What do you think?
Rate this book
A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach
Two authorities in argumentation theory present a view of argumentation as a means of resolving differences of opinion by testing the acceptability of the disputed positions. Their model of a "critical discussion" serves as a theoretical tool for analyzing, evaluating and producing argumentative discourse. This major contribution to the study of argumentation will be of particular value to professionals and graduate students in speech communication, informal logic, rhetoric, critical thinking, linguistics, and philosophy.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
224 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 2003
4 people are currently reading
44 people want to read
About the author
Rob Grootendorst
20 books1 followerRob Grootendorst was a Dutch communication and argumentation theory scholar. He was professor for Dutch speech communication at the University of Amsterdam. His contributions to the argumentation field include the co-foundation of the pragma-dialectic school in argumentation theory.
Detailed description:
Grootendorst was a teacher at an elementary school in the 1960s. He studied Dutch studies at the University of Amsterdam since 1980, and became a Ph.D. in 1982 in Speech Communication. The dissertation was jointly written with Frans H. van Eemeren. They jointly founded the International Society for the Study of Argumentation in 1986. Grootendorst together with Frans H. van Eemeren, developed pragma-dialectics, or pragma-dialectical theory, at the University of Amsterdam. It is an argumentation theory that is used to analyze and evaluate argumentation in actual practice. Unlike strictly logical approaches (which focus on the study of argument as product), or purely communication approaches (which emphasize argument as a process), pragma-dialectics was developed to study the entirety of an argumentation as a discourse activity. Thus, the pragma-dialectical theory views argumentation as a complex speech act that occurs as part of natural language activities and has specific communicative goals.
He also wrote several books on the life and works of the Dutch writer and politician Theo Thijssen.
Detailed description:
Grootendorst was a teacher at an elementary school in the 1960s. He studied Dutch studies at the University of Amsterdam since 1980, and became a Ph.D. in 1982 in Speech Communication. The dissertation was jointly written with Frans H. van Eemeren. They jointly founded the International Society for the Study of Argumentation in 1986. Grootendorst together with Frans H. van Eemeren, developed pragma-dialectics, or pragma-dialectical theory, at the University of Amsterdam. It is an argumentation theory that is used to analyze and evaluate argumentation in actual practice. Unlike strictly logical approaches (which focus on the study of argument as product), or purely communication approaches (which emphasize argument as a process), pragma-dialectics was developed to study the entirety of an argumentation as a discourse activity. Thus, the pragma-dialectical theory views argumentation as a complex speech act that occurs as part of natural language activities and has specific communicative goals.
He also wrote several books on the life and works of the Dutch writer and politician Theo Thijssen.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 of 1 review
March 10, 2024
An important and accessible work. Much has been said about its content. The basic approach is both laudable and logical: A theory of argumentation that is pragmatic, i.e. that "manifests itself primarily in the fact that the moves that can be made in a discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion are conceived as verbal activities (“speech acts”), carried out within the framework of a specific form of oral or written language use (“speech event”), in a context of interaction that takes place against a specific cultural-historical background." (p. 52) and dialectical "because it is premised on two parties who try to resolve a difference of opinion by means of a methodical exchange of discussion moves." (p. 22).
Argumentation is thus conceived both a s a methodical search for normative plausibility or factual truth and as a social activity. The ability of the theory to apply to real, not purely constructed or strictly logical (mathematical) conversations matters immensely. Argumentation is everywhere. To understand more about (for instance) political and legal arguments and how they could be improved is key to fostering meaningful public discourse.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst then go on to develop what any argumentation theorist should: A model of a critical discussion, a methodology to reconstruct real conversation according to the model and a ruleset for such discussions as well as a list of fallacies which are (interestingly) conceived as violations of said rules and not as logical mistakes.
Instead of a comprehensive review that could satisfy academic standards, I want to point out a few interesting (or problematic) aspects:
(1) The author conceive of reasonableness as a property that arises intersubjectively, in a discussion that adheres to standards both accepted (by the participants) and effective (in resolving the difference of opinion). The cognitive and emotional requirements for the parties are therefore enormous: They must be so interested in the resolution of the difference of opinion(s) that they are prepared to have all their own convictions tested and torn down, if reasonableness requires. This in turn explains and justifies why the actual rules, such as Rule 10 ("The antagonist retains throughout the entire discussion the right to call into question both the propositional content and the force of justification or refutation of every complex speech act of argumentation of the protagonist that the latter has not yet successfully defended.") or the simplified commandments such as commandment 6 ("Discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point.") are mostly rather trivial: Any debate that follows them quickly becomes a chess game (simple rules, incomprehensibly complex continuations) and few debates actually satisfy those rules.
An even simpler version could be: be fair and show your premises and train of thought. Lay them bare to criticism and attack. Aim for a shared result of the debate, even if it is a more informed "agree to disagree". Externalization brings rationality
(2) The rules are profoundly legal in nature, written as rights (!). Is a judicial procedure therefore the pinnacle of reasonable debate? What is a theory of argumentation more than "do as you would in court", with slightly less legalese rules? Are courts therefore able to resolve political problems more rationally? One reason for that could be: At least the legal premises of courts' reasoning are more openly stated. I would have expected some thoughts on these aspects by the authors.
(3) The model applies mostly (or rather: exclusively) to the dialogue of two equally powerful discussants/opponents. Van Eeemeren and Grootendorst are of course aware of psychological and societal conditions for the discussion, but they choose to attack the less complex question first: How to model an idealized debate. That limits the practical applicability, but also allows for less muddled theorizing.
(4) Both authors do not make much mention of potential criticism or at least the social context of the theory of negative utilitarianism (& negative conceptions of freedom) that they build on.
Nevertheless: Everybody who debates politics/philosophy etc. now and then would do well with a bit more pragma-dialectic methodology and a bit less disorganized shouting.
Argumentation is thus conceived both a s a methodical search for normative plausibility or factual truth and as a social activity. The ability of the theory to apply to real, not purely constructed or strictly logical (mathematical) conversations matters immensely. Argumentation is everywhere. To understand more about (for instance) political and legal arguments and how they could be improved is key to fostering meaningful public discourse.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst then go on to develop what any argumentation theorist should: A model of a critical discussion, a methodology to reconstruct real conversation according to the model and a ruleset for such discussions as well as a list of fallacies which are (interestingly) conceived as violations of said rules and not as logical mistakes.
Instead of a comprehensive review that could satisfy academic standards, I want to point out a few interesting (or problematic) aspects:
(1) The author conceive of reasonableness as a property that arises intersubjectively, in a discussion that adheres to standards both accepted (by the participants) and effective (in resolving the difference of opinion). The cognitive and emotional requirements for the parties are therefore enormous: They must be so interested in the resolution of the difference of opinion(s) that they are prepared to have all their own convictions tested and torn down, if reasonableness requires. This in turn explains and justifies why the actual rules, such as Rule 10 ("The antagonist retains throughout the entire discussion the right to call into question both the propositional content and the force of justification or refutation of every complex speech act of argumentation of the protagonist that the latter has not yet successfully defended.") or the simplified commandments such as commandment 6 ("Discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point.") are mostly rather trivial: Any debate that follows them quickly becomes a chess game (simple rules, incomprehensibly complex continuations) and few debates actually satisfy those rules.
An even simpler version could be: be fair and show your premises and train of thought. Lay them bare to criticism and attack. Aim for a shared result of the debate, even if it is a more informed "agree to disagree". Externalization brings rationality
(2) The rules are profoundly legal in nature, written as rights (!). Is a judicial procedure therefore the pinnacle of reasonable debate? What is a theory of argumentation more than "do as you would in court", with slightly less legalese rules? Are courts therefore able to resolve political problems more rationally? One reason for that could be: At least the legal premises of courts' reasoning are more openly stated. I would have expected some thoughts on these aspects by the authors.
(3) The model applies mostly (or rather: exclusively) to the dialogue of two equally powerful discussants/opponents. Van Eeemeren and Grootendorst are of course aware of psychological and societal conditions for the discussion, but they choose to attack the less complex question first: How to model an idealized debate. That limits the practical applicability, but also allows for less muddled theorizing.
(4) Both authors do not make much mention of potential criticism or at least the social context of the theory of negative utilitarianism (& negative conceptions of freedom) that they build on.
Nevertheless: Everybody who debates politics/philosophy etc. now and then would do well with a bit more pragma-dialectic methodology and a bit less disorganized shouting.
Displaying 1 of 1 review