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The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy
NATIONAL BESTSELLER • A NEW YORK TIMES NOTABLE BOOK • “A rich and revealing account of the turbulent relationship between the U.S. and Russia during the first post-Cold War years. . . . Essential for any understanding of this critical and even dangerous period.”—Elizabeth Drew
“A fascinating memoir of a weirdly unpredictable world.”— The New York Review of Books
In the eight years Bill Clinton was president, as Russia lurched from crisis to crisis, each one more horrifying than the last, Clinton and his foreign-policy team found they faced no greater task than helping to keep Russia stable and at peace with herself and her neighbors. Strobe Talbott’s mesmerizing account of this struggle reveals what a close-run thing this was, and how much the relationship between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin has been defined by the work of Bill Clinton.
Written with a novelistic richness and energy, The Russia Hand is the first great book about war and peace in the post-Cold War world. It is also the one book anyone needs to understand Russia’s fateful transformation and future possibilities after ten years as a democracy.
“A fascinating memoir of a weirdly unpredictable world.”— The New York Review of Books
In the eight years Bill Clinton was president, as Russia lurched from crisis to crisis, each one more horrifying than the last, Clinton and his foreign-policy team found they faced no greater task than helping to keep Russia stable and at peace with herself and her neighbors. Strobe Talbott’s mesmerizing account of this struggle reveals what a close-run thing this was, and how much the relationship between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin has been defined by the work of Bill Clinton.
Written with a novelistic richness and energy, The Russia Hand is the first great book about war and peace in the post-Cold War world. It is also the one book anyone needs to understand Russia’s fateful transformation and future possibilities after ten years as a democracy.
512 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2002
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
November 4, 2013
The insider account of the Clinton administration's diplomatic relationship to Russia is fascinating, but good Lord does Mr. Talbott have a high opinion of himself and Christ, does he love to name drop. The first fifty pages are all about him hanging out with a young Clinton (he loves good ol' Bill, they're bestest bestest buddies and good ol' Billy can do no wrong, no wrong at all, gosh he's so brilliant and perfect and also right about everything all the time...), chatting it up with George Kennan, and hobnobbing with Joseph Brodsky. All right, Talbott. We get it. You are part of an extensive, super-intelligent, and rather circle-jerky Ol' Boys Club. Congratufuckinglations. (I feel that this review has turned rather hostile...I'm not sure why. Something about reading about those rich white ol' boy networks does that to me, I guess. Sorry.)
Anyways, like I said, it's an interesting read. But one of the most interesting things about it is how fully it exposes Talbott's complete lack of self-awareness regarding the role he and Clinton played in the cold, antagonistic relations we are currently enjoying (not really though) with Russia right now. I'm not sure that's what Talbott intended me to get out of his self-congratulatory memoir, but there you have it.
Basically, I took two stars off because Talbott is just so annoying. It's still a readable and fascinating book, and if you have any interest in US/Russian relations, I'd recommend it.
Anyways, like I said, it's an interesting read. But one of the most interesting things about it is how fully it exposes Talbott's complete lack of self-awareness regarding the role he and Clinton played in the cold, antagonistic relations we are currently enjoying (not really though) with Russia right now. I'm not sure that's what Talbott intended me to get out of his self-congratulatory memoir, but there you have it.
Basically, I took two stars off because Talbott is just so annoying. It's still a readable and fascinating book, and if you have any interest in US/Russian relations, I'd recommend it.
May 2, 2020
I just finished reading “The Russia Hand” by Strobe Talbott. That’s a memoir about Talbott’s experiences in Russian diplomacy, mainly under Clinton. Talbott was a classmate of mine at Yale (a “big guy on campus” who I would have recognized from a distance, but never spoke to). He was a Russian major and scholar of the house. He got a Rhodes Scholarship the same year Clinton did and was Clinton’s roommate at Oxford. After 3 years at Oxford, he got a job with Time Magazine, and almost immediately was assigned the task of translating Khrushchev’s memoirs. Under Clinton, he was a deputy secretary of state, and focused on the countries of the former Soviet Union.
The book’s greatest strength is also its greatest weakness. It reads like “The Red Badge of Courage” of diplomacy — a first-person, front-line account of day-to-day diplomatic action. It’s vivid and engaging. It gives you sense of what it might be like to be a diplomat dealing with US relations with Russia, at a crucial period of Russia’s history. But at the same time it does not provide a context, doesn’t give a sense of the overall meaning of what is happening.
Since the subject is Russia, I can’t help but think of Tolstoy’s criticism, in “War and Peace”, of personality-focused history books. He found it absurd that historians write as if what Napoleon had for breakfast one day or the fact that he had a cold on another made a major difference in the outcome of battles and the destiny of nations. He took the extreme position that individuals have no significant effect on history, and that we should focus our attention instead on the broader picture — for instance that millions of men marched from one end of Europe to another and back again.
I’m also reminded of the Emperor in the Star Wars movies. He doesn’t fret over day-to-day events. He doesn’t even seem concerned about which side wins which battle. Destabilization of any kind will help create the conditions necessary to make the Republic obsolete and to put him in control.
And, of course, I’m reminded of Asimov’s early Foundation novels, where Hari Seldon and his psychohistory focus on broad changes, not just on a single planet, but throughout the galaxy, and over the course of thousands of years.
Take the case of the US invasion of Iraq (which happened after what is described in “Russia Hand”). To try to determine the “cause” and the possible “meaning” of events, you could focus on the personalities and ambitions of Saddam Hussein and Bush and Putin and Tony Blair. Or you could focus on the effect of actions in the Middle East on the price of oil, and the profits of the companies involved in the “rebuilding”. Or you could step back still further and see that the main results were 1) destabilization of the Middle East, creating a situation in which divisions between countries and within countries were intensified and in which coordinated action became unimaginable for a generation or even longer; and 2) Europe, which had been on the brink of full union, became divided, with a new emphasis on differing national interests, postponing full union for at least a decade, and perhaps much longer. If there were an “Emperor” or a Hari Seldon in the background, those are the kinds of developments that would matter. And regardless of the immediate “causes”, you’d want to sort out who benefits from such developments and how.
As it stands today, “Russia Hand” is a very good book that illuminates events you read and heard about as they unfolded. But Talbott could elevate this work to a classic by adding a final chapter that puts the events he describes so well into a much broader context and considers the long-term trends and consequences, and weighs if and how the actions of individuals, like himself, can matter.
The book’s greatest strength is also its greatest weakness. It reads like “The Red Badge of Courage” of diplomacy — a first-person, front-line account of day-to-day diplomatic action. It’s vivid and engaging. It gives you sense of what it might be like to be a diplomat dealing with US relations with Russia, at a crucial period of Russia’s history. But at the same time it does not provide a context, doesn’t give a sense of the overall meaning of what is happening.
Since the subject is Russia, I can’t help but think of Tolstoy’s criticism, in “War and Peace”, of personality-focused history books. He found it absurd that historians write as if what Napoleon had for breakfast one day or the fact that he had a cold on another made a major difference in the outcome of battles and the destiny of nations. He took the extreme position that individuals have no significant effect on history, and that we should focus our attention instead on the broader picture — for instance that millions of men marched from one end of Europe to another and back again.
I’m also reminded of the Emperor in the Star Wars movies. He doesn’t fret over day-to-day events. He doesn’t even seem concerned about which side wins which battle. Destabilization of any kind will help create the conditions necessary to make the Republic obsolete and to put him in control.
And, of course, I’m reminded of Asimov’s early Foundation novels, where Hari Seldon and his psychohistory focus on broad changes, not just on a single planet, but throughout the galaxy, and over the course of thousands of years.
Take the case of the US invasion of Iraq (which happened after what is described in “Russia Hand”). To try to determine the “cause” and the possible “meaning” of events, you could focus on the personalities and ambitions of Saddam Hussein and Bush and Putin and Tony Blair. Or you could focus on the effect of actions in the Middle East on the price of oil, and the profits of the companies involved in the “rebuilding”. Or you could step back still further and see that the main results were 1) destabilization of the Middle East, creating a situation in which divisions between countries and within countries were intensified and in which coordinated action became unimaginable for a generation or even longer; and 2) Europe, which had been on the brink of full union, became divided, with a new emphasis on differing national interests, postponing full union for at least a decade, and perhaps much longer. If there were an “Emperor” or a Hari Seldon in the background, those are the kinds of developments that would matter. And regardless of the immediate “causes”, you’d want to sort out who benefits from such developments and how.
