The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II

by Douglas Porch

Brilliantly argued, with vivid portraits of Churchill, Montgomery, FDR, Rommel, and Mussolini, this original, accessible, and compelling account of a little-known theater emphasizes the importance of the Mediterranean in the ultimate Allied victory in Europe in World War II.

The Mediterranean theater in World War II has long been overlooked by historians who believe it was little more than a string of small-scale battles--sideshows that were of minor importance in a war whose outcome was decided in the clashes of mammoth tank armies in northern Europe. But in this ground-breaking new book, one of our finest military historians argues that the Mediterranean was World War II's pivotal theater.

Douglas Porch's The Path to Victory examines the Mediterranean as an integrated arena, one in which events in Syria and Suez influenced the survival of Gibraltar. Without a Mediterranean alternative, the Western Allies would probably have committed to a premature cross-Channel invasion in 1943 that might well have cost them the war.

Genres: History, War, Military History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military Fiction

816 pages, Paperback

First published May 1, 2004

About the author

Douglas Porch is an American historian, academic and a Professor and former Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs for the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee in 1967 and a Ph. D. from Cambridge University in 1972. He has been a professor of strategy at the Naval War College, a guest lecturer at the Marine Corps University, a post-doctoral research fellow at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris and the Mark W. Clark Professor of History at The Citadel.

Reviews

[Creighton · Rating 4 out of 5]

It has been a while since I have been able to sit down and read a book with College stuff going on and plus since the last book I've read, it's been hard to find something else to read and I've tried reading book after book, but I finally settled on this one and didn't put it down.

I was glad I picked up Douglas Porch's book The Path to Victory, because it was illuminating to me, and I found the authors point's interesting. What I liked a great deal about this book were the facts that I felt I was able to walk away with. Overall, it Porch argues that the Mediterranean theatre was very important to the Second World War, if not one of the most important in the European Theatre. Porch listed so many reasons why, and they can be argued pretty strongly. For example, he claimed that the Mediterranean theatre was vitally important to the allies in that it allowed them to build up time for the cross channel invasion, it allowed them to try out new weapons, gather resources and experience for amphibious landings, and find out which generals would be suited to lead Overlord and which weren't. To begin, the author really tears into Benito Mussolini, Mussolini to him was a failure, and he led Italy into a war that it wasn't ready to fight, and couldn't even keep itself fully mobilized. Mussolini wanted to fight a "separate war" while Hitler did whatever he wanted to do, and what I found interesting was that El Duce viewed Hitler more as a rival than as an ally. Hitler obviously had no interest in the Mediterranean, but after the failure to bring Britain to the peace table, he began to explore the idea of bringing Spain into the war, and trying to get it along with Vichy France, Italy and the Arab Nationalists to work together and hopefully bring Britain to the peace table, but alas there goals were so divergent. As Mussolini blundered more and more, Hitler had to bail him out.
I want to stop right here and say that this book diverged courses in each of it’s chapters, and had individual sections focusing on one aspect of a certain part of the theatre, but it did come together nicely and not jumbled up as it could’ve been.
The author goes through to talk about Italy’s navy, and it’s defeat by the British, and how the Italians were reluctant to operate outside of anywhere they could receive land air support, and really the fact that Italy made so many mistakes is appalling. A lot of people think Hitler was incompetent and a blow hard who mismanaged terribly, but people need to look at Benito Mussolini and his high command.
What I especially liked was the authors mentioning of the partisans activities in Yugoslavia and Greece, which I feel are not mentioned enough and how Hitler put so many divisions in the Balkans that could’ve been used elsewhere. I found it really interesting how the Chetniks and even the Communists Partisans in Yugoslavia sometimes worked together with the Nazi's to fight against one another.
Trying to follow the storyline, we get to Rommel, and man does Douglas Porch criticize him. Porch says Rommel’s greatness as a general was a myth conjured up by the Nazi propaganda machine and by the allies to explain away their defeats earlier in the war by him. Rommel’s reputation is criticized from 1940, where the author claims he only fought second rate French troops, and then the author says that Rommel only did good against second rate British generals but he was outgeneraled by Montgomery -whom Porch does criticize later. Rommel did poorly in Operation Crusader. What really got me was that the author claimed that El Alamein was not exactly the turning point in the Mediterranean campaign, but really Operation Torch was. Operation Torch forced the Germans to commit more troops to the Mediterranean, it made Rommel realize the jig was up and that he began to withdraw. El Alamein was important for the British, in that it allowed them a psychological victory over Rommel, and helped propagate the image of the British Empire holding its own as an ally and as a world power against the Axis.
He talks about what would’ve happened in his mind if the allies had instead launched a cross channel invasion and in his mind it would've failed. To him, it is possible Stalin would’ve sought a peace deal with Hitler, that Churchill and Roosevelt could’ve faced political downfall, and that American resources could’ve been sent to the pacific.
Churchill’s relationship with Roosevelt made him politically bulletproof
My biggest skepticism of this book is Porch's claims that operation Anvil/Dragoon (the liberation of southern France) cost the Germans more casualties than Stalingrad, which puzzles me completely, but could make sense if we’re talking about German forces alone. Now maybe Porch meant the Italian campaign as a whole, but still, that's a long stretch. I see it's plausibility if look at the German forces lost at Stalingrad alone, but still, I question that claim.

Porch discussed the Italian theatre, and when he talks about whether Germany should’ve fallen back to the alps or held on as they did, I get confused. One minute, it seems like he is in favor of the strategy Kesselring used, but then he sees the idea of a withdrawal to the Alps as a good idea; maybe I didn’t get it, or maybe I missed something while reading. He talks about how the Germans committed an overabundance of troops in the Balkans and Italy that could’ve been used in France or in Russia, where the situation was worse.

The author gives credit to Albert Kesselring for the defense of Italy, but calls out the claims that the Germans inflicted high numbers of casualties on the allies, and instead makes the case it was Germany that suffered much more than the allies did.

When we get to Italy, Porch really lays into Mark Clark and Oliver Leese, whom he sees as glory hounds that wanted to get media attention and sometimes let it affect their decisions and plans.

Porch talks about the French and the whole issue between the Free French and Vichy France and how De Gaulle basically was able to eventually merge both camps together and use them to create a new French Army that would fight in Europe and put France on the table as a major player in the post-war world.

One of the big criticisms Porch has for the Axis is their failure to take Malta, the fact they could’ve mustered their resources to take it, but didn’t, and how it was detrimental to them.

Porch argues the idea that Operation Torch was more important to the Mediterranean theatre than El Alamein in that it was the event that forced Rommel to retreat, and that it forced Hitler to send more resources to the theatre that he ultimately lost in Tunisia in 1943.


I give the book 4 stars, because I did like it, and would read it again.

[Checkman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Professor Douglas Porch is always a solid and reliable historian. His focus is French military history and ,in particular, the French experience in North Africa and the Mediterranean. He brings the academics eye to the subject matter with tons of documentation, in-depth analysis and an avoidance of hyperbole.

"The Path to Victory" looks at the North African and Italian Campaigns and makes an argument that it was there that the allies won WWII. Now while I don't know if the Allies won the war against the Axis in the Mediterranean Professor Porch does an excellent job showing that it was in this theater that the allies learned how to fight against the Axis and work together as a team (albeit a rather quarrelsome and sometime dysfunctional team - basically your typical family/team) . The Italian Campaign remains controversial to this day and there is no denying that there were some serious mistakes made there. Mistakes that could have been avoided, but these very mistakes taught lessons. Lessons that helped to ensure that Operation Overlord was done correctly. In this respect I agree with Professor Porch completely. The Allies were not ready to invade across the English Channel in 1943 (which is what the United States initially wanted to do - Americans. *sigh*). The learning curve was steep and it cost many people their lives, but imagine the carnage if the Allies had made a go of it in 1943 and been repulsed. Now that is a chilling scenario.

This is a well done book. Whether one agrees with the Professor's thesis it is informative and provides an in-depth look at a theater that often receives (with the exception of a few battles and the invasion of Sicily) a short shrift by WWII historians.

[Betsy · Rating 3 out of 5]

I found this book to have multi-personalities. Parts were quite well done and I found them easy to read and informative. At other times, I could barely make it through a few pages. It took much longer to read than I anticipated as it was quite detailed, but it wasn't just that. Perhaps I just didn't find some aspects of the story as interesting, but that could be my fault for false assumptions. I do think Porch made a good case for his assertions about the importance of the Mediterranean, and I certainly agreed with some of his points on Clark especially. The author did a good job in his summation, bringing all that he had written together.

