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Tiger Force: A True Story of Men and War
At the outset of the Vietnam War, the Army created an experimental fighting unit that became known as "Tiger Force." The Tigers were to be made up of the cream of the crop-the very best and bravest soldiers the American military could offer. They would be given a long leash, allowed to operate in the field with less supervision. Their mission was to seek out enemy compounds and hiding places so that bombing runs could be accurately targeted. They were to go where no troops had gone, to become one with the jungle, to leave themselves behind and get deep inside the enemy's mind.
The experiment went terribly wrong.What happened during the seven months Tiger Force descended into the abyss is the stuff of nightmares. Their crimes were uncountable, their madness beyond imagination-so much so that for almost four decades, the story of Tiger Force was covered up under orders that stretched all the way to the White House. Records were scrubbed, documents were destroyed, men were told to say nothing.
But one person didn't follow orders. The product of years of investigative reporting, interviews around the world, and the discovery of an astonishing array of classified information, Tiger Force> is a masterpiece of journalism. Winners of the Pulitzer Prize for their Tiger Force reporting, Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss have uncovered the last great secret of the Vietnam War.
416 pages, Hardcover
First published May 15, 2006
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July 17, 2022
In their book, reporters Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss chronicle the series of atrocities committed by the infamous Tiger Force, an American special unit in Vietnam set up for patrols, which went on a seven-month killing spree in 1967, murdering about a thousand Vietnamese peasants.
As Sallah and Weiss narrate, Tiger Force was the Special Forces Unit of 101st Airborne Division. It was created in November 1965 by Major David H. Hackworth "to outguerrilla the guerrillas." Invisible, blending into the landscape, the Tigers would search for enemy positions, mark targets for air attack and ground operations, sabotage, cut supply lines and kidnap Viet Cong cadres. It was left to the Tigers to decide how to perform their tasks. In the words of a soldier, "the unit was an “ass kicking outfit” that fought their war as they saw fit. . . . They didn’t condone or associate with any outsiders." They operated autonomously, kept radio communication to a minimum and had a permission to improvise. "If they needed to kill, then they could do so without telling anyone."
The Tigers boasted their special status. They were the only ones allowed to grow beards and carry handguns openly. They considered themselves the elite of the elite. In the eyes of other soldiers, they were doing the dirty work. The were admired and feared at the same time, and it was generally accepted that they had no time for the discipline of a regular company and were following only their own rules.
According to the authors, most of the men selected to serve in the unit were veterans, who had volunteered to stay in Vietnam longer or for whom war had become an indispensable part of their lives. "They developed a he-man image of being effective fighters. . . . Looking at it now you’d say they sound like blood thirsty nuts but at that time we were looking for aggressive fighters and these guys developed the initiative to be aggressive fighters." The Tigers were assigned to pacification and cleansing in the northern provinces. They cleared the way for larger fighting units and paved the national way where others had run out of means and possibilities. The men of Tiger Force liked their job and executed it in the style of death squads.
Between June and November 1967, Tiger Force was stationed in the Song Ve Valley and in Quang Tin Province. Song Ve was one of the most fertile regions of Vietnam. The American Army saw this as a problem. Although the peasants there were not known to support the Viet Cong and just wanted to live in peace, the surplus rice that they produced was seen as potential spoils for the guerrillas. Tiger Force was tasked with demolishing the rice paddies and evacuating the 7,000 peasants with their livestock into the Nghia Hanh camp.
Like most similar operations, Operation Rawhide, as it was called, went horribly wrong. About 2,000 peasants either went into hiding or returned to their villages soon after. The commanders of Task Force Oregon, which Tiger Force was a support unit of, retaliated with their infamous "shock therapy" – they burnt down huts and gave the villagers a clear signal that everyone outside the refugee camps would be treated as fair game. Two-thirds of the region were declared a Free Fire Zone, and Tiger Force turned into an assault unit. "Anything in this valley is ours," Lieutenant James Hawkins, a platoon leader with Tiger Force from mid-August to the end of October, instructed the men. "There are no friendlies. Do you hear me? There are no friendlies. No one is supposed to be here. Shoot anything that moves!"
In Quang Tin, Tiger Force found encountered different problems. Quang Tin was a mountainous region covered with dense jungle, and the Tigers were no longer dealing with civilians or Viet Cong, but with sections of the feared 2nd Infantry Division of the North Vietnamese Army. 7,500 North Vietnamese soldiers were infiltrating the province from the North every month, bringing in supplies and establishing new base camps. For MACV Commander William Westmoreland, time was pressing, so Tiger Force was tasked with finding the base camps of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese and destroying them, and with annihilating as many enemy men as possible. "You’re the Tigers. I expect you to be the Tigers," their battalion commander continued the inspirational speeches. The Tigers themselves described the new opportunity as "balls to the wall." "It was standard practice," said one member, "for the Tiger Force to kill everything that moved when we went out on an operation. . . . With a few exceptions I think that is correct." Hackworth's decision to grant the Tigers so much independence backfired. The unit not only preceded, but also surpassed what many know as the Vietnam conflict's most nightmarish atrocity, the My Lai massacre.
For seven months, Tiger Force raged through Quang Tin and the Song Ve Valley. They shot peasants in the fields for no reason and murdered anyone whom they saw. They tortured prisoners and executed them. They raided villages and mowed down with machine gun fire everyone they could find – peasants who had gathered for a meal or were sleeping, children playing in the open, old people taking a walk. "We knew they were civilians, not VC," admitted one Tiger interviewed by Sallah and Weiss. They stole and beat their victims to death or raped them until they fainted. They shot people who minutes before had been holding leaflets dropped from the air and were prepared to obey the evacuation order. They did not spare the wounded and the sick. Lawyer Gustav Apsey, who undertook the investigation of the atrocities, counted forty-nine murders in eleven days by analyzing radio traffic. This is something, considering that the Tigers kept only infrequent radio contact with the headquarters and had given up on counting their victims. "We'll never know how many were killed," said another Tiger. There was an unseen side to the mass murders – murdering people who were hiding in cellars and bunkers. In Quang Tin Province, which was regularly subjected to aerial strikes, most of the villagers had built themselves primitive shelters, which turned into death-traps as soon as Tiger Force arrived in the village and threw hand grenades into the entrances without warning, so in addition to the dozens of mass graves there is also an unknown number of unidentified death chambers.
By the time they were transferred at the end of November 1967, the Tigers had massacred around a thousand people. How could this have happened? This is a complex question, as the authors demonstrate.
They note that the case of Tiger Force is unique. No other unit is known to have murdered so cruelly, for so long and virtually on its own account. The tales of the members of Tiger Force are exceptionally extreme. They speak of fear, rage, hatred – and foremost revenge. "Everybody was blood thirsty at the time, saying "We're going to get them back. . . . We’re going to even the score"." However, they also reveal a calculated intention to kill, violate and mutilate in any circumstances and at any time.
The Tigers alternated between routine murder and unhinged violence. Although Song Ve was not a setting where the rural population was the enemy's silent accomplice, there were not mines at every step and their comrades did not die by the dozens, the Tigers still stabbed, scalped, bayoneted, strangled and executed, and hunted down unarmed civilians. There was no revenge to speak of. They behaved like professional killers rather than lynch mobs. At other times, though, the Tigers "snapped". For instance, after his old and only friend, Kenneth "Boots" Green, was shot dead in an ambush at the end of September 1967, Tiger Sam Ybarra turned into a madman. In the course of a raid, Ybarra beheaded a baby with his bush knife. Other Tigers went on beating dead bodies. They became blind with rage and stabbed corpses as if they were out of their minds. Tiger Force leaders had to be on their guard against these soldiers, who repeatedly threatened to kill them for issuing risky orders or after accidents happened. These Tigers made even their comrades feel threatened.
According to the authors, it is difficult to judge how often the violence changed from calculated to crazy and back because in interrogations and interviews, the members of Tiger Force did not speak about "snapping" because losing self-control did not fit the image of an elite warrior that they wanted to project. This is why the authors speculate that the Tigers spoke of calculated killing because they did not want to admit that they had gone murderously mad during those seven months in 1967. For instance, they shied away from admitting that they had derived physical excitement from murdering people. However, their deeds spoke for themselves. Soldiers bet on the number of shots needed to hit a person. Whether they were slitting throats or hacking off limbs, the sight of blood was always accompanied with yells and laughter. They thought it was fun to leave behind explosives they had assembled themselves and hidden in food rations, which then blew to pieces the bodies of the hungry people who found them.