As it stands today, “Russia Hand” is a very good book that illuminates events you read and heard about as they unfolded. But Talbott could elevate this work to a classic by adding a final chapter that puts the events he describes so well into a much broader context and considers the long-term trends and consequences, and weighs if and how the actions of individuals, like himself, can matter.
November 30, 2015
A tumultuous stroll through the geopolitical memory lane of most of my high school and college undergrad years guided by Strobe Talbott, translator-editor of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs and (F.O.B.--friend of Bill) Clinton's go-to State Dept man for Russian trouble-shooting.
Any idiot can face a crisis; it is this day-to-day living that wears you out--Anton Chekhov
History is the total of things that could have been avoided--Konrad Adenaur
Clinton on cold war policymakers: "He admired Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman for intuitively understanding what their world required of them, but they got more credit than they deserved for knowing what they were doing when they were doing it. Clinton had been reading biographies of Roosevelt and Truman that convinced him that neither had grand strategies for how to exert American leadership against the global threats posed by Hitler and Stalin. Rather, they had 'powerful instincts about what had to be done, and they just made it up as they went along.'
"Strategic coherence, he said, was largely imposed after the fact by scholars, memoirists and 'the chattering classes.' It was 'a huge myth that we always knew what we were doing during the cold war,' he said. 'The alleged certainty of that period led us to make massive mistakes,' such as letting ourselves get drawn into Vietnam. 'Sure, the cold war was helpful as an organizing principle, but it had its dangers, because every welt on your skin became a cancer.' "
At the farewell/retirement Jan 1999 lunch for outgoing Russian ambassador to the U.S., Yuli Vorontsov, (to Talbott) regarding Russian intransigent defense of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic during the NATO air war in Kosovo: "You know, Strobe, having worked on U.S.-Russian relations for most of my career, including during the Soviet period and the cold war, I must tell you that it is much easier to be your enemy than to be your friend. As your friend, we constantly have to hear you saying to us that we must love all the girls you love and hate all the boys you hate."
Strobe's frustrated take on the political situation in post-Soviet Russian relations: "It was a variation of something we'd been hearing from Russians of different stripes for years: you're dealing with a confused, angry, screwed-up country; don't overplay your strong hand with us; give us a break; otherwise we might do something crazy."
Any idiot can face a crisis; it is this day-to-day living that wears you out--Anton Chekhov
History is the total of things that could have been avoided--Konrad Adenaur
Clinton on cold war policymakers: "He admired Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman for intuitively understanding what their world required of them, but they got more credit than they deserved for knowing what they were doing when they were doing it. Clinton had been reading biographies of Roosevelt and Truman that convinced him that neither had grand strategies for how to exert American leadership against the global threats posed by Hitler and Stalin. Rather, they had 'powerful instincts about what had to be done, and they just made it up as they went along.'
"Strategic coherence, he said, was largely imposed after the fact by scholars, memoirists and 'the chattering classes.' It was 'a huge myth that we always knew what we were doing during the cold war,' he said. 'The alleged certainty of that period led us to make massive mistakes,' such as letting ourselves get drawn into Vietnam. 'Sure, the cold war was helpful as an organizing principle, but it had its dangers, because every welt on your skin became a cancer.' "
At the farewell/retirement Jan 1999 lunch for outgoing Russian ambassador to the U.S., Yuli Vorontsov, (to Talbott) regarding Russian intransigent defense of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic during the NATO air war in Kosovo: "You know, Strobe, having worked on U.S.-Russian relations for most of my career, including during the Soviet period and the cold war, I must tell you that it is much easier to be your enemy than to be your friend. As your friend, we constantly have to hear you saying to us that we must love all the girls you love and hate all the boys you hate."
Strobe's frustrated take on the political situation in post-Soviet Russian relations: "It was a variation of something we'd been hearing from Russians of different stripes for years: you're dealing with a confused, angry, screwed-up country; don't overplay your strong hand with us; give us a break; otherwise we might do something crazy."
December 7, 2007
I'm only reviewing this book so that I can have something with one star to prove that my rating system is not inflated. It also has a bright red spine, so it stood out on the bookshelf as I was looking for books to review.
