he faced. Another was lack of supply. Lee couldn’t stockpile enough supplies to go on the offensive with the trickle coming from Richmond. He actually sent 20,000 men south to relieve the burden. So his best opportunity to crush the Army of the Potomac slowly slipped away.
Chancellorsville is above all a vindication of Major General Joseph Hooker. Hooker is usually portrayed as the Union general on the losing end of Robert E. Lee’s most stunning victory. But he was a brilliant organizer and military innovator. Unfortunately, “Fighting Joe” didn’t get along well with his peers. He was outspoken, a rough character, and a middle-aged bachelor at a time when that was viewed suspiciously.
Hooker most famously implemented the “corps badges” that identified each corps in the Army of the Potomac by symbol and each division by color (suggested by Maj. Gen. Dan Butterfield), but he also created an improved furlough system, reformed the Army cooks and quartermasters, re-established paydays and improved camp sanitation, and consolidated the cavalry into a single corps. He organized several divisions into “flying columns,” units that would pack light and carry eight days’ rations rather than the standard three. By dispensing with wagons and extra gear, these light infantry units would be far more flexible in rough terrain.
Hooker’s most important achievement was to replace George McClellan’s old system of military intelligence with a professional army staff called the Bureau of Military Information. The B.M.I. was so effective that by the end of April, Hooker knew as much about the Army of Northern Virginia as its own commander. They slightly underestimated the number of men under Lee’s command, but were far more accurate than the wild over-estimates of McClellan’s Pinkerton detectives.
Sears makes a compelling case that the Union Army’s loss at the Battle of Chancellorsville was made so much worse by the fact Hooker likely suffered a concussion when a cannonball struck a porch he was standing on. Later, many of his subordinates accused him of being drunk during the battle, but his confusion and slurred speech was probably a result of the concussion. Because nothing was physically wrong with him, no one ever relieved him of command, leaving the Union Army without central leadership at a critical moment.
Stephen Ward Sears (born July 27, 1932), of Norwalk, Connecticut, is a graduate of Lakewood High School and Oberlin College. He began his writing career in the 1960s as a World War 2 historian but later found a niche writing about the Army of the Potomac in the American Civil War, and particularly its most famous commander, General George B. McClellan. His other books include Gettysburg (2003) and George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon (1988).
November 19, 2011
I really enjoyed Chancellorsville. Prior to this book, I knew very little about the battle except that it was another Yankee defeat and led the demise of Joe Hooker and the death of Stonewall Jackson. I was glad I read Sear’s account. Little did I realize how close the Union came to total success. I believe this would have been a Union victory had it not been for 1.) Hooker’s poor use of artillery which included his order to surrender Hazel Grove, a strategic spot on the battlefield to employ artillery and 2.) had it not been for a round of solid shot from a Rebel cannon that knocked out a pillar that FJ Hooker was leaning against. This round caused a severe concussion to the general. After the concusion FJH could not think clearly and this seemed to cause a order to retreat that no one else agreed with. For me the book cleared up a few myths. First, Joe Hooker did not lose his nerve and fail to attack. He intended to fight a defensive battle similar to what Longstreet wanted to do in the Gettysburg campaign. Second, there was no credible account that fighting Joe Hooker told another general officer after the war that Joe Hooker lost confidence in Joe Hooker. Third, this was a Confederate victory but far from a Union route. The Union morale was improving and if their commanding officer had not suffered from concussion they probably would have stayed and slugged it out. Also, with the loss of Jackson and so many good men, the South could no longer afford anymore hollow victories like this. I loved this book.
November 15, 2021
Even those critical of Sears usually like his work on Chancellorsville. The account is like the rest; well written, but with original arguments in favor of the much maligned Hooker. Sears points out where Hooker went wrong, but he mostly thinks his defeat came down to bad luck and failures by his subordinates, chiefly Sickles, Sedgewick, Howard, and Stoneman. I would add that Sears only glosses over Hooker's greatest weakness. He had a propensity to make enemies from a broad range of people. I can easily rattle off a list of those who despised him, but his list of advocates has me searching. How exactly a man of intelligence and drive, who was popular with his soldiers, could attract such antipathy is not properly explored.
That said, this is an excellent and mostly fair account, limited only by its special pleading for Hooker and against those who failed him. Tellingly Sickles, who was Hooker's friend, comes in for the least damnation. This is a broader problem in Civil War scholarship, where favorites and villains are picked among the generals. What makes Chancellorsville work, as opposed to Sears' myopic analysis of McClellan, is that the argument is broad and well made. This is not the best battle study I have read, but it is clearly in the top 20, and I recommend it to anyone.
That said, this is an excellent and mostly fair account, limited only by its special pleading for Hooker and against those who failed him. Tellingly Sickles, who was Hooker's friend, comes in for the least damnation. This is a broader problem in Civil War scholarship, where favorites and villains are picked among the generals. What makes Chancellorsville work, as opposed to Sears' myopic analysis of McClellan, is that the argument is broad and well made. This is not the best battle study I have read, but it is clearly in the top 20, and I recommend it to anyone.
September 9, 2012
Sears' retelling of the battle of Chancellorsville is meticulously researched. In fact, about 100 of the 600 pages of this mighty tome are footnotes and Index.
If you are waiting for the excitement to start, don't hold your breath. For one thing, if you are sufficiently interested in the American Civil War to read 500 pages about just one battle, you already know how this one ended, so there is no magic in terms of waiting for the end. The value here is for the die-hard researcher or military theorist, who either wants to examine why the battle turned one way or another, what could have prevented it, etc. Picking apart the miniscule parts of each battle and seeing how they are different in the eyes of one historian from another (usually in small ways) is interesting, for those of us sufficiently obsessed.
In a nutshell, if you are interested in the most minute details of this particular battle, having had your fill of books on Gettysburg and Antietam, this man has done a good job of putting it all together. Sometimes it is compelling, even amusing, and other times dry, but there was no time when I did not feel he had carefully laid the groundwork for what he was describing.
If you are waiting for the excitement to start, don't hold your breath. For one thing, if you are sufficiently interested in the American Civil War to read 500 pages about just one battle, you already know how this one ended, so there is no magic in terms of waiting for the end. The value here is for the die-hard researcher or military theorist, who either wants to examine why the battle turned one way or another, what could have prevented it, etc. Picking apart the miniscule parts of each battle and seeing how they are different in the eyes of one historian from another (usually in small ways) is interesting, for those of us sufficiently obsessed.
In a nutshell, if you are interested in the most minute details of this particular battle, having had your fill of books on Gettysburg and Antietam, this man has done a good job of putting it all together. Sometimes it is compelling, even amusing, and other times dry, but there was no time when I did not feel he had carefully laid the groundwork for what he was describing.
February 3, 2017
This is an absolutely outstanding work. Sears clearly researched everything pertaining to both armies. Sears walks the reader through every change in the armies following the battle of Fredericksburg all the way through the final day of Chancellorsville. The information is masterfully presented in an easily digestible narrative flow.
April 20, 2018
At 640 pages, you could read more concise accounts of the Battle of Chancellorsville, but not a better one.
July 1, 2020
A very detailed look into the cause of Union defeat at Chancellorsville. It was not the inevitable outcome I once thought it to be.
August 4, 2024
Great narrative from one of the best Civil War historians. He goes into detail without getting bogged down, managing to weave between big events and individual experiences before and during the battle.
May 9, 2022
I really like Mr. Sears writing style and his analysis. I think he is becoming one of my favorite Civil War historians and authors.
August 12, 2020
In the wake of the Union defeat at Chancellorsville in May 1863, President Lincoln must have looked more fondly on Napoleon's maxim that it is better to have lucky generals than good ones. Robert E. Lee may have devised a brilliant battle plan and taken the initiative against Joseph Hooker's forces on the Rappahannock and Rapidan, but, as Stephen Sears concludes, he also was the beneficiary of much good luck during the Rappahannock Campaign.
Chancellorsville is a fascinating battle, often cited as Lee's coup de grace. In its complex maneuverings, split army corps, and multiple battlefronts stretching from Fredericksburg (the site of Burnside's defeat in December 1862) west to the Wilderness, Chancellorsville is a fast moving affair that stands in contracts to the largely defensive, pounding-against-the-wall warfare of Antietam and Gettysburg.
Sears, author of multiple military histories on Civil War battles, maintains his usual master of the facts with Chancellorsville. The narrative opens with Joseph Hooker's sly campaign to assume the mantle of command of the Army of the Potomac, to which he succeeds in the wake of Burnside's blunder at Fredericksburg and ensuing demoralization of the army. Sears is harsh on Hooker on tactics and his ability to respond to Lee, but there is much that the author lauds in Hooker: administrative ability; the instilling of elan in the army; and a solid grasp of flanking movements and a desire to avoid needless headlong assaults against an entrenched enemy.
Unfortunately, Hooker is fighting against audacity itself in Lee. Yes, Lee is lucky - Stonewall Jackson's flanking march is unseen (or at least ignored) by the Union high command; Union generals such as Howard and Sedgewick allow him the space for bold maneuvering; and the weather eventually saves Lee from a surely-fruitless and bloody assault on Hooker's entrenchments during the final phase of the battle. For all of his luck, though, Lee makes much of his own. Unlike any Union general up to 1863, Lee realizes the significance of offensive tactics and a strategy of forward movement that keeps the Union on the defensive. Lee is eerily prescient in reading the mind of his opponent, betting on breaking up his army not once, but twice, and facing Hooker at certain points in the battle with threadbare numbers.
Sears captures the battle well, particularly the tipping point of Hooker's likely concussion when a shell burst through a pillar the general was leaning on. For the following days, Hooker appears in a mental fog, unable to respond deftly to the developments in the battle and push his troops to victory. While there are lots of minute details on the battles, down to which companies fight where, the overall narrative is crisply told and the reader will undoubtedly come away with a greater understanding of the broad strokes of the battle.
Moreover, Sears is to be commended for inserting many helpful maps throughout the book, a virtual necessity with a battle like Chancellorsville, but a feature that aids any reader unfamiliar with the terrain.
Lee's victory is grand, though bought dearly. Jackson, the fighting-est of Lee's lieutenants, falls in battle to friendly fire and succumbs days later to his injuries. Lee is likely correct in his sad note that while General Jackson lost his left arm in the battle, Lee lost his right arm. Gettysburg may be the geographic high tide of the Confederacy, but Chancellorsville, in the minutes before Jackson is struck down, is almost certainly its military and strategic zenith.
And so the epitaph on the battle, and Hooker's command, can be quite long: an inauspicious injury; the measly performance of the Twelfth Corps that skedaddled at Jackson's flanking attack; missed communications. It may be much shorter though: Hooker, and the Union, were simply unlucky.
Chancellorsville is a fascinating battle, often cited as Lee's coup de grace. In its complex maneuverings, split army corps, and multiple battlefronts stretching from Fredericksburg (the site of Burnside's defeat in December 1862) west to the Wilderness, Chancellorsville is a fast moving affair that stands in contracts to the largely defensive, pounding-against-the-wall warfare of Antietam and Gettysburg.
Sears, author of multiple military histories on Civil War battles, maintains his usual master of the facts with Chancellorsville. The narrative opens with Joseph Hooker's sly campaign to assume the mantle of command of the Army of the Potomac, to which he succeeds in the wake of Burnside's blunder at Fredericksburg and ensuing demoralization of the army. Sears is harsh on Hooker on tactics and his ability to respond to Lee, but there is much that the author lauds in Hooker: administrative ability; the instilling of elan in the army; and a solid grasp of flanking movements and a desire to avoid needless headlong assaults against an entrenched enemy.
Unfortunately, Hooker is fighting against audacity itself in Lee. Yes, Lee is lucky - Stonewall Jackson's flanking march is unseen (or at least ignored) by the Union high command; Union generals such as Howard and Sedgewick allow him the space for bold maneuvering; and the weather eventually saves Lee from a surely-fruitless and bloody assault on Hooker's entrenchments during the final phase of the battle. For all of his luck, though, Lee makes much of his own. Unlike any Union general up to 1863, Lee realizes the significance of offensive tactics and a strategy of forward movement that keeps the Union on the defensive. Lee is eerily prescient in reading the mind of his opponent, betting on breaking up his army not once, but twice, and facing Hooker at certain points in the battle with threadbare numbers.
Sears captures the battle well, particularly the tipping point of Hooker's likely concussion when a shell burst through a pillar the general was leaning on. For the following days, Hooker appears in a mental fog, unable to respond deftly to the developments in the battle and push his troops to victory. While there are lots of minute details on the battles, down to which companies fight where, the overall narrative is crisply told and the reader will undoubtedly come away with a greater understanding of the broad strokes of the battle.
Moreover, Sears is to be commended for inserting many helpful maps throughout the book, a virtual necessity with a battle like Chancellorsville, but a feature that aids any reader unfamiliar with the terrain.
Lee's victory is grand, though bought dearly. Jackson, the fighting-est of Lee's lieutenants, falls in battle to friendly fire and succumbs days later to his injuries. Lee is likely correct in his sad note that while General Jackson lost his left arm in the battle, Lee lost his right arm. Gettysburg may be the geographic high tide of the Confederacy, but Chancellorsville, in the minutes before Jackson is struck down, is almost certainly its military and strategic zenith.
And so the epitaph on the battle, and Hooker's command, can be quite long: an inauspicious injury; the measly performance of the Twelfth Corps that skedaddled at Jackson's flanking attack; missed communications. It may be much shorter though: Hooker, and the Union, were simply unlucky.
June 12, 2021
Then he and his fellows opened fire and cut gaps in the Rebels' line but they closed up and came on. To the right the 2nd Massachusetts, which had been lying down, rose up as one man and added a ripping volley to the din. Then the two battle lines, perhaps 75 yards apart, on open ground, stood there and fired at each other, steadily and without pause for what both sides later agreed was 30 minutes.
History as page-turner. Stephen Sears has written what just might be the definitive account of this battle, perhaps Lee's greatest, most audacious triumph, and the fatal blow to General Hooker's short-lived role commanding the Army of the Potomac. The author deftly mitigates what some readers might consider overly copious detail on the composition and movements of brigades, divisions, and corps units of the opposing armies, with a broad tactical and strategic narrative that contextualizes all that detail. Overall, a thorough, thrilling account of a momentous battle the outcome of which was largely influenced by the breakdown of Union communication between units, crucially-placed insubordinate officers (Howard, for one, failed to stiffen his west-facing defenses as he was ordered), an ill-placed unit at the Union's far right – the XI Corps of Maj. General Howard, considered rightly or not to be the poorest, least dependable of the units, and placed there as not likely to see combat – and perhaps most egregious, the dismissal by the commanding officers of scattered glimpses of Confederate troops seen traveling through the Wilderness to their south. Since reports of a Confederate withdrawal had been circulating, these sightings were deemed just that, withdrawal. It was not. In fact it was Stonewall Jackson's 21,000 troops maneuvering behind cover of thick woods to engage Howard's XI Corps in a surprise flanking attack. The Union right collapsed totally, the XI Corps fled, and Hooker's grand scheme, meticulously planned, to beat Lee and demolish the Army of Northern Virginia, was doomed. Sears' chapters on this aspect of Chancellorsville alone is worth the entire volume.
This is the second of Sears' Civil War books I've read, 'Gettysburg' being the first. On deck for the next one is his volume on Antietam, 'Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam.'
