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To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence
In To Catch a The Art of Counterintelligence , former Chief of CIA counterintelligence James M. Olson offers a wake-up call for the American public, showing how the US is losing the intelligence war and how our country can do a better job of protecting its national security and trade secrets.
253 pages, Kindle Edition
Published May 1, 2019
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January 21, 2020
Olson provides an engaging overview of counterintelligence (CI) that will engage people interested in intelligence generally or CI specifically. Unfortunately, it falls short of its ambitions of defining an "art of counterintelligence" and mostly reviews general knowledge and cases that area already in the intelligence literature and will be familiar to people who have read more detailed accounts of specific CI cases.
Unfortunately, Olson's title highlights the need for a general book on counterintelligence to complement the several books on general intelligence, but this book falls far short of its potential. This is particularly disappointing given Olson's 30 years of experience in the CIA and current status as a professor of the practice at the Bush School.
This book provides a chapter each on China, Russia, and Cuba counterintelligence operations before chapters on the ten principles of CI, CI awareness in the workplace, and double agent operations. Olson finishes with several case studies of specific counterintelligence cases, but there is little new insight in the short summaries of these cases. Instead of an "art of counterintelligence," the book feels more like war stories with a CI expert.
This book would have been better if Olson had provided an overview of the US intelligence community and the intelligence cycle, which is covered in other books and unclassified government documents. He should have then talked about a general theory of CI as it applies to all countries as their CI agents seek to identify and mitigate foreign intelligence agents. He should have then presented specific chapters on different aspects of CI operations, such as identifying foreign intelligence officers (both those under official and nonofficial cover), how they recruit sources, how they satisfy requirements, running double agents, mitigating risk, etc. Indeed, a major gap in this book on CI is a very thin discussion on identifying foreign intelligence officers and mitigating their ability to operate, a gap which makes the chapter on double agents less relevant than it would have been with a more complete discussion. Lastly, Olson could have provided several chapters on comparative CI between different countries. By not providing a general theory on CI Olson exposes himself to many contradictions that ultimately weaken the overall message of this book and limit its usefulness to practitioners, policymakers, and the general public.
One contradiction is how Olson describes US and foreign CI services. He asks the reader to be shocked that the intelligence services of Russia, China, Cuba, and other countries have infiltrated the American government offices, universities, and companies, but take it for granted that the US runs intelligence operations in those countries trying to do, in essence, the same thing (satisfy requirements). If he had established a framework of how countries satisfy intelligence requirements (whether they do it professionally, as in the US, or in an adhoc manner), it would have been clear that, fundamentally, the US and other countries are interested in the same basic goal of satisfying these requirements.
This framework would have provided a natural lead-in to a discussion on the ethics of intelligence and counterintelligence. Of course, to engage in the recruitment of sources an individual must be willing to lie and deceive their family, friends, and sources, but where does one draw the line? Are there ethical boundaries that one can cross in an investigation that seeks to prevent an imminent attack versus an operation to satisfy a general intelligence requirement? Olson should have talked about how other countries engage in commercial espionage, such as China, or cyber-terrorism, such as North Korea's Sony hack and how the US's professional intelligence services stay away from these types of operations.
One critical flaw of Olson's work is that he seems to rely heavily on a small subset of well-known examples of CI cases. Instead of retell the story of Aldrich Ames, he should have researched federal indictments and newspaper articles, perhaps even from foreign countries, to attempt to bring new CI cases to the broader public attention.
Olson also fails to address several of the dilemmas that arise in his discussion. He calls for the intelligence community to take stricter stances on drugs and alcohol, but does not take the opportunity to address what a nuanced program would look like when many states have legalized or decriminalized drugs and binge drinking is as common in college as writing term papers at the last minute. Also, the intelligence community, including the military, has thousands of positions to fill every year. If the standards on drugs and minor infractions were too strict, it would be impossible to fill every open position. Olson could have done current administrators a service by thinking more deeply about these serious issues.
Olson also fails to address that much of what happens in the CI world is not publicly known either because it is highly classified, or the intelligence community failed to identify the foreign intelligence officer or their American agent. Although many cases have certainly not been declassified, the reader does not know if the cases presented in this book are a representative sample of CI cases. Also, Olson does not address the glaring possibility that the only people caught in CI operations were the dumb ones, and that the smart ones all got away with it. Olson gives us the Pollard case, and others, with inept spies who cannot help but brag to their friends about their adventures while flaunting their newfound prosperity, but is it possible that there have been Americans in the intelligence community who have spied for years and gotten away with it? Olson missed the opportunity to explain exactly why Cuba was so successful, which is especially disappointing considering Malcolm Gladwell's most recent book did such a good job.
This book, published in July 2019, also should have provided the opportunity for an expert like Olson to address modern dilemmas of hunting down foreign spies. With hundreds of thousands of foreign students and professional workers in the US, how can the US get a handle on identifying spies and agents without violating individual rights? With some universities reluctant to work with law enforcement in the absence of clear and convincing evidence and companies averse to highlighting security lapses, how can CI professionals best communicate the essential role they play for the country to the general public to ensure that they receive the tips from private citizens they need to do their job? How can the CIA and FBI convince companies that it is more important to report security lapses of critical national security information than to protect their reputation?
Considering these, and other flaws, most readers would do well to read other books about intelligence and counterintelligence. Despite this, there are enough interesting anecdotes to make this book worthwhile for somebody who has read several books on this and related subjects. One place to start would be the appendix, where Olson lists several books on CI, before coming back to this one. On the upside, there is still an opportunity for a retired CI officer or an aspiring academic to write the authoritative book on CI in the 21st Century.
Unfortunately, Olson's title highlights the need for a general book on counterintelligence to complement the several books on general intelligence, but this book falls far short of its potential. This is particularly disappointing given Olson's 30 years of experience in the CIA and current status as a professor of the practice at the Bush School.
This book provides a chapter each on China, Russia, and Cuba counterintelligence operations before chapters on the ten principles of CI, CI awareness in the workplace, and double agent operations. Olson finishes with several case studies of specific counterintelligence cases, but there is little new insight in the short summaries of these cases. Instead of an "art of counterintelligence," the book feels more like war stories with a CI expert.
This book would have been better if Olson had provided an overview of the US intelligence community and the intelligence cycle, which is covered in other books and unclassified government documents. He should have then talked about a general theory of CI as it applies to all countries as their CI agents seek to identify and mitigate foreign intelligence agents. He should have then presented specific chapters on different aspects of CI operations, such as identifying foreign intelligence officers (both those under official and nonofficial cover), how they recruit sources, how they satisfy requirements, running double agents, mitigating risk, etc. Indeed, a major gap in this book on CI is a very thin discussion on identifying foreign intelligence officers and mitigating their ability to operate, a gap which makes the chapter on double agents less relevant than it would have been with a more complete discussion. Lastly, Olson could have provided several chapters on comparative CI between different countries. By not providing a general theory on CI Olson exposes himself to many contradictions that ultimately weaken the overall message of this book and limit its usefulness to practitioners, policymakers, and the general public.
One contradiction is how Olson describes US and foreign CI services. He asks the reader to be shocked that the intelligence services of Russia, China, Cuba, and other countries have infiltrated the American government offices, universities, and companies, but take it for granted that the US runs intelligence operations in those countries trying to do, in essence, the same thing (satisfy requirements). If he had established a framework of how countries satisfy intelligence requirements (whether they do it professionally, as in the US, or in an adhoc manner), it would have been clear that, fundamentally, the US and other countries are interested in the same basic goal of satisfying these requirements.
This framework would have provided a natural lead-in to a discussion on the ethics of intelligence and counterintelligence. Of course, to engage in the recruitment of sources an individual must be willing to lie and deceive their family, friends, and sources, but where does one draw the line? Are there ethical boundaries that one can cross in an investigation that seeks to prevent an imminent attack versus an operation to satisfy a general intelligence requirement? Olson should have talked about how other countries engage in commercial espionage, such as China, or cyber-terrorism, such as North Korea's Sony hack and how the US's professional intelligence services stay away from these types of operations.
One critical flaw of Olson's work is that he seems to rely heavily on a small subset of well-known examples of CI cases. Instead of retell the story of Aldrich Ames, he should have researched federal indictments and newspaper articles, perhaps even from foreign countries, to attempt to bring new CI cases to the broader public attention.
Olson also fails to address several of the dilemmas that arise in his discussion. He calls for the intelligence community to take stricter stances on drugs and alcohol, but does not take the opportunity to address what a nuanced program would look like when many states have legalized or decriminalized drugs and binge drinking is as common in college as writing term papers at the last minute. Also, the intelligence community, including the military, has thousands of positions to fill every year. If the standards on drugs and minor infractions were too strict, it would be impossible to fill every open position. Olson could have done current administrators a service by thinking more deeply about these serious issues.
Olson also fails to address that much of what happens in the CI world is not publicly known either because it is highly classified, or the intelligence community failed to identify the foreign intelligence officer or their American agent. Although many cases have certainly not been declassified, the reader does not know if the cases presented in this book are a representative sample of CI cases. Also, Olson does not address the glaring possibility that the only people caught in CI operations were the dumb ones, and that the smart ones all got away with it. Olson gives us the Pollard case, and others, with inept spies who cannot help but brag to their friends about their adventures while flaunting their newfound prosperity, but is it possible that there have been Americans in the intelligence community who have spied for years and gotten away with it? Olson missed the opportunity to explain exactly why Cuba was so successful, which is especially disappointing considering Malcolm Gladwell's most recent book did such a good job.
This book, published in July 2019, also should have provided the opportunity for an expert like Olson to address modern dilemmas of hunting down foreign spies. With hundreds of thousands of foreign students and professional workers in the US, how can the US get a handle on identifying spies and agents without violating individual rights? With some universities reluctant to work with law enforcement in the absence of clear and convincing evidence and companies averse to highlighting security lapses, how can CI professionals best communicate the essential role they play for the country to the general public to ensure that they receive the tips from private citizens they need to do their job? How can the CIA and FBI convince companies that it is more important to report security lapses of critical national security information than to protect their reputation?
Considering these, and other flaws, most readers would do well to read other books about intelligence and counterintelligence. Despite this, there are enough interesting anecdotes to make this book worthwhile for somebody who has read several books on this and related subjects. One place to start would be the appendix, where Olson lists several books on CI, before coming back to this one. On the upside, there is still an opportunity for a retired CI officer or an aspiring academic to write the authoritative book on CI in the 21st Century.
March 31, 2021
The casual conversational tone undermines the authority of this book. Compared to other books on this topic the author’s decision to take everything personally and use argumentative language further give the appearance of bias. Had it been mostly about cases the author worked I might be more forgiving but all of the information is available in other books devoted to each specific agent, so nothing new is included. Some simple terminology mistakes (illegals = no diplomatic cover) meant that if this book had been any longer I would have quit it. I think if you want a book All About Amerika’s Evil enemies’ plots!! this is the book for you. If you wanted an examination of American tradecraft, successes and failures of American counterintelligence this is not the book for you.
I particularly took issue with the continual argument for use of a polygraph despite many of the "case studies" in the book passed a polygraph, each of which is dismissed by the author, as is the high rate of false positives.
I particularly took issue with the continual argument for use of a polygraph despite many of the "case studies" in the book passed a polygraph, each of which is dismissed by the author, as is the high rate of false positives.
February 25, 2021
this is very AMERICA FUCK YEAH, which to some extent is to be expected, but it meant that much of the book was not credible. It was unclear to me why I should be shocked -- shocked!! -- by what Russia and China are doing when we're doing the exact same thing, unless I am to think only America is allowed to spy? I also was turned off by Olson going on and on about how stupid/fat/slovenly/drunk/drugged-out/left-wing many of the caught spies were, first for the obvious reasons (who gives a shit if the guy was ugly?????) but secondly because if all the spies they caught were caught because they were inept Keystone Kops of the intelligence world.... are there no smart good spies that have not been caught? It just left some very weird holes.
June 21, 2021
This book was written by the former chief of CIA counterintelligence and was hard to put down at times. The author begins by unveiling some of the United States biggest intelligence threats such as China, Russia, and Cuba. Olson then gives his Ten Commandments of counterintelligence and walks through how to run and manage successful double agent operations. The last half of the book details a number of case studies of defectors, traitors, and double agents working against the the US on behalf of other nations. He concludes each section going through what happened and how it could have been avoided.
May 16, 2021
Mixed feelings.
The book felt a little self-indulgent. Just a little. But kind of deserved. The guy did important and interesting work.
And he made a point that feels right, namely that Chinese industrial and technological espionage is a threat Americans should take more seriously.
But I felt as if he hailed from an America it was a little easier to be proud of.
The book felt a little self-indulgent. Just a little. But kind of deserved. The guy did important and interesting work.
And he made a point that feels right, namely that Chinese industrial and technological espionage is a threat Americans should take more seriously.
But I felt as if he hailed from an America it was a little easier to be proud of.
May 22, 2019
This is an excellent work for anyone (from CI professionals to “armchair agents”) to learn from and enjoy. This book is very engaging and accessible with its numerous case studies. James Olson is the real deal. He has first hand experience with his years in the CIA and is incredibly knowledgeable in the craft of counterintelligence. This is a must read for any spy story enthusiast.
May 18, 2023
Interesting though obviously biased overview over counterintelligence work and various (in)famous cases.
July 13, 2024
Most of the enjoyment I found in this one was about the subject matter in general. It was a bit more like reading a series of newspaper articles and op-eds than it was reading a complete text.
February 1, 2023
I'm surprised and relieved that To Catch a Spy is publicly available and not suppressed with a convenient label of 'classified', not so much for the tradecraft it reveals in the business of practising counterintelligence, but for the author's professional insight into the philosophy, mindset and general approach taken by practitioners of the US version of the craft.
This is a valuable handbook for all those who would seek to understand the strengths and weaknesses of US counterintelligence, and it must surely be compulsory reading for intelligence and security agencies the world over, with lessons for Washington's allies and rivals alike. Olson doesn't pull his punches when it comes to US counterintelligence failures, either, nor does he gloss over the reasons for those disasters.
For example, authorities failing to grasp the importance of compulsory, full, life-style polygraph tests for anyone and everyone working in sensitive government areas or with access to confidential documents would be wise to read it and if necessary, adjust their opinion on the matter. I'm certainly convinced. It's surely time UK security did so, too.
There are also interesting observations on current policy towards drug-taking and drinking.
James Olson is, I imagine, a conservative in many ways, certainly an upstanding and patriotic citizen who has spent a career pursuing his country's traitors, and he seems inclined to interpret any dissent on the issue of US foreign policy as anti-American. If so, that rather inflexible stance probably comes with the turf.
He writes well, breaks his topics down into short chapters and he's not lacking in humour.
Olson's 10 counterintelligence commandments will be useful to practitioners, so too the case histories and the selected bibliography. They'll be helpful, too, unfortunately, to those on the other side of the hill who seek to breach Washington's defences: the primary threats posed by Chinese and Russian foreign intelligence services.
This is a valuable handbook for all those who would seek to understand the strengths and weaknesses of US counterintelligence, and it must surely be compulsory reading for intelligence and security agencies the world over, with lessons for Washington's allies and rivals alike. Olson doesn't pull his punches when it comes to US counterintelligence failures, either, nor does he gloss over the reasons for those disasters.
For example, authorities failing to grasp the importance of compulsory, full, life-style polygraph tests for anyone and everyone working in sensitive government areas or with access to confidential documents would be wise to read it and if necessary, adjust their opinion on the matter. I'm certainly convinced. It's surely time UK security did so, too.
There are also interesting observations on current policy towards drug-taking and drinking.
James Olson is, I imagine, a conservative in many ways, certainly an upstanding and patriotic citizen who has spent a career pursuing his country's traitors, and he seems inclined to interpret any dissent on the issue of US foreign policy as anti-American. If so, that rather inflexible stance probably comes with the turf.
He writes well, breaks his topics down into short chapters and he's not lacking in humour.
Olson's 10 counterintelligence commandments will be useful to practitioners, so too the case histories and the selected bibliography. They'll be helpful, too, unfortunately, to those on the other side of the hill who seek to breach Washington's defences: the primary threats posed by Chinese and Russian foreign intelligence services.
March 8, 2025
4.5 basic but in a good way very accessible yet informative
November 11, 2024
3 stars. I'm not surprised this book has received some fairly polarized reviews. As other reviewers have mentioned, the author decided to go with a conversational, folksy narration style. The results of that are...inconsistent. I found myself by turns literally groaning and laughing out loud with how hilariously lame and old-timey the author's writing and assessments are. At his best, he comes off as quite a "character" - a fossil from another time - at his worst he comes off as a flippant narrator who's assessments are eye-rollingly superficial and ethnocentric.
Let's start by clearing up a few small errors which I find shocking that Olson made and that the editors missed:
1. The actual name of MI6 is the 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘵 Intelligence Service, not the Security Intelligence Service, as Olson writes (p.14)
2. On the Larry Wu-Tai Chin case Olson writes: "It is curious that from the beginning (1951) Chin's intelligence association was with the Ministry of Public Security, the domestic law enforcement agency, rather than with the Ministry of State Security, the external intelligence collection agency." (p.183) - This is in fact not very curious when we recall that the Ministry of State Security was only founded in 1983 and thus did not yet exist when this case began. I recognize Olson is a Russia expert, but he might have done well to consult with someone who knew what they were talking about on this.
3. The name of the PRC spy who defected to the US in 1985 is Yu Qiangsheng, not Quiangsheng Yu. (p.41)
4. No so much an error as an example of the kind of flippant and slightly chauvinistic (but almost endearingly old-timey) analysis Olson is prone to, on how Larry Wu-Tai Chin passed the polygraph, he writes: "I believe there may also have been a cultural dimension to his successful lying. Some nationalities, we know, are particularly difficult polygraph subjects because of different cultural attitudes toward lying and personal responsibility. People who knew Chin commented on his emotional detachment. He was what we call a "flatliner" as opposed to a "reactor." Reactors make good polygraph subjects, and most Americans are good reactors. They have a sense of right and wrong and cannot lie with equanimity." (p.77) - Sure. Tell us more about the Oriental mind. I'll spare you my attempt to unpack and critique this assessment, but all that to say, Olson possesses a certain moral clarity about the good old US of A which I can only admire.
Here are some more light-hearted examples of Olson's writing which I find too delightful not to mention:
1. "I am grateful for one thing: Rick Ames was ultimately a stupid spy." (p.18)
2."I rank Cuba only number three on the dangerous scale, but I rank it number one on the obnoxious scale." (p.31)
3."The best analysts in the agency were in the Directorate of Intelligence, the home of the eggheads." (p.53)
4. "double-agent operations are the caviar of counterintelligence operations because, in my opinion, there is nothing more delectable than a good, juicy double-agent operation."(p.85)
5. "Richard Millar was an overweight misfit. To make matters worse, Miller was hopelessly incompetent.... He sold Amway products out of the trunk of his official FBI vehicle to colleagues and friends. How pathetic is that?" (p.144)
You get the idea.
All that being said, however, at the end of the day Olson did spend 30 years in the CIA and rose to be chief of CI. It would be a mistake to write this book off completely as there is definitely a baby in the bathwater here. Olson is at his strongest when he gets into the nitty gritty of running ops and organizing CI efforts within a bureaucracy - things he obviously knows a lot about. Other reviewers have rightly pointed out a litany of missed opportunities and other things he could have covered, and I broadly agree: this is an imperfect book and it could have covered a lot of other stuff and been a lot better. But I also think they're missing that there is probably a niche audience which this book is aimed at and to which it's making a number of arguments which aren't so clearly made anywhere else in the literature (at least that's how I'm reading the introduction).
So all that to say, if you're interested in this topic and are looking for an easy-breezy read on it from an insider who's imperfect but certainly represents a particular point of view, check this one out.
Let's start by clearing up a few small errors which I find shocking that Olson made and that the editors missed:
1. The actual name of MI6 is the 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘵 Intelligence Service, not the Security Intelligence Service, as Olson writes (p.14)
2. On the Larry Wu-Tai Chin case Olson writes: "It is curious that from the beginning (1951) Chin's intelligence association was with the Ministry of Public Security, the domestic law enforcement agency, rather than with the Ministry of State Security, the external intelligence collection agency." (p.183) - This is in fact not very curious when we recall that the Ministry of State Security was only founded in 1983 and thus did not yet exist when this case began. I recognize Olson is a Russia expert, but he might have done well to consult with someone who knew what they were talking about on this.
3. The name of the PRC spy who defected to the US in 1985 is Yu Qiangsheng, not Quiangsheng Yu. (p.41)
4. No so much an error as an example of the kind of flippant and slightly chauvinistic (but almost endearingly old-timey) analysis Olson is prone to, on how Larry Wu-Tai Chin passed the polygraph, he writes: "I believe there may also have been a cultural dimension to his successful lying. Some nationalities, we know, are particularly difficult polygraph subjects because of different cultural attitudes toward lying and personal responsibility. People who knew Chin commented on his emotional detachment. He was what we call a "flatliner" as opposed to a "reactor." Reactors make good polygraph subjects, and most Americans are good reactors. They have a sense of right and wrong and cannot lie with equanimity." (p.77) - Sure. Tell us more about the Oriental mind. I'll spare you my attempt to unpack and critique this assessment, but all that to say, Olson possesses a certain moral clarity about the good old US of A which I can only admire.
Here are some more light-hearted examples of Olson's writing which I find too delightful not to mention:
1. "I am grateful for one thing: Rick Ames was ultimately a stupid spy." (p.18)
2."I rank Cuba only number three on the dangerous scale, but I rank it number one on the obnoxious scale." (p.31)
3."The best analysts in the agency were in the Directorate of Intelligence, the home of the eggheads." (p.53)
4. "double-agent operations are the caviar of counterintelligence operations because, in my opinion, there is nothing more delectable than a good, juicy double-agent operation."(p.85)
5. "Richard Millar was an overweight misfit. To make matters worse, Miller was hopelessly incompetent.... He sold Amway products out of the trunk of his official FBI vehicle to colleagues and friends. How pathetic is that?" (p.144)
You get the idea.
All that being said, however, at the end of the day Olson did spend 30 years in the CIA and rose to be chief of CI. It would be a mistake to write this book off completely as there is definitely a baby in the bathwater here. Olson is at his strongest when he gets into the nitty gritty of running ops and organizing CI efforts within a bureaucracy - things he obviously knows a lot about. Other reviewers have rightly pointed out a litany of missed opportunities and other things he could have covered, and I broadly agree: this is an imperfect book and it could have covered a lot of other stuff and been a lot better. But I also think they're missing that there is probably a niche audience which this book is aimed at and to which it's making a number of arguments which aren't so clearly made anywhere else in the literature (at least that's how I'm reading the introduction).
So all that to say, if you're interested in this topic and are looking for an easy-breezy read on it from an insider who's imperfect but certainly represents a particular point of view, check this one out.
November 10, 2021
Berbat, özensiz çeviriye kurban gitmiş bir kitap.
“Karşı İstihbarat; bir ulusun vatandaşlarını, sırlarını ve teknolojisini yabancı casuslardan korumak için aldığı tüm önlemleri içermektedir ve dost ülkelerin olduğu, ancak dost istihbarat servislerinin olmadığı varsayımına dayanmaktadır.”
Çok merak uyandırıcı bir konu üzerine, işin profesyoneli bir kalemden okuması keyifli bir kitap. Ama daha ilk sayfalardan itibaren çeviride sıkıntılar tat kaçırmaya başlıyor. Üstelik bunlar ne dil ne de konu hakkında uzmanlık iddiasında bulunamayacak meraklı bir okurun dahi tespit edebileceği düzeyde. Öncelikle (bu konuda yerli literatür eksikliğinden olabilir) çevirmenin istihbarat/kontrespiyonaj/istihbarata karşı koyma alanlarında temel kavramlara aşina olmadığı hissi oluşuyor. Legal, illegal, service, case officer, counterintelligence, classified gibi kavramlar oldukça karmaşık (bazen yanlış) ve düzen ihtiva etmeyecek şekilde çevrilmiş. Bazı yerlerde cümleler zaman uyumsuzlukları, özne yokluğu ile dökülüyordu. Yine bazı bazı, adeta bir çeviri programında ham çeviri yaptırılmış ve eksik bir tashih yapılmış gibiydi. Cümle ve kitapla uyumsuz ilk anlamlar kullanılmış. İkinciye bir bütün olarak gözden geçirilmemiş gibi. Sözümona soyadı Bishop olan bir askeri personelden bahsederken sonraki cümlede piskopos denmiş. Şüpheli, garip anlamında kullanılan “funny” ilk anlamı olan “komik” olarak çevirilmiş; “gizli”ye karşılık gelmesi uygun düşen “classified” her yerde sınıflandırılmış olarak kullanılmış. Örnekler artırılabilir. Ahenk yoksunu bir çeviri. Bazı yerlerde kısaltmalar ve terimler açıklanmışken, özellikle sonlara doğru öylece bırakılmış. Ben okurken “Google”lamayı sevdiğimden sorun etmedim ama detaylı dipnotlu, editör/çeviren notlu bir okumayı yeğlerdim. Bu durumlar “sıradan” okuru bile rahatsız ediyorsa, problem var demektir. Yayınevine güven ve imaj açısından önemli olduğunu düşünüyorum.
Kitaba gelelim. Toplam sekiz bölümden oluşan kitabı iki ana bölüme ayırmak mümkün. İlk kısım, karşı istihbarat tanımları, çeşitleri, özellikleri ve yazarın ana düşman olarak gördüğü üç ülke servislerine dair yazdıklarından, ikinci kısım ise Birleşik Devletlerin yaşadığı somut ajanlık örneklerinden vakalar ve çıkarılacak derslerden oluşuyor. Editörün girişte bir uyarı mahiyetinde bahsettiği, kitabın “Amerika merkezli oluşu ve propaganda içerebileceği” uyarısı da rahatsız edici şekilde kendini göstermiyor. Vatansever bir devlet görevlisinin nasıl yazacağını okur olarak tartabiliyorsunuz zaten. Bundan etkilenmiyorsunuz da. Hatta azımsanmayacak ölçüde özeleştiri mevcut. Nisbi olarak küçük olmasına rağmen yazar Küba servisini başa koymuş ama ben özellikle pervasız, acımasız Rus servisinin operasyonlarından bahsedildiği sayfaları kanım donarak okudum. Çok alçakça icra edilen Kaşıkçı cinayetini hatırlatan nice infaza imza atmışlar (örnekleri açık kaynaklardan teyit mümkün.).
Ufak ufak örnekler ilk bölümü güzelce besliyor. İkinci bölümde ise önemli sızma örneklerini (ilkokuldaki parçadan anlam çıkarmayı hatırlatan şekilde *gülücük*) sonrasında bir değerlendirme ile sunuyor ve ilk bölümde öğrendiğimiz kavram, ilke ve sorunları pekiştirmemizi sağlıyor.
Kitabın finalinde güzel bir okuma önerileri listesi oluşturulmuş. Onlardan da daha özenli ve profesyonelce çevirilerle dilimize kazandırılanlar olur inşallah.
Her şeye rağmen, oldukça bilgilendiğim, faydalandığım bir okuma oldu. Sadece konunun ilgilileri değil, belli öneme haiz görevlerdeki tüm devlet memurlarının, savunma sanayii çalışanlarının, mühendislerin, akademisyenlerin ve dahi Jason Bourne sevenlerin okumasında fayda gördüğüm bir metin.
“Karşı İstihbarat; bir ulusun vatandaşlarını, sırlarını ve teknolojisini yabancı casuslardan korumak için aldığı tüm önlemleri içermektedir ve dost ülkelerin olduğu, ancak dost istihbarat servislerinin olmadığı varsayımına dayanmaktadır.”
Çok merak uyandırıcı bir konu üzerine, işin profesyoneli bir kalemden okuması keyifli bir kitap. Ama daha ilk sayfalardan itibaren çeviride sıkıntılar tat kaçırmaya başlıyor. Üstelik bunlar ne dil ne de konu hakkında uzmanlık iddiasında bulunamayacak meraklı bir okurun dahi tespit edebileceği düzeyde. Öncelikle (bu konuda yerli literatür eksikliğinden olabilir) çevirmenin istihbarat/kontrespiyonaj/istihbarata karşı koyma alanlarında temel kavramlara aşina olmadığı hissi oluşuyor. Legal, illegal, service, case officer, counterintelligence, classified gibi kavramlar oldukça karmaşık (bazen yanlış) ve düzen ihtiva etmeyecek şekilde çevrilmiş. Bazı yerlerde cümleler zaman uyumsuzlukları, özne yokluğu ile dökülüyordu. Yine bazı bazı, adeta bir çeviri programında ham çeviri yaptırılmış ve eksik bir tashih yapılmış gibiydi. Cümle ve kitapla uyumsuz ilk anlamlar kullanılmış. İkinciye bir bütün olarak gözden geçirilmemiş gibi. Sözümona soyadı Bishop olan bir askeri personelden bahsederken sonraki cümlede piskopos denmiş. Şüpheli, garip anlamında kullanılan “funny” ilk anlamı olan “komik” olarak çevirilmiş; “gizli”ye karşılık gelmesi uygun düşen “classified” her yerde sınıflandırılmış olarak kullanılmış. Örnekler artırılabilir. Ahenk yoksunu bir çeviri. Bazı yerlerde kısaltmalar ve terimler açıklanmışken, özellikle sonlara doğru öylece bırakılmış. Ben okurken “Google”lamayı sevdiğimden sorun etmedim ama detaylı dipnotlu, editör/çeviren notlu bir okumayı yeğlerdim. Bu durumlar “sıradan” okuru bile rahatsız ediyorsa, problem var demektir. Yayınevine güven ve imaj açısından önemli olduğunu düşünüyorum.
Kitaba gelelim. Toplam sekiz bölümden oluşan kitabı iki ana bölüme ayırmak mümkün. İlk kısım, karşı istihbarat tanımları, çeşitleri, özellikleri ve yazarın ana düşman olarak gördüğü üç ülke servislerine dair yazdıklarından, ikinci kısım ise Birleşik Devletlerin yaşadığı somut ajanlık örneklerinden vakalar ve çıkarılacak derslerden oluşuyor. Editörün girişte bir uyarı mahiyetinde bahsettiği, kitabın “Amerika merkezli oluşu ve propaganda içerebileceği” uyarısı da rahatsız edici şekilde kendini göstermiyor. Vatansever bir devlet görevlisinin nasıl yazacağını okur olarak tartabiliyorsunuz zaten. Bundan etkilenmiyorsunuz da. Hatta azımsanmayacak ölçüde özeleştiri mevcut. Nisbi olarak küçük olmasına rağmen yazar Küba servisini başa koymuş ama ben özellikle pervasız, acımasız Rus servisinin operasyonlarından bahsedildiği sayfaları kanım donarak okudum. Çok alçakça icra edilen Kaşıkçı cinayetini hatırlatan nice infaza imza atmışlar (örnekleri açık kaynaklardan teyit mümkün.).
Ufak ufak örnekler ilk bölümü güzelce besliyor. İkinci bölümde ise önemli sızma örneklerini (ilkokuldaki parçadan anlam çıkarmayı hatırlatan şekilde *gülücük*) sonrasında bir değerlendirme ile sunuyor ve ilk bölümde öğrendiğimiz kavram, ilke ve sorunları pekiştirmemizi sağlıyor.
Kitabın finalinde güzel bir okuma önerileri listesi oluşturulmuş. Onlardan da daha özenli ve profesyonelce çevirilerle dilimize kazandırılanlar olur inşallah.
Her şeye rağmen, oldukça bilgilendiğim, faydalandığım bir okuma oldu. Sadece konunun ilgilileri değil, belli öneme haiz görevlerdeki tüm devlet memurlarının, savunma sanayii çalışanlarının, mühendislerin, akademisyenlerin ve dahi Jason Bourne sevenlerin okumasında fayda gördüğüm bir metin.
May 23, 2021
To Catch a Spy, by James M. Olson; Georgetown University Press: Washington, DC; $26.95 hardback
It seems counterintelligence (CI) is in the news every day now. James M. Olson, former Chief of Counterintelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency, helps make CI understandable. Indeed, he does so while placing its role in the context of secret world events happening now.
Olson is concise, clear, and helpful in his presentation. A long time clandestine operative of the CIA before his CI assignment, he now teaches at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M. He draws on a lifetime of experience to explain what counterintelligence does, to whom, and why. CI is there to identify, counter, and defeat adversarial spies. CI people are ‘spy catchers’, for want of a summation.
Olson begins with an overview of how adversarial nations attempt to undermine ours. We read of Chinese attempts to use educational exchanges for espionage. Russia has always been known for its attempts to infiltrate and thus influence American activities, either through embassy spies, technology, or even worse, illegals. The latter are people who live secretly among us, but work directly for Russia. Then, surprisingly, there is Cuba, whose intelligence agency is identified as completely professional, and ‘punching above its weight’ in world affairs. All nations spy, only some are more dangerous than others.
Mr. Olson then identifies 10 ‘Commandments’ of counterintelligence. Summarized, these valuable guidelines will ground a potential CI agent in the context of his profession. He’ll understand the history of espionage, how it impacts his mission to deter the threat, while at the same time insuring he knows what must be done to remain current and effective. This chapter alone is worth the price of the book. Olson takes the ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tsu to heart as he shows us how to ‘know your enemy’.
We learn about ‘double agents’, surveillances, and are given hints about the whole new world of computer counterintelligence. What the reader will find of value are the case studies of actual spies written about ‘in depth’. This means, we’ll know about these espionage cases in as much detail as possible, for Olson clearly indicates where his study had to be circumscribed due to classification considerations.
We learn of spy cases from Anna Montes who spied for Cuba, to the 10 Russian ‘sleeper’ agents placed in America under false identifies, the better to infiltrate our national organizations. We learn of Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a spy for China whose recruitment is a puzzle. So much of the role of counterintelligence is covered in these studies you’ll understand what it does by how it works. You’ll also see where some pre-employment interviews failed to identify security risks, where the polygraph worked, or not, and a host of other methods. After concluding this book, you’ll know what a rich field of reading awaits you in the now understandable world of counterintelligence.
August 26, 2019
Jim Olson's years of experience in Counterintelligence at the CIA have served him well to write this insightful book about the CI profession.
His initial review of the threats China, Russia and Cuba pose to the US -and, certainly, to our Western lifestyle- is a good introductory analysis to those interested in CI and how intelligence services other than the CIA operate.
Chapters 4 to 7 provide the reader with knowledge that, until now, only the fortunate students at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M have been able to reach. Especially notable are Olson's own 'Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence' -reviewed in depth in this book- and his 'Three Principles of Workplace Counterintelligence.'
His passion for Double-Agent Operations and how to manage them (chapters 6 & 7) serves the neophyte reader in Intelligence studies to begin to grasp one of the most exciting type of CI operations. He crafts a good definition of Double-Agent and provides useful examples to understand what Double-Agent operations are and the advantages that come from conducting these operations against enemy intelligence services.
Finally, chapter 8 is rich in relevant and varied CI case studies that will teach future CI professionals a good lesson on how to avoid traitors within the intelligence agencies if Olson's 'Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence' and the 'Three Principles of Workplace Counterintelligence' are observed.
This book is populated with Olson's own experiences and thoughts on the tradecraft, all told in a fluid narrative style and with a powerful voice.
To Catch a Spy is bound to become an essential reading on Counterintelligence that all intelligence professional must add to their personal bookshelves.
His initial review of the threats China, Russia and Cuba pose to the US -and, certainly, to our Western lifestyle- is a good introductory analysis to those interested in CI and how intelligence services other than the CIA operate.
Chapters 4 to 7 provide the reader with knowledge that, until now, only the fortunate students at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M have been able to reach. Especially notable are Olson's own 'Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence' -reviewed in depth in this book- and his 'Three Principles of Workplace Counterintelligence.'
His passion for Double-Agent Operations and how to manage them (chapters 6 & 7) serves the neophyte reader in Intelligence studies to begin to grasp one of the most exciting type of CI operations. He crafts a good definition of Double-Agent and provides useful examples to understand what Double-Agent operations are and the advantages that come from conducting these operations against enemy intelligence services.
Finally, chapter 8 is rich in relevant and varied CI case studies that will teach future CI professionals a good lesson on how to avoid traitors within the intelligence agencies if Olson's 'Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence' and the 'Three Principles of Workplace Counterintelligence' are observed.
This book is populated with Olson's own experiences and thoughts on the tradecraft, all told in a fluid narrative style and with a powerful voice.
To Catch a Spy is bound to become an essential reading on Counterintelligence that all intelligence professional must add to their personal bookshelves.
April 8, 2022
This is a good book but although it is very amerocentric in it's preaching of CI. The author does make reference to the spying that America does in other countries, both enemy and friend but he the sense I get from this is that it is justified. That is all well and good. Perhaps it is justified, however this is a book on counter intelligence, so that moral argument is for another text.
I likes the fact that the author discussed both the wins and failures of the various CI organisations. You learn more from failure than you do from success so the lessons provided from these stories are worth understanding. A lot of the lessons that are scattered throughout the book have ties to the fraud training I went through when I worked for a major US based global financial institution. This is a good primer for the types of intelligence and people that foreign intelligence organisations try to recruit.
The most surprising thing I found was just how many of these CI operators were walk ins. That is genuinely surprising but when I think about it, it makes sense. They are easier to find public information on, while those CI operators who are turned in more clandestine methods may never be discovered.
The point about the benefits of analysts and the need to broaden the employee pool of this group within CI was also surprising. This insight was something I didn't think I would hear but it makes sense when you think of the amount of information expected to be analysed and reviewed.
The final chapter contains a list of 25 recommended books, and I am a sucker for a recommended reading list so I will be reviewing a few of these.
I likes the fact that the author discussed both the wins and failures of the various CI organisations. You learn more from failure than you do from success so the lessons provided from these stories are worth understanding. A lot of the lessons that are scattered throughout the book have ties to the fraud training I went through when I worked for a major US based global financial institution. This is a good primer for the types of intelligence and people that foreign intelligence organisations try to recruit.
The most surprising thing I found was just how many of these CI operators were walk ins. That is genuinely surprising but when I think about it, it makes sense. They are easier to find public information on, while those CI operators who are turned in more clandestine methods may never be discovered.
The point about the benefits of analysts and the need to broaden the employee pool of this group within CI was also surprising. This insight was something I didn't think I would hear but it makes sense when you think of the amount of information expected to be analysed and reviewed.
The final chapter contains a list of 25 recommended books, and I am a sucker for a recommended reading list so I will be reviewing a few of these.
January 18, 2021
Each chapter and part starts with a quote.
The first chapter talks about how China is responsible for many things, ones we always blame the Russians for. For example China has been meddling with our politics on all sides since 2000.
It is fascinating to know just how deep some of the counterintelligence is. What I really like is how current this book is, so he talks about information from the 1950s through something like 2017
Even after the Cold War, the KGB and the CIA did not get along. It is flabbergasting how intense Russian spies and espionage under Putin are.
Olson learned of his own interactions with a number of people whether they were spies for us or for others. The reader therefore learns of some of his former colleagues
He talks about ways in which spies were determined, found, and prosecuted.
It is interesting that he notes that China’s spying is impersonal whereas Russia’s is personal because they don’t like us (OK it’s more than that, but that’s what I took from it/
He considers Cuba to be the third most dangerous threat but the first most obnoxious. I had to laugh at that.
Olson’s 10 Commandments about counterintelligence are interesting.
I totally agree that drug and alcohol abuse, and major crimes, should screen out applicants. It’s scary that it doesn’t.
There is great info on double agents and their benefits.
I really like the case studies on catching spies against the US, and what we have learned from them.
There is a great annotated reading list at the end.
The first chapter talks about how China is responsible for many things, ones we always blame the Russians for. For example China has been meddling with our politics on all sides since 2000.
It is fascinating to know just how deep some of the counterintelligence is. What I really like is how current this book is, so he talks about information from the 1950s through something like 2017
Even after the Cold War, the KGB and the CIA did not get along. It is flabbergasting how intense Russian spies and espionage under Putin are.
Olson learned of his own interactions with a number of people whether they were spies for us or for others. The reader therefore learns of some of his former colleagues
He talks about ways in which spies were determined, found, and prosecuted.
It is interesting that he notes that China’s spying is impersonal whereas Russia’s is personal because they don’t like us (OK it’s more than that, but that’s what I took from it/
He considers Cuba to be the third most dangerous threat but the first most obnoxious. I had to laugh at that.
Olson’s 10 Commandments about counterintelligence are interesting.
I totally agree that drug and alcohol abuse, and major crimes, should screen out applicants. It’s scary that it doesn’t.
There is great info on double agents and their benefits.
I really like the case studies on catching spies against the US, and what we have learned from them.
There is a great annotated reading list at the end.
July 6, 2021
Counterintelligence (CI) is FASCINATING. CI is the activity undertaken to protect an agency's own intelligence services from opposition agencies. I thoroughly enjoyed learning about the theory and the practice of CI. The first third of the book is basic theory and Olson's "Ten Commandments of CI", while the second two-thirds of the book focuses on specific CI case studies. These case studies focus on Americans who spied for the Soviet Union, China, Israel, and Cuba. Each case study provides background information into why/how each American defected, the nature of their transgressions, how they were caught, and then what "commandments" were upheld or neglected.
I was shocked to learn how powerful Cuban CI capabilities are. With a small budget, the Cuban Intelligence Directorate is a FORCE to be reckoned with. They have proven to be very effective, and I shudder to think how much more damage they could do with a budget of scale. China's willingness to sit on counterintelligence assets was not surprising, but it's amazing how some assets were able to pass information for decades and the patience involved to collect it all. Very entertaining and you won't be able to put it down!
I was shocked to learn how powerful Cuban CI capabilities are. With a small budget, the Cuban Intelligence Directorate is a FORCE to be reckoned with. They have proven to be very effective, and I shudder to think how much more damage they could do with a budget of scale. China's willingness to sit on counterintelligence assets was not surprising, but it's amazing how some assets were able to pass information for decades and the patience involved to collect it all. Very entertaining and you won't be able to put it down!
April 15, 2020
Author James Olson is highly qualified to teach a general reader like me the art of counterintelligence. While he does provide the Ten Commandments of counterintelligence, principles CI agents should live by, much of the book focused on CI mistakes and failures.
Also, the book starts by touting the strength of CI work by China, Russia and Cuba. You get the impression that the United States has inferior CI efforts in the CIA, FBI and the military by reading this book.
The author says the it is difficult to attract people into CI work, that often federal agencies settle for mediocre people to fill those roles. The author says that is history, hoping now that he is a college professor, that this is no longer true.
This reads like a textbook, pretty dry at times. Many of the points made by the author are made repeatedly.
I wanted to learn something about CI, but I didn’t get out of this as much as I had hoped. I would rather have seen the author spend more time on successful CI than failed CI.
Also, the book starts by touting the strength of CI work by China, Russia and Cuba. You get the impression that the United States has inferior CI efforts in the CIA, FBI and the military by reading this book.
The author says the it is difficult to attract people into CI work, that often federal agencies settle for mediocre people to fill those roles. The author says that is history, hoping now that he is a college professor, that this is no longer true.
This reads like a textbook, pretty dry at times. Many of the points made by the author are made repeatedly.
I wanted to learn something about CI, but I didn’t get out of this as much as I had hoped. I would rather have seen the author spend more time on successful CI than failed CI.
October 29, 2022
I say this with love as a student... this is full of personal paranoia on Chinese people and Chinese Americans. Other than that blantantly obvious bias backed with my own personal knowledge, this is a good accounting of what it takes do be a good CI officer. The commandments, published elsewhere, are particularly valuable. Half of this book is case study material you can find in other publications or a basic CIA course, but it is good material nonetheless. There are suggested reading materials at the back for those who want to study more. A good read and easy to follow, but not for the average person who needs an introduction, because despite the author saying things againt deep paranoia, the book can nonetheless create more Angletons in the general pop-- which we do not need.
December 21, 2019
This book functions as a primer on US oriented counter-intelligence for the general reader. It introduces general intelligence concepts, but as the title suggests, focuses primarily on the various ways foreign agents are detected and handled.
One of the most useful sections is an annotated list of recommended reading of books about the history of intelligence organizations, both US and foreign. The list has a particularly strong collection of books that pertain to the KGB of the former Soviet Union, but it includes titles that also focus on China or other countries that pose significant intelligence threats to the United States.
One of the most useful sections is an annotated list of recommended reading of books about the history of intelligence organizations, both US and foreign. The list has a particularly strong collection of books that pertain to the KGB of the former Soviet Union, but it includes titles that also focus on China or other countries that pose significant intelligence threats to the United States.
July 10, 2023
Has some good information pertaining to the practicalities of COINTEL - nothing that you couldn't find in other books and manuals though. While the author's goal was to make an unclassified COINTEL book for the scholarly community and next-generation of COINTEL practitioners, the author imparts his feelings, politics, and opinion a bit too much for it to be entirely scholarly.
Got to a point where I was kind of annoyed with his personal tirades and recollections that held very little for a student or practitioner.
Got to a point where I was kind of annoyed with his personal tirades and recollections that held very little for a student or practitioner.
January 8, 2021
This is a good book about the craft and need for counterintelligence. The author James Olsen does a great job of discussing the threats to the U.S. and how we can counter them. Through stories of American traitors, he illustrates what he calls the Ten Commandments of counterintelligence. Olsen provides us with a necessary warning and how-to guide on defending America from the threats of foreign spying. Worth reading for those interested in the subject.
June 15, 2019
Case Officer Olson’s “To Catch a Spy” resonates well. A very well written Counterintelligence book.
I’m thinking the review editing may have been more significant than Olson explains, though I doubt we will really ever know.
Great list of recommended additional reading of a more recent vintage.
Recommend.
I’m thinking the review editing may have been more significant than Olson explains, though I doubt we will really ever know.
Great list of recommended additional reading of a more recent vintage.
Recommend.
February 3, 2021
James M. Olson explains the purpose of counter intelligence and the important role counter intelligence professionals play in protecting America. Olson provides interesting perspectives on global matters as well as individual relationships among professionals. I would absolutely recommend this book.
October 13, 2021
Dry stuff. Not as interesting as it could have been.
The author starts with a warning that the CCP is all over American intelligence. But doesn't describe how or why.
Worse: no real solutions are provided.
Instead, we get a written PowerPoint presentation, presumably designed for Counterintelligence trainees.
Miss.
The author starts with a warning that the CCP is all over American intelligence. But doesn't describe how or why.
Worse: no real solutions are provided.
Instead, we get a written PowerPoint presentation, presumably designed for Counterintelligence trainees.
Miss.
October 19, 2021
I read this book for research purposes - to become familiar with espionage and counterespionage. What better way to learn than to read a book written by a former CIA person, James Olson, who was there! This book is not for the reader who wants a spy thriller. This one is for people who want the real account of the art of counterintelligence.
July 5, 2020
A good entry into the history and culture of espionage. He covers the threats and impacts of Russia, China, and Cuba. He uses a framework of case studies and his own experience to weave a great background of both successes and failures of a long history international intel.
August 16, 2020
A bit like and exhaustive briefing but for sure concise. Would be fun to sit in on one of the authors classes if he’s still teaching at Texas A&M and if anyone’s child goes to A&M and has a career planned in technology or computers would strongly recommend a class to the author.
May 7, 2021
Interesting but a little repetitive
The chapters and case studies were an interested read, but towards the end of the book the “lessons learned” were rather repetitive. We need better workplace counterintelligence, more polygraphs, and more resources.
The chapters and case studies were an interested read, but towards the end of the book the “lessons learned” were rather repetitive. We need better workplace counterintelligence, more polygraphs, and more resources.
January 23, 2024
Very interesting and a great overlook into counterintelligence (which is one of the fields I don’t know that much about). Definitely some opinions I’m not sure I’m entirely on board with, but a great read nonetheless.
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