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Platonism and Naturalism: The Possibility of Philosophy
In his third and concluding volume, Lloyd P. Gerson presents an innovative account of Platonism, the central tradition in the history of philosophy, in conjunction with Naturalism, the "anti-Platonism" in antiquity and contemporary philosophy. Gerson contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy. Thus, the possibility of philosophy depends on the truth of Platonism. From Aristotle to Plotinus to Proclus, Gerson clearly links the construction of the Platonic system well beyond simply Plato's dialogues, providing strong evidence of the vast impact of Platonism on philosophy throughout history. Platonism and Naturalism concludes that attempts to seek a rapprochement between Platonism and Naturalism are unstable and likely indefensible.
318 pages, Hardcover
Published March 15, 2020
About the author
Lloyd P. Gerson
31 books29 followersLloyd Gerson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
December 7, 2022
A meticulously researched study of the historic clash between Platonic metaphysics and all brands of Naturalism, "Platonism and Naturalism: The Possibility of Philosophy" is a magisterial and probably paradigm-shifting study. Gerson makes the following claims about Plato and platonism (which I learned in philosophy courses and books not to believe):
Plato had a system; Plato's dialogues advance this system; the dialogues' hypothetical order is irrelevant and artificial; the heart of Plato's system is metaphysics; Aristotle was a Platonist; the differences between Aristotle and his teacher are not irreconcilable as 20th century scholarship insisted; Aristotle's comments regarding Plato's system are true; the other oral traditions and later fragments about Plato's metaphysical system are probably both accurate and historical; Plotinus and Proclus were not boldly original but ingeniously supportive of the original project of Plato; "Neo-Platonism" is a term which only popped up in the 18th century and is neither accurate nor helpful; one cannot "dabble" in Platonism as it has a single, metaphysical horizon that is either accepted or not; the Naturalism of Anaxagoras or the Naturalism of a 21st century Darwinian materialist consists of the exact same (lack of) metaphysical cogency or consistency; and finally, philosophy is Platonism.
It's the last part that Gerson actually begins and ends with. Quoting Rorty's assertion that philosophy is Platonism and should therefore be discarded, Gerson turns the tables and agrees with him in a way. Where Naturalists/Materialists may argue (like Stephen Hawking) that philosophy is not necessary in a universe where mechanistic laws can eventually be explained and is therefore "dead," Gerson argues that the opposite is actually true; only philosophy (Platonism) can actually give an "explanation" of anything because only philosophy (Platonist metaphysics) can provide meaning. Basically, the only way to understand philosophy is as Platonism, plus the accumulations of centuries of adjustments, clashes, and conflicts. The major development, as Gerson argues, is that beginning with the modern period, Platonism (philosophy) began giving more and more concessions to naturalism. Where we have ended up is with diluted, prudential, relativistic, anthropocentric ethics and a total lack of metaphysics. There's no over-arching story in the modern period, and the fighting is all happening as if Platonism no longer affected us or no longer mattered.
This book is a difficult read at times, but it is filled with refreshing insights, bold ideas, and satisfying rebuttals of countless modern scholars.
Plato had a system; Plato's dialogues advance this system; the dialogues' hypothetical order is irrelevant and artificial; the heart of Plato's system is metaphysics; Aristotle was a Platonist; the differences between Aristotle and his teacher are not irreconcilable as 20th century scholarship insisted; Aristotle's comments regarding Plato's system are true; the other oral traditions and later fragments about Plato's metaphysical system are probably both accurate and historical; Plotinus and Proclus were not boldly original but ingeniously supportive of the original project of Plato; "Neo-Platonism" is a term which only popped up in the 18th century and is neither accurate nor helpful; one cannot "dabble" in Platonism as it has a single, metaphysical horizon that is either accepted or not; the Naturalism of Anaxagoras or the Naturalism of a 21st century Darwinian materialist consists of the exact same (lack of) metaphysical cogency or consistency; and finally, philosophy is Platonism.
It's the last part that Gerson actually begins and ends with. Quoting Rorty's assertion that philosophy is Platonism and should therefore be discarded, Gerson turns the tables and agrees with him in a way. Where Naturalists/Materialists may argue (like Stephen Hawking) that philosophy is not necessary in a universe where mechanistic laws can eventually be explained and is therefore "dead," Gerson argues that the opposite is actually true; only philosophy (Platonism) can actually give an "explanation" of anything because only philosophy (Platonist metaphysics) can provide meaning. Basically, the only way to understand philosophy is as Platonism, plus the accumulations of centuries of adjustments, clashes, and conflicts. The major development, as Gerson argues, is that beginning with the modern period, Platonism (philosophy) began giving more and more concessions to naturalism. Where we have ended up is with diluted, prudential, relativistic, anthropocentric ethics and a total lack of metaphysics. There's no over-arching story in the modern period, and the fighting is all happening as if Platonism no longer affected us or no longer mattered.
