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No Clear And Present Danger: A Skeptical View Of The UNited States Entry Into World War II
From the Preface to the Twenty-fifth Anniversary was a controversial book, and likely remains so.? The world 25 years later looks quite different. With the end of the Cold War, the United States is now the world's only superpower. If this country cannot shape the international system and bring peace and stability to much of the world, surely no other state can. Yet the will to a broadly internationalist foreign policy cannot currently be found in the United States. The near-consensus that ranged across foreign policy elites before the Vietnam War has never been restored. Maybe that's just as well. But I hold to much of the basic perspective of this book as offering some guidance for fellow ?cooperative internationalists.? The power to shape international affairs is limited; military intervention is a costly, blunt, and dangerous instrument. The five questions I ask on page 108 of this book remain appropriate. I do believe there are appropriate circumstances for military action in international affairs. In most circumstances I do not believe that it is desirable, effective, or just to try to spread democracy or other American values by force of arms. Much more could be done by way of financial assistance as well as consistent ideological and technical support to create a more democratic and interdependent environment within which peace can be secured.? If the Vietnam War derived in substantial part from an overconfident and unilateral interpretation of history, that is a mistake from which we can still learn.
111 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1972
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September 17, 2025
No Clear and Present Danger by Bruce M. Russet explores the idea that American intervention in WWII had little effect on international politics and that the U.S. not entering the war would have had similar if not better results. Russet explains his argument for both the Pacific and European theatres, goes over alternate scenarios, and explains how the U.S. affected international politics during the time when the book was written, which was at the height of the Vietnam War. Russet’s argument is well thought out and he utilizes sufficient evidence to support his claim. He also recognizes and counters other arguments that go against his claims. Russet also is able to utilize and apply historical content to his writing which helps the reader understand not only his arguments but also arguments from his detractors. Overall Russet sufficiently argues against U.S. intervention in WWII and utilizes evidence and historical context to do so which makes his book relevant even in the modern era.
Bruce M. Russett begins No Clear and Present Danger by examining U.S. interventionism from WWII to the Vietnam War and introducing his argument: “American participation in WWII had very little effect on the essential structure of international politics thereafter, and probably did little either to advance the material welfare of most Americans or to make the nation secure from foreign military threats”. He contends that Americans' lives might have been better if the U.S. had not entered the war. Writing at the height of the Vietnam War, Russett aims to reexamine history and its implications for the United States, even if his conclusions challenge conventional beliefs.
In the first section, Russett applies his argument to the European Theatre. He disputes claims that “Hitler would have won if the U.S. didn’t get involved,” pointing instead to factors like the RAF’s strength, Lend-Lease aid, and Soviet advances. While supporting aid to Britain, Russett argues that U.S. non-intervention would have led to a stalemate rather than German victory. He envisions a postwar Europe where Germany’s power diminished without significantly altering the geopolitical landscape. Russett challenges alarmist views about Nazi threats to the Americas and the feasibility of German nuclear development, citing logistical constraints. He also critiques moral arguments for U.S. involvement, arguing they rely on hindsight and overlook how the U.S. viewed communism as a greater threat than fascism.
The second section shifts focus to the Pacific. Russett argues that Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was provoked by U.S. economic sanctions and military actions. He maintains that Japan’s prospects for success were slim by the time the U.S. entered the war, undermined by economic weakness and overextension. Russett also counters claims about the Axis powers being a unified threat, demonstrating the inherent weaknesses in their alliance. He explores alternative strategies for the U.S., such as continuing aid to allies, moderating actions against Japan, or avoiding direct engagement while pressuring Japan to withdraw from China.
Russett critiques the broader consequences of U.S. intervention in WWII, including undesirable legacies like the rise of the military-industrial complex, presidential overreach in foreign conflicts, and the U.S. adopting the role of “global policeman.” He connects these issues to Vietnam, highlighting how WWII shaped military and foreign policy. Negative outcomes include harsher military conduct, neglect of domestic priorities, and the establishment of a precedent for interventionism. Russett argues that isolationist perspectives, including limited aid without direct belligerence, might have avoided many of these problems while still achieving key goals.