A honorable mention deserve the dozen or so Tigers who abstained from such cruelties. They temporarily moved away, put down their weapons or expressed their contempt in some other way. Who they were is unknown, except for the only three Tigers who tried to stop their comrades. Bill Carpenter had an argument with his platoon leader who was going to shoot a peasant, but he could not prevent the murder. Donald Wood urged some Tigers to disobey the order given by Hawkins to shoot two old women, but in vain. Gerald Bruner aimed his M16 at two comrades who had already shot a peasant who was prepared for evacuation and now wanted to kill his younger brother. "If you fire up that kid, I'll do the same to you, damn it," he said. They did not shoot, and the young Vietnamese man and his family were evacuated. In the history of the seven-month killing spree, this was the only case of a life saved.
The three instances of active resistance explain why it was so difficult for an individual to abstain, and restrain others, from participating in atrocities. "You chicken shit son of a bitch. If you don’t shut up, I’ll shoot you," Bill Carpenter was told by Hawkins. This was not an empty threat. Donald Wood was knocked down by a comrade, and his commander fired a warning shot at him as he lay on the ground. "The only reason you’re still alive,’ Wood was told, "is that you’re a medic and we need you." It was also reported from the ranks of other units that soldiers who rebelled were risking their lives. There were talks of the "to whom it may concern round," shots that hit one’s own comrades seemingly inadvertently, but which were actually aimed at unreliable men or traitors. "Keep your mouth shut about this," said a Tiger to Dennis Lee Stout, who was temporarily attached to the Tigers as an Army journalist. "Remember, you don’t have to return from the next operation." The bullies – three or four soldiers who let everyone know that they were capable of anything – made sure everyone behaved. Anyone who in their eyes was showing restraint was made by Hawkins or Ybarra to commit murder in the presence of witnesses. The Tigers were kept together by the solidarity based on violence and compliance, which trust and respect came with. There was no way to rise above the shame, incomprehension, resignation and fear, so instead the men adjusted, and their compliance intensified.
The story of Tiger Force is a great case for analyzing the reasons for the tendency of small units in particular to commit violence. Small units create an atrocity-producing environment because they are an isolated mini-society whose members are allowed to live by their own rules. "We really got a chance to act it out," said one Special Forces soldier, ‘and there was no mommy to scold us, no principal's office to be sent to." Military training was forgotten. The limitations of civilian life did not apply. The Tigers did not have to seize opportunities to kill. The opportunities presented themselves, and the challenge was to resist them. As a man stationed in Quang Ngai put it: ‘What matters is what people here and now think about what you're doing. . . . This group of people . . . was the whole world. What they thought was right was right. And what they thought was wrong was wrong. The definitions for things were turned around. Courage was seen as stupidity . . . and cruelty and brutality were seen sometimes as heroic."
TIGER FORCE is an outstanding study. Sallah and Weiss have researched the topic meticulously and presented it engagingly. This book deserves the Pulitzer Prize that the authors received for it. I highly recommend it.
As Sallah and Weiss narrate, Tiger Force was the Special Forces Unit of 101st Airborne Division. It was created in November 1965 by Major David H. Hackworth "to outguerrilla the guerrillas." Invisible, blending into the landscape, the Tigers would search for enemy positions, mark targets for air attack and ground operations, sabotage, cut supply lines and kidnap Viet Cong cadres. It was left to the Tigers to decide how to perform their tasks. In the words of a soldier, "the unit was an “ass kicking outfit” that fought their war as they saw fit. . . . They didn’t condone or associate with any outsiders." They operated autonomously, kept radio communication to a minimum and had a permission to improvise. "If they needed to kill, then they could do so without telling anyone."
The Tigers boasted their special status. They were the only ones allowed to grow beards and carry handguns openly. They considered themselves the elite of the elite. In the eyes of other soldiers, they were doing the dirty work. The were admired and feared at the same time, and it was generally accepted that they had no time for the discipline of a regular company and were following only their own rules.
According to the authors, most of the men selected to serve in the unit were veterans, who had volunteered to stay in Vietnam longer or for whom war had become an indispensable part of their lives. "They developed a he-man image of being effective fighters. . . . Looking at it now you’d say they sound like blood thirsty nuts but at that time we were looking for aggressive fighters and these guys developed the initiative to be aggressive fighters." The Tigers were assigned to pacification and cleansing in the northern provinces. They cleared the way for larger fighting units and paved the national way where others had run out of means and possibilities. The men of Tiger Force liked their job and executed it in the style of death squads.
Between June and November 1967, Tiger Force was stationed in the Song Ve Valley and in Quang Tin Province. Song Ve was one of the most fertile regions of Vietnam. The American Army saw this as a problem. Although the peasants there were not known to support the Viet Cong and just wanted to live in peace, the surplus rice that they produced was seen as potential spoils for the guerrillas. Tiger Force was tasked with demolishing the rice paddies and evacuating the 7,000 peasants with their livestock into the Nghia Hanh camp.
Like most similar operations, Operation Rawhide, as it was called, went horribly wrong. About 2,000 peasants either went into hiding or returned to their villages soon after. The commanders of Task Force Oregon, which Tiger Force was a support unit of, retaliated with their infamous "shock therapy" – they burnt down huts and gave the villagers a clear signal that everyone outside the refugee camps would be treated as fair game. Two-thirds of the region were declared a Free Fire Zone, and Tiger Force turned into an assault unit. "Anything in this valley is ours," Lieutenant James Hawkins, a platoon leader with Tiger Force from mid-August to the end of October, instructed the men. "There are no friendlies. Do you hear me? There are no friendlies. No one is supposed to be here. Shoot anything that moves!"
In Quang Tin, Tiger Force found encountered different problems. Quang Tin was a mountainous region covered with dense jungle, and the Tigers were no longer dealing with civilians or Viet Cong, but with sections of the feared 2nd Infantry Division of the North Vietnamese Army. 7,500 North Vietnamese soldiers were infiltrating the province from the North every month, bringing in supplies and establishing new base camps. For MACV Commander William Westmoreland, time was pressing, so Tiger Force was tasked with finding the base camps of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese and destroying them, and with annihilating as many enemy men as possible. "You’re the Tigers. I expect you to be the Tigers," their battalion commander continued the inspirational speeches. The Tigers themselves described the new opportunity as "balls to the wall." "It was standard practice," said one member, "for the Tiger Force to kill everything that moved when we went out on an operation. . . . With a few exceptions I think that is correct." Hackworth's decision to grant the Tigers so much independence backfired. The unit not only preceded, but also surpassed what many know as the Vietnam conflict's most nightmarish atrocity, the My Lai massacre.
For seven months, Tiger Force raged through Quang Tin and the Song Ve Valley. They shot peasants in the fields for no reason and murdered anyone whom they saw. They tortured prisoners and executed them. They raided villages and mowed down with machine gun fire everyone they could find – peasants who had gathered for a meal or were sleeping, children playing in the open, old people taking a walk. "We knew they were civilians, not VC," admitted one Tiger interviewed by Sallah and Weiss. They stole and beat their victims to death or raped them until they fainted. They shot people who minutes before had been holding leaflets dropped from the air and were prepared to obey the evacuation order. They did not spare the wounded and the sick. Lawyer Gustav Apsey, who undertook the investigation of the atrocities, counted forty-nine murders in eleven days by analyzing radio traffic. This is something, considering that the Tigers kept only infrequent radio contact with the headquarters and had given up on counting their victims. "We'll never know how many were killed," said another Tiger. There was an unseen side to the mass murders – murdering people who were hiding in cellars and bunkers. In Quang Tin Province, which was regularly subjected to aerial strikes, most of the villagers had built themselves primitive shelters, which turned into death-traps as soon as Tiger Force arrived in the village and threw hand grenades into the entrances without warning, so in addition to the dozens of mass graves there is also an unknown number of unidentified death chambers.
By the time they were transferred at the end of November 1967, the Tigers had massacred around a thousand people. How could this have happened? This is a complex question, as the authors demonstrate.