This book is a difficult read at times, but it is filled with refreshing insights, bold ideas, and satisfying rebuttals of countless modern scholars.
July 26, 2025
Truly like drinking through a fire hose. This will be an evergreen source of knowledge to which I’ll be able to return to time and time again. I know there was a lot I missed on my first read, and looking forward to taking notes and cross referencing it with other works of Platonism.
The point of this book is not a straight forward argument for Platonism per se, although he does give several good arguments for the five pillars of Platonism. Rather, here’s what Gerson accomplishes:
1) Explain the system of Platonic philosophy.
2) Argue that this is what most people meant by philosophy (or first philosophy) until the 17th/18th century.
3) Explain Naturalism and it’s natural antagonism with Platonism (and thus philosophy)
4) Explain the role of the Idea of the Good (or the unhypothetical principle of all) and its indispensable role in Platonism.
5) Create a dilemma between Naturalism and Platonism. You can have one or the other, but not a comprise (Ex: Stoicism, empiricism, etc.)
Along the way, he provides some excellent exegesis of some classical philosophical sources (Ex: Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus). He also does an excellent job of explaining why some arguments against naturalism are not compelling. I caught myself generating counter arguments to the naturalists included in the texts, only for those arguments to be refuted by Gerson.
Overall, definitely a worthwhile read (and reread).
The point of this book is not a straight forward argument for Platonism per se, although he does give several good arguments for the five pillars of Platonism. Rather, here’s what Gerson accomplishes:
1) Explain the system of Platonic philosophy.
2) Argue that this is what most people meant by philosophy (or first philosophy) until the 17th/18th century.
3) Explain Naturalism and it’s natural antagonism with Platonism (and thus philosophy)
4) Explain the role of the Idea of the Good (or the unhypothetical principle of all) and its indispensable role in Platonism.
5) Create a dilemma between Naturalism and Platonism. You can have one or the other, but not a comprise (Ex: Stoicism, empiricism, etc.)
Along the way, he provides some excellent exegesis of some classical philosophical sources (Ex: Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus). He also does an excellent job of explaining why some arguments against naturalism are not compelling. I caught myself generating counter arguments to the naturalists included in the texts, only for those arguments to be refuted by Gerson.
Overall, definitely a worthwhile read (and reread).
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
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September 5, 2026Gerson is a real historical scholar AND philosopher. That's a rare combination. Sometimes just because there isn't enough room, I felt the philosophy wasn't clear and terms like 'one-all' 'all-one' etc started tumbling in for the sake of the historical discussion. So I wasn't always satisfied. But this has a lot of philosophy that is quite clear, concepts like
- the cognitive identity of nous and noemata (they're different but the same in the act of thinking)
- material causes for things we observe do not provide an explanation for them, they only provide necessary conditions
- the Forms provide a fuller explanation, but the rationale of explanation requires the Good / One to be adequate, since the Forms must in turn be caused and only act as instrumental causes of the primary cause of the One.
- the Forms are different from their instantiations in things and from the universals abstracted via our minds from things
- why the superordinate Good / One is needed to explain normative authority (to establish moral realism, which Gerson expands on in a book of its own), while a coordinate form of the Good only gets us a necessary condition for it (Aristotle's sense of it being a pros en equivocal I believe, e.g. there's the good for a plant, a good for a knife, a good for humans). This was one of the toughest but most rewarding to come to understand.
Along the way he offers some killer philosophy of mind disproofs of materialism. But I would not agree that Ur-Platonism should just be defined as the five anti's (anti materialism, anti nominalism, anti relativism, anti mechanism, anti skepticism). I don't know why he didn't include in its definition the Idea of the Good/One, but rather he treated that as a clear necessity of the five anti's. But even including this I think is insufficient for Ur-Platonism, since Heidegger would count as one - he accepted the five anti's and believed in Being in a way very informed by medieval transcendentals and the ancient Greeks. Heidegger only ditched axiological language or concepts because he felt it wasn't deep enough (as far as I understand, just like physics or psychology were nowhere near deep enough to provide adequate language / concepts), and the Platonists would probably agree that the One or Ineffable is the unhypothetical first principle of all in the first place, while the Good is the same only after considering its generated effects.
The soul: belief in the immortal soul seems to be a needed addition to define Ur-Platonism. Heidegger did not believe in an immortal soul. Now Platonists didn't seem to believe in a personal immortal soul, since different individuals kind of are just absorbed into Mind after separating from body.
