The Norman Conquest in the 11th century is one of the best known events in English history, yet the French attempts to invade England three hundred years later are largely ignored and misunderstood. In fact, French invaders landed on English soil more than 20 times in the second half of the 14th century, sometimes accompanied by allies from Castile, Monaco, Genoa, and Denmark. They were part of a carefully thought-out strategy led by the French King Charles V. The forces that landed were well trained soldiers and marine fighters answering to the French monarch. It had taken Charles V and his great admiral Jean de Vienne years to put together the ships, materiel, and skilled mariners that a successful landing required. Whole forests of ancient trees had been felled in the Seine Valley to build the fleet. The invasion was planned after the Battle of Poitiers in 1357, when France was engulfed by multiple crises, of which England was a prime cause: King Jean II was a prisoner in England alongside many of his supporters; there was popular rebellion in Paris; the Regent—future Charles V—was only a teenager; the aftermath of the Black Death had cost France perhaps half its population; the English were demanding huge ransoms and territories from the French; and warrior bandits—routiers—roamed France, supported by the English. In response, the Second French Invasion of England was not a single overwhelming event—like Napoleon’s invasion of Russia—but it resulted in civilian deaths, rape, looting and burning, military casualties, and economic disruption—which caused long-term consequences. This is the Anglo-French conflict that time forgot.
The author, Duncan Cameron, makes his bold claim right up there in the title and subtitle: "Invasion: the forgotten French bid to conquer England". So the question arises, after 266 pages does Cameron succeed in convincing the reader that the attempts by the Valois kings to turn back English aggression during the successive reigns of Edward III (who ruled from 1327 to 1377) and Richard II (1377 to 1399) actually amounted to a serious attempt to invade and conquer England? Not really. Perhaps a more accurate title for the book, and one that indicates where its real strengths lie, would be "By Fire and Sea: the unsung role of naval and marine warfare in the first decades of the Hundred Years’ War".
For it is certainly true that, bedazzled by the great Edwardian victories at the Battle of Crécy and the Siege of Calais, and the even more remarkable victory of Edward’s son, the Black Prince, at the Battle of Poitiers in 1356 which resulted in the capture of the French King, Jean II, and his youngest son Philip, contemporary chroniclers and later historians have tended to emphasise the land battles of these early decades of the Hundred Years War. While not surprising - Edward’s forces at the Battle of Neville’s Cross also managed to take captive King David II of Scotland, holding him captive and for ransom until 1357, meaning that for a year Edwardian England held the kings of France and Scotland captive - Cameron makes clear in his book that cross-Channel raiders played a much larger part in the French resistance to the destructive English raids, the chevauchée, which were a key element in Edward’s strategy, than has generally been acknowledged.
Faced with English armies burning and looting across northern France with the strategic aim of rendering the French incapable of fighting back, successive French kings authorised destructive counter chevauchée, employing mercenary crews of Genoan and Monegasque sailors and marines to man oared galleys as the spearheads for these amphibious raids on the ports of southern England. Some towns such as Winchelsea that had previously waxed wealthy on the proceeds of the lucrative wine trade with Gascony (a French province that, by the complicated laws of inheritance, was actually the personal property of Edward III) never recovered from the devastation caused by these combined naval attacks, the Genoans and Monegasque marines storming ashore, burning and looting, while French cogs, the mainstay of North Sea trade, waited at anchor to take all the looted goods home. The final French ‘invasion’ of England never actually happened, with the main invasion force defeated by weather and logistics, thus making the big reveal at the end something of a damp squib. But the journey there reveals a fascinating and little-known side to 14th-century warfare.
A very action-driven narrative, this book is well researched and well written. Sadly, the author is let down by the editing, with dozens of typos and inconsistencies scattered throughout the text: the French King is variably referred to as Philippe, Phillip or Philip, Lewes becomes Lewis, etc.