They note that the case of Tiger Force is unique. No other unit is known to have murdered so cruelly, for so long and virtually on its own account. The tales of the members of Tiger Force are exceptionally extreme. They speak of fear, rage, hatred – and foremost revenge. "Everybody was blood thirsty at the time, saying "We're going to get them back. . . . We’re going to even the score"." However, they also reveal a calculated intention to kill, violate and mutilate in any circumstances and at any time.
The Tigers alternated between routine murder and unhinged violence. Although Song Ve was not a setting where the rural population was the enemy's silent accomplice, there were not mines at every step and their comrades did not die by the dozens, the Tigers still stabbed, scalped, bayoneted, strangled and executed, and hunted down unarmed civilians. There was no revenge to speak of. They behaved like professional killers rather than lynch mobs. At other times, though, the Tigers "snapped". For instance, after his old and only friend, Kenneth "Boots" Green, was shot dead in an ambush at the end of September 1967, Tiger Sam Ybarra turned into a madman. In the course of a raid, Ybarra beheaded a baby with his bush knife. Other Tigers went on beating dead bodies. They became blind with rage and stabbed corpses as if they were out of their minds. Tiger Force leaders had to be on their guard against these soldiers, who repeatedly threatened to kill them for issuing risky orders or after accidents happened. These Tigers made even their comrades feel threatened.
According to the authors, it is difficult to judge how often the violence changed from calculated to crazy and back because in interrogations and interviews, the members of Tiger Force did not speak about "snapping" because losing self-control did not fit the image of an elite warrior that they wanted to project. This is why the authors speculate that the Tigers spoke of calculated killing because they did not want to admit that they had gone murderously mad during those seven months in 1967. For instance, they shied away from admitting that they had derived physical excitement from murdering people. However, their deeds spoke for themselves. Soldiers bet on the number of shots needed to hit a person. Whether they were slitting throats or hacking off limbs, the sight of blood was always accompanied with yells and laughter. They thought it was fun to leave behind explosives they had assembled themselves and hidden in food rations, which then blew to pieces the bodies of the hungry people who found them.
A honorable mention deserve the dozen or so Tigers who abstained from such cruelties. They temporarily moved away, put down their weapons or expressed their contempt in some other way. Who they were is unknown, except for the only three Tigers who tried to stop their comrades. Bill Carpenter had an argument with his platoon leader who was going to shoot a peasant, but he could not prevent the murder. Donald Wood urged some Tigers to disobey the order given by Hawkins to shoot two old women, but in vain. Gerald Bruner aimed his M16 at two comrades who had already shot a peasant who was prepared for evacuation and now wanted to kill his younger brother. "If you fire up that kid, I'll do the same to you, damn it," he said. They did not shoot, and the young Vietnamese man and his family were evacuated. In the history of the seven-month killing spree, this was the only case of a life saved.
The three instances of active resistance explain why it was so difficult for an individual to abstain, and restrain others, from participating in atrocities. "You chicken shit son of a bitch. If you don’t shut up, I’ll shoot you," Bill Carpenter was told by Hawkins. This was not an empty threat. Donald Wood was knocked down by a comrade, and his commander fired a warning shot at him as he lay on the ground. "The only reason you’re still alive,’ Wood was told, "is that you’re a medic and we need you." It was also reported from the ranks of other units that soldiers who rebelled were risking their lives. There were talks of the "to whom it may concern round," shots that hit one’s own comrades seemingly inadvertently, but which were actually aimed at unreliable men or traitors. "Keep your mouth shut about this," said a Tiger to Dennis Lee Stout, who was temporarily attached to the Tigers as an Army journalist. "Remember, you don’t have to return from the next operation." The bullies – three or four soldiers who let everyone know that they were capable of anything – made sure everyone behaved. Anyone who in their eyes was showing restraint was made by Hawkins or Ybarra to commit murder in the presence of witnesses. The Tigers were kept together by the solidarity based on violence and compliance, which trust and respect came with. There was no way to rise above the shame, incomprehension, resignation and fear, so instead the men adjusted, and their compliance intensified.
The story of Tiger Force is a great case for analyzing the reasons for the tendency of small units in particular to commit violence. Small units create an atrocity-producing environment because they are an isolated mini-society whose members are allowed to live by their own rules. "We really got a chance to act it out," said one Special Forces soldier, ‘and there was no mommy to scold us, no principal's office to be sent to." Military training was forgotten. The limitations of civilian life did not apply. The Tigers did not have to seize opportunities to kill. The opportunities presented themselves, and the challenge was to resist them. As a man stationed in Quang Ngai put it: ‘What matters is what people here and now think about what you're doing. . . . This group of people . . . was the whole world. What they thought was right was right. And what they thought was wrong was wrong. The definitions for things were turned around. Courage was seen as stupidity . . . and cruelty and brutality were seen sometimes as heroic."
TIGER FORCE is an outstanding study. Sallah and Weiss have researched the topic meticulously and presented it engagingly. This book deserves the Pulitzer Prize that the authors received for it. I highly recommend it.
April 27, 2016
There is a quote, attributed to Ernest Hemingway, that war, no matter how necessary or justified, is always a crime. While the sentiment (war is terrible) is understandable, the statement is not strictly true. In the law, murder is an unjustified killing. In war, the killing of combatants is sanctioned by governments; accordingly, it is not murder.
Of course, that doesn't mean it's a free-for-all. To the contrary, there have always been rules of warfare (ignore those legal isolationists who argue that the Nuremberg Tribunals were sui generis). From the Book of Deuteronomy ("thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou mayest eat of them") to the Lieber Code promulgated during the American Civil War to the Hague Conventions to the Geneva Conventions, there has always been a line that soldiers cannot cross. That line, though, can get a little blurry. How much difference, for instance, is there between a soldier shooting a woman and her baby (a crime) and a pilot dropping a bomb packed with Uranium-235 on a city full of women and babies (a triumph)? I guess that's a discussion for a different book.
Tiger Force is the story of a bunch of men who definitely crossed the line. Written by Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss, it started as a Pulitzer Prize-winning piece of reporting in the Toledo Blade. The Blade articles uncovered an investigation by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division into members of the so-called "Tiger Force" (1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry Regiment). During a period of several months in 1967, the Tiger Force murdered, tortured and mutilated (scalpings, ear necklaces, etc.) countless Vietnamese civilians. These were old men; women; children; infants (one man reportedly cut the head off a baby).
Winning hearts and minds, indeed.
I believe the incidents described occurred. Moreover, I would not tender any defense to the actions of these soldiers (there are certain philosophical schools to which I do not belong, among them: in order to make omlettes (war) you have to crack a few eggs (innocent civilians); and "America: right or wrong".
That being said, I was very disappointed with this book.
The problem begins an ends with its genesis as long-form newspaper reporting. Even when you get more than a column in a newspaper or magazine, a long-form writer still has serious space concerns. This necessitates certain elisions and requires the sacrifice of depth for scope. In the case of Tiger Force, the book-length expansion does not strengthen the weaknesses inherent in any newspaper article.
I knew the book was going to be problematic right from the start. For some reason, Tiger Force never takes the time to properly and accurately describe the titular band of brothers. What is Tiger Force? The authors say that it was platoon founded by Colonel David Hackworth (a war hero and author) especially to fight guerrillas. But how did Hackworth do this? By act of Congress, creating a new unit? By going through some chain of command? The authors state that there was special training and a rigorous application process, but later say that these were shelved and anyone could join. What was that special training? Even later in the book, the authors state that Tiger Force was actually an unofficial force, more akin to a gang I was in while attending fifth grade called The Best Best Friends.
Not to get all Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid on you, but who are these guys? Not only did the authors fail to provide the actual status of Tiger Force (official or non-official), they also failed to delineate their duties. Were they special forces? Were they recon? (it seems they were, so it might have been helpful to explain what a recon platoon does).
From this trembly set-up, the book plunges into the vortex of madness described on the book flap. Except it doesn't. The story that is told is lifeless and meandering. A string of killings is described, but the brutality of these actions is nonexistent. I attribute this to a couple things. First, the authors, while probably exceptional journalists, are not exceptional writers. Their spare "prose" is just-the-facts and, frankly, plodding for a book this length. Also, there is a dirth of tactile details. In a newspaper article, its fine to report that a troop of soldiers went to this village and killed two people. In a book, however, a lot more is necessary. I need to know more than simply what happened; I need to know what it felt like to be there. This lack of detail made it hard to engage this book. However, I also have the nagging suspicion that it is a function of the reporting, and of the witnesses telling their stories. That is, there is a certain fuzziness in the retelling of these killings that smacks of men trying to forget, and of men trying to shift blame.
