John Maynard Keynes published “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” in 1936. Keynes's work has had more influence on modern macroeconomics than any other. It continues to shape economic discussions by the media and policies implemented by the Fed and elected officials. Full disclosure: I haven’t read Keynes’s General Theory. From what I understand, his main argument was a direct assault on classical economics. Keynes argues that unemployment arises from insufficient aggregate demand (and not an artificially high price of labor as classical economists posit). To achieve full employment, the government can and should work to increase demand. This can be accomplished through monetary policy (the Fed lowering interest rates to spur borrowing and investment) and fiscal policy (the government increasing expenditures on public works projects, welfare, warfare, etc.). Keynes coined a term called the “multiplier,” which is basically a measure of the amount of increased aggregate demand that an additional dollar of spending creates. The idea is that the U.S. government can spend $100 and create additional GDP of $150 because the money will percolate through the economy and spur productive activity. Keynes also argues that he has solved the problem of booms and busts. He can give us a perpetual boom by the government keeping interest rates below where they would be in a free market. He says, “The Remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but a lower rate of interest! For that may enable the boom to last. The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom.”
Henry Hazlitt was a classical economist, who, here, ruthlessly dismantles Keynes’s magnum opus. HH asserts that Keynes’s work was so widely regarded for a couple of reasons. First, it was opaque and convoluted, so few people could both understand it and had the courage to challenge it. Second, it played into the proclivities of the people in power: politicians loved the idea of being able to spend more, and big business was close enough to those politicians to benefit themselves. The most recent financial crisis seems to bear this out. Look at the benefits recently bestowed upon GM, Chrysler, Wall Street banks, and Fannie and Freddie.
HH says Keynes has it all wrong. There is no multiplier, and government dictating the price of money (i.e., the interest rates) creates booms and busts--or at least greatly magnifies them. Moreover, keeping interest rates low discourages saving, which is the prerequisite to capital accumulation and an increased standard of living. There are no free lunches. You can’t magically wave away scarcity of capital through currency manipulation. Inflation is a bad thing that harms consumers, and it necessarily results from low interest rates or printing money.
To criticize Keynes’s faulty reasoning and reveal his numerous errors, Hazlitt analyzes Keynes’s General Theory chapter by chapter, and sometimes line by line. Because the General Theory is technical and inaccessible, The Failure of the New Economics often follows suit. My mind wandered, and I will not remember the specific arguments going forward. Towards the end of the book, however, HH has provided a nice summary of each of the chapters, and I will provide some of the quotes below.
The book reminded me of a conversation with my mother I had long ago. One of my earliest memories is a ride in the backseat of my mom’s 1988 Honda Accord. It was sometime around 1990 and I was about 5 years old. The image is foggy. But I can see the car has a silver exterior and dark brown interior. We are headed north to school. My mom hands me two quarters, which I could use after school to get a fistful of candy (Skittles, Runts, or M&Ms) and a coke. I am very pleased with these two quarters. I understand from experience that they will be converted into tasty treats later in the day.
Suddenly, a question strikes me. The two pieces of silver metal in my hands contain some mysterious, almost magical power that makes me very happy. I wonder where they come from and why can’t there be more of them. I decide to ask.
Me: Mom, where does money come from?
Mom: I get money from working at the hospital.
Me: Where does the hospital get money?
Mom: From patients.
Me: Where do patients get money?
Mom: From their jobs.
Me: But where do these coins and dollars come from?
Mom: They come from the government. The government makes them.
Me: Well, why doesn’t the government just make a whole bunch of them and give them to everyone so everyone can get as much stuff as they want?
That’s where my memory ends. I don’t remember the rest because I didn’t understand my mom’s answer. My mother must have provided some explanation that the metal coins and paper bills were merely representations of things that people really wanted, like Skittles and coke. We couldn’t eat the metal and paper. She must have told me that merely printing more paper dollars would not actually make more Skittles. This was too confusing and abstract for my young mind to handle. In my mind, the value of money and the value of goods were identical.
In that memory, I am to Keynes as my mom is to Hazlitt.
Memorable quotes:
“Though Keynes has been praised as the peer of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and even Darwin, not a single important doctrine in his work is both true and original.”
“Keynes did not succeed in refuting Say’s Law of Markets. His attempted refutation consisted merely in ignoring the qualifications that the classical economists themselves insisted on as an integral part of the doctrine.”
“Keynes’s thought is honeycombed with contradictions. His central idea of an equilibrium with unemployment is self-contradictory by the very concept and definition of equilibrium.”
“Keynes’s definitions of his key terms—Income, Saving, and Investment—are merely circular; they are all defined in terms of each other. He so defines Saving and Investment that they are not only necessarily equal, but identical. He repudiates and apologizes for his ‘confusing’ definitions of these same terms as given in his Treatise on Money, but absent-mindedly returns to these old definitions in his subsequent discussion, particularly when he tries to prove that investment increases employment and that saving reduces it. Keynes treated saving with contempt as far back as The Consequences of the Peace, in 1919. His General Theory was merely his last rationalization of that contempt.”
“Keynes’s investment ‘multiplier’ is a myth. There is never any fixed, predictable ‘multiplier’; there is never any precise, predeterminable, or mechanical relationship between social income, consumption, investment, and extent of employment. An ‘equilibrium with unemployment’ is a contradiction in terms.”
“Keynes’s arguments against ‘liquidity’ and against ‘speculation’ are untenable. Speculative anticipations and risks are necessarily involved in all economic activity. Somebody must bear them. What Keynes is saying is that people cannot be trusted to invest the money they have themselves earned, and that this money should be seized from them by government officials and spent or ‘invested’ in the directions in which those officials (seeking to hold on to political power) deem best.”
“Inflation is at once an uncertain remedy for unemployment, an unnecessary remedy for unemployment, and a dangerous remedy for unemployment.”
“Keynes’s ‘system,’ as he came to recognize at the end of the General Theory, was actually a reversion to the naïve and discredited theories of the mercantilists and underconsumption theorists, from Mandeville and Malthus to Hobson. It was also a reversion to all the inflationist theories of the currency cranks, from John Law to Silvio Gesell.”
“Keynes’s proposals for the ‘euthanasia of the rentier, of the functionless investor,’ were proposals to rob the productive and expropriate their savings. Keynes’s plan for the ‘socialization of investment’ would inevitably entail socialism and state planning. Seriously carried out, it would remove any significant field for the exercise of private initiative and responsibility. Keynes, in brief, recommended de facto socialism under the guise of ‘reforming’ and ‘preserving’ capitalism. ‘Domestic laissez faire and an international gold standard,’ blamed by Keynes as among the ‘economic causes of war,’ were, in fact, powerful forces for peace and international cooperation. It is the national planning policies recommended by Keynes that would tend to provoke wars.”
“Now though I have analyzed Keynes’s General Theory in the following pages theorem by theorem, chapter by chapter, and sometimes even sentence by sentence, to what to some readers may appear a tedious length, I have been unable to find in it a single important doctrine that is both true and original. What is original in the book is not true; and what is true is not original.”
“I have found in Keynes’s General Theory an incredible number of fallacies, inconsistencies, vaguenesses, shifting definitions and usages of words, and plain errors of fact. My desire for thoroughness in pointing these out has carried the length of this book much beyond what I originally intended.”
“The whole of the General Theory might be described as an exercise in obfuscation, and the obfuscation begins at an early point.”
“The ‘virtue’ of Keynes’s teaching is that it praised thriftlessness, reckless spending, and unbalanced budgets and was therefore extremely palatable to the politicians in power.”