Critique of Cynical Reason

by Peter Sloterdijk, Andreas Huyssen (Foreword), Michael Eldred (Translator)

Upon its publication in Germany in 1983, this author's book stirred both critical acclaim and consternation, attracting a wide readership. He finds cynicism the dominant mode in contemporary culture, in personal and institutional settings; his book is both a history of the impulse and an investigation of its role today, among those whose earlier hopes for social change have crumbled and faded away.

Theory and History of Literature series, Volume 40

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Theory, History, German Literature, Germany, Essays

600 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1983

About the author

Peter Sloterdijk is a German philosopher, cultural theorist, television host and columnist. He is a professor of philosophy and media theory at the University of Art and Design Karlsruhe.

Peter Sloterdijk studied philosophy, Germanistics and history at the University of Munich. In 1975 he received his Ph.D. from the University of Hamburg. Since 1980 he has published many philosophical works, including the Critique of Cynical Reason. In 2001 he was named president of the State Academy of Design, part of the Center for Art and Media in Karlsruhe. In 2002 he began to co-host Das Philosophische Quartett, a show on the German ZDF television channel devoted to discussing key issues affecting present-day society.

The Kritik der Zynischen Vernunft (Critique of Cynical Reason), published by Suhrkamp in 1983, became the best-selling philosophical book in the German language since the Second World War and launched Sloterdijk's career as an author.

The trilogy Spheres is the philosopher's magnum opus. The first volume was published in 1998, the second in 1999, and the last in 2004.

Reviews

[Jacob Wren · Rating 5 out of 5]

Peter Sloterdijke writes:



Psychologically present-day cynics can be understood as borderline melancholics, who can keep their symptoms of depression under control and can remain more or less able to work. Indeed, this is the essential point in modern cynicism: the ability of it’s bearers to work – in spite of anything that might happen. For cynics are not dumb, and every now and then they certainly see the nothingness to which everything leads. Their psychic apparatus has become elastic enough to incorporate as a survival factor a permanent doubt about their own activities. They know what they are doing, but they do it because, in the short run, the force of circumstances and the instinct for self-preservation are speaking the same language, and they are telling them that it has to be so. Others would do it anyway, perhaps worse. Thus, the new, integrated cynicism even has the understandable feeling about itself of being a victim and of making sacrifices. Behind the capable, collaborative hard facade, it covers up a mass of offensive unhappiness and the need to cry.


And later:


It is a matter of experiences for which I can find no other word than the exuberant experience of a well-spent life. In our best moments, when, overcome with success, even the most energetic activity gives way to passivity and the rhythmics of living carry us spontaneously, courage can suddenly make itself felt as a euphoric clarity or a seriousness that is wonderfully tranquil within itself. It awakens the present within us. In the present, awareness climbs all at once to the heights of being. Cool and bright, every moment enters its space; you are no different from its brightness, its coolness, its jubilation. Bad experiences give way to new opportunities. No history makes you old. The unkindnesses of yesterday compel you to nothing. In light of such a presence of spirit, the spell of reenactments is broken. Every conscious second eradicates what is hopelessly past and becomes the first second of an Other History.

[sologdin · Rating 3 out of 5]

quite a bit going on here, but famous among literary & lefty types for the notion "enlightened false consciousness." not so sure about some of the other distinctions, such as kynicism/cynicism, or some of the local readings of various objects.

[Dustyn Hessie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Before I read this book I was indoctrinated with the belief (partly by education, mostly by general opinion) that Sloterdijk was a "post-humanist," and a "neo-facist" (both of which I am not so found of). But in the Critique of Cynical Reason I didn't get any sideways ideology out of this 20th century German thinker.

This philosophical critique doesn't just hone in on our modern idea of the cynic, the melancholy bastard of epithets and premature gloominess, but it also turns our heads back to the true, radical cynicism of Greek Philosophical Antiquity, Diogenes, in whom we have a rather enlightened "kynicism" (as I believe Sloterdijk had called it). Diogenes presided in ancient Greece, and in witnessing the mayhem and untruthfulness of his era and people, emphatically, in light of much joy, gave Greece the, "No," due in much part to their insistence on hasty modernization and inflated overvaluation of material excess (all, of course, in the very same epoch as Alexander of Macedonia and Aristotle).

Of course, Diogenes, as kynic par excellence, recurs several times in Sloterdijk's Critique. But there are also several sudden flights of illuminative discourse regarding cynicism I'd almost call indispensable for any philosophy reader: his critique of the almost-hyperbolically cynical Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevski's world famous, The Brothers Karamazov; his knee-deep inspection into the new cynic, the person who admittedly refuses any truth, and so, goes along with the modern hedonistic ethos of "self"-preservation and such; and lastly, I'll note Sloterdijk's flattering insistence on the truth of enlightenment.

I'll leave much to the imagination of any reader self-propelled into this here Critique. I slammed through the 600-page monster of a book in a week without much trouble, but Sloterdijk's style (and I say this as a mild warning) does begin to blur into obscurity with his tendency to use a plethora of -isms of menial renown, by using such cackling half-baked-ideological phrases: prefacist-kynicist-postmodernism, and the like...

[j. · Rating 4 out of 5]

some good fart jokes, some swearing, deceptively breezy for a 600-page book of critical theory. his psychological interpretations sometimes have a tendency to sound facile, but he seems to find that funny too, and anyway just when you're thinking you're superior to them he tosses off another one that makes it seem pretty likely that you're never going to read as much of THE ENTIRE HISTORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT as he has so there's not much point in getting too fussy about his details. a man who includes several separate major discussions of naughty body parts in his work seems to deserve to have his intellectual project too.

the scope of his effort to trace the transformation of ancient cynicism into modern cynicism suggests that the reason you don't see lots of other people dealing with the issue is that it's too much for them to manage. but it may also be that his approach incorporates an assumption that less critique-oriented scholars aren't signed on to—treating ancient cynicism as itself a form of critique of power. as a result of the assumption his account has a secret-historyish flavor.

this is possibly a liberating book.

it's surely fallen by the wayside in the u.s., though. unsure whether his recent flurry of english translations will generate any more interest for what sure seems like an underappreciated book.

i never looked into this for years despite always seeing it around in used bookstores—it just looked like outdated 'theory' trash. the very beginning may be more indulgent than the main text is once he kicks the machinery into gear.

[Leonart Maruli]

Buku langka ini...beruntung banget bisa pinjam buku ini di perpustakaan daring...

[Dionysius the Areopagite · Rating 5 out of 5]

If I give you $15,000 and a year's supply of domestic beer, porn, and a sports car, will you seriously commit to altering your perspective, belief on eternity at year's end?

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason. The title echoes Kant’s Critique but Sloterdijk is far from Kant’s concern with the philosophical basis of scientific procedure. Sloterdijk rejects Kant’s cognitively-biased universalisms associated with the Enlightenment, such as impartiality in scientific practice, materiality-based empiricism. Instead he argues from what he calls a ‘pre-Enlightenment’ tradition that posits the body, critical (i.e. not Heideggarian) ‘existential ontology’. He sets the body against intellect, desire against abstraction, a sexual exhibitionist’ impulse versus the bourgeois boudoir and privatization of sexual desire. In essence, he calls for the

instantiation of desire into Soviet-era as much as western European forms of the public sphere.
Sloterdijk’s key philosophical sources are the pre-Enlightenment ‘low thinkers’ like the ‘cheeky’ (surely the translator could have come up with a better translation of the German than this?) Kynic (the K to distinguish them from later cynical reasoners) Diogenes and Heraclitus and their modern age heirs in artistic developments like Dadaism, and literary figures like Goethe’s Mephistopheles.
Low theory is a philosophy of ends, of desire, embodied reason rather than the perverted thinking of means, procedure, subject-object division. Sloterdijk’s low theory is one that is constantly historicizing thought and theories that obscure their functionalism and involvement in political subjectification. Low theory counters on the basis of an epistemology pinioned on the subject and physicality the ‘physiogonomist as philosopher’. This is pitted against, for example, forms of ‘schizoid’ reasoning found in Freudian analysis which must always sublimate the ‘id to the superego’. Sloterdijk wants to counter ‘Nobodyness’ because Kynicism and embodied identity have no place, at least in pure form, in bourgeois’ disembodied publicness or its constant attendant dangers of nationalistic war and state’s suspicion of their own and foreign populations. For Sloterdijk we need to start thinking substantively of ends because this will save us, politically, from the cynical and manipulative sciences and technologies based on procedure and other forms of means-directed thought.
A long chapter engages with Heidegger because this cynical uptake of ontology (in its conceptualization of the idea of ‘homeliness’, death-consciousness, in particular) typifies the corruption of ontological thought – as seen in its involvement in Nazism. Instead Sloterdijk wants to kynicise ontology and combat its political misappropriation of the human desire for belonging and community:
Inspired by the kynicism of ends, life that has learned the coldness of producing, ruling and destroying through the cynicism of means could become warm again for us. The critique of instrumental reason presses for its completion as a critique of cynical reason. Its chief task is to loosen Heidegger’s pathos and break its tight hold on the mere consciousness of death. 207
Sloterdijk counters embodied kynical reason to unearth the failings of the degenerative ‘master cynicisms’ that dominant modern societies such as the state and military power, Christianity, sexual cynicism. His writing style is often marked by diffuseness, allusion and, particularly because he comes from a position outside the cynical traditions he analyses, somewhat dualistic. Sloterdijk also tends to a highly functionalist form of argumentation as seen in statements like, ‘Imperialist power submitted to Christian Kynicism in order to tame it’ (235). The master cynicisms act always thus to sublimate Kynical impulses into serving the means of power and

instrumental reason rather than the ends of the good, the unstoppered complex desires and rhythms of the body.
Despite these drawbacks this book is compulsive, critical, creative in its analysis, and the examples he gives from 17th century western culture onwards are always intriguing – some of the illustrations alone are probably worth half the book’s cover price. But the theoretical (rather than the stronger historical) bases of his critique are somewhat weaker. Sloterdijk’s key thinkers, Heraclitus and Diogenes are not really strong enough to build such a wide-ranging critique of western culture and science. And a concept like embodiment could have been deepened and made more analytically useful by linguistic theorists like Merleau-Ponty, for example. Similarly, more from Foucault could have deepened Sloterdijk’s analyses of the master cynicisms from a bio-power perspective.
One must, also, turn the book’s historicism back upon itself. This is a height of the Cold War-era study circ. 1983 and the threat of nuclear Armageddon, its consequent features of spying and surveillance, inform its analysis of cynical reason. But cynical reasoning has moved on – the commoditization of desire, for example, it could be argued has made the ‘gay sciences’ themselves more corrupted as they become pervasive. And one will find nothing of the key political Other of our era - Islamophobia. Sloterdijk cannot be guilty of missing such contemporary issues, but the Euro-centric nature of his examples means it is hard to relate to his work now. And Sloterdijk is responsible for his glaring oversight of racial ideologies in the traditions of cynical reasoning, and the impact of colonialism.
However, how on earth this (great) book passed under my radar when I was employed in research and teaching about Habermas and public sphere theory in the Noughties is beyond me. This book was referred to in a recent TLS review of Sloterdijk’s latest book and its suggestive title, like Bourdieu’s Logic of a Theory of Practice, shouts out at one, it demands to be read. Sloterdijk is, essentially, a theorist who prefers to allude indirectly to the contemporary thinkers he has in mind. Thus Habermas’s early idea of Universal Pragmatics isn’t mentioned directly but adapted in Sloterdijk’s idea of Universal Polemics, or Ricoeur’s ideas on rhythm analysis go unreferenced (there is one cryptic reference to Ricoeur early on in the book.) Habermas and the bourgeois concept of the pubic sphere, dialogic reason is more directly discussed, the diogenetic questioning of the classical Greek foundations of the public and private divide being a key feature of the book:
Where dogmatics postulates an unconditional duty toward truth, the Gay Science assumes from the start the right to lie. And where theory demands that the truth be presented in discursive forms (argumentatively self-contained texts, chains of sentences), the original critique knows of the possibilities of expressing the truth pantomimically and spontaneously. 289

In this way Sloterdijk dismisses the Habermasian argument that dialogical agreement, disembodied reasoning are the bases for unbiased political argument or reasoning. So the Habermasian idea that ‘agreement’ is good in itself – is a false ‘Third Party’ that erases the specific quality of experiential forms of knowledge and argumentation.
But Sloterdijk never really puts forward a viable utopian moment – his is a Kynicism of negation, a negative dialectic. Sloterdijk, in the end, remains a much better critic than theorist. His Gay Science, the concern with the body, of pre-Enlightenment ideas, is thin on any prescription other than that of radical dissent, of revealing ‘bluff’ and ‘disingenuous opinion’ (402) If there is anything to cling to, to hope with, it is an erotics, not just a sexual erotics, but of non-objectifying love:
[T]here is another kind of precedence that is not based on subjugation: The precedence the object enjoys in sympathetic understanding does not demand that we reconcile ourselves to an inferiority and an alienated position. Its prototype is love. The ability to concede the object a precedence would be tantamount to the ability to live and let live (instead of following the impulse to pull everything down into death with us). 360
But that, I’m afraid is just very noble guff.

[Nemo · Rating 5 out of 5]

In his Critique of Cynical Reason, Peter Sloterdijk explores the philosophical implications of the pervasive cynicism that dominates contemporary society. Greek kynic philosophers, believed that the key to a good and happy life lies in living in accordance with nature and reason, rather than being swayed by societal norms and expectations. According to kynic philosophers , society has twisted this natural state by imposing foolish opinions and unnatural needs on individuals, creating never-ending demands that can never truly be satisfied. However, he believes that people can always rewrite their brains to rediscover this natural state and reclaim their happiness.The kynic philosophers envisioned themselves as equal to kings, so when Alexander found Diogenes taking the sun, Alexander said “Ask me for anything you’d like.” Diogenes, lying on the ground asked him to move a little, so as not to block the sun. Alexander later told his courtiers, that had he not been Alexander, he would like to have been Diogenes. Modern society has turned this attitude on its head, promoting the belief that people are hopelessly selfish and materialistic. This pessimistic view of human nature has led to a sense of resignation and apathy, preventing people from taking action to bring about real change.
In this sense, Sloterdijk's critique of cynical reason can be seen as a call to action, encouraging individuals to reject the cynicism that pervades contemporary society and strive towards a more enlightened way of life.

[Rui Coelho · Rating 4 out of 5]

In Critique of Cynical Reason, Sloterdijk argues that the Enlightenment rational critique of everything ended up giving birth to our current cynical age. He thinks that the antidote to this dangerous strain of egoistic nihilism is the return of Greek cynic philosophy, an ironic and satirical critique rooted in a practical/existential detached niilism.
This is a great book, possibly even the best book I have read this year (way better than Sloterdijk's Rage and Time). But it should be a lot shorter. What could easily have been a 200/300 pages book, ended up a 600 pages work, full of unnecessary ramblings. The historic section is specially annoying. I understand that Sloterdijk had to give some use to the years he spent studying Weimar Germany, but spending 180 p. on it is just a distasteful waste of the reader's time.
But, oh boy, the short chapter on farts makes up for all the wasted time!

[Tadas Talaikis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Someone said me that this book works better than my actions, but as it turns out, it works only in his own mind, not the real. Reality still needs some sort of an appeal on emotions of the ego = survival function = fight or flight response and somewhat anti-cynical scientific cynical reasoning and game theory. No real solutions provided here for new religions like scientism.

Laugh as a solution works, but the book misses the big part of the human psyche that it is a part of first step - categorization - to genocide. I still consider hard thinking (about theories or ideologies or people) far more valuable than easy laughs (Thinking, Fast and Slow).

[nicolaskm09 · Rating 5 out of 5]

„Und Diogenes? Hat sich das existentialontologische Abenteuer für ihn gelohnt? Hat seine Laterne die Menschen gefunden? Ist es ihm gelungen, das unsäglich Einfache in die Köpfe einzuträufeln? Ich glaube, er selber zweifelt daran. Er wird sich überlegen, ob er nicht das ganze Unternehmen Philosophie einstellt. Sie kommt nicht auf gegen die traurige Kompliziertheit der Verhältnisse. Die Strategie des Mitmachens-um-zu-ändern verwickelt den Änderer in die kollektive Melancholie. Am Ende ist er, der der Lebendigere war, nur noch der Traurigere, und es könnte auch kaum anders sein. Wahrscheinlich kündigt Diogenes eines Tages seine Professur, am Schwarzen Brett findet man bald darauf die Nach-richt, daß die Vorlesungen von Professor X. bis auf weiteres ausfallen. Das Gerücht sagt, man habe ihn im American Shop gesehen, wo er sich einen Schlafsack gekauft habe. Zuletzt sah man ihn angeblich auf einer Mülltonne sitzen, ziemlich betrunken und vor sich hin kichernd wie einer, bei dem es im Kopf nicht ganz stimmt.“

[Stephen Ragan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting book. Sloterdijk explores individual psychology and cultural trends during the Weimar Republic to describe the contemporary cynical disbelief in truth and use of morality as a tool for social control citing among other examples Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor as this ultimate manifestation. Against this cynicism Sloterdijk advocates the kynical philosophy of Diogenes. The homeless philosopher who told Alexander the Great to get out of his sun light.

Hard to describe all the gems included in this book.

One criticism is that Sloterdijk seems to be a bit of a confused intellect at times including passages that don't seem to serve the overall thesis.

[Kristian Paris · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fornuften bedrages hverken af ideologi som falsk bevidsthed (jf. Marx) eller af ideologien som ikke-falsk men autentisk virkelighed (Zizek), men er snarere blevet falsk oplyst bevidsthed. Med det menes, at fornuften gennemstrømmes af en kynisme, der "ved, hvad den gør, men gør det alligevel". Den tese udtrykker Sloterdijk med udgangspunkt i virkelige eksempler. Bedst virker parallelen til 2. verdenskrig: folk vidste (for det meste) hvad de gjorde, men gjorde det alligevel. Årsagerne hertil gennemgås også.

[Prudente Impertinente · Rating 5 out of 5]

Punta de lanza del autor alemán, con este texto consiguió su merecido reconocimiento internacional. Pocas veces he leído y oído tanto entusiasmo sobre un autor contemporáneo como por Sloterdijk. Siendo exactos, puede que ningún otro haya obtenido tantas recomendaciones e incluso declaraciones de algunos profesores universatarios de filosofía sobre que éste es el último filósofo occidental a tener en cuenta en nuestra ya larga tradición reflexiva.

Si bien su obra magna debe considerarse su trilogía "Esferas" (las cuales, por cierto, leí antes de este libro), puede bien considerarse esta obra como la más característica del autor, donde se expone y se encarna en la palabra, donde puedes dilatar las pupilas ante brillantes reflexiones y contraerla ante abruptos juicios localistas.

Podríamos considerar esta obra un complemento desapasionado de la Dialéctica de la Ilustración de Adorno&Horkheimer. En efecto, el slogan usado por el propio autor reza: «El cinismo es la falsa conciencia ilustrada. Es la moderna conciencia infeliz sobre la que la Ilustración ha trabajado tanto con éxito como en vano.» Esta contradicción es el desarrollo que Peter establece a través de las más de 700 páginas, apoyándose en la dinámica entre cinismo y quinismo. Entre el cinismo de aquella ilustración que intenta reírse de su propia catástrofe y aquel quinismo que intenta superar cualquier idealismo en el mismo momento de ser creado. Así Diógenes de Sinope.

Con este libro Peter establece una agudísima crítica a la Ilustración occidental, a sus mecanismos de actuación, a su ideología, a su materialización, estableciendo la crítica a la derecha por su cisimos y a la izquierda por su falta de quinismo y de superación de su propia condición.

El remate es un grueso capítulo en el que la exhibición de la Crítica de la Razón Cínica se pone en práctica analizando la Alemania de Weimar, justo en el momento en el que el cinismo más famoso de Occidente se manifestó: el nazismo.

Un hurra por Peter !

PD: 700 páginas de libro, hay que cogerlo con ganas. Pero ayuda que la traducción haya conseguido fluidez y que esté, como suele decirse, muy bien escrito.

[Volbet · Rating 5 out of 5]

As an admittedly cynical motherfucker, I was surprisingly pleased with Peter Sloterdijk's analysis and histography of the inherit cynicism of the Enlightenment project. As radical as Sloterdijk’s thesis sounds, he does make a series of very good and thorough arguments to support his point: the Enlightenment’s focus on instrumental, objective reason has alienated the individual and made the general epistemic mode cynical and borderline defeatist.

Sloterdijk does this by doing a quick historiographical survey of cynicism (and thereby differentiate it from the more individualistic cousin, kynicism). Then the entire analysis culminates in an in-depth analysis of the cultural and political mode of the Weimar Republic.
But what I found so brilliant about this book is the way Sloterdijk marries two schools of thought that, for more or less arbitrary reasons, spend decades in opposition to each other, namely the Marxist dialectics of the Frankfurt School and the more systematic works of the French post-modernists. Specifically, Sloterdijk manages to combine the thoughts of Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

[Luis4b1d · Rating 5 out of 5]

Es tal vez una de las mejores piezas de filosofía de los últimos 15 años. Presenta una perspectiva sobre la llamada cotidianidad, desafiando la necesidad de perspectiva histórica, y la posibilidad de hacer excepcional cualquier elemento de deseo.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Brilliant and enjoyable to read (none of the dryness of so much philosophy.)

[Miro Nguyen]

Dr. Doubt suggested this book to me after the paper about Sarajevo being ignored and left unprotected.

[Helmi Chikaoui · Rating 5 out of 5]

لم تزل الفلسفة منذ قرن تحتضر حتى أنه ليس بإمكانها أن تموت لأنها لم تنجز بعد مهمتها. وهكذا طال توديعها المؤلم أمدا طويلا. حيث لا تنهمك الفلسفة في مجرّد إدارة الفكر، تراها تتراخي في احتضار سَنيّ تتذكر في أثنائه ما كانت نسيت أن تقوله طوال مدتها . فلما أحست بدنو أجلها أرادت أن تصبح صادقة وتكشف عن سرّها الأخير. وهي الآن تعترف بأنّ موضوعاتها وأغراضها العظيمة كانت مراوغات وتعلات وأنصاف حقائق. أمّا تلك التحليقات الباطلة والجميلة باتجاه موضوعات من مثل الله، الكون، النظرية الممارسة الذات الموضوع الجسد، الرّوح، المعنى، العدم، فتخطئ المرمى. إذ أنّها أسماء توصيفية مرصودة للشباب والمهمشين والرهبان وعلماء الاجتماع.
"ألفاظ وألفاظ، وأسماء توصيفية، ليس لها إلا أن تنشر أجنحتها حتى تسقط من طيرانها قرون وقرون» (غوتفريد بين، حياة مزدوجة منشورات مينوي)
لقد ولّى عصر تلك المسائل وانقضى. ولم يتبق في فكرنا أي شيء من ازدهار المفاهيم ونشوات الفهم. إننا مستنيرون وخاملون. إذاك لم يعد يتعلق الأمر بحب للحكمة. ولم يعد ثمّة معرفة سيكون بإمكان المرء أن يكون صديقا لها (فيلوس). ولا يكون منّا على بال مع ما نعرفه، أن نحبّه، بل نتساءل على العكس من ذلك، كيف لنا أن نحيا وإياه من دون أن نتحجر.
...
يعيش التنوير انشقاقه الرئيس من جراء الكلبية السياسية للهيمنات. ذلك أنّ المعرفة سلطة، والسلطة تفضي إذْ يُفرَض عليها الصراع، إلى تقسيم المعرفة إلى معرفة تُحيا ومعرفة لا تُحيا. هذا ما لا يبدو باعتباره تقابلا بين «الواقعية» وبين المثالية» إلا على السطح. أما الحق فهو أنّ التقابل قائم بين واقعيّة فُصاميّة وواقعية مضادّة للفصام. الأولى تتحمّل مسؤولية ما لا يسأل عنه أحد؛ والثانية تنهض بلا مسؤولية، إلى ما يُسأل عنه . الأولى تنشد كما تقول، المحافظة على البقاء ؛ والثانية سترغب في إنقاذ الحياة الكريمة أشكال من إفراط واقعية السلطة.

[Elias Nachtmann · Rating 4 out of 5]

I. The Kugel-motiv (sphere-motiv) three-stage model evolves through a top-down and out-in metaphysical structure, achieving a Klein bottle shaped internal and external harmony under the pressue of gradually saturating existence. Its formal evolution also follows the law of reaction forces being shortened.
II. Insights about the end of human evolution theory (Kojeve-Fukuyama-Di Dongsheng) resonates with Nick(ole) Land's prophecy of "a collective marathon towards death, as a compliant, advanced procession, as a revelrous hunt, as an effort of continuous progress..."
III. The pattern of revaluing all values exists in the material exchange of organisms, where the possibilities offered by market life replace monism or crude simplicity -> monochromatic humanity required to make choices in a colorful external world (consumerism society code)
IV Verwöhnungsraum consists of five levels within the Crystal Palace (epitome of capitalism globalization where all hetero-cultures were absorbed into the world Expo, condensation of the external physical world into the internal space, depicting the generalized "langweilig" of normative methods.)