History as page-turner. Stephen Sears has written what just might be the definitive account of this battle, perhaps Lee's greatest, most audacious triumph, and the fatal blow to General Hooker's short-lived role commanding the Army of the Potomac. The author deftly mitigates what some readers might consider overly copious detail on the composition and movements of brigades, divisions, and corps units of the opposing armies, with a broad tactical and strategic narrative that contextualizes all that detail. Overall, a thorough, thrilling account of a momentous battle the outcome of which was largely influenced by the breakdown of Union communication between units, crucially-placed insubordinate officers (Howard, for one, failed to stiffen his west-facing defenses as he was ordered), an ill-placed unit at the Union's far right – the XI Corps of Maj. General Howard, considered rightly or not to be the poorest, least dependable of the units, and placed there as not likely to see combat – and perhaps most egregious, the dismissal by the commanding officers of scattered glimpses of Confederate troops seen traveling through the Wilderness to their south. Since reports of a Confederate withdrawal had been circulating, these sightings were deemed just that, withdrawal. It was not. In fact it was Stonewall Jackson's 21,000 troops maneuvering behind cover of thick woods to engage Howard's XI Corps in a surprise flanking attack. The Union right collapsed totally, the XI Corps fled, and Hooker's grand scheme, meticulously planned, to beat Lee and demolish the Army of Northern Virginia, was doomed. Sears' chapters on this aspect of Chancellorsville alone is worth the entire volume.
This is the second of Sears' Civil War books I've read, 'Gettysburg' being the first. On deck for the next one is his volume on Antietam, 'Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam.'
March 4, 2020
What to say? Sears is said to be the authority on Chancellorsville ...and it shows. This is a very dense and thorough account of the battle. Descriptions of troop movements with detail from division commanders down to brigaide and company makeup. But like i said, this is a very dense, very detailed account. Not a book for a layman like me. I somewhat lost the genius of Lee's "perfect battle", with Stonewall Jackson's flanking movement, in all this detail. Still, Sears is fair to Hooker and one feels Lincoln's frustrations at his Generals in the East (Grant and Sherman still out west about to win Vicksburg). The book ends with Jackson's death and feels almost abrupt. Would like to hear analysis on the tactical loss of Jackson, with Gettysburg being months away. But I am not qualified to fully appreciate or judge such a scholarly work.
July 21, 2022
I often think about whether it has value to tie books to seasons. We think of vacationers in summer who want something short and relatively mindless. Perhaps some of us think of winter as a time to read those long nonfiction books we've put off all year. For others, there really is no specific season or time to read a particular type of book. We just grab what we think will interest us and carry forward with it regardless of what the calendar says. I'm hopeful that's the case this month. This isn't exactly the kind of book you would think about taking on an airplane trip or to the beach. On the other hand, why not?
I was into this book only a few pages before it began to fascinate me with its numerous facts and circumstances about which I knew little. I make no pretense of being part of the civil war cognoscenti. But I thought I had read enough to at least be almost conversant with what I assumed would be the material in this book. I discovered my woeful ignorance, and I rekindled my insatiable interest in the topic. This book will do that to you. At the very least, it will rekindle your insatiable interest in the topic.
In the earliest chapter of the book, we learn about the horrific state of the army of the Potomac. I had no idea during the winter of 1863 that things were so hopeless. It didn't seem to matter whom Lincoln appointed to the generalship of that army, they failed and failed miserably. But it wasn't just a crisis of leadership that dogged the president and his cabinet. As soon as Lincoln released the Emancipation Proclamation in January of 1863, desertions of Union soldiers took an upward jump. There was a significant sentiment among the Union army that they weren't there to free blacks. And many of them determined then and there that their participation in the war was over. I had no idea how bad it got. This book includes fascinating stories about soldiers who received civilian clothing from the folks back home and simply slipped out of the ranks and rejoined life as civilians. That changed to some degree when Lincoln named fighting Joe Hooker as the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac. But he came with his own troublesome baggage, and his tenure as the head of that army would not last all that long. Still, the author points out that history may have been unfair to Hooker Thinking that perhaps he wasn't quite as prone to drunkenness as his associates claimed.
One of the things that drew my attention was the extreme hunger of the Confederate troops. Robert E. Lee may have gone on the offensive that spring if his forces had full stomachs. But they didn’t, and supplies were tough to get. The rations were pitiful, and I was amazed that there weren’t more desertions. Chapter five looks briefly at the Richmond bread riots and the struggles faced by the civilian population during the time of the battle of Chancellorsville.
You’ll read about miscommunications and Hooker’s bad decisions that forced his forces to fight in the wilderness rather than bringing the battle into the open. Critics claim that one decision made in early May rang the death nell to any Union victory.
Decency and good humor can find lodging in the strangest of circumstances. The book gives the account of two bands—a Union and a Confederate one—being within hearing distance of one another. The Confederates struck up a rendition of “Yankee Doodle,” and the Union band promptly replied with a jaunty arrangement of “Dixie.” Men on both sides cheered when they heard the two songs. In a chapter closer to the back of the book, the author dedicates a paragraph or two to narrow escapes. He described 1 Confederate soldier who dealt with a missing backpack. a Union ball ripped the backpack off the soldier and flung it 40 feet behind him. The Confederate soldier suffered no damage. Other soldiers wrote home describing hats riddled with bullet holes while the head bearing the hat was undamaged. Another man was horrified to see holes ripped in the armpits of his coat by bullets, but he suffered no harm. Still another reported that the seat of his pants was missing probably the result of a narrow escape from a shell. Miraculously enough, the buns the trousers once covered suffered no ill effects. In yet another narrow escape, a Confederate soldier became convinced he was dying when he saw what he thought was blood running from his body. It turned out that a Union bullet had punctured his canteen, and the fluid was not blood but water.
Chapter 11 explores the fate of Stonewall Jackson. You may remember from your own knowledge of civil war history that Jackson died eight days after friendly forces shot him. He had gone out on a night excursion, and a Confederate soldier took him for a Yankee. He lived in a hospital for several days after his shooting. Physicians amputated his arm at the shoulder. He complained occasionally of pain in his side but felt as though he were beginning to recover. He lived long enough to dictate a missive to Robert E. Lee and receive one in return.
The epilogue looks at some of the reasons for the failures associated with Chancellorsville. The book's tone is thoughtful, and it will leave you with a great deal to ponder as you consider the importance of the battle in light of what would happen just over a month later in Pennsylvania.
The only negative I experienced with the book is a circumstance that is unavoidable. I could not always follow appropriately all of the names and places referenced in the book. I think if I had had vision and had been able to flip back and forth between the text and some of the battle maps and other illustrations that are doubtless in the print edition, this would have been much easier for me. As it was, I found myself sometimes frustrated and confused by all the place names and geographic references. Not the author's fault.
I was into this book only a few pages before it began to fascinate me with its numerous facts and circumstances about which I knew little. I make no pretense of being part of the civil war cognoscenti. But I thought I had read enough to at least be almost conversant with what I assumed would be the material in this book. I discovered my woeful ignorance, and I rekindled my insatiable interest in the topic. This book will do that to you. At the very least, it will rekindle your insatiable interest in the topic.
In the earliest chapter of the book, we learn about the horrific state of the army of the Potomac. I had no idea during the winter of 1863 that things were so hopeless. It didn't seem to matter whom Lincoln appointed to the generalship of that army, they failed and failed miserably. But it wasn't just a crisis of leadership that dogged the president and his cabinet. As soon as Lincoln released the Emancipation Proclamation in January of 1863, desertions of Union soldiers took an upward jump. There was a significant sentiment among the Union army that they weren't there to free blacks. And many of them determined then and there that their participation in the war was over. I had no idea how bad it got. This book includes fascinating stories about soldiers who received civilian clothing from the folks back home and simply slipped out of the ranks and rejoined life as civilians. That changed to some degree when Lincoln named fighting Joe Hooker as the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac. But he came with his own troublesome baggage, and his tenure as the head of that army would not last all that long. Still, the author points out that history may have been unfair to Hooker Thinking that perhaps he wasn't quite as prone to drunkenness as his associates claimed.