Strobe Talbott has a very high opinion of himself, which is largely unwarranted. It appears that he has fairly significant substantive understanding of Russia, but no perspective or analytical judgment. He credits the warmth of Russo-American relations in the mid-1990s to the bonhomie of President Clinton (yes, the "Russia hand" is Clinton) and the cheery friendship he enjoyed with Boris Yeltsin. He is also far too apologetic of Yeltsin's bufoonery while simultaneously failing to see that Yeltsin had true political skill in dealing with the U.S.. Talbott fails to consider how the end of the Cold War may have in many ways determined the relationship of the American and Russian leaders, regardless of who they were. He also fails to assess how possible failures of the Clinton years may have lead to the chillier relations the U.S. and Russia are currently experiencing. On the other hand, Talbott has done a good job of creating a platform to show pictures of himself biking with Javier Solana and hanging out with Clinton and other world leaders.
Yes Mr. Talbott, you were there; no, that doesn't automatically make what you have to say interesting.
Strobe Talbott has a very high opinion of himself, which is largely unwarranted. It appears that he has fairly significant substantive understanding of Russia, but no perspective or analytical judgment. He credits the warmth of Russo-American relations in the mid-1990s to the bonhomie of President Clinton (yes, the "Russia hand" is Clinton) and the cheery friendship he enjoyed with Boris Yeltsin. He is also far too apologetic of Yeltsin's bufoonery while simultaneously failing to see that Yeltsin had true political skill in dealing with the U.S.. Talbott fails to consider how the end of the Cold War may have in many ways determined the relationship of the American and Russian leaders, regardless of who they were. He also fails to assess how possible failures of the Clinton years may have lead to the chillier relations the U.S. and Russia are currently experiencing. On the other hand, Talbott has done a good job of creating a platform to show pictures of himself biking with Javier Solana and hanging out with Clinton and other world leaders.
Yes Mr. Talbott, you were there; no, that doesn't automatically make what you have to say interesting.
Read
November 16, 2020"I read the news today, oh boy".
A vivid personal account of one of the most fascinating times in the history of the US-Russia relations, somehow tainted by the author's excessive penchant for namedropping and self-praise. One cannot always be at the right side of events; somehow, Talbott (self righteous as he is) tries to pass himself off as a cultivated savant who ain't got any worthy opponent, and, what's worse, always has to tell EVERYBODY (pour souls, even Mr.President, such a good sport, oh did I mention we jogged a couple of times??) what they should do now. Weary is the head that wears a crown.
The overall impression created by the author's undoubtedly witty and polished style is bittersweet: the desire to justify Clinton's policy as well as his own private shortcomings doesn't bear any close scrutiny compared with the facts. Clinton worrying about Yeltsin's abilities to win in his country? His unwavering faith in Yeltsin's good faith and his ability to lead his country into a brighter future? Please. He had his own country to worry about.
What I personally found thought-provoking is the US' faith in personal channels -- what was passed of as an open exchange between two almost-friends was not perceived as anything more than a temporary exchange with an easily replaceable (and disposable) counterpart. In this respect, it's worth remembering how nobody was able to give Talbott any news on Kozyrev's political after-life (to simply his whereabouts) after he fell from Yeltsin's grace.
Was genuinely surprised to learn that Primakov's legendary U-turn only got two sentences — just enough to briefly mention and discard what constitutes a symbol of a decisive change in Russia's overall foreign policy, a turn from the status of a "junior partner" to the beginning of what now is shaping out to be a multipolar system.
A good opportunity for as, 90s kids, to catch up on history -- but be sure to at least flip through an objective textbook on the subject afterwards -- just in case.
A vivid personal account of one of the most fascinating times in the history of the US-Russia relations, somehow tainted by the author's excessive penchant for namedropping and self-praise. One cannot always be at the right side of events; somehow, Talbott (self righteous as he is) tries to pass himself off as a cultivated savant who ain't got any worthy opponent, and, what's worse, always has to tell EVERYBODY (pour souls, even Mr.President, such a good sport, oh did I mention we jogged a couple of times??) what they should do now. Weary is the head that wears a crown.
The overall impression created by the author's undoubtedly witty and polished style is bittersweet: the desire to justify Clinton's policy as well as his own private shortcomings doesn't bear any close scrutiny compared with the facts. Clinton worrying about Yeltsin's abilities to win in his country? His unwavering faith in Yeltsin's good faith and his ability to lead his country into a brighter future? Please. He had his own country to worry about.
