What do you think?
Rate this book
Success in the Shadows: Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines and the Global War on Terror, 2002–2015
This book has footnotes, pictures, and charts. It was published in 2018 by Combat Studies Institute Press, Army University Press.
“The Global War on Terror turned out to be, in one important aspect, what was originally predicted — a generational struggle, although one being waged by only a small percentage of the current generation of Americans. While Afghanistan and Iraq garnered most of the public attention in the war, other smaller theaters have been active and one in particular could provide a framework for future operations. Specifically the US effort in the southern Philippines was a complex generational effort that, viewed over the long term, was remarkably successful in achieving US strategic goals in the region. Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P) — as the US involvement in the southern Philippines was dubbed — was quite different from its counterpart in Afghanistan. Rather than a dramatic battle against terrorists and the establishment of a new government, OEF-P became, for the Americans, a largely steady-state application of multiple US government resources to fundamentally alter the relationship between the Philippine government and security forces and the people of the southern Philippines in support of American and Philippine strategic goals. OEF-P changed the situation in the southern Philippines from one in which various terrorist groups openly conducted operations while Philippine government institutions behaved as a besieged force or occupying force, to one in which the Philippine security forces were accepted by the local population as a legitimate presence in the region. The terrorists, while still deadly, were reduced to a chronic law enforcement problem.”
“What became Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines began following 9/11 in 2002, when the United States sought to open a second front in the larger war against Islamic terrorist networks by engaging al Qaeda-linked organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI), organizations that were taking advantage of the relatively ungoverned space in southern Mindanao and in the Sulu Archipelago. In this sovereignty vacuum, violent terrorist groups such as JI and the ASG were able to operate with impunity. One catalyst for US forces to enter the region was the kidnapping of an American missionary couple who were taken, along with others, from the Philippine island of Palawan on 27 May 2001 and brought to the region. Initially employing Task Force 510, and later Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P), the United States worked to increase the capability of the Philippine security forces (including both the armed forces and later the Philippine National Police) to defeat ASG and JI. Concurrently, JSOTF-P conducted Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Information Operations (IO) throughout the region to help Philippine government institutions enhance their legitimacy in the region. In all these endeavors, the long-term goal was to build the capacity of the Philippine security forces, strengthen the legitimacy of the Philippine government throughout the southern Philippines, and end the power vacuum in which the ASG and JI had flourished.
About the author:
Dr. Barry M. Stentiford is a Professor of Military History at the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies and the Director of its Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program. His books include The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century (Texas A&M Press, 2002); The Jim Crow Encyclopedia (co-editor, Greenwood Press, 2008); The Tuskegee Airmen (Greenwood, 2012); and The Richardson Light Guard of Wakefield Massachusetts: A Town Militia in War and Peace, 1851–1975 (McFarland, 2013). An officer in the US Army Reserve, Dr.
“The Global War on Terror turned out to be, in one important aspect, what was originally predicted — a generational struggle, although one being waged by only a small percentage of the current generation of Americans. While Afghanistan and Iraq garnered most of the public attention in the war, other smaller theaters have been active and one in particular could provide a framework for future operations. Specifically the US effort in the southern Philippines was a complex generational effort that, viewed over the long term, was remarkably successful in achieving US strategic goals in the region. Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P) — as the US involvement in the southern Philippines was dubbed — was quite different from its counterpart in Afghanistan. Rather than a dramatic battle against terrorists and the establishment of a new government, OEF-P became, for the Americans, a largely steady-state application of multiple US government resources to fundamentally alter the relationship between the Philippine government and security forces and the people of the southern Philippines in support of American and Philippine strategic goals. OEF-P changed the situation in the southern Philippines from one in which various terrorist groups openly conducted operations while Philippine government institutions behaved as a besieged force or occupying force, to one in which the Philippine security forces were accepted by the local population as a legitimate presence in the region. The terrorists, while still deadly, were reduced to a chronic law enforcement problem.”
“What became Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines began following 9/11 in 2002, when the United States sought to open a second front in the larger war against Islamic terrorist networks by engaging al Qaeda-linked organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI), organizations that were taking advantage of the relatively ungoverned space in southern Mindanao and in the Sulu Archipelago. In this sovereignty vacuum, violent terrorist groups such as JI and the ASG were able to operate with impunity. One catalyst for US forces to enter the region was the kidnapping of an American missionary couple who were taken, along with others, from the Philippine island of Palawan on 27 May 2001 and brought to the region. Initially employing Task Force 510, and later Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P), the United States worked to increase the capability of the Philippine security forces (including both the armed forces and later the Philippine National Police) to defeat ASG and JI. Concurrently, JSOTF-P conducted Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Information Operations (IO) throughout the region to help Philippine government institutions enhance their legitimacy in the region. In all these endeavors, the long-term goal was to build the capacity of the Philippine security forces, strengthen the legitimacy of the Philippine government throughout the southern Philippines, and end the power vacuum in which the ASG and JI had flourished.