Another problem in Tiger Force is the lack of definable characters. Despite a modest effort, the men in this book all meld together. They're names, and nothing more. I kept having to flip back to the dramatis personae in front to remind myself who was good (Lieutenant Wood) and who was bad (Lieutenant Hawkins). The only instantly identifiable person in the book is Sam Ybarra, and this comes from the fact that he embodies the unfortunate archetype of the mentally tortured, alcoholic Indian point-man. (I can imagine Adam Beach playing this role, in the eventual movie).
The authors are reporters, not soldiers, and it shows. Obviously, their profession doesn't disqualify them from writing a military history. (In fact, the journalist Rick Atkinson has absolutely nailed the first two volumes of his "Liberation Trilogy" about the American Army in World War II).
The problem, though, is that these guys didn't do the lifting required to intelligently write about such matters. Not to belabor the point, but this isn't a newspaper story any more: It's a book. That's why the pages are stuck between two hard covers with a ludicrously high suggested retail price. The authors display an obvious discomfort in writing about the Army, which probably dovetails with my earlier criticism on their failure to define Tiger Force. For instance, they refer at one point to a "carbine .15 rifle." What's that? Is it a carbine or a rifle? (Or is it a typo, because this book was slapped together to capitalize on the Pulitzer Prize?). Later, they make reference to a .15 carbine. Again, what is this? I'm not a gun afficionado by any means, so I need a little help here. It appears to be a .15 caliber weapon, but what kind? A Colt Automatic Rifle? A paint gun? This might be a small point, but throughout the book there are gaps like this; points where the reader can only pause and scratch his or her head in vain supposition.
The book ends with a tired whimper. This isn't all the fault of the authors. At this point, the realities of the world step in to ensure there is no justice. The perpetrators go unpunished. They either die of natural causes or leave the Army. The Pentagon seals the records. The dead remain dead.
The story in Tiger Force is no great shocking revelation. The only thing that's shocking is that no one is ever, ever responsible. Trace the line from Sand Creek to the Phillipine Insurrection to No Gun Ri to My Lai to Haditha. It comprises a gallery of the dead who have no killers. Most of these places, these hamlets and villages left in smoke and ash, are forgotten by Americans. They are not, however, forgotten by the people who live in those places. And that's worth bearing in mind when we think about our spot in history.
So, in that sense, I praise the existence of Tiger Force. Unlike the Army's CID, it uncovers evidence; it lays out the argument; it renders judgment and assigns guilt.
It just didn't work as a book.
Of course, that doesn't mean it's a free-for-all. To the contrary, there have always been rules of warfare (ignore those legal isolationists who argue that the Nuremberg Tribunals were sui generis). From the Book of Deuteronomy ("thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou mayest eat of them") to the Lieber Code promulgated during the American Civil War to the Hague Conventions to the Geneva Conventions, there has always been a line that soldiers cannot cross. That line, though, can get a little blurry. How much difference, for instance, is there between a soldier shooting a woman and her baby (a crime) and a pilot dropping a bomb packed with Uranium-235 on a city full of women and babies (a triumph)? I guess that's a discussion for a different book.
Tiger Force is the story of a bunch of men who definitely crossed the line. Written by Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss, it started as a Pulitzer Prize-winning piece of reporting in the Toledo Blade. The Blade articles uncovered an investigation by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division into members of the so-called "Tiger Force" (1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry Regiment). During a period of several months in 1967, the Tiger Force murdered, tortured and mutilated (scalpings, ear necklaces, etc.) countless Vietnamese civilians. These were old men; women; children; infants (one man reportedly cut the head off a baby).
Winning hearts and minds, indeed.
I believe the incidents described occurred. Moreover, I would not tender any defense to the actions of these soldiers (there are certain philosophical schools to which I do not belong, among them: in order to make omlettes (war) you have to crack a few eggs (innocent civilians); and "America: right or wrong".
That being said, I was very disappointed with this book.
The problem begins an ends with its genesis as long-form newspaper reporting. Even when you get more than a column in a newspaper or magazine, a long-form writer still has serious space concerns. This necessitates certain elisions and requires the sacrifice of depth for scope. In the case of Tiger Force, the book-length expansion does not strengthen the weaknesses inherent in any newspaper article.
I knew the book was going to be problematic right from the start. For some reason, Tiger Force never takes the time to properly and accurately describe the titular band of brothers. What is Tiger Force? The authors say that it was platoon founded by Colonel David Hackworth (a war hero and author) especially to fight guerrillas. But how did Hackworth do this? By act of Congress, creating a new unit? By going through some chain of command? The authors state that there was special training and a rigorous application process, but later say that these were shelved and anyone could join. What was that special training? Even later in the book, the authors state that Tiger Force was actually an unofficial force, more akin to a gang I was in while attending fifth grade called The Best Best Friends.
Not to get all Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid on you, but who are these guys? Not only did the authors fail to provide the actual status of Tiger Force (official or non-official), they also failed to delineate their duties. Were they special forces? Were they recon? (it seems they were, so it might have been helpful to explain what a recon platoon does).
From this trembly set-up, the book plunges into the vortex of madness described on the book flap. Except it doesn't. The story that is told is lifeless and meandering. A string of killings is described, but the brutality of these actions is nonexistent. I attribute this to a couple things. First, the authors, while probably exceptional journalists, are not exceptional writers. Their spare "prose" is just-the-facts and, frankly, plodding for a book this length. Also, there is a dirth of tactile details. In a newspaper article, its fine to report that a troop of soldiers went to this village and killed two people. In a book, however, a lot more is necessary. I need to know more than simply what happened; I need to know what it felt like to be there. This lack of detail made it hard to engage this book. However, I also have the nagging suspicion that it is a function of the reporting, and of the witnesses telling their stories. That is, there is a certain fuzziness in the retelling of these killings that smacks of men trying to forget, and of men trying to shift blame.
Another problem in Tiger Force is the lack of definable characters. Despite a modest effort, the men in this book all meld together. They're names, and nothing more. I kept having to flip back to the dramatis personae in front to remind myself who was good (Lieutenant Wood) and who was bad (Lieutenant Hawkins). The only instantly identifiable person in the book is Sam Ybarra, and this comes from the fact that he embodies the unfortunate archetype of the mentally tortured, alcoholic Indian point-man. (I can imagine Adam Beach playing this role, in the eventual movie).
The authors are reporters, not soldiers, and it shows. Obviously, their profession doesn't disqualify them from writing a military history. (In fact, the journalist Rick Atkinson has absolutely nailed the first two volumes of his "Liberation Trilogy" about the American Army in World War II).
The problem, though, is that these guys didn't do the lifting required to intelligently write about such matters. Not to belabor the point, but this isn't a newspaper story any more: It's a book. That's why the pages are stuck between two hard covers with a ludicrously high suggested retail price. The authors display an obvious discomfort in writing about the Army, which probably dovetails with my earlier criticism on their failure to define Tiger Force. For instance, they refer at one point to a "carbine .15 rifle." What's that? Is it a carbine or a rifle? (Or is it a typo, because this book was slapped together to capitalize on the Pulitzer Prize?). Later, they make reference to a .15 carbine. Again, what is this? I'm not a gun afficionado by any means, so I need a little help here. It appears to be a .15 caliber weapon, but what kind? A Colt Automatic Rifle? A paint gun? This might be a small point, but throughout the book there are gaps like this; points where the reader can only pause and scratch his or her head in vain supposition.
The book ends with a tired whimper. This isn't all the fault of the authors. At this point, the realities of the world step in to ensure there is no justice. The perpetrators go unpunished. They either die of natural causes or leave the Army. The Pentagon seals the records. The dead remain dead.
The story in Tiger Force is no great shocking revelation. The only thing that's shocking is that no one is ever, ever responsible. Trace the line from Sand Creek to the Phillipine Insurrection to No Gun Ri to My Lai to Haditha. It comprises a gallery of the dead who have no killers. Most of these places, these hamlets and villages left in smoke and ash, are forgotten by Americans. They are not, however, forgotten by the people who live in those places. And that's worth bearing in mind when we think about our spot in history.
So, in that sense, I praise the existence of Tiger Force. Unlike the Army's CID, it uncovers evidence; it lays out the argument; it renders judgment and assigns guilt.
It just didn't work as a book.
February 18, 2009
This story is appalling and heart breaking, detailed, and told well. You don't know whether to be disappointed/disgusted with the men who committed atrocities aginst Vietnamese civilians or furious with the leadership that let it happen and covered it up. I fully acknowledge that the North Vietcong were no saints and committed many atrocities of their own, but we were supposed to be the "good guys." I hope the army learned something from these experiences and we don't have to read books like this in 20 years about atrocities in Iraq or Afghanistan.
July 24, 2016
The book is about a lesser known atrocity in the Vietnam war which was covered up by Army immediately after the war. A cautionary tale of what can go wrong when soldiers who are out in the field for too long lose their voices of conscience, watch their comrades die without understanding why, and resentful of a HQ that does not seem to understand the difficulties on the ground. A good investigative piece - I was left feeling very indignant because justice was never done for this case.
March 20, 2025
Magnificently written.
A tragic story of men and war, and the things that haunt them. You relate to these men, you want to like these men...despite the horrible things that happened and the actions they took.
In the end, they all suffered in their own way, their PTSD punishing them for the rest of their lives for the things they had down.
This story will haunt you for a long time, and it is a cautionary tale of war, and how men can crack under the pressure of war and survival in a place they never should have been.
5 StARS
A tragic story of men and war, and the things that haunt them. You relate to these men, you want to like these men...despite the horrible things that happened and the actions they took.
In the end, they all suffered in their own way, their PTSD punishing them for the rest of their lives for the things they had down.
This story will haunt you for a long time, and it is a cautionary tale of war, and how men can crack under the pressure of war and survival in a place they never should have been.
5 StARS
August 10, 2017
References to marines as "soldiers" and to shooting "carbine .15 rifles" make you acutely aware this book contains errors. The book constantly makes statements about what combat soldiers feel, how they interpret events, and how they develop distinct bonds - but there's nothing provided to substantiate the claims. Finally and most problematic for a "non-fiction" book, the narrative offers several accounts of the interior thoughts, motivations, and feelings of people moments before they were killed. Clearly, these can't be known - but they are presented as facts.
Add in a dearth of citations and you have a really large piece of modern journalism that pretends like it's historical non-fiction. I'd rate most of the book as "informed opinion". Given the inflammatory and divisive subject matter, I would expect more academic rigor (to say the least) in a published book-length account. The choice of piling notes in a chapter-by-chapter summary at the end of the book is unfortunate. It reads more like "inspired by true events" than historical fact.
Merely asserting that "lots of Tigers" said something does not make it factual. Presenting collective experience as factual when it is based on limited testimony of one or a few people in the general area - testimony offered years later - does not make it factual. Asserting the case was not prosecuted because of a conspiracy to cover up does not make it a conspiracy to cover up. Maybe there just wasn't any actionable intelligence - exactly like one senior prosecutor stated.
Add in a dearth of citations and you have a really large piece of modern journalism that pretends like it's historical non-fiction. I'd rate most of the book as "informed opinion". Given the inflammatory and divisive subject matter, I would expect more academic rigor (to say the least) in a published book-length account. The choice of piling notes in a chapter-by-chapter summary at the end of the book is unfortunate. It reads more like "inspired by true events" than historical fact.
Merely asserting that "lots of Tigers" said something does not make it factual. Presenting collective experience as factual when it is based on limited testimony of one or a few people in the general area - testimony offered years later - does not make it factual. Asserting the case was not prosecuted because of a conspiracy to cover up does not make it a conspiracy to cover up. Maybe there just wasn't any actionable intelligence - exactly like one senior prosecutor stated.
Read
March 31, 2012This is an outstanding book that should be studied by all military professionals and anyone interested in Vietnam. It describes a rouge platoon that has lost the since of right & wrong and committed atrocities. They story begins many years after the war, and the reader discovers than of the men who made it our of Vietnam, not many made it out of the 70s. Guilt was the biggest killers and manifested itself through drugs, alcohol, and domestic violence. These men had criminals for leaders and they were forever damaged. The leadership lessons in this book are invaluable, and if they had been thoroughly absorbed in todays military maybe defeats like Abu Garib and Hadithia would have been different. I am a huge proponent of this book, I recommend it to every junior officer that works with me, and I think it should be studied at our educational institutions.
December 7, 2008
It was unfortunate that these men were the scapegoats of circumstance... bad leadership, a few crazy bastards that wore necklaces of ears and indiscriminately sprayed hooches and zapped villagers. But, to think of these actions as something that were done by the entire military in Vietnam is just plain wrong. This was an elite unit of men that were frustrated over the way the war was being prosecuted, infected by a few psychotic soldiers (that were crazy long before they entered the army), and intentionally "let off of the leash" by the Army brass who then egged on the atrocities while they turned a blind eye.
Is the book graphic? Yes. Is what the unit did a shame? Yes. Was it their fault? Read for yourself.
Is the book graphic? Yes. Is what the unit did a shame? Yes. Was it their fault? Read for yourself.
July 20, 2009
this was a superb book...it tells the story of Tiger Force, a platoon of US army special forces soldiers...in the beginning they are an elite group of men, doing special "jobs"...by the middle of the book they have lost control completely and are performing heinous acts such as murder of civilians, rape, and mutliations...the second part of the book tells of the quest to bring those involved to justice...this never happened even though the investigation went on for years and was well documented...instead it was swept under the rug to keep America from coming apart over the Vietnam War....i highly recommend this book to everyone...
May 24, 2010
I had to temporarily stop reading this book about half-way through because the atrocities it describes were so disturbing. The second half of the book focuses more on the military investigation of the war crimes committed by the unit Tiger Force in 1967 in Vietnam. The book is engaging and an important account of not only the war in Vietnam but the lack of political will by the 1970s to prosecute war crimes.
June 29, 2011
This is an unbelievably well researched book about how soldiers already on the edge of sanity can quickly lose it all when they're set loose with no restraints. One person in particular was just pure evil in the jungle, and his exploits are sickening. It's worth reading just for the sake of knowing what really happened. Vietnam sucked for literally everyone involved, and the Tiger Force was a large reason why for many unfortunate villagers that had no stake in that pointless war.
April 29, 2019
An important story that was poorly done. The narrative read like a bad fiction novel. It had zero resolution and barely explained why. The author never explained how he came up with the information or why he wanted to write it. Overall, this would have had a lot more impact to me if it had been written better.
August 4, 2011
A disturbing read ....
July 17, 2022
Goodhart’s Law- when a measure becomes a target it ceases to be a good measure. In this case- in order to win the war there should be a high body count. Then body count becomes the target and you end up with “kill anything that moves” and the events of this book.
July 24, 2008
My Dad had me read "Strong Men Armed" I learned so much and had a whole new appreciation of my Grandfather and his life in service. However, This book is about a platoon and their atrocities in Vietnam. It didn't sink in until Chapter 12 when I realized it wasn't just a few random acts of violence. That's what the whole book was about, so I quit reading it.While I'm not naive enough to believe that these atrocities didn't happen, I don't want to read about them. My Dad is a Vietnam Vet, and I'm going to believe that he was one of the ones who "didn't cross the line". Not just because he's my Dad and I want to think the best of him - but because of his life since 1966. He hasn't destroyed his life drowned in Alcohol or spent it trying to forget. He's admitted it was a bad deal - he did what he had to - it was a struggle - and conscious free - his life went on. So until any military investigative reporter proves otherwise - My Dad was a good soldier. Although I hated the content, (which is deserving of one star) I gave it two stars because it was well-written, and I do feel for the innocent Vietnamese whose life were changed by those out of control in the name of war.
Read
February 5, 2009Sallah and Weiss, who won a Pulitzer Prize (along with fellow reporter Joe Mahr) for their reporting on the Tiger Force in the Toledo Blade in 2003, have crafted a compelling, chilling story. Reviewers draw obvious parallels between the events detailed here and the My Lai massacre, as well as recent incidents from the war in Iraq. The book is a primer on journalistic technique, the narrative drawn from firsthand accounts in interviews with victims' families and more than 40 former members of the Tiger Force, as well as a suppressed 55-page document that came out of an army investigation. The authors visited the sites of many of the atrocities, pinpointing them through old radio logs. The result is one of the most important books on the Vietnam War.
This is an excerpt from a review published in Bookmarks magazine.
December 8, 2017
Excellent book. Told an amazing tale and really gave a face to the people involved without demonizing them. I think it was terrible what the military did to our men sent over during Vietnam. While some choices were their own, many of them were pushed into things that they otherwise may not have done.
September 6, 2008
I counldn't help but think that this would have been a great New Yorker article. I just got too bogged down inthe detail. That said, I think it was an important look into how massacres happen.
December 10, 2018
It was OK, a bit long winded.
May 5, 2023
RICK “SHAQ” GOLDSTEIN SAYS: WAR AIN’T PRETTY… ESPECIALLY WHEN “RULES” ONLY APPLY TO YOU!
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I am an Honorably Discharged United States Viet Nam era veteran. I read this book a year ago, when it was first released. I didn’t know about this avenue of book reviews. I wish I had, because it would have been cathartic for me. It’s hard to use the word “enjoy”, when relating to the subject matter herein. For me, a better word might be mesmerizing. I feel it was a great book that kept me enthralled from start to finish. This book is not for everyone. In fact, I’m still carrying inner, and some, not so inner, animosity, towards the Jane Fonda types of the world. I think a positive use of this book is not with them. Some veteran’s have deep scars, and emotional wounds, that can never heal. Others have moved on, as far as leading a normal life, but privately, without it affecting, things in general, still harbor hard feelings, in the way we were treated by our own citizens. While we were in the service, and after. I plead with non-veteran readers, to understand, that the entire Viet Nam war, was not like what was portrayed in this book. It also should be noted, that many American people, including the media, and the big Hollywood stars, only real knowledge of the war, is sitting in front of their TV, with a glass of wine, and their pinkie in the air, while they watch the news. War is war! It is not pretty, and when the other side, only plays by the “rule”, that there are no rules, many of our people, who still play by the rules, are rewarded by a free trip home in a body bag! I feel there is a great value to this book, at this place in time, for several types of people. Mothers and Fathers, of veterans, wives, sons and daughters, and loved ones, of this era of veterans, should read this book. Not to discuss, the pros and con’s, of the history of the war; but to simply understand, some of the hell that they went through. Again, not to discuss it with the veteran’s in your life; but to simply learn to have compassion and understanding, when your veteran, gets up and walks out of the room, when some music video, shows Viet Cong, being killed, without the other side of the death equation. Or a Hollywood star, whose biggest brush with combat, was a photographer jostling them, and your veteran, smashes his fist on a coffee table, when the “star” makes anti U.S. military comments. Think about small children, carrying rifles, and with grenades strapped to their legs, trying to kill our American boys, before you so blindly criticize, the damaged souls, that were “lucky” enough to make it home.
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I am an Honorably Discharged United States Viet Nam era veteran. I read this book a year ago, when it was first released. I didn’t know about this avenue of book reviews. I wish I had, because it would have been cathartic for me. It’s hard to use the word “enjoy”, when relating to the subject matter herein. For me, a better word might be mesmerizing. I feel it was a great book that kept me enthralled from start to finish. This book is not for everyone. In fact, I’m still carrying inner, and some, not so inner, animosity, towards the Jane Fonda types of the world. I think a positive use of this book is not with them. Some veteran’s have deep scars, and emotional wounds, that can never heal. Others have moved on, as far as leading a normal life, but privately, without it affecting, things in general, still harbor hard feelings, in the way we were treated by our own citizens. While we were in the service, and after. I plead with non-veteran readers, to understand, that the entire Viet Nam war, was not like what was portrayed in this book. It also should be noted, that many American people, including the media, and the big Hollywood stars, only real knowledge of the war, is sitting in front of their TV, with a glass of wine, and their pinkie in the air, while they watch the news. War is war! It is not pretty, and when the other side, only plays by the “rule”, that there are no rules, many of our people, who still play by the rules, are rewarded by a free trip home in a body bag! I feel there is a great value to this book, at this place in time, for several types of people. Mothers and Fathers, of veterans, wives, sons and daughters, and loved ones, of this era of veterans, should read this book. Not to discuss, the pros and con’s, of the history of the war; but to simply understand, some of the hell that they went through. Again, not to discuss it with the veteran’s in your life; but to simply learn to have compassion and understanding, when your veteran, gets up and walks out of the room, when some music video, shows Viet Cong, being killed, without the other side of the death equation. Or a Hollywood star, whose biggest brush with combat, was a photographer jostling them, and your veteran, smashes his fist on a coffee table, when the “star” makes anti U.S. military comments. Think about small children, carrying rifles, and with grenades strapped to their legs, trying to kill our American boys, before you so blindly criticize, the damaged souls, that were “lucky” enough to make it home.
October 25, 2022
Audiobook this - don't waste your time reading it. You will hear (or read) the term "Tiger Force" 50,000 times. "Tiger Force" (if it at all existed) was unofficial moniker for an Army recon unit who had a lot of latitude and little oversight in their missions. It wasn't an Elite Unit per say bc there was no specialized training apart from the basic Infantry training (which isn't easy but it's exactly that Basic Infantry vs specialized training for specialized missions). So anyone who was in that Army unit or assigned or wanted to simply join was in "the Tiger Force". There was no information in the book as to how it officially began other than a mention that Colonel Hackworth started it. Taking it at face value Tiger Force was a Platoon in the Army that was supposed to do missions of finding the enemy (VC/NVA) and calling in air strikes (though no mention of any training in Advanced Call for Fire (artillery or air) for any of the personnel. Tiger Force was basically a small unit that had no oversight and freelanced on carrying out missions turning everything into search and destroy and evidently murdered civilians (though that can be hard to distinguish in that war). No matter, obvious war crimes were committed.
Apparently the Army and DC didn't want another Mi Lai scandal so nothing became of said war crimes. There was an investigation but nothing became of it bc the Army didn't want the negative publicity. Who knows there was probably a lot of this from both sides (it's war after all).
The book reads like a long winded magazine article (which I believe was a magazine article turned into a book). It wasn't too long (around 6 hours) but it could have been condensed bc it was repetitive I felt that I couldn't wait to get through it. It's certainly not worth me hearing a second time but was ok to listen to I suppose giving it 2 stars. I wouldn't recommend someone to bother listening to this unless they have a heavy interest in war history and lore.
Apparently the Army and DC didn't want another Mi Lai scandal so nothing became of said war crimes. There was an investigation but nothing became of it bc the Army didn't want the negative publicity. Who knows there was probably a lot of this from both sides (it's war after all).
The book reads like a long winded magazine article (which I believe was a magazine article turned into a book). It wasn't too long (around 6 hours) but it could have been condensed bc it was repetitive I felt that I couldn't wait to get through it. It's certainly not worth me hearing a second time but was ok to listen to I suppose giving it 2 stars. I wouldn't recommend someone to bother listening to this unless they have a heavy interest in war history and lore.
May 11, 2018
Sallah and Weiss have compiled a superb work of investigative journalism about the Tiger Force during the Vietnam war.
The first part of the book reads like a typical war story detailing the exploits of an elite military force faced with the perils of fighting a guerrilla war in inhospitable conditions. What struck me as an after thought was how little those of us who did not serve in 'Nam knew about what it was like for those who did. Many of my high school classmates are veterans of "our" war but few open up about what lasting impressions the hostilities have made in their lives.
The second part of the book covers the Aspey investigations into the war crimes akin to the My Lai massacre that captured American headlines and helped precipitate the end of the conflict for the United States. Is it any surprise that the investigation failed to lead to any charges against soldiers or their commanders when there was already a groundswell of negative publicity about Vietnam and America's role? Hardly, but the cover-up continues to nag at one's conscience.
Were they really war crimes? What else is being covered up?
It was, most certainly, an interesting read about what soldiers are capable of in hostile territory. Does it change my opinion of whether it is better to shoot first and ask questions later in times of war? Other stories of 'Nam gain relevance when it comes to the thought of kill or be killed.
The first part of the book reads like a typical war story detailing the exploits of an elite military force faced with the perils of fighting a guerrilla war in inhospitable conditions. What struck me as an after thought was how little those of us who did not serve in 'Nam knew about what it was like for those who did. Many of my high school classmates are veterans of "our" war but few open up about what lasting impressions the hostilities have made in their lives.