As a Christian I see the doctrine of analogy lacking by the final chapter on Proclus and Damascius. It's by analogy that I don't need to distinguish Mind from One, as Plotinus too, did. The unity or oneness that these Platonists seem to want is very literal and univocal. No distinctions! Yet oneness is a concept of ours too. Whatever oneness the One is is not the same as what we observe in the world. It can't be. The oneness and goodness and activity and whatness (ousia), and thus these distinctions, are all pre-eminent in the One in a higher incomprehensible unity, not just virtually since the One of course does 'have' them in order to give them, but has to have them really, just not univocally, but analogically. The henads are a result of Proclus' trying to accept an excess transcendence of the One, transcendent to the point that it can't even be a cause of things or related to things or distinct from things (while things yet must be different from it and related to it, breaking the normal symmetry of these concepts), by bypassing analogy, positing participated unities of the unparticipated One, which *are* the One except qua participated. I don't see how this solves anything. If they *are* the One, then the One is participated. Anyway, analogy is what allows us to see the One as Pure Act and as Mind with all the Divine Ideas or logoi as we EO Christians would call them. I may be a bit heterodox in saying God's existence is his essence, but I mean this by analogy. It is not existence as we could know it, much less essence as we could even positively understand. But these terms kataphatically point us away from error to the God who is un-point-at-able, or unreferrable. This doctrine of analogy together with the principle of proportionate causality allows us to ascribe Personhood to God or interactivity and attention to creation. This is then how it makes sense to look for that interaction in history, find revelation that is consistent with this philosophical (over-scientific) view of God, and ground belief in an immortal personal soul.
- the cognitive identity of nous and noemata (they're different but the same in the act of thinking)
- material causes for things we observe do not provide an explanation for them, they only provide necessary conditions
- the Forms provide a fuller explanation, but the rationale of explanation requires the Good / One to be adequate, since the Forms must in turn be caused and only act as instrumental causes of the primary cause of the One.
- the Forms are different from their instantiations in things and from the universals abstracted via our minds from things
- why the superordinate Good / One is needed to explain normative authority (to establish moral realism, which Gerson expands on in a book of its own), while a coordinate form of the Good only gets us a necessary condition for it (Aristotle's sense of it being a pros en equivocal I believe, e.g. there's the good for a plant, a good for a knife, a good for humans). This was one of the toughest but most rewarding to come to understand.
Along the way he offers some killer philosophy of mind disproofs of materialism. But I would not agree that Ur-Platonism should just be defined as the five anti's (anti materialism, anti nominalism, anti relativism, anti mechanism, anti skepticism). I don't know why he didn't include in its definition the Idea of the Good/One, but rather he treated that as a clear necessity of the five anti's. But even including this I think is insufficient for Ur-Platonism, since Heidegger would count as one - he accepted the five anti's and believed in Being in a way very informed by medieval transcendentals and the ancient Greeks. Heidegger only ditched axiological language or concepts because he felt it wasn't deep enough (as far as I understand, just like physics or psychology were nowhere near deep enough to provide adequate language / concepts), and the Platonists would probably agree that the One or Ineffable is the unhypothetical first principle of all in the first place, while the Good is the same only after considering its generated effects.
The soul: belief in the immortal soul seems to be a needed addition to define Ur-Platonism. Heidegger did not believe in an immortal soul. Now Platonists didn't seem to believe in a personal immortal soul, since different individuals kind of are just absorbed into Mind after separating from body.
As a Christian I see the doctrine of analogy lacking by the final chapter on Proclus and Damascius. It's by analogy that I don't need to distinguish Mind from One, as Plotinus too, did. The unity or oneness that these Platonists seem to want is very literal and univocal. No distinctions! Yet oneness is a concept of ours too. Whatever oneness the One is is not the same as what we observe in the world. It can't be. The oneness and goodness and activity and whatness (ousia), and thus these distinctions, are all pre-eminent in the One in a higher incomprehensible unity, not just virtually since the One of course does 'have' them in order to give them, but has to have them really, just not univocally, but analogically. The henads are a result of Proclus' trying to accept an excess transcendence of the One, transcendent to the point that it can't even be a cause of things or related to things or distinct from things (while things yet must be different from it and related to it, breaking the normal symmetry of these concepts), by bypassing analogy, positing participated unities of the unparticipated One, which *are* the One except qua participated. I don't see how this solves anything. If they *are* the One, then the One is participated. Anyway, analogy is what allows us to see the One as Pure Act and as Mind with all the Divine Ideas or logoi as we EO Christians would call them. I may be a bit heterodox in saying God's existence is his essence, but I mean this by analogy. It is not existence as we could know it, much less essence as we could even positively understand. But these terms kataphatically point us away from error to the God who is un-point-at-able, or unreferrable. This doctrine of analogy together with the principle of proportionate causality allows us to ascribe Personhood to God or interactivity and attention to creation. This is then how it makes sense to look for that interaction in history, find revelation that is consistent with this philosophical (over-scientific) view of God, and ground belief in an immortal personal soul.
December 21, 2020
Quite good. Quite difficult.
February 3, 2024
Great book. Great author. Enjoyed it.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews