What do you think?
Rate this book
The Origins of Unfairness: Social Categories and Cultural Evolution
In almost every human society some people get more and others get less. Why is inequity the rule in these societies? In The Origins of Unfairness , philosopher Cailin O'Connor firstly considers how groups are divided into social categories, like gender, race, and religion, to address this question. She uses the formal frameworks of game theory and evolutionary game theory to explore the cultural evolution of the conventions which piggyback on these seemingly irrelevant social categories. These frameworks elucidate a variety of topics from the innateness of gender differences, to collaboration in academia, to household bargaining, to minority disadvantage, to homophily. They help to show how inequity can emerge from simple processes of cultural change in groups with gender and racial categories, and under a wide array of situations. The process of learning conventions of coordination and resource division is such that some groups will tend to get more and others less. O'Connor
offers solutions to such problems of coordination and resource division and also shows why we need to think of inequity as part of an ever evolving process. Surprisingly minimal conditions are needed to robustly produce phenomena related to inequity and, once inequity emerges in these models, it takes very little for it to persist indefinitely. Thus, those concerned with social justice must remain vigilant against the dynamic forces that push towards inequity.
offers solutions to such problems of coordination and resource division and also shows why we need to think of inequity as part of an ever evolving process. Surprisingly minimal conditions are needed to robustly produce phenomena related to inequity and, once inequity emerges in these models, it takes very little for it to persist indefinitely. Thus, those concerned with social justice must remain vigilant against the dynamic forces that push towards inequity.
256 pages, Hardcover
Published September 18, 2019
16 people are currently reading
380 people want to read
About the author
Cailin O'Connor
5 books23 followersCailin O’Connor is assistant professor of logic and philosophy of science at the University of California, Irvine.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
August 28, 2020
It's time for some game theory...
I enjoyed the book quite a bit (partly maybe because it's in my wheelhouse, research wise). It gave more rigor to some of my intuitions about why some of the things are the way they are in our society. Be it gendered roles or racial inequalities. And how some of these differences can arise from no fault the individuals involved (counter to some of the currently popular theories on sexism, racism etc). The book uses fairly simple ideas from evolutionary game theory and models these various interactions as simple games to demonstrate how easily agents can reach these "unfair" equilibrium solutions to the game in the process of optimizing their own benefits. I haven't read the original papers so I am taking the author at their words that the results are robust to model perturbations.
Most fun thing about the book is that no side (left/right; progressive/conservative) will really come out happy after reading this book.
I might be biased as such, but I don't completely agree with the conclusion as much. The author advocates using social justice ideas to try to change the equilibrium. But none of the included research actually says that it would result into any better equilibrium and that there may not be any way to obtain one (from game theory equilibrium selection problems are quite hard and there are no guarantees that a dynamical system can actually reach some).
I enjoyed the book quite a bit (partly maybe because it's in my wheelhouse, research wise). It gave more rigor to some of my intuitions about why some of the things are the way they are in our society. Be it gendered roles or racial inequalities. And how some of these differences can arise from no fault the individuals involved (counter to some of the currently popular theories on sexism, racism etc). The book uses fairly simple ideas from evolutionary game theory and models these various interactions as simple games to demonstrate how easily agents can reach these "unfair" equilibrium solutions to the game in the process of optimizing their own benefits. I haven't read the original papers so I am taking the author at their words that the results are robust to model perturbations.
Most fun thing about the book is that no side (left/right; progressive/conservative) will really come out happy after reading this book.
I might be biased as such, but I don't completely agree with the conclusion as much. The author advocates using social justice ideas to try to change the equilibrium. But none of the included research actually says that it would result into any better equilibrium and that there may not be any way to obtain one (from game theory equilibrium selection problems are quite hard and there are no guarantees that a dynamical system can actually reach some).
March 31, 2021
Read for PHIL444
I really enjoyed this book. As a person who isn't very familiar with the ins-and-outs of basic philosophy, let alone philosophical game theory, I was a bit intimidated at first, but O'Connor does a good job of simplifying the content in a way that is very digestible, even to the common reader. The ideas that she brought up in her book were really interesting; I've never thought about inequalities from a coordination game standpoint before. I found her writing on basins of attraction really compelling, especially in the final few chapters where she wrote about the potential for changing their strength in order to create social change in the direction of equity. I appreciated that she did end on a more hopeful note about the potential for equity (albeit temporary), especially since the book was a bit frustrating to read (as are most books on inequities).
Overall, I thought this book was really insightful. I'm coming out of it with a more structured view on social inequalities: in how they arose, how they continue to stay in power, and how they might change in the future. I thought the organization of the book could have been a bit better, especially with consistency in the chapters and the number of footnotes in the book was a bit overwhelming, but I would recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about game theory, gender, or inequality broadly.
I really enjoyed this book. As a person who isn't very familiar with the ins-and-outs of basic philosophy, let alone philosophical game theory, I was a bit intimidated at first, but O'Connor does a good job of simplifying the content in a way that is very digestible, even to the common reader. The ideas that she brought up in her book were really interesting; I've never thought about inequalities from a coordination game standpoint before. I found her writing on basins of attraction really compelling, especially in the final few chapters where she wrote about the potential for changing their strength in order to create social change in the direction of equity. I appreciated that she did end on a more hopeful note about the potential for equity (albeit temporary), especially since the book was a bit frustrating to read (as are most books on inequities).
Overall, I thought this book was really insightful. I'm coming out of it with a more structured view on social inequalities: in how they arose, how they continue to stay in power, and how they might change in the future. I thought the organization of the book could have been a bit better, especially with consistency in the chapters and the number of footnotes in the book was a bit overwhelming, but I would recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about game theory, gender, or inequality broadly.
March 21, 2024
Written clearly and carrying a well-argued, very relevant thesis.
Namely, that social categorisation (e.g., gendering) is the most effective way to solve problems of complementary coordination. It engenders asymmetries that turn such problems into, much simpler to solve, correlation problems. As O'Connor shows, arbitrary symmetry-breaking is sufficient to explain the emergence of roles and social categories associated with self-sustaining inequitable rewards. Differences in innate skills or interests, in context or conditions are not necessary to understand the persistence of such differences and the emergence of the associated categories.
The big takeaway from this is that inequality is "structural" in a fundamental/foundational, but non-essentialist sense. That is, it simply comes with the development of human cooperation. This means that inequality (in all its different forms) can only be tackled through constant watch and radical intervention.
The downside of the book is that 75% of it are cultural-evolutionary game-theoretical models demonstrating platitudes. Some of them are necessary, but it's quite a drag for those mostly interested in the philosophical insights.
Namely, that social categorisation (e.g., gendering) is the most effective way to solve problems of complementary coordination. It engenders asymmetries that turn such problems into, much simpler to solve, correlation problems. As O'Connor shows, arbitrary symmetry-breaking is sufficient to explain the emergence of roles and social categories associated with self-sustaining inequitable rewards. Differences in innate skills or interests, in context or conditions are not necessary to understand the persistence of such differences and the emergence of the associated categories.
The big takeaway from this is that inequality is "structural" in a fundamental/foundational, but non-essentialist sense. That is, it simply comes with the development of human cooperation. This means that inequality (in all its different forms) can only be tackled through constant watch and radical intervention.
The downside of the book is that 75% of it are cultural-evolutionary game-theoretical models demonstrating platitudes. Some of them are necessary, but it's quite a drag for those mostly interested in the philosophical insights.
November 24, 2022
Thaddeus Stevens once said: ,
'I know it is easy to protect the interests of the rich and powerful; but it is a great labour to guard the rights of the poor and downtrodden - it is the eternal labour of Sisyphus, forever to be renewed'.
Equity is not something to achieve and be done with. The social processes leading to inequity are too basic, and require preconditions that are too ubiquitous. Instead, equity is a state we must keep seeking in an ever-evolving process that naturally generates inequities.
The battle for social justice is against a hydra that grows a new head each time any one is cut off.
'I know it is easy to protect the interests of the rich and powerful; but it is a great labour to guard the rights of the poor and downtrodden - it is the eternal labour of Sisyphus, forever to be renewed'.
Equity is not something to achieve and be done with. The social processes leading to inequity are too basic, and require preconditions that are too ubiquitous. Instead, equity is a state we must keep seeking in an ever-evolving process that naturally generates inequities.
The battle for social justice is against a hydra that grows a new head each time any one is cut off.
February 20, 2023
Scholarship of unflinching integrity with important implications for a cohort of my fav topics - re/distributive justice, minority dis/enfranchisement, feminism, identity politics, post/structuralism - providing a powerful new conceptual through-line for these issues via evolutionary game theoretic models of social coordination.
Here, O'Connor uses mathematical models of 'social coordination games' to first illustrate the efficacy and ubiquity of social categories. In short, since categories like gender and race provide a relatively more efficient/successful way to coordinate a society - eg. through divisions of labor, skill specialization, resource distribution etc - compared to a society without them, ongoing coordination pressures will likely select for such categories. Importantly, this selection holds even for entirely conventional categories, ie. pure social constructs like a caste system with zero biological correlation. Further models indicate, however, that even if we removed overt psychological biases - racism, bigotry, stereotyping, misogyny etc - from a given society, the mere existence of social categories therein would still most likely produce entrenched inequitable relations between them while coordinating over time given eg. some minimal power differential of initial conditions like physical prowess, financial safety-nets, or relative category size (ie. minority vs majority population).
The above is a crude truncation of a robust, nuanced and rigorous study but it nevertheless carries the project's ultimate proof: social inequity is an a priori constant of cultural evolution and thus efforts toward a more just society will be never ending. The honesty of this scholarship - ie. when the findings could be interpreted to support innate social hierarchies while the author clearly prefers equality - reminded me of the stunning frankness by which Picketty's 'Capital in the Twenty-First Century' evinced that it was world war, and not any movement for social justice, which was responsible for the most economically equitable era of modern history.
Another topic the book covers with refreshingly forthright calculation is the division of household labor (apparently a field of study to which I was completely ignorant, yikes). Here, the 'transactional' nature of domestic relationships is emphasized and analyzed as locus of cultural convention, instead of being treated as moral taboo.
Despite the mathematical technicalia behind them, O'Connor's powerful explanatory models are often simple and easily interpreted (an enthralling feature of game theory). Along with the author's gifted cogency, this makes for a very readable book even for a veritable innumerate like myself. I bought a second book by O'Connor before even finishing this one!
Here, O'Connor uses mathematical models of 'social coordination games' to first illustrate the efficacy and ubiquity of social categories. In short, since categories like gender and race provide a relatively more efficient/successful way to coordinate a society - eg. through divisions of labor, skill specialization, resource distribution etc - compared to a society without them, ongoing coordination pressures will likely select for such categories. Importantly, this selection holds even for entirely conventional categories, ie. pure social constructs like a caste system with zero biological correlation. Further models indicate, however, that even if we removed overt psychological biases - racism, bigotry, stereotyping, misogyny etc - from a given society, the mere existence of social categories therein would still most likely produce entrenched inequitable relations between them while coordinating over time given eg. some minimal power differential of initial conditions like physical prowess, financial safety-nets, or relative category size (ie. minority vs majority population).
The above is a crude truncation of a robust, nuanced and rigorous study but it nevertheless carries the project's ultimate proof: social inequity is an a priori constant of cultural evolution and thus efforts toward a more just society will be never ending. The honesty of this scholarship - ie. when the findings could be interpreted to support innate social hierarchies while the author clearly prefers equality - reminded me of the stunning frankness by which Picketty's 'Capital in the Twenty-First Century' evinced that it was world war, and not any movement for social justice, which was responsible for the most economically equitable era of modern history.
Another topic the book covers with refreshingly forthright calculation is the division of household labor (apparently a field of study to which I was completely ignorant, yikes). Here, the 'transactional' nature of domestic relationships is emphasized and analyzed as locus of cultural convention, instead of being treated as moral taboo.
Despite the mathematical technicalia behind them, O'Connor's powerful explanatory models are often simple and easily interpreted (an enthralling feature of game theory). Along with the author's gifted cogency, this makes for a very readable book even for a veritable innumerate like myself. I bought a second book by O'Connor before even finishing this one!
Read
April 14, 2023Essentially a primer on evolutionary game theory. O’Connor is interested in modeling how different social dynamics can lead to inequality, entrench it, or reverse it. If you’re looking for specific historical examples, I suggest “The Creation of Inequality” by Marcus and Flannery. If you’re looking for clear abstract models, stick with “The Origins of Unfairness.”
O’Connor shows that self-interested agents easily settle into patterns that look an awful lot like one group exploiting another. Many simple, deceptively symmetrical start points tend to lead to surprisingly lopsided end states.
When everyone starts identical, it’s easy to reach an equilibrium where one group always demands more and another always settles for less.
When two groups start out distinguishable, and division of labor has some benefit, the groups tend to lock into complementary roles. This can happen even if one role gets a far better end of the bargain, even if the two groups are evenly sized and have equal bargaining power. O’Connor uses this as a model for sex discrimination.
O’Connor models discrimination against visible minorities with a similar bargaining game. Many starting positions lead to an equilibrium where majority group members demand more from minority group members than from each other.
When there’s no visible distinction between groups, everyone tends to learn to make even demands. But because the groups are of different sizes, members of the small group interact with members of the large group more than vice versa. This pushes members of the small group to learn to demand less from members of the large group, faster than vice versa. This leads to end states where majority group members make even demands on each other and high demands on minority group members.
O’Connor emphasizes that “unfair” behavior can push out “fair” behavior by simpler mechanisms than what we usually imagine when we think about real-world discrimination. She covers complications like power imbalances and skewed social networks to show how these speed up or reproduce tendencies she’s already shown in simpler models.
Great theory read. If you’re into pop sci, it’s a bit dry but lays out all the details you need without getting too dense.
O’Connor shows that self-interested agents easily settle into patterns that look an awful lot like one group exploiting another. Many simple, deceptively symmetrical start points tend to lead to surprisingly lopsided end states.
When everyone starts identical, it’s easy to reach an equilibrium where one group always demands more and another always settles for less.
When two groups start out distinguishable, and division of labor has some benefit, the groups tend to lock into complementary roles. This can happen even if one role gets a far better end of the bargain, even if the two groups are evenly sized and have equal bargaining power. O’Connor uses this as a model for sex discrimination.
O’Connor models discrimination against visible minorities with a similar bargaining game. Many starting positions lead to an equilibrium where majority group members demand more from minority group members than from each other.
When there’s no visible distinction between groups, everyone tends to learn to make even demands. But because the groups are of different sizes, members of the small group interact with members of the large group more than vice versa. This pushes members of the small group to learn to demand less from members of the large group, faster than vice versa. This leads to end states where majority group members make even demands on each other and high demands on minority group members.
O’Connor emphasizes that “unfair” behavior can push out “fair” behavior by simpler mechanisms than what we usually imagine when we think about real-world discrimination. She covers complications like power imbalances and skewed social networks to show how these speed up or reproduce tendencies she’s already shown in simpler models.
Great theory read. If you’re into pop sci, it’s a bit dry but lays out all the details you need without getting too dense.
January 9, 2022
Inequity through the lens of evolutionary game theoretic models
I really enjoy the book especially the second part showing many versions of how differential powers between groups lead to inequitable outcomes.
I would recommend the book to all researchers who work on unfairness and inequity (but could also be good for general audience because the technical parts are largely simplified).
I really enjoy the book especially the second part showing many versions of how differential powers between groups lead to inequitable outcomes.
I would recommend the book to all researchers who work on unfairness and inequity (but could also be good for general audience because the technical parts are largely simplified).
March 22, 2023
Would not teach this at the undergrad level. They did not find it accessible/engaging.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews