I got this book in a Goodreads giveaway, and I entered the giveaway because I've heard a lot about the simulation hypothesis, kind of know the basic premise, but haven't actually read a full argument. However, this was not the book for me. It was aimed at a much more general audience. I don't want to be a snob, however I had to struggle not to be turned off by so many of the references being from Wikipedia. I wanted something more in depth, more high-falutin', written by some stuffy academic who would cow me into believing the hypothesis with math I couldn't understand, backed by a miles-deep philosophical treatise. Instead this was an essay written by a smart guy who got excited by an idea and went down a wikipedia hole for a few days.
So I'm not confident how well the details of the argument are represented here, and I admit I also didn't care too much for the spiritual/mystic side. I couldn't decide how much of that was Virk trying to appeal to everyone or how much was due to his own mystical beliefs. I suppose it doesn't matter, either way it's always a bit worrying when some theory explains how all religions are actually right. There was definitely some overreach - the idea that fractals are easily computable, so when we find fractals in nature, that's evidence for the computational nature of the universe. That seems like something that can be explained by growth patterns we already understand. And it was strange to me how Virk wrote essentially the whole book more or less as though, were the universe a simulation, there would exist, for each of us, a player in the outside world - and only at the end mentioned the possibility that we might be entirely simulations. That seems to be a bit hopeful, clinging to the notion of our consciousness and spirit as something transcendent while simultaneously surreptitiously denying the possibility of an AI being conscious. I always figured that of course, if this were a simulation, we are part of that simulation - minds and all, not people with some kind of body or other existence outside the simulation only 'playing' us. It's definitely a possibility, I suppose, but I'm not sure it makes any more sense than the alternative.
And finally, so much of the support for the hypothesis rested on what we are or may soon be capable of doing in this universe. Since we can create video games, since we have such-and-such computing power, such-and-such physics, then that tells us something about the capabilities of the outside world. And this is where I'd like to read a more thorough argument about statistical probabilities or whatnot. Since I know that Bostrom's original paper talked about ancestor simulations, which suggests that the simulations are worlds much like the one making the simulation, so in that case is makes sense to suppose that our future is much like the outside world's past, and we are much like them. However I really don't know how much more likely that is than that we are in some significant way different than our creators. Think of World of Warcraft, which Virk so loved to reference - if a player becomes very advanced in a game like that, they can maybe cast very powerful spells, maybe as new versions of the game are developed more land or monsters appear. These types of things do not happen in our universe, and it's completely plausible to me that our universe is different in some serious way from the outside one. Since the foundations of physics are perhaps the most compelling argument in support of this hypothesis, that might imply that physics are not the same out there - with who knows what consequences. So the focus on our activities and future as an argument for how the outside world works seems a little strange to me, but then again, it is all we have to go on.