"A very good book indeed.... It is quietly reasoned, beautifully ordered, and spirited as hell.... [It] is not a book for children, nostalgic or otherwise."―Loren Baritz, The Nation William Appleman Williams was one of America’s greatest critics of US imperialism. The Contours of American History , first published in 1961, reached back to seventeenth-century British history to argue that the relationship between liberalism and empire was in effect a grand compromise, with expansion abroad containing class and race tensions at home. Coming as it did before the political explosions of the 1960s, Williams’s message was a deeply heretical one, and yet the Modern Library ultimately chose Contours as one of the best 100 nonfiction books of the 20th Century.
This book fills in a lot of good information about the history of Liberalism, the American ideology derived from Seventeenth Century Britain. For example, it clarifies very helpfully the debt John Locke (America's favourite philosopher) owes to his patron, Shaftesbury, and the fundamentally important difference between Shaftesbury's Mercantilist values and Locke's Laissez Faire values. In both cases, though, Liberalism has always demanded expanding markets and the search for these has driven American history and American thinking. As long as America has had its frontiers, continental and foreign, it has been able to evade dealing with the profound issues of its painfully divided and shamefully unequal society. Williams concludes that the shrinking of the world with the onset of nuclear weapons and the refusal of other nations to continue accepting American dominance will bring expansion to an end and force political change within the USA. The benefit of fifty years hindsight since this book was published enables us to point to globalisation, free trade and the neoliberal dominance of American and European politics as evidence that the frontiers have not yet been closed and the social revolution so cheerfully proclaimed in this book has been deferred, though always it remains just around the corner. One day America will decide to take its social divisions seriously. But not yet. One day the rest of the world will step out from under its economic dominance. But not yet.
For all its limitations, this book was a pleasure to read and certainly added to my understanding of the very distinctive way Americans approach politics. It was useful to get a handle on what they think of as "progressives" for example, and other terms that simply do not mean the same things in Europe. But from my debates on the internet I predict that this is one book most Americans will hate - yet another reason to read it as soon as you get the chance.
I don't quite buy it. This book is rightly celebrated as a landmark in American historiography, and William Appleman Williams (1921-1990) is remembered as one of the most insightful and creative scholars of US History. Having read his most monumental critique, I now recognize how much of the way I see the world I already owed to him. But I don't quite buy it. So much of what he says strikes me as true, and everything is thought provoking, but I neither buy his explanation of American history (entirely), nor do I buy the proposed solution he hints at.
Williams is probably the most famous exponent of the "Of course the United States is an empire!!" thesis, popularizing it from his safe position at the University of Wisconsin in the late 1950s and the 1960s. His critique only got more biting as the US fell into the Vietnam war and associated 60s-70s chaos. As an excellent Nation article from a decade or so back lays out, his reputation fell into eclipse in the triumphant 1990s, but the many failures of George W. Bush and his successors have brought Williams roaring back into significance.
What Williams points out, in a less sunny expansion of Turner's Frontier thesis, is that the United States has been governed by a series of world-views that have all been about imperial expansion at their root. This is the part of Williams' argument that I found most intoxicating. I'm a big fan of the periodization of US history, holding that the past 80 years have featured an FDR era that ended in 1980, followed by a Reagan era that we are currently experiencing the death throes of. Well Williams goes much further, arguing that all of European history in North America, from the 1600s on, fits into three much larger cycles. Mercantilism under the British and the early Republic until the 1820s or so, followed by "Laissez Nous Faire" until the 1890s, followed by a "Corporate Political Economy'" that brought things up until the time of his writing (1961).
I think this periodization can be defended, and reading through it certainly expanded my sense of a lot of things. He's got idiosyncratic reads on everybody from John Locke to Abraham Lincoln, and he even introduced a few figures I'd never heard of, which rarely happens anymore. Shaftesbury and John Taylor of Caroline were new characters for me. I'm truly in awe of the ambition and breadth of this book, and I'd recommend it to anybody. His ambivalence is also very attractive. He vigorously cuts down the reputations of many of the figures he talks about, but still seems to kind of love them. A radical critique of American history does not require hating American history.
I disagree with two things, however. The explanation and the solution are both too pat. This book covers a lot, and I think Williams is right that much of US government history and diplomacy has been about imperial expansion in one guise or another, which is significant, as far as it goes. But I do not believe it goes as far as Williams contends. There is vastly more to the United States than the bleeding edge of colonial real estate speculators or modern-day weapons salesmen. Certainly, their work is an important dynamic within the American panorama, but a less and less significant part with every decade of growing US gigantism. Williams grants a little too much to the greedy imperialists at every stage. He abhors, but almost seems to agree with their view that US prosperity and continued success has depended on imperial expansion. That's not as clear to me. US prosperity certainly depended on expansion in the first century of Manifest Destiny, but less and less as the 20th century wore on.
