Fighting Churchill, Appeasing Hitler: Neville Chamberlain, Sir Horace Wilson, & Britain's Plight of Appeasement: 1937-1939

by Adrian Phillips

A radically new view of the British policy of appeasement in the late 1930s, identifying the individuals responsible for a variety of miscalculations and moral surrender that made World War II inevitable.

Appeasement failed in all its goals. The kindest thing that can be said of it is that postponed World War II by one year. Its real effect was to convince Hitler and Mussolini that Britain was weak and afraid of confrontation, encouraging them to ever-greater acts of aggression. The turning point of the Czech crisis in September 1938 came when Wilson saw Hitler on his own and left him convinced that Britain was bluffing and would not go to war to defend Czechoslovakia. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia that followed was not the end of appeasement. The Anglo-German Declaration was Chamberlain’s personal vanity project but both Chamberlain and Wilson believed that it genuinely brought "peace for our time."



Chamberlain and Wilson blindly pursued bilateral friendship between Britain and the dictators and ferociously resisted alternative policies such as working with France, the Soviet Union, or the U.S. to face down the dictators. They resisted all-out rearmament which would have put the economy on a war footing. These were all the policies advocated by Winston Churchill, the most dangerous opponent of appeasement. Churchill was a hated figure for Chamberlain and Wilson. They could not accept Churchill’s perception that that Hitler was the implacable enemy of peace and Britain, and opposing him became an end in itself for them. Churchill and Wilson had been bitter adversaries since early in their careers because of an incident that Fighting Churchill, Appeasing Hitler reveals publicly for the first time. Chamberlain had a fraught relationship with Churchill long before appeasement became an issue.



Neither Chamberlain nor Wilson had any experience of day-to-day practical diplomacy. Both thought that the dictators would apply the same standards of rationality and clarity to the policies of Italy and Germany that applied in Britain. They could not grasp that Fascist demagogues operated in an entirely different way to democratic politicians. The catastrophe of the Chamberlain/Wilson appeasement policy offers a vital lesson in how blind conviction in one policy as the only alternative can be fatally damaging.

Genres: History, Biography, World War II, Nonfiction, Politics, Germany, Military History

455 pages, Kindle Edition

First published December 1, 2019

Reviews

[Tom · Rating 4 out of 5]

Chamberlain was definitely the wrong man for the job.

[David Akeroyd · Rating 5 out of 5]

The recent trend to re-evaluate Neville Chamberlain and somewhat redeem him has always bothered me and this book does an excellent job of showing why.

[Gabriel Stein · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent

This is a second excellent book by Adrian Philips (the first was about the Abdication Crisis). When I studied Modern History at Stockholm University in the 1970s, one of the books we had to read was Gilbert & Gott 'The Appeasers'. Phillips has made ample use of sources that have become available since, and produced a work which will be the standard work on appeasement for years to come. Above all, he conclusively shows that the argument that appeasement was a policy aimed at gaining time to build up Britain's strength, is a post-facto justification. The appeasers aimed at avoiding war at any cost, and were determined to go to any length to achieve this, regardless of the consequences. It was a shameful, dishonourable and counterproductive policy then and it remains so now.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book successfully covers the period of appeasement leading up to the invasion of Poland. It does so in an interesting and enjoyably readable way, considering it mainly concerns diplomacy. But the author also explores a few other issues of the day that had an an inadvertent affect on Chamberlain’s approach.
The British Tory Government of the thirties, with its public school/old school tie approach to international matters, staggered from one crisis to the next. What is apparent in the book is how this same government failed to understand the Nazi regime. The warnings were there from the start, but Chamberlain thought he could tame the narcissistic, violent psychopath that was Hitler.
The role of a large percentage of the aristocracy in Britain did not help. There was obviously a secret admiration,by some, for Hitler and his anti-Semite, pro-fascism, anti-Bolshevik views. The failed Russian pact was a direct result of this as was the curtailing of the British press, by the government, of reports of Nazi brutality towards the Jews.
There was an early chance to contain the Nazi threat in a small war over Czechoslovakia. France, Britain and Russia had a chance to defeat Germany whilst it was at its weakest. The catastrophe was that this did not happen and the descent into the bloodiest war of human history was avoidable

[Chris Holland · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent. Full of shocking information that was new to me showing the true deoths yo which Chamberlain and his cronies syooped to appease the fictators. Sir Horace Wilson's role and influence was unbelievable and ge was rightly treated as a pariah after Churchill took over. An absorbing , infor.ative and enjoyable read.

[Thomas George Phillips · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent account of the history at that time. It is well worth reading.

[Peter · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting and well-researched review of appeasement and the working relationship between Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his civil servant adviser Sir Horace Wilson.

[PJ Wenzel · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read this one on and off for months. The amount of detail provided on the background comms of the political elite in Britain is astounding and even bordering on too much. This is. It a book for the newb who wants to get familiar with churchill or WW11. This is for the well oriented, the folks who know the players and understand the geopolitical situation at the time. That said, it’s extremely valuable in that it reveals the depth of the (treachery?) negligence of chamberlain and his cronies.