In the end, I think he was right that Hitler made a grave error in investing so heavily in the Mediterranean, especially when he had so much to lose. But then, Hitler made many critical mistakes, which gave the Allies the upper hand. Fortunately, the British and Americans were able use the Mediterranean as a deadly training ground for the battles of 1944-45, and to ease some of the pressure on Russia.

[Andrew Canfield · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Path to Victory is a superb recounting of a frequently overlooked theater in World War Two. While the struggle against Japan and the fighting against the Axis Powers on the European continent understandably receive ample amounts of coverage in books on the second world war, the Mediterranean theater is often given short shrift.

Historian Douglas Porch set out to place this portion of the war under the microscope, and he pulled this off in The Path to Victory. Porch starts out with a thesis that, contrary to established historical opinion, the Mediterranean was actually vital to Allied success in the war against Germany and Italy. He demonstrates that its ability to divert valuable resources from the Eastern and ultimately Western front against Russia and the U.S./Great Britain, respectively, went a long way to securing Hitler's defeat.

This book is brimming with details that are usually not featured in World War Two fare. Bernard Montgomery and Erwin Rommel play huge roles early on in the desert-based warfare, and the arrival of the Americans during Operation Torch in November 1942 adds other military commanders to the mix. Operations Husky and Avalanche are analyzed, and the difficult fighting up the boot of Italy (and all the political shenanigans which occur when Italy gets cold feet toward its alliance with the Germans) is pored over in close detail.

Porch also expends many pages talking about maneuverings in the Balkans as well as side struggles like those which unfolded in theaters like Iraq, where the Axis leaders sought to drive a wedge between Britain and areas resentful after a long time spent under its hegemony. It is not often that King Faisal I is given a lot of coverage in a World War Two story, but this is one of many parts of the sprawling struggle covered by the book.

The section on Greece and Yugoslavia get a bit inside baseball at certain points. The intricacies of those two country's approach to the war and the battle for loyalties it engendered, coupled with geopolitical happenings like the rise to power of Josip Tito, made this another immensely fascinating entry.

The Path to Victory is careful to note the frequent tension and awkwardness between the American and British military leadership, not to mention the headaches created by having to deal with Frenchmen like Francois Darlan and Charles de Gaulle. Men like Harold Alexander and Dwight Eisenhower, though crucial to Allied victory, were not treated uncritically by Porch.

The difficulty of Britain and America when it came to meshing together as teammates was sometimes reflected in how Alexander and Eisenhower approached large, over arching tactical questions. Yet despite occasional slipups, the courage and guidance from Allied generalships was enough to see them through to the win.

The same cannot be said for Rommel (whom he indicates was a tad overrated in the grand scheme of things) and Albert Kesselring, who was shown to do what he could with what he was given to work with in Italy. The author was even willing to note the good and bad resulting from Winston Churchill's decision-making, seeming to rank him highly in the political category but less than perfect in the military domain.

The Path to Victory is definitely recommendable. The breadth of information it distills is impressive, with both small and large battles and small and large personalities covered with the eye for military precision one would expect from a work authored by the Professor Emeritus at the Naval Postgraduate School. From Morocco and Tunisia to Sicily, Italy, and Yugoslavia, this book provides a strong summary of the Mediterranean theater and the role it played in securing the defeat of tyranny.

-Andrew Canfield Denver, Colorado

[Land Murphy · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good overview of World War II in the Mediterranean. Porch argues that the Med. theater was the pivotal theater of the war, an argument which deserves further thought. Porch argues, for example, that Operation Sledgehammer (Overlord's predecessor) would have been a disaster in 1943. The book establishes that Hitler's decisions in the theater were ill-advised and damaged the Axis war effort, tying up Axis men and material that could have turned the tide on the Eastern front or in Normandy. Many of the Allied and Axis commanders come off poorly in the book. Porch does not consider Rommel to be one of the better commanders, contending that the publicity surrounding Rommel actually benefited the Allies and that Rommel never bested the better Allied generals. Eisenhower does not appear to have been a very effective commander in the Mediterranean, and Mark Clark--not surprisingly--is shown to be a publicity hound of the worst sort.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

As a result of my habit of reading multiple books at once this one took a while but I found it well worth the time it took. This is the first book I have read which surveys the entire Mediterranean Theater of World War Two. Very eye opening. Changed my opinion of some personalities involved, some in a negative way. Confirmed my opinion of some other leaders involved.

[Hans · Rating 4 out of 5]

What could have happened if the Allies had decided to open a front in Northwestern Europe in 1943? What were the benefits of opening a front in the Med?

In this book, the author describes what happened in this area, so in all of the theaters around the Med, and parts of the Balkan, during WWII. Greece, Malta, Syria, Iran, Irak and the North African theater, followed by Sicily, Italy and Southern France all see coverage. It is a large area of operations, which also adds a big chunk of politics to it all. What we do not often realise is the fact that while operating in this theater, the Allies founded their alliance which would see the invasion in France. Britain most certainly had its own agenda. Mussolini had, well, question is if he had an agenda, but he surely had ideas what he wanted there. This despite the unpreparedness of the Italian people and industry to wage a modern war. The United States got their feet wet in this part of the war in the Med and learned its lessons from it. At the same time they had to cope with Churchill's big ideas about the future of the Med and Balkan area. This often strained the relationship between the UK and the USA, but the bond created here was strong enough to prepare for the invasion in France.

The Soviet Union had to cope with countries that sided with Germany, but Communist powers within those countries, and also some in what we consider to be Western Europe, tried to benefit from the changing situation. France, disgraced in 1940, tried to return as an important European continental power. This while internal power struggles raged among some strong headed men that had their own ideas about the future of France. They were not shy to even raise their voices against the US, which was in fact their main supplier of war material.

One of the things I never really thought about is that during the campaign in the Med the future leaders of the NWE campaign became clear, and the men that did do less well were dropped along the way. I must add to this that circumstances and personalities clashing were also a big part if this process.

Reading this book it becomes clear that what happened here prepared not only the leaders, but also the men and equipment needed for the big invasion of June 6th, 1944. Tactics were changed, equipment showed its flaws, as did procedures, to land large numbers of men and equipment ashore. As was so often the case during WWII, the Germans turned out to be a cunning foe while on the defense. The campaign, as fought by Kesselring in Italy, showed how hard it was to eliminate a well dug in defender. It was often through the use of Ultra that the Allies could make headway, knowing what the state and plan of the defenders was. But add to this the rough terrain and atrocious weather, and one has a really tough job ahead. Porch is no fan of Rommel, but does clearly explain why he thinks Rommel to be overrated and the source of many tense moments in North Africa.

All of this is described in great detail by Porch. Some parts of the book were kind of a struggle to get through, but in other places things flowed really well and were easy to read. There are maps, but they somehow forgot to add a microscope to my copy of the book, since the details on them are so small, they are often impossible to read.

I think this book to be a must read for people who want to get a good overview of the battles, and all that comes with them, in this important and often neglected theater of war. Reading it made me realise that it was more important than I had thought before. What happened next, and even what happened in Italy after June 6th, 1944, are an extension of what the Allies achieved during their struggles in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and the other areas connected to this all.

[José Ramón · Rating 4 out of 5]

Otra de esas lecturas que deje para cuando tengo tiempo libre, ya que reconozco que este libro es denso.
El libro es muy bueno, y el autor tiene un gran conocimiento sobre el periodo, y sobre la II Guerra Mundial. Tiene unos grandes conocimientos sobre el contexto, sobre los personajes y sobre los acontecimientos que describe. La verdad es que el libro es un gran compendio sobre la II Guerra Mundial y los acontecimientos en el Mediterráneo. Eso implica que este libro no es para todo el mundo, tienes que estar muy interesado en el conflicto y en los acontecimientos para poder leerlo; porque si no este libro se va a hacer demasiado denso.
Es el tipo libro de historia militar hablando de cuerpos de batalla, formación de divisiones, acontecimientos en el movimiento de tropas y los el equipamiento militar de las unidades y los problemas logísticos. Pero, en la que el autor mete ciertos toques "cómicos", que creo que no todo el mundo pillaría, y un juego de la ironía muy peculiar. Reconozco que D. Porch es un buen autor y tiene muy claro lo que piensa. Hay ciertas cosas que me han interesado más, y acontecimientos que no conocía en profundidad sobre el conflicto. Estoy muy de acuerdo con muchas de sus conclusiones, y de sus razonamientos.
Me ha parecido muy simpático los comentarios sobre ciertos generales, aliados y no aliados, y las descripciones que hace de ellos. El autor se salta los tópicos, y va a lo más peliagudo y sangrante sobre la actitud de los "grandes generales" de la II Guerra Mundial. Esto lleva desmitificar el papel de Rommel, Ike Eisenhower, Patton o Montgomery.... Cosa que me parece de lo más realista, y se que por ello fue muy cuestionado.
Debo reconocer que me ha interesado mucho el análisis de Grecia y los Balcanes, que son considerados por muchos como frentes menores, dentro del ya secundario frente Mediterráneo. Esto me ha permitido analizar cuestiones interesantes, que no conocía sobre Tito y la formación de Yugoslavia; y sobre la realidad griega después de la II Guerra Mundial.
Como era de esperar, le da un peso menor al Mediterráneo occidental, pero me parece lo más adecuado.
Si es cierto que hay una cosa que no me ha gustado, y no es cosa del autor, sino de la editorial. La maquetación de los mapas no me parece de lo más acertada. En muchos casos los mapas se ven pequeños, y eso dificulta poder verlos con claridad. Deberían ponerlos en otro sentido, y que cada mapa ocupara una página entera. Puede ser que me este volviendo viejo, y mi vista empeorara. Pero en muchas ocasiones me ha costado poder verlos bien por el tamaño. O quizá podían haberlos agrupado al final, como anexo, y ponerlos más grandes. No sé si es problema de la edición en castellano, o la original tenía el mismo problema.
El libro es muy recomendable, pero para un público que espera analizar bien el conflicto. Es un libro denso, y el que lo quiera leer debe partir de esa idea.
A mi me ha gustado, y lo recomiendo.

[Bill V · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the first book I've read that covers the situation, especially military, in Italy after the fall of Rome in 1944. There are a few factual errors in the book as well as some questionable statements but overall the book was quite satisfying to read. The breadth of areas covered is a bit questionable. The subtitle of the book says it it's about the Mediterranean but it covers in good detail the situation in East Africa (Somaliland, Eritrea, Abyssinia, etc) as well as Iraq. Both areas are not part of the Mediterranean but I see why these areas were included in the book. There are a multitude of maps but I found them too small to be of any real use. The lack of a list of maps does not help either.
This book also provided to me some details as to what was happening with partisan activities in Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia. It also goes into detail regarding some of Churchill's obsessions with the Balkans.
The book covers the North African campaign (Libya and Egypt) in some detail. I recommend this book to anyone who wants to learn more about this arena of the war.

[Ferris Mx · Rating 4 out of 5]

WWII in the Mediterranean. A bunch of this book was a slog - in particular, the war in Greece never made sense to me. It was a barrage of acronyms and the synthesis was weak. For the non-Greek parts, the book jumps around a bit, moving from a standard timeline presentation to a thematic presentation without any warning.

The positives are the critical assessment of the performance of the armies and the leaders. Maybe too critical - it's not clear the author thinks any General did a good job, with the possible exception of Juin. Most of the criticism seems valid though, and reinforces what my old acquaintance Murray Stoltz once expressed about the psychopathological makeup necessary for any General who sends thousands to hundreds of thousands of young people to their graves and can still live with themselves. Many of the Generals were more concerned with their reputation and place in history than protecting their troops, and many had a conspicuous lack of skill.

[Teddee · Rating 4 out of 5]

Porch does a good job of blending narrative history/politics with military strategy/tactics. His thesis is that the Mediterranean as a theater was, contrary to the conventional wisdom, a key theater for the Allies. It was a classic strategic diversion luring Germany into getting bogged down and spreading its resources across a very large southern flank, while giving the Allies a chance to practice against German tactics and modern weaponry utilizing Allied strengths- air and sea power over long hard-to-defend supply lines. This book also showcases how imperial aims and personal ambition sabotaged efforts that would have resulted in quicker victories. The book also demonstrates the difference that aggressive, opportunistic and single minded leadership can make. While Mussolini's failure to lead in all aspects left the Italian forces ineffective and without direction, Rommel in Africa showcased the Axis's superiority in operations, mobile forces, inter-service tactical coordination, and offensive tactics. His success was so well propagandized that it may have helped rally Americans to the Allied cause. But Rommel's less publicized failures were symptomatic of the Axis failures overall. In prioritizing tactical and operational success, the Axis overall failed to plan for strategic success. It was the Axis failure to control its supply lines for oil and material, and its attempt to defend too large a front by failing to make a strategic retreat from the Mediterranean coast, that ultimately allowed the Allies to win in North Africa and later to capture and isolate hundreds of thousands of Axis troops in North Africa, France and Italy.

[Mark · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a dense historical tome which thoroughly covers the Mediterranean Theater of WWII. It argues convincingly that it was an important strategic theater which contributed to the Allied victory over the Axis. It took me several years to read, but in the end, i believe it was worth the effort. I have a greater understanding of WWII and why the Allies spent so much time, men and material in a seemingly, at least on the surface, peripheral side theater. I agree that when Hitler decided to shore up his southern flank, he made a strategic blunder which the Allies were able to exploit. It allowed them to fight the veteran German troops in a theater which would have little consequence for Allied failure. It allowed them to learn how to be a modern army, learn which generals were any good, get rid of those who were not suited and to establish a corp of veterans which greatly assisted the D-Day invasion. They tied down numerous German divisions not only in Italy, but in the Baltic, troops which Hitler could have used to better effect on either the Eastern or Western fronts. Would the Battle of Bulge gone differently, had Hitler moved divisions from Italy to the Ardennes? Probably, at least it would have been a tougher slog for the Allies. THe Allies inflicted over 500,000 casualties on the Germans in the Medt. theater, at a cost to themselves of 312,000, also contributing to the attrition warfare. Fascinating historical treatment by an able historian. I am glad I stuck it out and read it.

[Brian · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Mediterranean theater was an important place during World War 2. It comprised a significant amount of forces (although never as much as the east) and gave experience to those who would command operation overlord. From the shores of Tripoli to the peaks of Italy's mountains battles were waged for control of this strategic "lake". Both the Italians and the British saw the Mediterranean as a lake that they would command. Each side fought to make this a reality. The British were able to convince the United States to commit their forces here and exploit the weakness of Italy's armies and the lack of German forces. The argument for the importance of this theater is very clear and done well.

There are some errors in this book pointed out by other reviewers but the scope that Porch undertakes still make this a four star book. It is well written and clearly analyzes the salient points of the war. It is hard to find a book that is as comprehensive as this one can be. There are several great books on North Africa and Italy is only recently coming into its own but few approach this level. By covering the conflict as a region you get a richer picture of the "lake" and how it was impacted by the strategies of war. This book is highly recommended for those who want to understand World War 2 and the way in which operations unfolded.

[Bookmarks Magazine]

Reviews glow with kind words for Porch, a professor of national security at the Naval Postgraduate School. The author presents his case in clear, convincing prose and a careful eye to historical detail. Most importantly, he upends the idea of the Mediterranean campaign as a "costly sideshow" (Washington Post). He both successfully brings historic characters to life__including Mussolini, Churchill, and FDR__and combs through the finer points of military strategy. Whether his central hypothesis about the importance of the Mediterranean in the Allied victory is right or wrong, critics uniformly welcomed the book to the debate.

This is an excerpt from a review published in Bookmarks magazine.

[SR Bolton · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent study of the political, strategic, and theater-operational tensions at play in the Med. Porch gives due consideration to contrasting arguments, but he is rarely neutral, and is frequently critical of decisions and decision-makers in a manner which provokes the reader to consider new perspectives. Read as part of the SAMS curriculum.

[Josh Liller · Rating 3 out of 5]

Seemed a good overview of the topic and I didn't have trouble getting through it. But it is BRUTUALLY critical - especially of Italy - and loaded with unneccesarily fancy dictionary words and LONG paragraphs.

[Lee · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good analysis of some strategic options to the Allies in WWII. Porch does a good job of sticking to his thesis, and not burying it under observations or data. I felt like I was savoring this book by reading it in short sessions.

[Frank · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Med was no sideshow! Good book.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fun book. A really good discussion of the whole Med theatre in WWII. I totally enjoyed it and learned a ton.

[Nishant Pappireddi · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book gives a very convincing argument about why the Mediterranean was a pivotal theater for Allied victory in WW2.

[Jack · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent overview of the Mediterranean theater in WW2.