What I personally found thought-provoking is the US' faith in personal channels -- what was passed of as an open exchange between two almost-friends was not perceived as anything more than a temporary exchange with an easily replaceable (and disposable) counterpart. In this respect, it's worth remembering how nobody was able to give Talbott any news on Kozyrev's political after-life (to simply his whereabouts) after he fell from Yeltsin's grace.
Was genuinely surprised to learn that Primakov's legendary U-turn only got two sentences — just enough to briefly mention and discard what constitutes a symbol of a decisive change in Russia's overall foreign policy, a turn from the status of a "junior partner" to the beginning of what now is shaping out to be a multipolar system.
A good opportunity for as, 90s kids, to catch up on history -- but be sure to at least flip through an objective textbook on the subject afterwards -- just in case.
August 10, 2021
A genuinely revelatory memoir and essential to understanding the trajectory of U.S.-Russian relations in the 90s.
Read
February 10, 2022This is a 90% false book
March 15, 2020
A short enjoyable book about the achievements by President Clinton and Russian president Yeltsin. I've always thought that President Clinton did not get enough credit (at least here) for his achievements on the international stage and the respect that other other leaders had for him. President Clinton was able to work on a number of important issues with Russia's president including NATO enlargement, removal of Soviet troops from the Baltic nations and removing nuclear weapons from Ukraine.
One of the things that President Clinton did was allow Yeltsin to act brash in public towards him because he knew that Yeltsin had to "look tough" to the nationalists back home. But in private, Clinton would slowly persuade Yeltsin towards a compromise. The 90s were an interesting time for Russia as it was attempting to change into a modern democracy (although one can argue it did not quite out as expected). Overall, a great book for history lovers.
One of the things that President Clinton did was allow Yeltsin to act brash in public towards him because he knew that Yeltsin had to "look tough" to the nationalists back home. But in private, Clinton would slowly persuade Yeltsin towards a compromise. The 90s were an interesting time for Russia as it was attempting to change into a modern democracy (although one can argue it did not quite out as expected). Overall, a great book for history lovers.
August 11, 2008
I understand that book is or was going to be released in Russia/Europe as "Boris and Bill". Frankly that might have been a more appropriate title overall. :-)
I would be interested in hearing S. Talbot's response to recent allegations/observations that while not disclosing anything of a secure nature, Talbott's close personal diplomatic ties with the Russians were exploited during the Kosovo crisis to get info on the planning/approach of the administration in dealing with a potential powderkey with the Russians in that operation.
Still a very good read ... at least from the administration's point of view of the Clinton/Yeltsin relationship.
I would be interested in hearing S. Talbot's response to recent allegations/observations that while not disclosing anything of a secure nature, Talbott's close personal diplomatic ties with the Russians were exploited during the Kosovo crisis to get info on the planning/approach of the administration in dealing with a potential powderkey with the Russians in that operation.
Still a very good read ... at least from the administration's point of view of the Clinton/Yeltsin relationship.
March 15, 2012
Honestly, I didn't finish this book. Actually, I heavily skimmed this book. But after a chapter or two of careful reading you get the idea of the entire book (granted I guess I can't say that with any legitimacy of knowing). It's very in depth and definitely shows the personalities of Clinton and Yeltsin, which is really interesting. But the whole book is basically how the two of them worked together through various problems through the years at the helm to make Russia something functioning. Good book if you are into that kinda thing.
August 24, 2007
Go behind the scenes to some of the most influential decisions in the history of US-Russian relations. A rare first hand look at political brokering, back office negotiating and some hilarious stories.
January 8, 2008
A must read!...Strobe Talbot takes you inside the infancy of Bill Clinton's White House in 1992, and how they struggled to become foreign policy masters, especially with regards to Russia. You will be amazed to learn how Russia's current leaders came into their positions.
January 4, 2011
I love reading behind-the-scenes accounts of historical events. It's the voyeur in me, probably. This is an interesting look at Clinton's relationship with Yeltsin and how the Russian need to constantly "save face" plays out at the highest level.
June 7, 2009
I enjoyed getting a policy maker's inside prespective of the U.S.'s Cold War Diplomacy
November 25, 2012
I don't know much about foreign policy between USA and Russia, but after reading this book, I wanted to find out more. It was an easy read.
February 2, 2025
Bill Clinton ):
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