One of the things that drew my attention was the extreme hunger of the Confederate troops. Robert E. Lee may have gone on the offensive that spring if his forces had full stomachs. But they didn’t, and supplies were tough to get. The rations were pitiful, and I was amazed that there weren’t more desertions. Chapter five looks briefly at the Richmond bread riots and the struggles faced by the civilian population during the time of the battle of Chancellorsville.
You’ll read about miscommunications and Hooker’s bad decisions that forced his forces to fight in the wilderness rather than bringing the battle into the open. Critics claim that one decision made in early May rang the death nell to any Union victory.
Decency and good humor can find lodging in the strangest of circumstances. The book gives the account of two bands—a Union and a Confederate one—being within hearing distance of one another. The Confederates struck up a rendition of “Yankee Doodle,” and the Union band promptly replied with a jaunty arrangement of “Dixie.” Men on both sides cheered when they heard the two songs. In a chapter closer to the back of the book, the author dedicates a paragraph or two to narrow escapes. He described 1 Confederate soldier who dealt with a missing backpack. a Union ball ripped the backpack off the soldier and flung it 40 feet behind him. The Confederate soldier suffered no damage. Other soldiers wrote home describing hats riddled with bullet holes while the head bearing the hat was undamaged. Another man was horrified to see holes ripped in the armpits of his coat by bullets, but he suffered no harm. Still another reported that the seat of his pants was missing probably the result of a narrow escape from a shell. Miraculously enough, the buns the trousers once covered suffered no ill effects. In yet another narrow escape, a Confederate soldier became convinced he was dying when he saw what he thought was blood running from his body. It turned out that a Union bullet had punctured his canteen, and the fluid was not blood but water.
Chapter 11 explores the fate of Stonewall Jackson. You may remember from your own knowledge of civil war history that Jackson died eight days after friendly forces shot him. He had gone out on a night excursion, and a Confederate soldier took him for a Yankee. He lived in a hospital for several days after his shooting. Physicians amputated his arm at the shoulder. He complained occasionally of pain in his side but felt as though he were beginning to recover. He lived long enough to dictate a missive to Robert E. Lee and receive one in return.
The epilogue looks at some of the reasons for the failures associated with Chancellorsville. The book's tone is thoughtful, and it will leave you with a great deal to ponder as you consider the importance of the battle in light of what would happen just over a month later in Pennsylvania.
The only negative I experienced with the book is a circumstance that is unavoidable. I could not always follow appropriately all of the names and places referenced in the book. I think if I had had vision and had been able to flip back and forth between the text and some of the battle maps and other illustrations that are doubtless in the print edition, this would have been much easier for me. As it was, I found myself sometimes frustrated and confused by all the place names and geographic references. Not the author's fault.
July 10, 2020
This was an excellent book on this battle, as Sears described in minute detail not only Union and Confederate dispositions, but the morale of the various corps on the eve of Hooker's crossing into the Wilderness. The main player in this book was the fog of war, as Jackson took advantage of the fog to roll up the Union flank, starting with Howard's corps. The only thing he was missing was time. Sears also does an excellent job in describing how Stuart demonstrated exceptional leadership and flexibility by taking over the infantry operations of Jackson's corps after he was wounded. Sears has a really good writing style, and I think I might normally have finished the book rather quickly, however, the current insanity slowed me down in reading this history.
May 30, 2024
What I’ve liked about some of the more modern books I’ve read about Civil War battles is that they go beyond the generals’-eye view to give you a sense of what was happening on the ground, and they don’t overhype their story by emphasizing how crucial, how important, how pivotal this particular battle was above all others.
So this book about the Battle of Chancellorsville, published in 1996, came across as a bit of a throwback, with its battle-as-chess-game perspective and an opening paragraph full of superlatives about how Chancellorsville was the “most complex,” “most intense,” etc. battle of the war.
That said, what I liked about the book was that it seemed in no particular rush to get to the actual battle. And as a reader, I came to find that I wasn’t either.
The narrative begins months before the titular battle, in the aftermath of the disastrous Union defeat at Fredericksburg. Fredericksburg commander Ambrose Burnside becomes the latest in the string of “one and done” Union generals after McClellan, replaced by another general destined to continue the trend, Joseph Hooker.
Of course, no one knew that at the time. Through the winter and early spring of 1863, Sears offers a detailed discussion of Hooker’s meticulously thought-out battle plans, as he sought to avoid Burnside’s costly frontal assaults on Robert E. Lee’s entrenched forces in Fredericksburg, instead plotting to draw them out. “It was obvious that Hooker wanted to fight defensively,” Sears observes. “He was inviting attack; he was daring Lee to attack.”
As well-conceived a plan that might have been, though, entrenching himself in nearby Chancellorsville meant that Hooker “had to give up the initiative,” Sears continues, “and on the battlefields of this war the initiative was something that had always served Robert E. Lee very well.”
When he’s not describing how Hooker and Lee spent months making plans and sizing each other up, Sears offers plenty of color about conditions and activities in the soldiers’ winter quarters, the organization of forces, civilian life and more.
And the battle itself doesn't get underway until very nearly ⅔ of the way in. But what should have been the book’s long-awaited climax that everything had been building toward, never quite got off the ground for me. Instead of providing a burst of energy, the beginning of the fight somehow slowed down the narrative, draining it of some of the drama and intensity one might expect. It’s a very big-picture, somewhat antiseptic look at the battle, with plenty of troop movements and descriptions of which division traveled down which road to confront which enemy flank.
That critique may say more about me than about the book - it doesn’t mean it’s a bad book, it just means I’m not a Civil War scholar, and this book simply reads more like a treatise than a story. Part of the problem may be that, compared to other major battles that took place over a day or two in a concentrated area, Chancellorsville was a weeklong battle along multiple fronts. So it’s a complex battle to follow, and a challenging one to describe in narrative form. So perhaps Sears simply had to take a wider view to avoid getting bogged down in minutiae and exponentially lengthening the book’s page count. Nevertheless, it was such a wide view that it left me without any feel for what the soldiers themselves experienced, while, somehow, it was simultaneously such a detailed view that I still felt I needed to consult an online summary of the battle to get a firm grasp on the big picture of what was happening where and when.
One of the more notable events of the battle was the wounding and later death of Stonewall Jackson. While his battlefield injury is told in this book somewhat matter-of-factly and not particularly dramatically, the rest of his story plays out in real time in the background - we occasionally check in with him as the battle progresses, until he meets his end in the book’s final pages.
In an epilogue, Sears offers a brief after report of the battle, explaining why Hooker failed and why Lee succeeded, while offering some contrary viewpoints as food for thought. Hooker had an admirable grand plan, but when things didn't go according to that plan, he seemed to have nothing to fall back on. And yet, “it must be said in defense of Joe Hooker,” Sears offers, “that no Union general in any battle in this war was so badly served by his lieutenants.” As for Lee, Sears acknowledges Chancellorsville was “his greatest victory,” but qualifies it just a bit by noting that Lee was blessed with many episodes of “astonishingly good fortune” as well.
The end of the book foreshadows what was to come in Chancellorsville’s aftermath - just as the previous year’s Confederate victory at the Second Battle of Bull Run prompted Lee to head north to Antietam, the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville bolstered Lee’s confidence and prompted him to once again take the battle to the enemy - this time, in Gettysburg.
In the end, it seems odd to say that in a book about a battle, the battle itself was, for me, the least compelling and memorable part. The long lead-up and strategic planning, followed by the aftermath and the impact, were strong enough to make this book a worthy read, and those parts will stay with me. If, however, I someday need a refresher on what exactly happened at Chancellorsville and when, I suspect I will be seeking out another online summary of the battle for a more concise and uncomplicated explanation, while this book will remain right in its place of honor on the shelf where I am about to put it.
So this book about the Battle of Chancellorsville, published in 1996, came across as a bit of a throwback, with its battle-as-chess-game perspective and an opening paragraph full of superlatives about how Chancellorsville was the “most complex,” “most intense,” etc. battle of the war.
That said, what I liked about the book was that it seemed in no particular rush to get to the actual battle. And as a reader, I came to find that I wasn’t either.
The narrative begins months before the titular battle, in the aftermath of the disastrous Union defeat at Fredericksburg. Fredericksburg commander Ambrose Burnside becomes the latest in the string of “one and done” Union generals after McClellan, replaced by another general destined to continue the trend, Joseph Hooker.
Of course, no one knew that at the time. Through the winter and early spring of 1863, Sears offers a detailed discussion of Hooker’s meticulously thought-out battle plans, as he sought to avoid Burnside’s costly frontal assaults on Robert E. Lee’s entrenched forces in Fredericksburg, instead plotting to draw them out. “It was obvious that Hooker wanted to fight defensively,” Sears observes. “He was inviting attack; he was daring Lee to attack.”
As well-conceived a plan that might have been, though, entrenching himself in nearby Chancellorsville meant that Hooker “had to give up the initiative,” Sears continues, “and on the battlefields of this war the initiative was something that had always served Robert E. Lee very well.”
When he’s not describing how Hooker and Lee spent months making plans and sizing each other up, Sears offers plenty of color about conditions and activities in the soldiers’ winter quarters, the organization of forces, civilian life and more.
And the battle itself doesn't get underway until very nearly ⅔ of the way in. But what should have been the book’s long-awaited climax that everything had been building toward, never quite got off the ground for me. Instead of providing a burst of energy, the beginning of the fight somehow slowed down the narrative, draining it of some of the drama and intensity one might expect. It’s a very big-picture, somewhat antiseptic look at the battle, with plenty of troop movements and descriptions of which division traveled down which road to confront which enemy flank.
That critique may say more about me than about the book - it doesn’t mean it’s a bad book, it just means I’m not a Civil War scholar, and this book simply reads more like a treatise than a story. Part of the problem may be that, compared to other major battles that took place over a day or two in a concentrated area, Chancellorsville was a weeklong battle along multiple fronts. So it’s a complex battle to follow, and a challenging one to describe in narrative form. So perhaps Sears simply had to take a wider view to avoid getting bogged down in minutiae and exponentially lengthening the book’s page count. Nevertheless, it was such a wide view that it left me without any feel for what the soldiers themselves experienced, while, somehow, it was simultaneously such a detailed view that I still felt I needed to consult an online summary of the battle to get a firm grasp on the big picture of what was happening where and when.
One of the more notable events of the battle was the wounding and later death of Stonewall Jackson. While his battlefield injury is told in this book somewhat matter-of-factly and not particularly dramatically, the rest of his story plays out in real time in the background - we occasionally check in with him as the battle progresses, until he meets his end in the book’s final pages.
In an epilogue, Sears offers a brief after report of the battle, explaining why Hooker failed and why Lee succeeded, while offering some contrary viewpoints as food for thought. Hooker had an admirable grand plan, but when things didn't go according to that plan, he seemed to have nothing to fall back on. And yet, “it must be said in defense of Joe Hooker,” Sears offers, “that no Union general in any battle in this war was so badly served by his lieutenants.” As for Lee, Sears acknowledges Chancellorsville was “his greatest victory,” but qualifies it just a bit by noting that Lee was blessed with many episodes of “astonishingly good fortune” as well.
The end of the book foreshadows what was to come in Chancellorsville’s aftermath - just as the previous year’s Confederate victory at the Second Battle of Bull Run prompted Lee to head north to Antietam, the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville bolstered Lee’s confidence and prompted him to once again take the battle to the enemy - this time, in Gettysburg.
In the end, it seems odd to say that in a book about a battle, the battle itself was, for me, the least compelling and memorable part. The long lead-up and strategic planning, followed by the aftermath and the impact, were strong enough to make this book a worthy read, and those parts will stay with me. If, however, I someday need a refresher on what exactly happened at Chancellorsville and when, I suspect I will be seeking out another online summary of the battle for a more concise and uncomplicated explanation, while this book will remain right in its place of honor on the shelf where I am about to put it.
February 20, 2008
Stephen Sears is a top flight Civil War historian, and Chancelorsville is an extraordinary battle to recount. My old Rommie is a CW buff and marched me through Jackson's flanking manuever--a 19 mile hike that ended at the spot Jackson died. I had the conviction that Sears accounted for every bullet and every cannon fired, and every human weakness, and every intervention of fate.
June 16, 2024
Excellent treatment of the Battle of Chancellorsville by the best writer and historian of the eastern theatre battles of 1862-1863. The most interesting parts are those describing General Joseph Hooker. While he is not a Hooker “fan,” hooker is treated more fairly and accurately by Sears than any other history of the battle.
March 15, 2019
The Civil War is a fascinating subject, but too many books on its battles are focused on minutia such as "the movements of the 29th Pennsylvanians on Cemetery Ridge at 2pm on the second day of Gettysburg" or so riddled with military terminology as to be incomprehensible to ordinary readers. I was then very pleased to find Chancellorsville by Stephen Sears to be page-turning interesting and easy to understand, even by someone like myself, who is not a military historian.
Sears' writing is very good, and he is careful to frame the battle in the setting of its historical and political times. Abraham Lincoln had a difficult time finding a good leader for the Army of the Potomac, and Sears covers the brief failed leadership of Ambrose Burnside, then how "Fighting Joe" Hooker came to be appointed Commanding General. He details the good work Hooker did in rebuilding the Army's morale, and in developing a solid battle plan for crossing the Rappahonnock River and attacking General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia.
When the battle begins, Sears gives detailed accounts of the movements and action, but in ways a regular reader can understand. I learned a lot about Civil War military terminology, while being able to easily understand how the battle unfolded.
Ultimately, the Union lost the Battle of Chancellorsville for 3 major reasons, I gleaned from this book: General Otis Howard did a terrible job securing the end line of the army and when "Stonewall" Jackson attacked, his wing of the army collapsed. Another, General Stoneman, given the charge to break Lee's supply trains, inexplicably failed to do so. Finally, General Hooker himself likely suffered a severe concussion at the height of the battle, and was rendered confused and insensible, to the point that "Fighting Joe" actually retreated back across the river, ending the campaign. Except for a torrential rain that delayed a planned additional attack by Lee, the outcome may have been worse. Ultimately though, the death of famed Confederate General Stonewall Jackson after wounding by his own troops during the battle, might have been the most important thing for the Union that came out of the battle.
Sears gives a balanced account of Hooker's plusses and minuses, and given what we know today about concussions, it now seems clear he should have been relieved after suffering his head injury. Even days and weeks after the battle, his own closest aides reported still altered behavior. Hooker also suffered bad luck from failed corps commanders, but then again, he was responsible for them.
Robert E. Lee secured one of his strongest victories at Chancellorsville, through a combination of strong and daring leadership, the flank attack by General Jackson that destroyed Howard's wing, and good luck.
Afterwards, Hooker would be relieved by Lincoln just before the Battle of Gettysburg, where Lee would be defeated by General Meade, whose skill Hooker little used at Chancellorsville. But then Meade would allow Lee to escape and he too would be relieved, when Lincoln would finally find the General he needed, Ulysseys Grant.
Chancellorsville is a very readable, page-turning book that anyone interested in the politics and generalmanship of one of the key battles of the Civil War will much enjoy and benefit from reading. Highly recommended.
Sears' writing is very good, and he is careful to frame the battle in the setting of its historical and political times. Abraham Lincoln had a difficult time finding a good leader for the Army of the Potomac, and Sears covers the brief failed leadership of Ambrose Burnside, then how "Fighting Joe" Hooker came to be appointed Commanding General. He details the good work Hooker did in rebuilding the Army's morale, and in developing a solid battle plan for crossing the Rappahonnock River and attacking General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia.
When the battle begins, Sears gives detailed accounts of the movements and action, but in ways a regular reader can understand. I learned a lot about Civil War military terminology, while being able to easily understand how the battle unfolded.
Ultimately, the Union lost the Battle of Chancellorsville for 3 major reasons, I gleaned from this book: General Otis Howard did a terrible job securing the end line of the army and when "Stonewall" Jackson attacked, his wing of the army collapsed. Another, General Stoneman, given the charge to break Lee's supply trains, inexplicably failed to do so. Finally, General Hooker himself likely suffered a severe concussion at the height of the battle, and was rendered confused and insensible, to the point that "Fighting Joe" actually retreated back across the river, ending the campaign. Except for a torrential rain that delayed a planned additional attack by Lee, the outcome may have been worse. Ultimately though, the death of famed Confederate General Stonewall Jackson after wounding by his own troops during the battle, might have been the most important thing for the Union that came out of the battle.
Sears gives a balanced account of Hooker's plusses and minuses, and given what we know today about concussions, it now seems clear he should have been relieved after suffering his head injury. Even days and weeks after the battle, his own closest aides reported still altered behavior. Hooker also suffered bad luck from failed corps commanders, but then again, he was responsible for them.
Robert E. Lee secured one of his strongest victories at Chancellorsville, through a combination of strong and daring leadership, the flank attack by General Jackson that destroyed Howard's wing, and good luck.
Afterwards, Hooker would be relieved by Lincoln just before the Battle of Gettysburg, where Lee would be defeated by General Meade, whose skill Hooker little used at Chancellorsville. But then Meade would allow Lee to escape and he too would be relieved, when Lincoln would finally find the General he needed, Ulysseys Grant.
Chancellorsville is a very readable, page-turning book that anyone interested in the politics and generalmanship of one of the key battles of the Civil War will much enjoy and benefit from reading. Highly recommended.
September 1, 2025
Stephen W. Sears’ Chancellorsville (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996) is a masterful and meticulously researched account of one of the Civil War’s most pivotal battles. Spanning over 600 pages, this work stands as a definitive study of the 1863 Chancellorsville campaign, where Confederate General Robert E. Lee achieved a stunning victory against a numerically superior Union army under Joseph Hooker. Sears’ ability to weave strategic analysis, vivid storytelling, and primary source material makes this book a compelling read for both Civil War enthusiasts and general readers interested in military history.
The book’s strength lies in its exhaustive detail and Sears’ knack for bringing the human element of the battle to life. One particularly striking passage captures the eerie intensity of Stonewall Jackson’s famous flank march. As Lieutenant Robert Stiles recalled, Jackson’s men moved “striding along silently in their endless column. The only sound as they passed, Stiles remembered, was ‘the low clatter or jingle of accoutrements’” (p. 197). This vivid imagery underscores the disciplined resolve of the Confederate troops, marching with singular purpose to outmaneuver their enemy. Sears’ inclusion of such firsthand accounts transforms the march from a tactical maneuver into a haunting moment of collective determination, as the soldiers, without banter or distraction, advanced to drive the Union forces from their homeland.
Sears also excels at portraying the frustrations and complexities of command. A memorable moment comes after the Battle of Banks’ Ford, when Lee learns that the Union army has slipped across the Rappahannock. His sharp rebuke to a subordinate—“This is the way that you young men are always doing. You have again let these people get away. I can only tell you what to do, and if you do not do it, it will not be done…” (p. 420)—reveals Lee’s exasperation and the high stakes of missed opportunities. This quote humanizes Lee, showing not just the strategic genius but also the pressure and irritation of a commander whose bold plans hinged on the execution of others. Sears uses such moments to highlight the fragile balance between brilliance and failure in wartime leadership.
The book’s comprehensive approach, while a strength, can occasionally feel overwhelming due to its dense recounting of troop movements and logistical details. Readers less familiar with Civil War history might find the sheer volume of information daunting, though Sears’ clear prose and well-organized structure mitigate this challenge. Maps and illustrations included in the text are helpful, though additional diagrams could further clarify the complex maneuvers, especially during Jackson’s flank attack.
Overall, Chancellorsville is a triumph of historical scholarship and narrative storytelling. Sears not only dissects the strategic and tactical intricacies of the campaign but also captures the raw emotion and human cost of the conflict. The haunting silence of Jackson’s marching men and Lee’s sharp words at Banks’ Ford linger long after the book is closed, making this a must-read for anyone seeking to understand the brilliance and tragedy of Chancellorsville. 5/5 stars
The book’s strength lies in its exhaustive detail and Sears’ knack for bringing the human element of the battle to life. One particularly striking passage captures the eerie intensity of Stonewall Jackson’s famous flank march. As Lieutenant Robert Stiles recalled, Jackson’s men moved “striding along silently in their endless column. The only sound as they passed, Stiles remembered, was ‘the low clatter or jingle of accoutrements’” (p. 197). This vivid imagery underscores the disciplined resolve of the Confederate troops, marching with singular purpose to outmaneuver their enemy. Sears’ inclusion of such firsthand accounts transforms the march from a tactical maneuver into a haunting moment of collective determination, as the soldiers, without banter or distraction, advanced to drive the Union forces from their homeland.
Sears also excels at portraying the frustrations and complexities of command. A memorable moment comes after the Battle of Banks’ Ford, when Lee learns that the Union army has slipped across the Rappahannock. His sharp rebuke to a subordinate—“This is the way that you young men are always doing. You have again let these people get away. I can only tell you what to do, and if you do not do it, it will not be done…” (p. 420)—reveals Lee’s exasperation and the high stakes of missed opportunities. This quote humanizes Lee, showing not just the strategic genius but also the pressure and irritation of a commander whose bold plans hinged on the execution of others. Sears uses such moments to highlight the fragile balance between brilliance and failure in wartime leadership.
The book’s comprehensive approach, while a strength, can occasionally feel overwhelming due to its dense recounting of troop movements and logistical details. Readers less familiar with Civil War history might find the sheer volume of information daunting, though Sears’ clear prose and well-organized structure mitigate this challenge. Maps and illustrations included in the text are helpful, though additional diagrams could further clarify the complex maneuvers, especially during Jackson’s flank attack.
Overall, Chancellorsville is a triumph of historical scholarship and narrative storytelling. Sears not only dissects the strategic and tactical intricacies of the campaign but also captures the raw emotion and human cost of the conflict. The haunting silence of Jackson’s marching men and Lee’s sharp words at Banks’ Ford linger long after the book is closed, making this a must-read for anyone seeking to understand the brilliance and tragedy of Chancellorsville. 5/5 stars
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 25, 2024
This review originally appeared on my website at: https://www.stuartellisgorman.com/blo...
I’ve always had a weird relationship with Chancellorsville, but I like to think it’s not entirely my fault. Growing up in Virginia it’s hard to avoid it, especially if, like me, you lived an hour away and your dad liked to take you and your brothers there on random weekends to get out of the house. Chancellorsville looms large in the mythic lives of Robert E. Lee and “Stonewall” Jackson. It was also top of the pile in the “what’s the biggest Civil War Battle” debates that were somehow considered small talk in my home state. With all that baggage, it was hard for me growing up to not develop a slightly contrary preference for battles like Gettysburg and The Wilderness. That meant that I never really dug all that deeply into Chancellorsville, and I let the battle’s myths define it rather than learning about it for myself. On a recent trip to my parents’ house, I decided to correct this and I chose my father’s copy of Chancellorsville as the method since I had previously been really impressed with Stephen W. Sears’ book on Gettysburg. I am pleased to announce that Chancellorsville is at least as good as Gettysburg and may even be a bit better. This is a great book.
Chancellorsville picks up its narrative right after the disaster at Fredericksburg and charts both sides’ efforts to reorganize their armies in the wake of that battle. Lee’s supply issues frustrated him from taking the offensive while a revolt of the generals in the Army of the Potomac resulted in Burnsides’ eventual replacement with Joe Hooker. Hooker’s revival of the army and plans for a grand offensive in spring 1863 set the stage for the battle narrative proper, which takes up the bulk of the book as you would expect. I really appreciate how Sears takes a wider campaign focus in his battle histories. While he assumes some familiarity with the subject – someone ignorant of the events of 1862 would struggle with Chancellorsville – he doesn’t just drop you into the main event without context. That context is key to good analysis and this emphasis lays a strong foundation for the reader to better interpret the significance of what happened when the armies started shooting.
The main battle narrative doesn’t look for easy answers and does a lot to challenge popular misconceptions about Chancellorsville. I really appreciated how much detail he provided for Hooker’s campaign leading up to the battle which gave me a newfound respect for the general. Sears also doesn’t rely on easy answers – he doesn’t point to a single event as where the battle was lost or one. Instead, Chancellorsville shows a battle that teetered on the brink for days on end. It remained winnable by both sides for a very long time, and a compounding series of bad luck and bad choices helped to push it over against Hooker and his generals. I also particularly liked the coda in the appendix that examined the “romance of Chancellorsville”, focusing on many popular myths that cropped up in subsequent decades.
Sears spends significant time on the many things that went wrong and right for both sides. More than just listing mishaps, Sears goes into detail about how the mishap came to be and the decisions that made it such a disaster. For example, consider the frequent problems Hooker had coordinating the disparate parts of his army once he divided it for his grand turning movement. Sears goes into great detail about the available wire telecommunication technology available to Hooker, what he chose to use, what factors influenced that choice (such as infighting between military departments), and the ramifications of that choice. This kind of detail provides valuable information beyond just the movement of troops and shows the complexities of command. Sears doesn’t use these mishaps to excuse the poor decisions that commanders made. Instead he provides a holistic view of the campaign, not pinning success or failure on any one moment.
Overall, this is an engaging narrative of the Chancellorsville campaign that provides plenty of detail without getting too lost in the weeds. I mildly criticized Gettysburg because I thought it went into a little too much detail, but I didn’t have the same problem with Chancellorsville. This book hit a real sweet spot for me and gave me newfound respect for and interest in one of the Civil War’s most famous battles.
I’ve always had a weird relationship with Chancellorsville, but I like to think it’s not entirely my fault. Growing up in Virginia it’s hard to avoid it, especially if, like me, you lived an hour away and your dad liked to take you and your brothers there on random weekends to get out of the house. Chancellorsville looms large in the mythic lives of Robert E. Lee and “Stonewall” Jackson. It was also top of the pile in the “what’s the biggest Civil War Battle” debates that were somehow considered small talk in my home state. With all that baggage, it was hard for me growing up to not develop a slightly contrary preference for battles like Gettysburg and The Wilderness. That meant that I never really dug all that deeply into Chancellorsville, and I let the battle’s myths define it rather than learning about it for myself. On a recent trip to my parents’ house, I decided to correct this and I chose my father’s copy of Chancellorsville as the method since I had previously been really impressed with Stephen W. Sears’ book on Gettysburg. I am pleased to announce that Chancellorsville is at least as good as Gettysburg and may even be a bit better. This is a great book.
Chancellorsville picks up its narrative right after the disaster at Fredericksburg and charts both sides’ efforts to reorganize their armies in the wake of that battle. Lee’s supply issues frustrated him from taking the offensive while a revolt of the generals in the Army of the Potomac resulted in Burnsides’ eventual replacement with Joe Hooker. Hooker’s revival of the army and plans for a grand offensive in spring 1863 set the stage for the battle narrative proper, which takes up the bulk of the book as you would expect. I really appreciate how Sears takes a wider campaign focus in his battle histories. While he assumes some familiarity with the subject – someone ignorant of the events of 1862 would struggle with Chancellorsville – he doesn’t just drop you into the main event without context. That context is key to good analysis and this emphasis lays a strong foundation for the reader to better interpret the significance of what happened when the armies started shooting.
The main battle narrative doesn’t look for easy answers and does a lot to challenge popular misconceptions about Chancellorsville. I really appreciated how much detail he provided for Hooker’s campaign leading up to the battle which gave me a newfound respect for the general. Sears also doesn’t rely on easy answers – he doesn’t point to a single event as where the battle was lost or one. Instead, Chancellorsville shows a battle that teetered on the brink for days on end. It remained winnable by both sides for a very long time, and a compounding series of bad luck and bad choices helped to push it over against Hooker and his generals. I also particularly liked the coda in the appendix that examined the “romance of Chancellorsville”, focusing on many popular myths that cropped up in subsequent decades.
Sears spends significant time on the many things that went wrong and right for both sides. More than just listing mishaps, Sears goes into detail about how the mishap came to be and the decisions that made it such a disaster. For example, consider the frequent problems Hooker had coordinating the disparate parts of his army once he divided it for his grand turning movement. Sears goes into great detail about the available wire telecommunication technology available to Hooker, what he chose to use, what factors influenced that choice (such as infighting between military departments), and the ramifications of that choice. This kind of detail provides valuable information beyond just the movement of troops and shows the complexities of command. Sears doesn’t use these mishaps to excuse the poor decisions that commanders made. Instead he provides a holistic view of the campaign, not pinning success or failure on any one moment.
Overall, this is an engaging narrative of the Chancellorsville campaign that provides plenty of detail without getting too lost in the weeds. I mildly criticized Gettysburg because I thought it went into a little too much detail, but I didn’t have the same problem with Chancellorsville. This book hit a real sweet spot for me and gave me newfound respect for and interest in one of the Civil War’s most famous battles.
May 4, 2020
This was the most enjoyable battle account I have yet read. The text and maps (good ol’ George Skoch again) enabled me to follow the action without being confused. It begins with General Burnside’s unfortunate “mud march” and finishes with the passing of Saint Stonewall and, ominously (sound bass horns), Lee looking north.
Author Sears discusses generals’ attributes and the mistakes they made which affected the course of the battle. He spends much of his time with “F.J. Hooker” and we learn that he wasn’t nearly as bad as often made out to be. It’s your job to read this and learn why; suffice it to say the Army of the Potomac which won at Gettysburg (see “horns” above) was the result of Hooker’s leadership and administration. What was in Hooker’s mind when he seemed to pull up after crossing the Rapidan and Rappahannock is revealed, and, by the way, don’t lean of pillars. Generals Sedgwick (USA) and McLaws (CSA) are spiritual twins. The battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville look to be the Confederate artillery’s finest moment under Porter Alexander, and General Henry Hunt was truly missed at Chancellorsville. The actions on both portions of the battlefield are covered. The main object of writers’ attention is near Chancellorsville; but the action at Fredericksburg and Salem Church get splendid attention.
Accounts from the soldiers themselves are quoted; Sears seems to have a fondness for the northern Iron Brigade of Wisconsin, Indiana, and Michigan soldiers (I recognized the regiments). Staff officers get credited; a major contributor to Hooker’s early successes (planning and enroute to Chancellorsville) came from the newly created Bureau of Military Information. The cavalry was reorganized; but of Stoneman’s diversionary raid the less said, the better. Lee and Jackson are their usual splendidly aggressive selves; J.E.B. Stuart does well as an infantry corps commander.