The second part of the book covers the Aspey investigations into the war crimes akin to the My Lai massacre that captured American headlines and helped precipitate the end of the conflict for the United States. Is it any surprise that the investigation failed to lead to any charges against soldiers or their commanders when there was already a groundswell of negative publicity about Vietnam and America's role? Hardly, but the cover-up continues to nag at one's conscience.
Were they really war crimes? What else is being covered up?
It was, most certainly, an interesting read about what soldiers are capable of in hostile territory. Does it change my opinion of whether it is better to shoot first and ask questions later in times of war? Other stories of 'Nam gain relevance when it comes to the thought of kill or be killed.
June 13, 2013
This review can also be found on my blog, The Spastic Writer: http://thespasticwriter.blogspot.com/...
Tiger Force throws no curves; it is a straightforward book that delivers what Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss promise to deliver right from the front of the cover. The “true story of men and war” presents itself in a simplistic, chronological structure that nevertheless does justice to a highly disturbing story.
The book begins with a prologue that sets up the after-story of one of the most notorious killers on Tiger Force (a reconnaissance platoon of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry developed for the largely guerilla nature of the Vietnam War)—Sam Ybarra. In 1975, following the anticlimactic conclusion of the Vietnam War, Ybarra, an alcoholic suffering from PTSD, is living with his mom on the San Carlos Indian Reservation. An agent from the CID called Gustav Apsey has arrived for an interview, but Ybarra turns him away.
Flashback to 1967; the signs of mental cracking are already beginning to manifest. Replacements fill in for the two killed and the twenty-five wounded Tigers after the Mother’s Day Massacre. In addition to Ybarra and his best friend Kenneth Green, the reader is introduced to the surviving and new members of the platoon. There is happy-go-lucky surfer Kerrigan, tough-love sergeant Doyle, idealistic medic Bowman, and many more. Later on, these succinct profiles melt away until only the killers and the anti-killers remain.
The book is essentially divided into three phases: The Song Ve Valley, Operation Wheeler, and the post-war investigation. In the South Ve Valley portion, Tiger Force receives the mission to relocate villagers living in the fertile, rice paddy, which feeds the Viet Cong. Despite the many leaflets and the promise of food and shelter at the relocation camps, the Tigers are met with resistance. By the end of the South Ve Valley, ten unthreatening farmers are killed; elderly men are beaten until their brains come out; hamlets are torched; and ears are cut off and collected for trophies and necklaces. The killings only escalate with Operation Wheeler, a search and destroy missions during which the entire area of Quang Tin becomes a free fire zone. The most grotesque of atrocities, one that is repeatedly underscored during future investigations, is the beheading of a baby by Ybarra.
The third phase of the book, the investigation, opens in 1972. The reader follows the diligent and relentless CID agent Gustav Apsey. In order to get the reluctant ex-Tigers to talk, Apsey faces long hours in the office, numerous flights to track down Tigers who have scattered to other outposts in the army or to civilian life, and even gunpoint at the home of an unstable veteran. Then, just as his work comes to fruition, he is shipped away to Korea. The case is closed. No one receives justice.
For a book of this moderate size, Tiger Force packs in a hefty blow of information to the gut. It leaves the reader at once reeling and numb from the sheer amount of information and the horrid nature of the events described. Its inconclusive ending may drive the reader to look up more information on Tiger Force. As the book would suggest, however, an Internet search on Tiger Force turns up an unfortunate dearth of information. As a result, it is only more incredible that Sallah and Weiss were able to write in the third person narrative, fleshing out details of events, backgrounds, and in-the-moment actions.
As expected from Sallah and Weiss, both of whom received the Pulitzer for their journalism detailing Tiger Force, the writing is streamlined, frank, and at times, dry. The dryness, however, serves the story well, for what takes the stage in the book is what happened. Though it brushes on some of the psychology of war and men, Tiger Force is not by any means a book unraveling the beauty of life and the ugliness of war. Any flowery language would detract from its mission: why did the atrocities happen? Why did nobody stop them?
However, in asking the question why? Sallah and Weiss flaunt the weakest point in the book.
While an empathy link between the reader and the soldier in any book of war is incredibly difficult—even foolish—to establish (after all, no amount of living vicariously through words will truly recreate that fine tightrope between life and death), sympathy toward men of war can and has been achieved in other war books. Tiger Force, however, vacillates between portraying the Tigers as men who committed the atrocities because they were frayed to the quick and men who committed atrocities because a factor in their psyches and backgrounds made them susceptible to becoming bloodthirsty, twisted killers who beheaded babies. At times, Sallah and Weiss seemed to favor the latter explanation, tossing out hypotheses not limited to abusive parents and rocky childhoods. In addition, the clear distinction made between Tiger Force’s story and My Lai’s make it harder for the reader to attribute the killings to “madness” brought about by weeks of being picked off by snipers and booby-traps (which seemed to be the favored explanation in the beginning). In particular, the reader may be confused as to how to view Sam Ybarra. His post-war days are tragic, flooded with alcohol, nightmares, and guilt, but Sallah and Weiss do not expand that into point about personal punishment versus punishment by justice.
The problem with Tiger Force is that it is minimally biased in details, word choice, and tone. That is all very well—for journalism. Tiger Force, however, is not journalism. As a book, it should be doing more than to inform; it should offer a unique perspective from the authors themselves on the subject matter. The problem with Tiger Force is that it suspiciously resembles a collage of news articles from the authors’ work in the Toledo Blade’s Tiger Force series.
Thus, the praise of Edward Nawokta serves as a double-edged sword:
“Tiger Force is a shining example of how journalism can fulfill its most noble aims: informing and, consequently, empowering the public.”
Perhaps the point of the authors is there is no answer to the why.
Perhaps the point of the authors is that it all happened. And not a thing was done about it.
Tiger Force throws no curves; it is a straightforward book that delivers what Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss promise to deliver right from the front of the cover. The “true story of men and war” presents itself in a simplistic, chronological structure that nevertheless does justice to a highly disturbing story.
The book begins with a prologue that sets up the after-story of one of the most notorious killers on Tiger Force (a reconnaissance platoon of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry developed for the largely guerilla nature of the Vietnam War)—Sam Ybarra. In 1975, following the anticlimactic conclusion of the Vietnam War, Ybarra, an alcoholic suffering from PTSD, is living with his mom on the San Carlos Indian Reservation. An agent from the CID called Gustav Apsey has arrived for an interview, but Ybarra turns him away.
Flashback to 1967; the signs of mental cracking are already beginning to manifest. Replacements fill in for the two killed and the twenty-five wounded Tigers after the Mother’s Day Massacre. In addition to Ybarra and his best friend Kenneth Green, the reader is introduced to the surviving and new members of the platoon. There is happy-go-lucky surfer Kerrigan, tough-love sergeant Doyle, idealistic medic Bowman, and many more. Later on, these succinct profiles melt away until only the killers and the anti-killers remain.
The book is essentially divided into three phases: The Song Ve Valley, Operation Wheeler, and the post-war investigation. In the South Ve Valley portion, Tiger Force receives the mission to relocate villagers living in the fertile, rice paddy, which feeds the Viet Cong. Despite the many leaflets and the promise of food and shelter at the relocation camps, the Tigers are met with resistance. By the end of the South Ve Valley, ten unthreatening farmers are killed; elderly men are beaten until their brains come out; hamlets are torched; and ears are cut off and collected for trophies and necklaces. The killings only escalate with Operation Wheeler, a search and destroy missions during which the entire area of Quang Tin becomes a free fire zone. The most grotesque of atrocities, one that is repeatedly underscored during future investigations, is the beheading of a baby by Ybarra.
The third phase of the book, the investigation, opens in 1972. The reader follows the diligent and relentless CID agent Gustav Apsey. In order to get the reluctant ex-Tigers to talk, Apsey faces long hours in the office, numerous flights to track down Tigers who have scattered to other outposts in the army or to civilian life, and even gunpoint at the home of an unstable veteran. Then, just as his work comes to fruition, he is shipped away to Korea. The case is closed. No one receives justice.