Russet further claims that our involvement in WWII led to us relying more on antagonizing nations rather than using other methods such as building good foreign relations or other forms of persuasion to deal with potential enemies. He applies this argument to the start of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and shows how things could have gone instead. In the end he claims that reward instead of punishment can be more effective than relying solely on fear and the possibilities of threats. He also applies this idea to what U.S. Eastern policy could have looked like in the 1930’s
Russet then explains the importance of looking at geopolitics from a “macroscopic perception” that allows one to look at often overlooked factors whilst not focusing too much on smaller and less apparent insignificant factors from a “microscopic perception”. He shows how a “macroscopic perception” was applied to his argument and alternative scenarios he presents and how a “microscopic” viewpoint omits much of the larger picture. He utilizes examples such as the UN voting history, U.S.-Cuban relations in the 50s and 60s, revolutions, and France's involvement in Vietnam to further drive home his point and to explain how focusing on the “big picture” gives a better view of the geopolitical climate at the time and for the future. In the end, Russet concludes that there needs to be broader considerations for politicians to limit the number of choices they have for important decisions to avoid conflicts and to better recognize critical decisions and their long-term consequences.
Russet’s well-thought-out and supported argument displays many strengths. For starters, his argument is one that is not typically thought about and unanimously supported, yet he does a good job presenting it regardless. He makes sure not to diminish the sacrifices of the millions of Americans who fought in the conflict despite the surface-level implications his argument may convey. He does an excellent job examining counterarguments and often finds a somewhat middle ground between his ideas and others who may disagree with him, which is displayed in his thoughts about the importance of the U.S. foreign aid to the allies whilst also not fighting. He even provides primary sources from the time to show how some of his opinions were shared by many during WWII. Although the argument in No Clear and Present Danger displays many strengths, there are some slight weaknesses within the work. With any writing dealing with historical alternatives, there are always issues with counterfactual reasoning. It is impossible to get a complete understanding of historical events and the political and social climates during them without actually being there. Russet could not possibly know what the effects would be if the U.S. decided to not to get involved in WWII no matter how much evidence there is to support possibilities. Regardless, Russet is very aware of this and makes these issues clear, and tries his best to observe the conflict from a “macroscopic” perspective whilst providing quality evidence to support his arguments for alternatives. It can also be argued that Russet possibly still undermines the threat of the Axis Powers despite his arguments against their intentions and capabilities. Russet does not seem to consider how Hitler's ideologies may have spread, the imperial culture and policies of Japan, and the strength and support from Axis-supporting nations and their implications on other countries. Neo-Nazism is a fairly relevant issue today, but it could possibly be a much larger ideology even if Hitler eventually lost a stalemate conflict in Europe without U.S. intervention. Regardless, many speculations can be applied to Russet’s work and the value of these considerations may not be relevant to the overall message of his book.
Despite being written in the 1970s, No Clear and Present Danger remains a relevant piece of historical writing still to this day. In a way, this is unfortunate since it seems that the U.S. government has not learned too much from their mistakes during the Vietnam War era. You could apply Russet’s argument to the U.S. War on Terror to a shocking degree. Considering surface-level comparison, one can argue that the U.S. made several mistakes that provoked Al-Qaeda throughout the late 80’s and the 90’s, which went almost completely ignored by U.S. officials but not to Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden even bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 and attacked US Embassies in 1998 before the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks. Eventually, the attacks on September 11th, 2001, led to mass U.S. intervention in the Middle East. This first seemed noble but decades later ran into many issues, lost a good chunk of public support, and changed the nature of U.S. foreign intervention. Russet similarly argues that the U.S. provoked Japan with little regard and avoided warnings which led to Pearl Harbor, causing the U.S. to enter WWII and later saw political consequences after the war. The U.S. also seems to focus a lot more on antagonisation than using other forms of negotiation in geopolitics today. The War in Ukraine seems to have the U.S. and Russia escalating their involvement and threatening the use of military assets rather than focusing on more diplomatic means to solve the conflict. Although these are just surface-level analogies, it is clear that Russet’s argument that U.S. intervention in WWII had a noticeable effect on international politics and foreign intervention has some undeniable credibility.
Overall I found Russet's argument to be very compelling, especially relating to his argument about U.S. involvement in Europe. It is clear that Hitler’s dreams for conquest were extremely unlikely by 1941 and that we, at best, sped up the war in Europe rather than saving it from the Nazis. Russet even points to the casualties the U.S. received in Europe which is a small fraction compared to what the Soviets and other nations saw. Russetts argument may be hard to swallow for most, but it is undeniable that the Allies could have held out for a resolution in the end that would have been similar to what history actually presented to the world. Russett even makes a compelling argument when talking about the Pacific front, despite the direct Pearl Harbor attacks. Mainstream historical works often fail to emphasize that the effect of U.S. involvement in the Pacific and U.S.- Japan relations before Pearl Harbor added more context to the attacks and their consequences. Russet makes the reader wonder what the U.S. could have done differently, and what the first half of the 1940s looked like if things had been handled differently. Again, speculation is not nearly as solid as historical facts, but Russet really paints a picture in the reader's mind of what the American politicians and people felt at the time. This added context and support from carefully selected evidence makes his alternate scenarios seem not so far-fetched and somewhat credible, despite heavily relying on speculation. Although Russett relies on the Vietnam War a lot as a comparison between modern and WWII-era U.S. foreign policy, several decades have passed, and yet several other U.S. conflicts since can be used in place of the Vietnam War to show how WWII affected U.S. policy nearly 80 years later. In the end, I believe No Clear and Present Danger is more relevant than ever and is a valuable read for anyone interested in WWII and international politics.
Russet sufficiently argues against U.S. intervention in WWII and utilizes evidence and historical context to do so, which makes his book extremely relevant to this day. Russet’s skeptical viewpoint is executed very well despite his argument's minor flaws. The arguments presented in No Clear and Present Danger tie in closely with the Vietnam War, which adds even more relevance to Russet’s work. Not only that, many of the key themes he presents in his work still remain relevant to this day. Because of this, No Clear and Present Danger remains a relevant and valuable read that can easily be applied to current events.
Bibliography
Russett, Bruce M. No clear and present danger a skeptical view of the United States entry into World War II. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
Bruce M. Russett begins No Clear and Present Danger by examining U.S. interventionism from WWII to the Vietnam War and introducing his argument: “American participation in WWII had very little effect on the essential structure of international politics thereafter, and probably did little either to advance the material welfare of most Americans or to make the nation secure from foreign military threats”. He contends that Americans' lives might have been better if the U.S. had not entered the war. Writing at the height of the Vietnam War, Russett aims to reexamine history and its implications for the United States, even if his conclusions challenge conventional beliefs.
In the first section, Russett applies his argument to the European Theatre. He disputes claims that “Hitler would have won if the U.S. didn’t get involved,” pointing instead to factors like the RAF’s strength, Lend-Lease aid, and Soviet advances. While supporting aid to Britain, Russett argues that U.S. non-intervention would have led to a stalemate rather than German victory. He envisions a postwar Europe where Germany’s power diminished without significantly altering the geopolitical landscape. Russett challenges alarmist views about Nazi threats to the Americas and the feasibility of German nuclear development, citing logistical constraints. He also critiques moral arguments for U.S. involvement, arguing they rely on hindsight and overlook how the U.S. viewed communism as a greater threat than fascism.