The author made one mistake mentioning Oliver P. Morton as governor of Illinois; he was governor of Indiana. No matter; if you like your battlefield accounts and the how and whys of what happened, this is for you.
Author Sears discusses generals’ attributes and the mistakes they made which affected the course of the battle. He spends much of his time with “F.J. Hooker” and we learn that he wasn’t nearly as bad as often made out to be. It’s your job to read this and learn why; suffice it to say the Army of the Potomac which won at Gettysburg (see “horns” above) was the result of Hooker’s leadership and administration. What was in Hooker’s mind when he seemed to pull up after crossing the Rapidan and Rappahannock is revealed, and, by the way, don’t lean of pillars. Generals Sedgwick (USA) and McLaws (CSA) are spiritual twins. The battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville look to be the Confederate artillery’s finest moment under Porter Alexander, and General Henry Hunt was truly missed at Chancellorsville. The actions on both portions of the battlefield are covered. The main object of writers’ attention is near Chancellorsville; but the action at Fredericksburg and Salem Church get splendid attention.
Accounts from the soldiers themselves are quoted; Sears seems to have a fondness for the northern Iron Brigade of Wisconsin, Indiana, and Michigan soldiers (I recognized the regiments). Staff officers get credited; a major contributor to Hooker’s early successes (planning and enroute to Chancellorsville) came from the newly created Bureau of Military Information. The cavalry was reorganized; but of Stoneman’s diversionary raid the less said, the better. Lee and Jackson are their usual splendidly aggressive selves; J.E.B. Stuart does well as an infantry corps commander.
The author made one mistake mentioning Oliver P. Morton as governor of Illinois; he was governor of Indiana. No matter; if you like your battlefield accounts and the how and whys of what happened, this is for you.
June 3, 2024
As a compendium of facts and quotes from obscure primary sources, this book can hardly be criticized. It is detailed, dense, and covers every aspect of the battle. And for the audience I think Sears is writing for -- the Civil War grognard who already is familiar with the battle and who would happily read a 640 page book just to pick up a few more nuances -- this is probably sufficient. So, if this book is on your radar, then you will find this an informative read with plenty of little factoids to throw about in conversation.
However, reading Sears' account of Chancellorsville was an effort in patience. Perhaps it's the competition from other priorities at this point in my life. Perhaps I just value my time differently now than when I was younger and felt like I had all the time in the world to devote to dry, deep dive research on obscure subjects of interest. For some reason, the Civil War attracts hobby historians, and in this case Sears' day job of being an editor of school textbooks is painfully evident. He has none of the writing skills or pathos of Foote or Freeman. I imagine if one were to protest that one likes their history with a little more narrative flow and energy, Sears would instruct that critic to go read a novel.
Since the people who are even contemplating this book are probably already well-versed in the generalities of the Battle of Chancellorsville, I would recommend picking up one of the many primary sources Sears cites rather than this book.
However, reading Sears' account of Chancellorsville was an effort in patience. Perhaps it's the competition from other priorities at this point in my life. Perhaps I just value my time differently now than when I was younger and felt like I had all the time in the world to devote to dry, deep dive research on obscure subjects of interest. For some reason, the Civil War attracts hobby historians, and in this case Sears' day job of being an editor of school textbooks is painfully evident. He has none of the writing skills or pathos of Foote or Freeman. I imagine if one were to protest that one likes their history with a little more narrative flow and energy, Sears would instruct that critic to go read a novel.
Since the people who are even contemplating this book are probably already well-versed in the generalities of the Battle of Chancellorsville, I would recommend picking up one of the many primary sources Sears cites rather than this book.
May 4, 2021
Fighting Joe Hooker's reign as the leader of the Army of the Potomac was relatively brief and Chancellorsville was the beginning of the end for him, as his corps commanders and Lincoln became increasingly impatient for the success and laurels that had been denied them. Yet, in this books, Sears does a fabulous job explaining how Hooker took a thoroughly demoralized Army of the Potomac (after Fredericksburg) and rebuilt it in the months after. He did much good and yet he is barely remembered.
And, as Sears points out, his plan for Chancellorsville was masterful. He stole a March on Lee and was in position to execute his grand scheme by the time the firing started. But then, due to fortune, luck, inept subordinates, communication problems, and the dense wilderness he was fighting in, it all began to unravel. The Federals had their chance to turn the tide at Chancellorsville, yet they always managed to fail to do so. Thus, they "lost" the battle by retreating, but certainly they did not lose -- as at Fredericksburg -- because morale in the Army remained high after the battle and Chancellorsville would become the springboard for Gettysburg.
Sears always goes deep and his accounts are a joy to read. This book certainly helped me to better appreciate what was a very confusing battle.
And, as Sears points out, his plan for Chancellorsville was masterful. He stole a March on Lee and was in position to execute his grand scheme by the time the firing started. But then, due to fortune, luck, inept subordinates, communication problems, and the dense wilderness he was fighting in, it all began to unravel. The Federals had their chance to turn the tide at Chancellorsville, yet they always managed to fail to do so. Thus, they "lost" the battle by retreating, but certainly they did not lose -- as at Fredericksburg -- because morale in the Army remained high after the battle and Chancellorsville would become the springboard for Gettysburg.
Sears always goes deep and his accounts are a joy to read. This book certainly helped me to better appreciate what was a very confusing battle.
December 28, 2018
Having recently visited the battlefield, I really appreciated seeing the maps of the various stages of the battle and being able to relate those images to my memories of what we saw. After driving the Chancellorsville battlefield route, walking around the foundations of the Chancellor house, and standing at the spot where Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded, it was easy to fit those present-day sites into the line drawings of land features and troop deployments.
Better yet was reading personal accounts by both major and minor players in the Chancellorsville campaign. Excerpts from journals, letters, and testimony from commanders and foot soldiers gave the story of military events more immediacy and a sense of intimacy.
Reading the book also made the timeline of events clearer to me. When you walk through a visitor center exhibit, you usually see artifacts and layouts of the major phases in and around one spot. This account made it easier for me to keep things straight, knowing that while one thing was happening at Chancellorsville, something else was occurring back in Fredericksburg.
I'm planning on going back in Civil War time to the Sears book on Antietam.
Better yet was reading personal accounts by both major and minor players in the Chancellorsville campaign. Excerpts from journals, letters, and testimony from commanders and foot soldiers gave the story of military events more immediacy and a sense of intimacy.
Reading the book also made the timeline of events clearer to me. When you walk through a visitor center exhibit, you usually see artifacts and layouts of the major phases in and around one spot. This account made it easier for me to keep things straight, knowing that while one thing was happening at Chancellorsville, something else was occurring back in Fredericksburg.
I'm planning on going back in Civil War time to the Sears book on Antietam.
April 24, 2020
Stephen Sears is a good writer and I enjoy his Civil War books immensely. Chancellorsville is a great read because he challenges the notion that this is Robert E. Lee's greatest victory. Sears questions that and does a great job debunking it. I know some will disagree with his argument, but I believe he made a strong case. My only issue with this book was the information leading up the battle. I thought it got extremely repetitive about General Hooker making changes to the Army of Potomac, which made me say, "I get the point." Nevertheless, this is a great book and I learned a lot about the battle.
June 14, 2022
I can not say enough about this book. An incredibly detailed account of the entire campaign. I've read about this battle and recently read Shelby Foote's three volume history and I think I'm pretty knowledgeable about the war. But I never fully grasped how comprehensive Hooker's grand strategy was, and how close he came to pulling it off. Had he won with his vastly larger army, the war probably would have ended that Summer. But his Corps Commanders failed him and Lee was, as always, a genius. Strongly recommend to anyone who enjoys Civil War History. I know nothing about Mr. Sears, but this is good history
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