For a book of this moderate size, Tiger Force packs in a hefty blow of information to the gut. It leaves the reader at once reeling and numb from the sheer amount of information and the horrid nature of the events described. Its inconclusive ending may drive the reader to look up more information on Tiger Force. As the book would suggest, however, an Internet search on Tiger Force turns up an unfortunate dearth of information. As a result, it is only more incredible that Sallah and Weiss were able to write in the third person narrative, fleshing out details of events, backgrounds, and in-the-moment actions.
As expected from Sallah and Weiss, both of whom received the Pulitzer for their journalism detailing Tiger Force, the writing is streamlined, frank, and at times, dry. The dryness, however, serves the story well, for what takes the stage in the book is what happened. Though it brushes on some of the psychology of war and men, Tiger Force is not by any means a book unraveling the beauty of life and the ugliness of war. Any flowery language would detract from its mission: why did the atrocities happen? Why did nobody stop them?
However, in asking the question why? Sallah and Weiss flaunt the weakest point in the book.
While an empathy link between the reader and the soldier in any book of war is incredibly difficult—even foolish—to establish (after all, no amount of living vicariously through words will truly recreate that fine tightrope between life and death), sympathy toward men of war can and has been achieved in other war books. Tiger Force, however, vacillates between portraying the Tigers as men who committed the atrocities because they were frayed to the quick and men who committed atrocities because a factor in their psyches and backgrounds made them susceptible to becoming bloodthirsty, twisted killers who beheaded babies. At times, Sallah and Weiss seemed to favor the latter explanation, tossing out hypotheses not limited to abusive parents and rocky childhoods. In addition, the clear distinction made between Tiger Force’s story and My Lai’s make it harder for the reader to attribute the killings to “madness” brought about by weeks of being picked off by snipers and booby-traps (which seemed to be the favored explanation in the beginning). In particular, the reader may be confused as to how to view Sam Ybarra. His post-war days are tragic, flooded with alcohol, nightmares, and guilt, but Sallah and Weiss do not expand that into point about personal punishment versus punishment by justice.
The problem with Tiger Force is that it is minimally biased in details, word choice, and tone. That is all very well—for journalism. Tiger Force, however, is not journalism. As a book, it should be doing more than to inform; it should offer a unique perspective from the authors themselves on the subject matter. The problem with Tiger Force is that it suspiciously resembles a collage of news articles from the authors’ work in the Toledo Blade’s Tiger Force series.
Thus, the praise of Edward Nawokta serves as a double-edged sword:
“Tiger Force is a shining example of how journalism can fulfill its most noble aims: informing and, consequently, empowering the public.”
Perhaps the point of the authors is there is no answer to the why.
Perhaps the point of the authors is that it all happened. And not a thing was done about it.
November 14, 2017
Like other reviewers, I have to agree that it was difficult to remember the major characters since there was not a lot of background development with maybe the exception of Sam Ybarra and Kenneth Green. Nevertheless, the atrocities committed were surreal and ghastly and the author sews together the acts of separate isolated platoons well. In hindsight, it seems clear that when you attempt to evacuate an entire rural and agrarian region, with many remote hamlets miles into the jungle and without any clear communication other than leaflets dropped from planes and helicopters, and then you give a deadline and state that everyone left behind is a VietCong or NVA sympathizer, and the region is then a "free-fire" zone after the deadline, you will see these kinds of war crimes. As disturbing as the actions of the Tiger Force were, one can only hope that lessons were institutionally learned, because ultimately no action was taken against any war criminals.
January 23, 2018
One of the most important journalistic investigations in 20th century American history, and something all Americans should read. Tough stuff to learn about ourselves, but as vital to know as what happened in the Civil War, this book explains what happens when military commanders form groups of men trained to kill and let them loose with instructions to kill "anything that moves."
Without any distinction between enemy or friendly, and no grounding in the line between acceptable warfare (what a misnomer!) and war crime, or ethical foundation in human rights, these men murdered Vietnamese citizens without compunction for seven straight months. What they did was horrible. What they did to themselves was more horrible still. The actions taken by senior commanders after the fact, in the name of the American people, will terrify you. Because this book will prove that America may have never been great.
Without any distinction between enemy or friendly, and no grounding in the line between acceptable warfare (what a misnomer!) and war crime, or ethical foundation in human rights, these men murdered Vietnamese citizens without compunction for seven straight months. What they did was horrible. What they did to themselves was more horrible still. The actions taken by senior commanders after the fact, in the name of the American people, will terrify you. Because this book will prove that America may have never been great.
April 2, 2019
Book grown from Pulitzer Prize-winning series of articles in the Toledo Blade about the longest-running series of atrocities committed by a US military unit in Vietnam: Tiger Force. Listened to the (short) audio book, which ended with the main text; the e-book contains an Epilogue that brings things up to date as of 2006 and has lots of end notes documenting everything.
As to the history: yuck. My Lai was terrible, but happened once. The platoon-sized Tiger Force was designed to out-guerilla the guerillas, was sanctioned by command, and killed 1000+ unarmed civilians over the course of about 6 months. The investigation in the early 70s lasted about 3 years, but by the time it wrapped, there was no political will to pursue it as a result of My Lai and the ending of the war. Things like farmer killings, baby decapitations, and necklaces of ears tend not to sit well with a public tired of administration lies and counterculture protests.
As to the history: yuck. My Lai was terrible, but happened once. The platoon-sized Tiger Force was designed to out-guerilla the guerillas, was sanctioned by command, and killed 1000+ unarmed civilians over the course of about 6 months. The investigation in the early 70s lasted about 3 years, but by the time it wrapped, there was no political will to pursue it as a result of My Lai and the ending of the war. Things like farmer killings, baby decapitations, and necklaces of ears tend not to sit well with a public tired of administration lies and counterculture protests.
April 1, 2018
A very disturbing chronicle about what went wrong in VietNam. For those of us who served in SEA, I am horrified that our military leaders encouraged and turned a blind eye to the monster they had created. If you ever wondered why the people of Southeast Asia didn’t trust us, look no further.
Unfortunately, war allows evil men to commit atrocities that cause us to blame ourselves for their evil. Were we right to support a crooked regime in the South? You cannot make that determination using the information available today. Most of us were not immoral murders that did unthinkable things to the people we were supposed to be helping. We answered the call without much question. We were lied to over and over by people that didn’t much care about why we were there in the first place.
Unfortunately, war allows evil men to commit atrocities that cause us to blame ourselves for their evil. Were we right to support a crooked regime in the South? You cannot make that determination using the information available today. Most of us were not immoral murders that did unthinkable things to the people we were supposed to be helping. We answered the call without much question. We were lied to over and over by people that didn’t much care about why we were there in the first place.
June 5, 2019
A real eye opener into brutality of war and the actions to which even Americans can stoop, Tiger Force describes a special unit in Vietnam designed to seek and destroy enemy forces within enemy held territory. Within the context of a war fought when body counts were a measurement of success, Tiger Force tried not to disappoint. It challenges the idea of nobility in warfare and can raise the question within some of tactics used in situations when one cannot tell the difference between a simple farmer, and one who is only a farmer by day, and an armed enemy at night.
Not recommended for those seeking a glorification of American adherence to the rules of war.
Not recommended for those seeking a glorification of American adherence to the rules of war.
September 27, 2021
My main criticism of this book is that both authors seemed ignorant of the military outside of the investigation and paperwork provided to them. There were many mistakes that even someone with a cursory knowledge of the US military would not make.
It seems to me the best researched parts of this investigation was the notes they received and the soldiers who did all the work beforehand. The authors basically took those notes, put a journalistic spin on things, and ran with it.
The investigation conducted by the US Army was very thorough and it's pretty shocking that they decided to not do anything about it. That is the only reason why this is actually three stars.
It seems to me the best researched parts of this investigation was the notes they received and the soldiers who did all the work beforehand. The authors basically took those notes, put a journalistic spin on things, and ran with it.
The investigation conducted by the US Army was very thorough and it's pretty shocking that they decided to not do anything about it. That is the only reason why this is actually three stars.
April 6, 2018
While it is beyond my place to pass judgement on those who have served and fought in the heat of battle, if only a fraction of the accounts retold here are true, words like barbarism and savagery are all that remain to describe them. Equally disturbing is the fact that these acts were encouraged and supported by the chain of command during the war. More disturbing is that the entire post-war investigation, the largest of its kind, was discreetly closed just before reaching completion without a single charge being filed.
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