The second section shifts focus to the Pacific. Russett argues that Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was provoked by U.S. economic sanctions and military actions. He maintains that Japan’s prospects for success were slim by the time the U.S. entered the war, undermined by economic weakness and overextension. Russett also counters claims about the Axis powers being a unified threat, demonstrating the inherent weaknesses in their alliance. He explores alternative strategies for the U.S., such as continuing aid to allies, moderating actions against Japan, or avoiding direct engagement while pressuring Japan to withdraw from China.
Russett critiques the broader consequences of U.S. intervention in WWII, including undesirable legacies like the rise of the military-industrial complex, presidential overreach in foreign conflicts, and the U.S. adopting the role of “global policeman.” He connects these issues to Vietnam, highlighting how WWII shaped military and foreign policy. Negative outcomes include harsher military conduct, neglect of domestic priorities, and the establishment of a precedent for interventionism. Russett argues that isolationist perspectives, including limited aid without direct belligerence, might have avoided many of these problems while still achieving key goals.
Russet further claims that our involvement in WWII led to us relying more on antagonizing nations rather than using other methods such as building good foreign relations or other forms of persuasion to deal with potential enemies. He applies this argument to the start of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and shows how things could have gone instead. In the end he claims that reward instead of punishment can be more effective than relying solely on fear and the possibilities of threats. He also applies this idea to what U.S. Eastern policy could have looked like in the 1930’s
Russet then explains the importance of looking at geopolitics from a “macroscopic perception” that allows one to look at often overlooked factors whilst not focusing too much on smaller and less apparent insignificant factors from a “microscopic perception”. He shows how a “macroscopic perception” was applied to his argument and alternative scenarios he presents and how a “microscopic” viewpoint omits much of the larger picture. He utilizes examples such as the UN voting history, U.S.-Cuban relations in the 50s and 60s, revolutions, and France's involvement in Vietnam to further drive home his point and to explain how focusing on the “big picture” gives a better view of the geopolitical climate at the time and for the future. In the end, Russet concludes that there needs to be broader considerations for politicians to limit the number of choices they have for important decisions to avoid conflicts and to better recognize critical decisions and their long-term consequences.
Russet’s well-thought-out and supported argument displays many strengths. For starters, his argument is one that is not typically thought about and unanimously supported, yet he does a good job presenting it regardless. He makes sure not to diminish the sacrifices of the millions of Americans who fought in the conflict despite the surface-level implications his argument may convey. He does an excellent job examining counterarguments and often finds a somewhat middle ground between his ideas and others who may disagree with him, which is displayed in his thoughts about the importance of the U.S. foreign aid to the allies whilst also not fighting. He even provides primary sources from the time to show how some of his opinions were shared by many during WWII. Although the argument in No Clear and Present Danger displays many strengths, there are some slight weaknesses within the work. With any writing dealing with historical alternatives, there are always issues with counterfactual reasoning. It is impossible to get a complete understanding of historical events and the political and social climates during them without actually being there. Russet could not possibly know what the effects would be if the U.S. decided to not to get involved in WWII no matter how much evidence there is to support possibilities. Regardless, Russet is very aware of this and makes these issues clear, and tries his best to observe the conflict from a “macroscopic” perspective whilst providing quality evidence to support his arguments for alternatives. It can also be argued that Russet possibly still undermines the threat of the Axis Powers despite his arguments against their intentions and capabilities. Russet does not seem to consider how Hitler's ideologies may have spread, the imperial culture and policies of Japan, and the strength and support from Axis-supporting nations and their implications on other countries. Neo-Nazism is a fairly relevant issue today, but it could possibly be a much larger ideology even if Hitler eventually lost a stalemate conflict in Europe without U.S. intervention. Regardless, many speculations can be applied to Russet’s work and the value of these considerations may not be relevant to the overall message of his book.