About the author:
Dr. Barry M. Stentiford is a Professor of Military History at the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies and the Director of its Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program. His books include The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century (Texas A&M Press, 2002); The Jim Crow Encyclopedia (co-editor, Greenwood Press, 2008); The Tuskegee Airmen (Greenwood, 2012); and The Richardson Light Guard of Wakefield Massachusetts: A Town Militia in War and Peace, 1851–1975 (McFarland, 2013). An officer in the US Army Reserve, Dr.
- GenresMilitary FictionHistory
119 pages, Kindle Edition
First published August 1, 2018
6 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 of 1 review
August 3, 2021
Dr. Stentiford presents a relatively solid overview of a unique and arguably successful case of foreign internal defense largely overshadowed by more prominent COIN operations in various locations such as Western Asia. My primary concern with this book is that while the successes seen from OEF-P in Basilan and Jolo are encouraging, the confirmation of “substantial progress in the theater” (p. 99) and reflection of “why OEF-P succeeded” (p. 103) seem slightly premature. Although viewing from hindsight, the tidiness of the success of OEF-P in 2015 and/or the brevity of time required to see true permanent progress may be overstated in this book. The period discussed covers up to 2015, and the book was published in 2018. At the time of publishing, Dr. Stentiford presents the possible JSOTF-P success of “reduc[ing]…violence to the level of a chronic law enforcement issue rather than a serious challenge to [Philippine government’s] legitimacy and sovereignty” (page 90).
However, western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago continue to see significant violence from 2015 to the present date, and US forces are still involved in the region although their presence tends to be hidden from publicity. High profile incidents like the 2015 Mamasapano incident involving the MILF and BIFF which left 44 PNP members dead, the 2016 Battle of Tipo-Tipo against ASG in Basilan which left 18 AFP members dead, the 2019 Jolo Cathedral bombing, and the tens of thousands of displaced indigenous personnel from these incidents seems to typify an ongoing conflict as opposed to a “chronic law enforcement issue.” Most notably, the well-known 5-month long siege of the city of Marawi in 2017 by breakaway members from the MILF and ASG who pledged allegiance to IS indicates a clear and direct threat to legitimacy and sovereignty in Mindanao.
In addition to my primary overarching concern, the book could have also used some proofreading. Place and person names appeared to be often incorrect, unless I’m just not aware of applicable alternate spellings (I searched for these to no avail, but I welcome feedback to the contrary). Additionally, some place names were correct but very obsolete. While I can forgive a few typos, the overall sloppiness made me start questioning objective facts in the book. Examples:
Place Names:
- Page 4 refers to the famous battle of “Bud Datu” during the Moro Rebellion of the early 20th Century. While Bud Datu appears to be an actual location on Jolo Island, I don’t know of a famous battle there. However, “Bud Dajo” (alternatively “Bud Dahu”) was the location for two very well-known battles between Americans and Moros in 1906 and 1911.
- Page 42 refers to the municipality of “Tururan” in Basilan, which I believe should be “Tuburan.” I could find no mention of Tururan anywhere. Out of the 13 municipalities/cities and their respective 210 barangays, I could only find the municipality of Tuburan.
- Page 49 refers to the Sultan of Sulu as the Sultan of “Sulo.”
- Maps on page 51 use outdated place names (the entire second map on this page is also physically distorted in its representation of various countries):
-- Balimbing (municipality on Tawi-Tawi which was renamed Panglima Sugala in 1991).
-- Celebes (old Portuguese name) instead of Sulawesi.
-- Indochina (last used in 1950) instead of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
-- Formosa (last used in 1945) instead of Taiwan.
-- Batavia (last used in 1942) instead of Jakarta (additionally, the location marked for Batavia isn’t even in the correct location).
- Page 66 incorrectly refers to a “Tamantaka River” near Cotabato and then three sentences later it is referred to correctly as the Tamontaka River.
- Page 69 lists “Malamavi” as an island near Basilan. The island being referred to is actually “Malamawi,” and the misspelling is made even worse by the correct spelling of it in the map on page 68.
- Map on Page 68 is also labeled incorrectly like the map on page 51:
-- The Batanes (or Batan Islands) are mislabeled as the “Babat Islands.”
-- The city of Baguio is mislabeled as “Bagulo.”
-- Legazpi is labeled as “Legaspi.” From what I can find, Legazpi was named after Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, so “Legaspi” should be incorrect.
-- Bongao Island is labeled as “Bongoa Island” (which is then spelled correctly as “Bongao” on page 79).
-- Masbate Island is labeled as “Visayan Island.” It is a part of the Visayas, but generic regional labeling is inconsistent with the specificity of the other labels on the map.
-- Masbate City is labeled as “Mastrato.” I couldn’t find mention of “Mastrato” in any municipality on Masbate nor in any of the 550 barangays.
-- Cagayancillo labeled as “Cagaya Island.” Cagayancillo used to be known as “Cagayan.”
Person Names:
- Page 86 refers to President Benigno Aquino III as “Benito” Aquino.
- Page 95 refers to the French king, King Philip IV as “Phillip IV.”
Other Minor Mistakes:
- Egregious typos that made sentences confusing, such as “reMost” (p. 3), “recestanding” (p.4), and “effots” (p. 49)
- Dates of “Operation Ultimatum” are listed as Aug 2006 – Apr 2007, whereas the source referenced (US Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001-2014 by Linda Robinson) lists August 2006 – October 2007 (p. 52)
However, western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago continue to see significant violence from 2015 to the present date, and US forces are still involved in the region although their presence tends to be hidden from publicity. High profile incidents like the 2015 Mamasapano incident involving the MILF and BIFF which left 44 PNP members dead, the 2016 Battle of Tipo-Tipo against ASG in Basilan which left 18 AFP members dead, the 2019 Jolo Cathedral bombing, and the tens of thousands of displaced indigenous personnel from these incidents seems to typify an ongoing conflict as opposed to a “chronic law enforcement issue.” Most notably, the well-known 5-month long siege of the city of Marawi in 2017 by breakaway members from the MILF and ASG who pledged allegiance to IS indicates a clear and direct threat to legitimacy and sovereignty in Mindanao.
In addition to my primary overarching concern, the book could have also used some proofreading. Place and person names appeared to be often incorrect, unless I’m just not aware of applicable alternate spellings (I searched for these to no avail, but I welcome feedback to the contrary). Additionally, some place names were correct but very obsolete. While I can forgive a few typos, the overall sloppiness made me start questioning objective facts in the book. Examples:
Place Names:
- Page 4 refers to the famous battle of “Bud Datu” during the Moro Rebellion of the early 20th Century. While Bud Datu appears to be an actual location on Jolo Island, I don’t know of a famous battle there. However, “Bud Dajo” (alternatively “Bud Dahu”) was the location for two very well-known battles between Americans and Moros in 1906 and 1911.
- Page 42 refers to the municipality of “Tururan” in Basilan, which I believe should be “Tuburan.” I could find no mention of Tururan anywhere. Out of the 13 municipalities/cities and their respective 210 barangays, I could only find the municipality of Tuburan.
- Page 49 refers to the Sultan of Sulu as the Sultan of “Sulo.”
- Maps on page 51 use outdated place names (the entire second map on this page is also physically distorted in its representation of various countries):
-- Balimbing (municipality on Tawi-Tawi which was renamed Panglima Sugala in 1991).
-- Celebes (old Portuguese name) instead of Sulawesi.
-- Indochina (last used in 1950) instead of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
-- Formosa (last used in 1945) instead of Taiwan.
-- Batavia (last used in 1942) instead of Jakarta (additionally, the location marked for Batavia isn’t even in the correct location).
- Page 66 incorrectly refers to a “Tamantaka River” near Cotabato and then three sentences later it is referred to correctly as the Tamontaka River.
- Page 69 lists “Malamavi” as an island near Basilan. The island being referred to is actually “Malamawi,” and the misspelling is made even worse by the correct spelling of it in the map on page 68.
- Map on Page 68 is also labeled incorrectly like the map on page 51:
-- The Batanes (or Batan Islands) are mislabeled as the “Babat Islands.”
-- The city of Baguio is mislabeled as “Bagulo.”
-- Legazpi is labeled as “Legaspi.” From what I can find, Legazpi was named after Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, so “Legaspi” should be incorrect.
-- Bongao Island is labeled as “Bongoa Island” (which is then spelled correctly as “Bongao” on page 79).
-- Masbate Island is labeled as “Visayan Island.” It is a part of the Visayas, but generic regional labeling is inconsistent with the specificity of the other labels on the map.
-- Masbate City is labeled as “Mastrato.” I couldn’t find mention of “Mastrato” in any municipality on Masbate nor in any of the 550 barangays.
-- Cagayancillo labeled as “Cagaya Island.” Cagayancillo used to be known as “Cagayan.”
Person Names:
- Page 86 refers to President Benigno Aquino III as “Benito” Aquino.
- Page 95 refers to the French king, King Philip IV as “Phillip IV.”
Other Minor Mistakes:
- Egregious typos that made sentences confusing, such as “reMost” (p. 3), “recestanding” (p.4), and “effots” (p. 49)
- Dates of “Operation Ultimatum” are listed as Aug 2006 – Apr 2007, whereas the source referenced (US Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001-2014 by Linda Robinson) lists August 2006 – October 2007 (p. 52)
Displaying 1 of 1 review