From the Philippines, to Vietnam to Iraq & Afghanistan, the US's attempts at extracontinental expansion have become progressively bloodier and more pointless messes, not something the US economy is profiting from in any real way. There are a wide range of profiteers who have made out like bandits from each of these catastrophes, but the defense industry has become more and more of a sideshow to the US economy. This is clear in US politics as well. Questions of expansion, how deeply to abuse Native Americans, how to apportion land, and how many slaves to put on that land were the central political issues of the first century of US history. Our lethal imperial flatulence over the past century, and certainly the past three decades rarely even makes it into the news. And when it does, it does so only briefly, as we saw with Afghanistan six months ago, and we are about to see with Ukraine now. I wonder what Williams would have made of the developments of the past 60 years? It's hard to see exactly how the US relationship with China would have fit into his framework, though I'm sure he could have made it work. Williams' work is vital, but I don't think it explains quite as much about US history as he claims it does.
And then there's his solution. It struck me as a kind of warmed over mid-century Mid-Western Marxism. It's not particularly well thought out. Or even well described. It can mean anything. He suggests a turn more towards "social property" rather than constantly using expansion to paper over class conflict. His book gets less satisfying as he gets closer to his own time, introducing a lot of jargon that might have seemed more widely comprehensible in the 1960s, talking about the necessity of a "class conscious gentry" and seeming to argue both for and against a "syndicalist" society, whatever the hell that means. Perhaps I should re-read these chapters. He seems to both be arguing for a sort of American Socialism and trying to defend Herbert Hoover? It all gets rather confusing.
Perhaps I'm mixing up Williams' argument with folks I see as his modern-day disciples (mostly left-wing podcasters) but I think the argument is that the US needs to throw over capitalism to truly reach its potential/true happiness/big rock candy mountain or whatever. I don't buy that either. America is guilty of a range of original sins, but I don't buy that our way of life is so bankrupt that we need to rip everything up root and branch. These bones are good. We can still redeem ourselves by changing things at the margin. That's my take anyway.
"“America,” he wrote toward the end of his life, “is the kind of culture that wakes you in the night, the kind of nightmare that may [yet] possibly lead us closer to the truth.”"
"“good” came to be understood as expansion (“Calvin’s Virgin”), whereas anything that stood in its way—from American Indians to the Confederacy, from the Soviet Union to the Third World—was “evil.”"
"Our true goal should be an American community. Now community is a process as well as an achievement, and the process is more important. Community as process is the ever-deepening understanding of our nature and potential as human beings, and the sustained creation of ways of living together that are appropriate to that nature and potential."
"For if a man is free only if he holds property, then he is a mere product of material wealth."
"A philosophy without a Utopia is like the sky without the stars. It is very inspiring until it gets dark."
After reading Williams' terrific "Tragedy of American Diplomacy," I decided to read his broader American history to see essentially what he had to say. The Contours is an incredibly ambitious history of dominant ideology in American life, dividing our history into three parts: Mercantilism, Laissez Nous Faire, and then the era of Corporate Capitalism that arguably we are still in today. He does this through a dissection not only of political speeches and popular philosophical tracts but even the popular literature of the day, at one second citing Jefferson, at another Poe. He does this while sticking to his talent of elevating those he feels have been unduly looked over, while exocoriating others who have perhaps been overrated. For the time he was writing this, his treatment of Jefferson in particular strikes me as incredibly progressive and his love of the forgotten John Quincy Adams is interesting too. The Age of Mercantilism, stretching from the 1760's to the 1820's, was dominated by a desire to uphold private property while ensuring the social good. The core of this philosophy could be described as follows: "First, the state was the institution for achieving wealth and welfare. Second, and as implied by the first, good fortune did not happen by itself: it was the result of men making good policies...Third, the state had an obligation to serve society by accepting and discharging the responsibility for the general welfare...Fourth, the world was defined as known and finite, a principle agreed upon by science and theology." It is important to note that the *policies* of mercantilism, often taking the form of protectionism as well as public investiture in internal improvements in areas such as transportation and industry, stem from these core beliefs. The State was to serve a positive role in the formation of society rather than a *negative* role as it did under the dictates of Laissez Nous Faire. What caused the break down of mercantilism was its own answer to the struggle of affirming private property while attempting to ensure the public good. Williams writes that the Americans under Madison essentially "ran away" from the problem as they used the frontier source of new opportunities for people to find wealth. Private property never needed to be redistributed equitably so long as more property could be taken from the American Indians and Europian holders of colonial property. The Frontier became the "American utopia" a troubling development that resulted in the American tendency to identify the source of wealth as well as trouble as being without rather than within. Of this era, Williams finds in John Quincy Adams the character of a hero. He was not only an abolitionist, but a fervent believer in the state's responsibility to ensure the national welfare. Williams notes that "In four years the Adams Administration spent almost as much on internal improvements as had been allocated in the previous twenty-four. Indeed, by 1826 the government was the largest single economic entrepreneur in the country." I feel there is a myth that the American "strong government" was created by New Dealers when in fact in our earliest history the State played a vigorous and active role in American life. This was not to last, however, as Jackson's inauguration meant the triumph of those in support of Laissez Nous Faire (1819-1876). Of this new governing ideology, Williams writes that what"the militant advocates of laissez nous faire came to demand was help without responsibilities. In their