Despite being written in the 1970s, No Clear and Present Danger remains a relevant piece of historical writing still to this day. In a way, this is unfortunate since it seems that the U.S. government has not learned too much from their mistakes during the Vietnam War era. You could apply Russet’s argument to the U.S. War on Terror to a shocking degree. Considering surface-level comparison, one can argue that the U.S. made several mistakes that provoked Al-Qaeda throughout the late 80’s and the 90’s, which went almost completely ignored by U.S. officials but not to Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden even bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 and attacked US Embassies in 1998 before the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks. Eventually, the attacks on September 11th, 2001, led to mass U.S. intervention in the Middle East. This first seemed noble but decades later ran into many issues, lost a good chunk of public support, and changed the nature of U.S. foreign intervention. Russet similarly argues that the U.S. provoked Japan with little regard and avoided warnings which led to Pearl Harbor, causing the U.S. to enter WWII and later saw political consequences after the war. The U.S. also seems to focus a lot more on antagonisation than using other forms of negotiation in geopolitics today. The War in Ukraine seems to have the U.S. and Russia escalating their involvement and threatening the use of military assets rather than focusing on more diplomatic means to solve the conflict. Although these are just surface-level analogies, it is clear that Russet’s argument that U.S. intervention in WWII had a noticeable effect on international politics and foreign intervention has some undeniable credibility.
Overall I found Russet's argument to be very compelling, especially relating to his argument about U.S. involvement in Europe. It is clear that Hitler’s dreams for conquest were extremely unlikely by 1941 and that we, at best, sped up the war in Europe rather than saving it from the Nazis. Russet even points to the casualties the U.S. received in Europe which is a small fraction compared to what the Soviets and other nations saw. Russetts argument may be hard to swallow for most, but it is undeniable that the Allies could have held out for a resolution in the end that would have been similar to what history actually presented to the world. Russett even makes a compelling argument when talking about the Pacific front, despite the direct Pearl Harbor attacks. Mainstream historical works often fail to emphasize that the effect of U.S. involvement in the Pacific and U.S.- Japan relations before Pearl Harbor added more context to the attacks and their consequences. Russet makes the reader wonder what the U.S. could have done differently, and what the first half of the 1940s looked like if things had been handled differently. Again, speculation is not nearly as solid as historical facts, but Russet really paints a picture in the reader's mind of what the American politicians and people felt at the time. This added context and support from carefully selected evidence makes his alternate scenarios seem not so far-fetched and somewhat credible, despite heavily relying on speculation. Although Russett relies on the Vietnam War a lot as a comparison between modern and WWII-era U.S. foreign policy, several decades have passed, and yet several other U.S. conflicts since can be used in place of the Vietnam War to show how WWII affected U.S. policy nearly 80 years later. In the end, I believe No Clear and Present Danger is more relevant than ever and is a valuable read for anyone interested in WWII and international politics.
Russet sufficiently argues against U.S. intervention in WWII and utilizes evidence and historical context to do so, which makes his book extremely relevant to this day. Russet’s skeptical viewpoint is executed very well despite his argument's minor flaws. The arguments presented in No Clear and Present Danger tie in closely with the Vietnam War, which adds even more relevance to Russet’s work. Not only that, many of the key themes he presents in his work still remain relevant to this day. Because of this, No Clear and Present Danger remains a relevant and valuable read that can easily be applied to current events.
Bibliography
Russett, Bruce M. No clear and present danger a skeptical view of the United States entry into World War II. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
October 3, 2010
It's not a book that everyone should read, it's a book that everyone should have read. A foreshadowing look at the last 30 years that was roundly ignored.
August 17, 2011
Just read this (it's really just a 100pp essay) in a sitting. Analysis much more solid on the mistakes that made the Pacific war more likely than for the European front, where I think a lot of the recent scholarship has really not weighed in Russett's favor. Wrong, weird, but kind of an old-timey version of a long contrarian blog post. Still, an interesting and strange little book (that still suffers from a bit too much reverse projection of Vietnam-era angst).
July 28, 2011
clear, well articulated, reasonable argument for how and why US involvement in WWII could/should have been avoided and how such decisions affected then current US foreign policy in vietnam.
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