minds, at any rate, that was the working definition of democratic freedom." Responsibilities in this statement meant towards the broader community as these new businessmen pursued their narrow interests with fanatic vigor. The politician became less interested in representing the general welfare as "Leadership became instead a task of representing a specific element of the system and attempting to secure its objectives through conflict and compromise with the other elements." All of society became a Hobbesian "war of all against all." That the Mercantilists failed to preserve belief in placing the community over yourself comes down to the fact that they could never square their defense of private property with the "socialism of the heart" that they felt. During this period, the state tended to be seen as only necessary to act "negatively" so that it could restore the state at which free competition could reign. Monopolies had to be broken up, and transportation as slowly regulated so that it would no longer be beholden to special interests. Slavery too came under intense fire during this period as "Only moral men could attain the general welfare through the indulgence of their various self-interests. Since only free men could be moral, the slaveholder was by definition the most immoral." Williams argues that Laissez Nous Faire is in fact responsible for the Civil War and thus the abolition of slavery. I agree with this, as the last "compromises" between the North and South can only be seen as the last gasps of a decayed mercantilism that prioritizes general peace over individual freedom. That being said, the fact that nothing came of the "forty acres and a mule" proposal also owes itself to Laissez Nous Faire, as it was believed that the freed slaves would simply fall into place naturally. Once again, private property triumphed over the urgent need for redistribution to ensure equity. In the end, Williams writes that "Civil war, grave social disorders, and the progressive disillusionment and alienation of a sizable segment of society were the scars and open wounds [Laissez Nous Faire] bequeathed to its heirs. The open field for fair play became first a military battleground and finally the restricted arena dominated by the giant corporation." The Era of Corporate Capitalism (1882-Now?) has "transformed the fears of men like Madison and Jefferson, and the expectations of others like Seward, into a reality that crossed every economic, political, and social boundary, affected every branch of government, and permeated every aspect of the individual citizen’s life." The Corporation became the new feudal lord of society, the problem being there was no way for the individual to enforce their reciprocal obligation to society. Syndicalism became the order of the day, as society organized itself into successive blocs. The individual lost all ability to be heard; his only hope was that a representative might succeed in arguing for his and many other's welfare. As Williams writes, "That meant that the citizen elected a representative who was his agent, but over whose actions he had no substantial control. For electing a different man did not even modify the basic features of the system, let alone change them." Hoover saw society as being broadly composed of three competing groups "labor, business, and government" and that despotism was the result should any of the above groups get too much power. Of this era, the critical inciting incident that would come to define American foreign policy and thus society itself was the decision by McKinley to invade Cuba as its state under Spain affected American prosperity. The frontier having filled up, the new frontier had to be established lest Americans be forced to face their problems head on and truly design an equitable society. American problems were externalized and the Open Door became first the Law of the Land, then an inarguable axiom that all nations were expected to adhere to. New markets for American manufacturing needed to be found and exploited, doors needed to be opened and once open, there needed to be something behind them. Dollar Diplomacy and other loan efforts can be seen in this vein as establishing foreign markets ultimately at the expense of the taxpayer. Even the Progressives and New Dealers supported the idea that constant expansion was the key to American prosperity. The New Deal, Williams argues, should be seen as a rationalization of the corporate order rather than an affront to it. FDR is treated as the last member of the feudal gentry who believed in a "noblesse oblige" and that ultimately he was more conservative than many seem to believe. Labor representatives should be given responsibility for the more progressive planks of the New Deal as they sensed that this was their "chance" to have bills such as the Wagner Act finally passed. Williams concludes with the idea that it is time for America to stop blaming foreign countries for domestic troubles and finally confront the gulf between our ideals and our reality. He believes that democratic socialism is the only way forwards, the only way to serve the idea that ultimate frontier is in fact each one of us and our endless potential. In that, I agree.
It took some time to cover it all but well worth the investment . The book is organized into three blocks: the age of mercantilism, the age of laisse faire and the age of corporate capitalism. There is background on Britain’s own age of mercantilism which led up to the formation of the American colonies. The trials, tribulations and the trade offs by leaders of America that led up to the 1990s are described in considerable detail. I didn’t agree with the author on all his perspectives but overall this is a rewarding read for anyone seeking to discover the drivers behind American history and what one can learn from its past.
Wow! This was a dense book and I have finally finished it! I would highly recommend it to anyone who is interested in the history of the USA and has the patience to wade through the mire.
If you want history from an anti-individualist slant this is the book for you. While criticizing Locke and Smith for their "laissez-faire" outlook he praises the limits they place on the economy. He is basically a mercantilist at heart and this comes through most clearly when he praises Keynes and the "Progressive Movement" for their adherence to the mercantilist tradition.(p446) He concludes his history (ending as the sixties began) with praise for the "socialist reassertion of the . . . ancient ideal of a Christian Commonwealth (as) a viable utopia".(p487) With that and a dollop of praise for Eugene V. Debs he, mercifully, closes the book on his progressive take on American history.
Great history book, some narrative elements are nice as you'd hope to find in a casual history book, but I was happy to be filled in on a lot of continuities in political philosophy throughout America's longish history. Pretty academic content sometimes but nice to read.